

THE LIFE OF REASON

INTRODUCTION AND REASON IN COMMON SENSE

Critical Edition

Co-edited by
Marianne S. Wokeck and Martin A. Coleman
with an Introduction by James Gouinlock

Volume VII, Book One
THE WORKS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA


George Santayana

The Works of George Santayana

VOLUME VII, BOOK ONE

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THE LIFE OF REASON

OR THE

PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS

BY

GEORGE SANTAYANA

INTRODUCTION

AND

REASON IN COMMON SENSE

ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή

Volume VII, Book One

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Critical Edition

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The Santayana Edition

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GEORGE SANTAYANA: *THE LIFE OF REASON*

AN INTRODUCTION
BY JAMES GOUINLOCK

Santayana's *Life of Reason*, published in five volumes, 1905–6, is one of the greatest works in modern philosophical naturalism. It proved to be a major stimulus to the revitalization of philosophy in America, and its value continues today. There is no canonical definition of “philosophical naturalism,” but a workable understanding of the idea is indispensable to an appreciation of Santayana’s achievement. The meanings of naturalism cluster around a certain nucleus, which might seem innocent enough but in historical fact is radical. The core idea is this: Any philosophy that would bring clarity and resource to human existence and fructify its meanings must steadily engage the pervasive realities of experience. These realities, and not the works of philosophers, are the fundamental subject matter. When the substance of experience is ignored or denied, philosophy subsides into academic pretense. The ultimate good of the naturalist is to bring intelligibility to the practical and intellectual strivings of humanity in the context of the nature of things—as Santayana will do with reason itself and with society, religion, art, science, and the moral life. The examination of nature and its issue must be candid, without unwarranted additions or subtractions. It must exercise intellectual honesty and rigor throughout its inquiries and in the formation of theories.¹

One might suppose that any philosophy intends this, but in fact its occurrence is a rarity. Very few philosophers have proven capable of “free and disillusioned” thought. There has not been such a one since Spinoza, Santayana declared, judging him the only true philosophic

¹See *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, edited by Yervant Krikorian (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), for a selection of essays that explore the distinguishing features of naturalism.

mind of the modern era. The aim of a philosopher is typically something else: apologetics, the elaboration of antecedently preferred theories, or following a line of thought that would prescribe the nature of reality rather than seek its comprehension. If the urgencies of experience should interrupt these exercises, so much the worse for experience. It has been characteristic of philosophers to deny or to obscure the very features of experience and nature that life most depends upon. At the same time, such thinkers have invented one cosmos after another that suits their personal sensibilities. Naturalists are sensitive to these failings and wary of the propensity of philosophy to turn in upon itself and away from the world. Even with the world ostensibly in mind, the typical practice, Santayana complains, is for the philosopher to begin his reflections with fatal oversimplifications, making the inquiry vain. As he puts it in the Preface to *Scepticism and Animal Faith*: “I think that common sense, in a rough dogged way, is technically sounder than the special schools of philosophy, each of which squints and overlooks half the facts and half the difficulties in its eagerness to find in some detail the key to the whole.”²

The condition of philosophy during Santayana’s formative years, the late nineteenth century, is exhibit “A” in the account of the mystifications that philosophy is commonly drawn into. A prime avenue, then, to a grasp of the merits of philosophical naturalism and hence to a recognition of Santayana’s significance is by way of a summary of what was in fact the crisis in philosophy at that time.

Thanks principally to the legacy of Descartes, the sum of all reality was thought to be wholly compartmentalized—so much so, indeed, that the universally observed continuities between these “compartments” were unintelligible. Nature, according to Cartesianism, is nothing but matter in motion; it has no qualitative properties and is without potentiality for them. Hence it possesses none of the features that otherwise seem inseparable from our persistent life activity. The events we characterize as good and evil, beautiful and ugly, disordered and conflicted—the entire array of qualities that delight and confound our lives—all give way to the eternal night of matter in motion. Juxtaposed to nature is mind, which is an independent substance in its own right, and it shares none of the characteristics of matter, including those of the body. Given the radical exclusion of experience from nature, all

² *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (New York: Scribner’s, 1923), v.

experience must occur *within* mind: We do not experience natural events, but only the contents of our own subjectivity. Experience, accordingly, cannot be regarded as evidential of events of a putative outer world. The common sense and natural science of ordinary life are alike reduced to mysteries, for the normal procedure of verifying assertions about worldly events by reference to those self-same events is impossible on the assumptions of modern philosophy. Worse still, the social world itself, in all its varieties, hazards, and satisfactions, is likewise inaccessible to experience: If we hold to modern theories, we must confess that for each individual, his own experience is a state of solitary confinement—without an exit and without access to any alleged reality beyond. To express it with another image: each and every person is a perpetual somnambulist. Compartmentalization seems to have reached its limit; but the nature of all experience, in addition, was believed to be wholly pulverized: an aggregate of inherently unrelated atoms of sensation. The elaborate formations, varieties, depths, and sequences of experience are nothing more than concoctions of subjective mind, representing nothing.

In the usual course of events, moreover, we humans typically investigate the opportunities and pitfalls that the natural world—above all, the social world—presents to us; and we study the complexities, obstacles, and fulfillments that these processes might bring about. There might even be ideal goods within our reach. We might suppose that the study and practice of life in typical circumstances might yield codes of conduct that would help to preserve community life with some hope of harmony and happiness and perhaps even distinction. Such study might help to identify life-affirming goods; but the modern philosopher tells us that things are not what we suppose and leaves us helpless to contend with the realities which in truth determine our fate. In such conditions, where can there be a guide to life? Values cannot be conceived as either natural or interpersonal events. In Santayana's judgment, the explicit guides formulated by philosophers are but inventions, prompted by the ordinary experience that the philosopher will not acknowledge. The life of reason, in contrast, must be predicated on the most conscientious apprehension of the true state of the human condition.

Not surprisingly, a worldview so confounded as this called forth many attempts to solve its intrinsic puzzles. Philosophic idealism was one of the most notable responses to the impotent Cartesian philoso-

phy. By arguing for the identity of thought and being, the idealists intended to negate the mind/nature dualism. In place of the perfectly fragmented reality of modern philosophy, they asserted the unity of all things. Each event in the universe, however insignificant, contributes to the determination of everything else; and each such event is itself determined by the totality of all else in existence—the conflicts and independent processes of the natural world notwithstanding. This alleged unity is constituted by the thinking of the Absolute Mind, itself a divine and perfect unity. By this way of thought, the disorders and consternations of the natural world are a mere seeming; they are appearance and no more. Likewise, processes that seem to function independently of each other—as the wheat harvest in Kansas, for example, is brought in without reference to the curriculum at Harvard College—are really inseparable parts of what William James disparagingly called “the block-universe.”³ Worst of all, the inherent logic of idealism required the denial of evil. All things are part of the divine perfection; so evil must be unreal. It, too, is mere appearance.

Such is a sampling of the bafflements produced by modern philosophy. Much ingenuity was devoted to trying to manipulate theories to make them at least compatible with living reality, if not to be an actual resource for the conduct of life. A few philosophers, most notably Santayana, recognized that the real problems lay in the implicit presuppositions that led to the obfuscations of experience in the first place, but they did not suppose that it is self-evident what the better theory or theories would be. In any case, philosophical naturalism does not covet assumptions or theories that make life and thought less clear and coherent; yet it is not a question-begging procedure. It is more a standpoint for undertaking philosophic inquiry than a set of assumptions about what the ultimate content of a philosophy must be. It does not, for example, suppose *a priori* that there are no supernatural existences. If there are gods of some sort, let us so determine by intellectually responsible procedures and ascertain their respective natures and powers and their dispositions toward mortals. Then we might honestly consider their bearing on human existence in the full

³This expression and variations of it occur several times in the James essay “The Dilemma of Determinism” (*The Works of William James: The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, edited by Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis [Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1979], 114–40).

panoply of all natures within our ken.⁴ Most naturalists, including Santayana, have in fact been atheists. This uniformity is a result, evidently, of their insistence on experimentally verifiable evidence for any sort of belief. Faith, authority, or presumption are unacceptable. Accordingly, the identification of naturalism with atheism is generally warranted. For the naturalist, just the same, atheism does not necessarily bring an irreligious conception of existence. Santayana showed how one can have “a religious acceptance of the world” while remaining steadfastly naturalistic. The way is shown above all in Volume III of *The Life of Reason, Reason in Religion*.

He repeatedly notes that philosophers seem compelled both to underpopulate and overpopulate the universe. The denial of nature’s most conspicuous qualities is underpopulation, as is the denial of evil; while stocking reality with transcendent moral imperatives and Absolute Minds—or Platonic forms and final causes—is overpopulating. The claim that nature is without qualitative characteristics is not supported by any intersubjectively testable experience. It is an idea promulgated by the requirements of certain postulates in a philosophical system. In this case, it is principally a product of the (unexamined) belief that the really real is changeless.⁵ When philosophers have declared that nature has no qualitative properties, and yet we are submerged in them and can manipulate their occurrence by interceding in natural processes, the naturalist rejects the reduction to nothing but matter in motion. Or, when the rationalist has defined knowledge to be indubitable, then he must insist that the flood of scientific information is not knowledge, and he flirts with a wholesale skepticism. The naturalist, in contrast, asks: “What is the nature of science such that it is so productive of verifiable evidence about our natural environment?” and “What does the nature of science portend for the nature of nature?” When it is likewise said that mind and nature are utterly

⁴Santayana argues that supernaturalism and even infra-naturalism are compatible with naturalism. There is allegedly much traffic, with major consequences, between these realms; and so far as we can determine what is really happening, we have simply established an enlarged naturalism. See *The Genteel Tradition at Bay* (New York: Scribner’s, London: “The Adelphi,” 1931), 20–21.

⁵Inasmuch as objects of experience change, they cannot, in Descartes’ mind, be objectively real. Since he cannot deny that experience *somehow* exists, he simply deposits it all in somnambulistic mind. Derivative of this fundamental idea of the changeless is the reductive conception of science: In the examination of physical events, science takes no note of immediate qualities. In not being a subject matter of science, qualities must be unreal and hence subjective.

separate and have no conceivable interconnection, much less a union, the naturalist becomes suspicious of the conceptions in question, and he looks for continuity to replace dualism. Or, if no one has actually experienced the utter discontinuity and pulverization of experience postulated by the reductionists and dualists, then the naturalist does not wring his hands in solipsistic despair. He revises his conception of experience in accordance with common life. In the same manner, the idea that evil is unreal is supported by no verifiable evidence. The idea is demanded because of (an indefensible) theory about the nature of the Absolute and reinforced by religious sentimentality.

One can be a naturalist, to be sure, or contribute to philosophical naturalism in a limited way, without producing the inclusive philosophy in the manner of Santayana or, later, John Dewey. In addition, one can have much the same integrity of aim as a naturalist and still produce works that do not satisfy the naturalistic tests. Such works occur, Santayana supposes, because a philosopher has become bogged down in the obsessions of the academic milieu and/or lacks the imagination to surpass his captivity to currently favored assumptions.

Today, the philosophy of Aristotle is regarded as the *locus classicus* of naturalism, and Santayana's rediscovery of him turned out to be the main impetus to philosophic renewal. But the Aristotle understood by Santayana was not the Aristotle propounded in the universities of America more than a century ago. In those precincts, Aristotle was read through the lenses of the Absolute, and he was taken to be an idealist and proto-Christian.⁶ In his student days, Santayana reports, he "knew little of the Greeks," for at Harvard "the philosophical and political departments had not yet discovered Plato and Aristotle."⁷ He remedied this deficit first during a student fellowship at Berlin, where Paulsen expounded "Greek ethics with a sweet reasonableness," and later in systematic study at Trinity College, Cambridge, under the tutelage of Dr. Henry Jackson. Santayana found in Greek thinkers a celebration of knowledge, beauty, and ideal life within the order of the

⁶John P. Anton's *American Naturalism and Greek Philosophy* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2005) is a splendid source of information about the reception of Aristotle in America. According to Anton's research, Santayana is the pivotal figure in this reception.

⁷George Santayana, "A Brief History of My Opinions," in *Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements*, edited by George P. Adams and William Montague (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 249.

natural world, and he was enchanted. “[T]he composition of *The Life of Reason*,” he tells us, “was the consequence.”⁸

Leading the way for those seeking a philosophy to supplant the compartmentalized view of things, Santayana will contend that all the distinctive functions and reaches of human nature are outcomes of the biological creature engaging its natural environment; and he will urge, in fact, that the possibilities of ideal life resident in these activities can be more fully recognized, estimated, and achieved when they are identified in their natural continuities. One of the most liberating comments in *The Life of Reason* is this declaration in volume I: “In Aristotle the conception of human nature is perfectly sound; everything ideal has a natural basis and everything natural an ideal development.”⁹ This principle of continuity is not confined to human nature. It pertains to every process in the life of reason, wherein human powers combine with natural events to produce ideal fulfillments. “Nature is a perfect garden of ideals...”¹⁰ Except for the contemplative life (always the supreme good for Santayana himself), it is a life of overt action: specifically, a life of art, as Santayana will explain in volume IV, *Reason in Art*.

The magnitude and promise of the change that Santayana launched are extraordinary. Modern philosophy had been compelled to regard nature as a realm apart, while experience was transported into solipsistic subjectivity, in which nature had no conceivable role. A philosopher was to regard nature as nothing but materiality *per se*, without potentiality. Now, with Santayana, there are not two utterly distinct provinces of being, but one inclusive subject matter. He has thrown open the gateway of experience to the teeming potentialities of nature, in all their forms and possibilities, which may now be coherently and productively studied for their bearings on human weal and woe.¹¹

⁸“A Brief History,” 249.

⁹*Reason in Common Sense*, volume I of *The Life of Reason* (New York: Scribner’s, 1905), 21.

¹⁰*Common Sense*, 282.

¹¹In the words of John Herman Randall, Jr., in leading philosophers out of the deserts of modern philosophy, Santayana is “the Moses of the new naturalism” (Randall, “The Nature of Naturalism,” in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit* [op. cit.], 363).



The Introduction to the five volumes begins with some brief remarks about the rudiments of the life of reason. It is actuated by instincts enlightened by ideas, not by either alone. “Man’s rational life consists in those moments in which reflection not only occurs but proves efficacious.”¹² The meaning of the life of reason is progressively developed throughout the five volumes. The coordinate tasks of reason and impulse are treated repeatedly in these texts, not without some obscurity, but the general position will be made clear in reference to subsequent discussions.

The remainder of his Introduction is devoted to two themes: Santayana’s reasons for undertaking the project, and suggestions of radical revisions in basic philosophies of nature. He has almost unlimited praise for Plato and Aristotle in their accounts of the life of reason, and he believes neither of them will ever be equaled. Why then should Santayana take up the subject? More than two millennia have passed since Aristotle, witnessing remarkable new influences in religion, philosophy, politics, science, and the arts. In his own day, Santayana says, the very idea of the life of reason has been forgotten; so it is time to resurrect it in more contemporary terms. Moreover, Plato has no physics, and Aristotle has a basically flawed physics.¹³ Platonic forms are a manifestly poetical explanation of the natural world, and Aristotle’s final causes are an invention to give cosmic support to moral ideals. Both the forms and final causes illustrate the constant temptation to offer mythical accounts of phenomena that can be most justly supported on their own terms. The merit of moral virtue, for example, is found in the order that it gives to the soul and in its indispensable offices in the conduct of life, not in the supposed fact that excellence in human nature is underwritten by the Form of the Good or by an alleged final cause.

The remedy for bad physics is found, in essence, in two other ancient thinkers: Heraclitus and Democritus. Heraclitus’s physics declares that incessant change, including all immediate qualities, comprises the totality of nature. The Heraclitean conception of the imme-

¹² *Common Sense*, 2.

¹³ Santayana uses “physics” in the same sense that Aristotle had: the science of the nature of nature.

mediate must be retained, but Descartes stands in the way. “[W]e need but to rescind the artificial division which Descartes has taught us to make between nature and life, to feel again the absolute aptness of Heraclitus’s expressions.”¹⁴ Heraclitus was also reductive, for he took the immediate to be the whole of being. His position must be combined with the material atomism of Democritus, who taught that invariable laws of mechanical sequence govern all things. Democritus, however, was also a reductionist, for he denied the immediate. Santayana sees no inescapable contradiction between the two, because the incessantly bombarding atoms are of different sizes and shapes; and they collide, rebound, and unite in different combinations and directions, giving rise to the bewildering array of events given in immediacy. Still, every movement and outcome is explicable in terms of mechanical law.



The main task of volume I, *Reason in Common Sense*, is to provide an account of how the human animal develops instinct, passion, and chaotic experience into rationality and ideal life. For Descartes and his successors, reason is a self-existent given, a surd, not a function of inclusive and extensive processes. Inspired by the (largely) biological psychology of Aristotle’s *De Anima*, Darwin’s evolutionary theory, and James’s *The Principles of Psychology*, Santayana contends that the requirements of action in a hazardous and uncertain environment are the source of the development of mind in *homo sapiens*. More specifically, instinct and imagination are crucial to the emergence of reason from out of chaos. There is chaos in animal surroundings and in the most primitive experience of the organism.¹⁵ In this situation, he says, imagination produces innumerable ideas about what might be going on in the immediate world, and one or more of these ideas might turn out to be true. Its truth is assured when an instinct would be satisfied in an imagined action, and then it *is* satisfied in overt action. If one imagines that a given object might satisfy hunger and the object really does so, then the idea is confirmed; if not, not. In its rudiments, reason

¹⁴ *Common Sense*, 15.

¹⁵ The chaos is often called “a dream” or “dreamlike,” and it is often the norm, according to Santayana, for much of the experience of waking life in rational people.

is successful imagination, and it becomes sophisticated with practice, led on by the imperative to satisfy instincts and impulses.¹⁶ Still, it is a tenuous development, of several stages, which Santayana expounds in some detail; and it is never highly successful. “The intelligent man known to history flourishes within a dullard and holds a lunatic in leash.... Only the routine and equilibrium which healthy instinct involves keep thought and will at all within the limits of sanity.”¹⁷

This line of thought from a century ago might seem quaint today in some respects, but regardless of that, it is highly significant and probably true in its main import. The basic strategy of understanding human mentality in terms of an active creature in a perilous environment has proven highly productive in subsequent inquiry. In addition, reason in Santayana’s sobering account is in glaring contrast to the self-sufficient and infallible power postulated by the major figures of the Enlightenment, such as Descartes or Kant. Santayana was wary regarding the powers of intelligence to effect a radical reordering of the environment, especially its social forms. Customs and traditions proven in historical experience are more reliable guides. Finally, whether imagination (with instinct) was or was not at the founding of reason, it would still play a paramount role in the life of reason. Imagination is the creative resource of all great achievement, he contends in these volumes, and it is essential to an understanding of all cultural phenomena. One can neither comprehend, nor interpret, nor evaluate the meaning of Homer, Plato, the Holy Bible, the history of the Jews, Protestantism, the reign of Louis XIV, or anything else without imaginative power. A passing parade of pieces of information, as such, is neither an integrated nor intelligible whole. To entertain meaningful ideas and to examine them to any coherent use requires active thought. Santayana typically speaks of his exposure to religions, arts, and ideas as presentations to his imagination, and he thought of *The Life of Reason* as “a history of the human imagination.”¹⁸

Imagination is highly inventive. It breaks the hold of artistic fixation, intellectual dogma, and political rigidity; but Santayana will never countenance inventiveness for its own sake. Imagination must be disciplined, he insists, whether by reflection, knowledge, or experi-

¹⁶ Santayana seems to use these two terms interchangeably.

¹⁷ *Common Sense*, 50–51.

¹⁸ “A Brief History of My Opinions,” 249.

ence; and it must be the bearer of responsible teachings about the human predicament. To praise the imagination, accordingly, is by no means to endorse irrationalism or the propagation of idle fictions.

His recognition of imagination is one more of the striking ways in which Santayana separates himself from the typical thought of his time. Volume I contains extensive critiques of various philosophies of mind conspicuous in the modern day, especially those of Kant and the British empiricists. There are some especially inviting observations about the life of reason in later chapters, IX and XI in particular, but a full discussion of the nature of the ideal is still in abeyance.

A remarkable array of issues and analyses awaits the reader in the succeeding volumes. They will prove more manageable if given a fuller context at this point. Greek in inspiration, Santayana's is an ideal of the fulfillment and unification of human nature. Indeed, it aims at a harmony within the soul and with all the conditions upon which the life of the soul depends. Santayana often speaks of it as a harmony of instincts or impulses, but we should be aware that instincts become definite practices and skills. "Arts are instincts bred and reared in the open, creative habits acquired in the light of reason."¹⁹ The full range of activities and pursuits are developments of impulse and continue to be actuated by impulse. These arts are capable both of ideal fulfillment and harmonization with other goods. They are necessarily ordered in some manner of hierarchy: one cannot be equally devoted to all possible fulfillments. For any individual there is a highest good—the ideal activity that most fully satisfies his inmost love—and other goods are ordered in relation to this utmost good. The ideal requires renunciations, renunciations of impulses and desires incompatible with harmony; but this is not a renunciation of animal nature *per se*. All interests and activities have their roots in instinct; so the life of reason is a fulfillment, not a denial, of the natural animal. The normal human repertoire of instincts includes those that in time become specifically moral impulses and behavior. To be sure, different forms of life, different institutions, varying lessons of experience, teachings, and reflection will shape and refine such impulses and strengthen them.

¹⁹ *Reason in Art*, volume IV in *The Life of Reason* (New York: Scribner's, 1905), 5.

Reason presides over this process neither as master nor motive force but as informant and liberator.²⁰ Santayana refers to reason as an “observer” who “plays the most important and beneficent part” in human judgment because it surveys the intricate scene of conduct and its potentialities.²¹ Motivation is an affective state, which reason in and of itself cannot provide. One is motivated by recognized attractions and repulsions within the scope of his experience, memory, and imagination. But for the use of imagination and reason, he is unable to perceive these enticements and menaces as they are distributed, inter-related, and altered in space and time, or as they might be reconstructed and ordered; so reason is a guide to the potentialities of life far beyond the powers of brute instinct. One affect is subordinated to another in consequence of our having a greater passion for one thing than another, but impulse can make no discrimination between possibilities of which it is ignorant. Love of the ideal, in the course of events, might be strong enough to surpass the temptation to the mediocre or base, and the happiness of ideal life might be so great that the very temptations become extinguished.

“Ideal” suggests “greatly fulfilling,” perhaps “perfect,” “rare,” or “consummating an ordered process.” Santayana’s usage accommodates these meanings, but he typically has in mind specifically the Greek idea of something that we seek and enjoy for its own sake.²² In the experience of intrinsic goods, there are no further potentialities to strive for and fulfill; life is fully actual, happiness complete and untroubled. These ideal ends he calls “liberal,” “free,” or “ultimate.” Ordered in harmony with the goods intrinsic to the rational formation of self, activities of liberal value might be pursued and consummated in the life of reason.²³

²⁰ In his typically figurative language, Santayana frequently speaks of reason as direct motivator and commander, but there is no doctrinal evidence to support a literal reading. He does not have a Kantian conception of reason.

²¹ *Common Sense*, 265.

²² In addition to these normative or laudatory meanings, Santayana also uses “ideal” in a descriptive sense: to refer to any exclusively mental activity—that is, any activity carried on within the imagination. Unhappily, the context does not always make clear which sense is intended.

²³ Santayana does not mean that ideal ends must be without further efficacy. Almost any kind of experience will have a specific bearing on further experiences. He will say in *Reason in Society*, for example, that marriage and the nurturing of children are capable of ideal fulfillment, while recognizing that these activities are at the same time beneficial for parents, children, and community.

Santayana typically makes a sharp, and pejorative, distinction between means and ends. It is a distinction that Dewey will rightly deplore, but Santayana has a point just the same. He draws our attention to forms of experience that are intrinsically precious, and which emancipate us for a time from the bare necessities of the world. But these experiences are rarely known. More specifically, for example, he was markedly unhappy with the culture of modernity, in which America was particularly embedded; a culture, it seemed to him, occupied with nothing but instrumentalities: getting and spending, doing business, consuming, struggling, competing, accumulating, trying to get ahead. All this mania crowded out the truly liberal arts and loves and made the life of reason not only inaccessible but beyond normal comprehension.

There are significant deviations from the Greek ideal. Plato and Aristotle spoke of a single well-defined form of perfection for all human beings: the full actualization of moral and intellectual virtue. The inmost, most cherished, love that individuals will have, however, admits of considerable variation. In regard to ideal goods, Santayana is decidedly a pluralist. "There is no ideal *à priori*; an ideal can but express, if it is genuine, the balance of impulses and potentialities in a given soul."²⁴ The focus on virtue is a most important difference between Santayana and the original philosophers of the life of reason. As the latter saw it, virtue is the key to the unification and happiness of the soul and it is the *sine qua non* of the orderly and morally vigorous society. For Aristotle, if not for Plato, one is unable to deliberate and choose wisely without the activity of moral virtue. Santayana, on the other hand—at least as compared to his great forebears—tends to marginalize virtue. He speaks more of modification and harmonization of desires than of their development into an excellence, as Aristotle had done. Santayana might well contend that an actual life of reason would possess the functional equivalent of virtue; and he occasionally expands his notion of reason to accommodate moral demands, sounding almost like Kant at times. In light of his naturalistic analysis of reason, however, it is problematic whether this expansion is credible.

Were Santayana to have addressed such concerns directly, he would have had to formulate somewhere in these volumes a philosophy of education. He often speaks with great pertinence of the kinds

²⁴ *Art*, 181.

of personal change that are requisite to the life of reason and to a decent society, and he mentions in passing—sometimes eloquently—a variety of social antecedents to ideal life; but he has only an assortment of suggestions regarding what it is about these agents and patients such that they are efficacious in bringing about desired changes. The question is, How do moral learning and development occur? How do individuals learn to be morally observant and responsible? How do they become a harmonious whole? By observation and reflection? By learning from unforgiving experience? By participation in social action? Parental teaching? From the ambience cast by sacred institutions and traditions? None of these possibilities is developed. At least a sketch of a philosophy of education would be a welcome addition.

A final comment before turning to discussions in the remaining volumes: Santayana was a splendid naturalist, yet *The Life of Reason* says less about the nature of nature than it might have. He acknowledges as much, saying there is a difference in emphasis between his earlier and later works.²⁵ The emphasis on nature in the later works, however, is on the realms of being, as he called them: essence, matter, truth, and spirit; and these are not beings of a sort to give *particular* illumination to the life of reason. In *The Life of Reason*, Santayana makes the general distinction, noted earlier, between the immediate and matter governed by law, which together constitute a seamless whole. Twenty years later, the only rival to the greatness of *The Life of Reason* in twentieth-century naturalism was published: *Experience and Nature* (1925), by John Dewey. Dewey distinguishes five principal traits of nature: the stable, the precarious, qualities, ends, and histories. The elaboration of these traits gives intelligibility to moral experience as a natural function, and it discloses their direct pertinence to moral thought and practice.²⁶ In terms of almost random suggestions that Santayana makes about the nature of nature throughout *The Life of Reason*, he could, in fact, accommodate Dewey's naturalistic distinctions, or something very like them, by making more distinctions himself. He needn't have done so just as Dewey did, to be sure; but if he had been more systematic in thinking about salient and fateful traits of

²⁵ Preface to the second edition of *The Life of Reason* (New York: Scribner's, 1922), v.

²⁶ For a fuller analysis of the ways in which knowledge of nature enlightens moral aspiration and conduct, see my *Eros and the Good: Wisdom According to Nature* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2004).

nature, he could have presented the stunning ideas of *The Life of Reason* within a fuller and more articulated conception of nature.²⁷ Some of Santayana's most noteworthy observations pertinent to the nature of nature will be remarked upon in due course.



Reason in Society, the second of the five volumes, is not a work in political philosophy, although it has an indispensable pertinence to that discipline. It is an analysis of several distinctive forms of human association, from the political order to various forms of friendship, to determine what possibilities they provide for the life of reason. At the same time, Santayana considers how these various forms can be corrupting or destructive of ideal life. The evaluation of associations begins with a chapter on love. Love of the ideal originates in animal love. The Aristotelian principle of continuity finds sparkling expression: "For love is a brilliant illustration of a principle everywhere discoverable: namely, that human reason lives by turning the friction of material forces into the light of ideal goods."²⁸ Clearly the student of Plato's *Symposium*, Santayana speaks of our affinity for the ideal—or at any rate the affinity of a "finely constituted being." Some humans have an instinctive, if implicit, love for the good, the true, and the beautiful. "The profoundest affinities" are essential to our happiness. "If we put them by," he goes on, "although in other respects we may call ourselves happy, we inwardly know that we have dismissed the ideal, and all that was essentially possible has not been realized."²⁹ Such passages are flattering to humankind, and Santayana is not given to praise the human race in general. In any case, we always find in his writings a love of and yearning for the highest—what the Greeks called τὸ καλόν—roughly translated as the *fine* or the *beautiful*. His expressions of this sort are typically infectious. In the present day, when the standards of our supposed guardians of culture run from mediocre to low to non-existent, any infectiousness of the sort conveyed by Santayana is like

²⁷ For example, Santayana's Aristotelian principle—everything ideal has a natural source, everything natural has a possible ideal fulfillment—corresponds to Dewey's conception, "histories"; but Dewey uses the notion in more generic form and develops it more systematically.

²⁸ *Reason in Society*, volume II in *The Life of Reason* (New York: Scribner's, 1905), 9.

²⁹ *Society*, 28.

fresh water in the desert, and it is inspirational to “*a mind in love with the good.*”³⁰

He subdivides societies into natural, free, and ideal. The natural begin with families, of which Santayana gives a remarkably sympathetic—if sometimes erroneous—interpretation. “The family is one of nature’s masterpieces,” he writes.³¹ He goes on to consider different economic and political orders, including aristocracy and democracy, none of which are acceptable to reason. “The pleasures a democratic society affords are vulgar and not even by an amiable illusion can they become an aim in life.”³² This reminds one of Plato’s famous critique in *The Republic*. Unlike Plato, but like Aristotle, he commonly refers to historical example in evidence of the behavior typical of different forms of social structure; yet, although his search yields no realistically possible orders that would be suitably rational, Santayana finds that all societies are not equally poisonous to ideal life. In later volumes he even lapses into uncharacteristic utopian enthusiasms. Such enthusiasms apart, he does not expect many individuals to have the temperament, independence, and courage to pursue the ideal.³³ Within his survey there are many acute (and often unpopular) judgments of social practice—and some dubious ones as well. In every case, just the same, we observe a philosopher who speaks what he takes to be true without regard to its acceptability to anyone’s sensibilities. The good life is not attained by shielding ourselves from uncongenial truths, but by reconciling ourselves to them—or even appropriating them to some good.

Free society is made up in part by a form of friendship. Santayana examines the alternative forms, typically with a keen sense of the constituents of human bonding, but few forms are capable of liberal fulfillment. Genuinely free friendship means, for Santayana, sharing not only the bonds of natural society, but sharing above all a love for things ideal—souls uniting in study and appreciation of the beauty and genius of human accomplishment. He allows that the friendship of husband and wife has that capability.

³⁰ *Common Sense*, 46. (Italics are in original.) To praise Santayana for his wisdom and insight is not to deny that he can sometimes be wrongheaded and ill-informed.

³¹ *Society*, 35. Santayana reports in his autobiography, *Persons and Places*, that his own experience of family life was miserable ([Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986], 118).

³² *Society*, 135.

³³ See *Society*, 192–93, for what is evidently a reference to his personal struggle to overcome the oppressions of conventional society.

Patriotism is—or can be—another form of free society. Santayana is both sympathetic and perceptive on this topic. “The object of patriotism is in truth something ideal, a moral entity definable only by the ties which a man’s imagination and reason can at any moment recognise.... Patriotism accordingly has two aspects: it is partly sentiment, by which it looks back upon the sources of culture, and partly policy, or allegiance to those ideals which, being suggested by what has already been attained, animate the better organs of society and demand further embodiment.”³⁴ His analysis introduces the notion of tradition, a concept (like that of patriotism) of no interest to a typical child of the Enlightenment, but one of great consequence to Santayana and to the life of reason.³⁵ Attachment to tradition (or to country) should not be indiscriminate: there are admirable traditions and also abominable ones. An admirable tradition has the added virtue of helping to form and stabilize the ethos of any generation; it is a treasured heritage, giving both identity and solidarity to its members. Such a tradition is the product of generations of trial and error and continuing modification; so it has proven itself in a way that *a priori* planning cannot. (At the same time, Santayana acknowledges, it can limit the spiritual freedom of its participants, and it contributes to the divisions between groups.) Patriotism and tradition have much in common: Both *patria* and the inheritance from our forebears are objects of piety, bestowing an ambience of deep-rootedness and rightness to a life—as Santayana will urge in volume III, *Reason in Religion*, and subsequently. A society that is exclusively observant of custom and tradition would not satisfy the ideal of a fully or predominantly rational society; but if a rational order were ever to occur, it would wisely preserve much in the way of customary life.³⁶

The final stage is ideal society. It is both a creature of imagination and a felt kinship. “Whatever spirit in the past or future, or in the remotest regions of the sky, shares our love and pursuit, say of mathematics or of music, or of any ideal object, becomes, if we can somehow divine his existence, a partner in our joys and sorrows, and a

³⁴ *Society*, 163–64.

³⁵ Affection for tradition, I take it, is very similar to patriotism but not identical to it. There are traditions that are without political structure or purpose, others that cross national boundaries, and others within a given nation that are indifferent to the national history.

³⁶ See *Society*, 176–77.

welcome friend.”³⁷ This remark takes liberties with “partner” and “friend,” but we must grant its candor. Santayana deeply appreciated kindred spirits, and he even imagined himself in company with them in the brilliant and delightful *Dialogues in Limbo*.³⁸ Shortly after the remark just quoted, he adds that in a sense “there is no true companionship except with the universe.”³⁹ The comment suggests his great regard for Spinoza, who declared his supreme love of God (nature; loosely: the universe) without expectation of love in return. Santayana elaborates: Our knowledge of nature is expressed in symbols; so our “companionship” with nature is neither a single intuition nor a mystical oneness. It is a joy in “rational activity itself, and in the intrinsic beauty of all symbols bred in a genial mind.”⁴⁰ Ideal society is the life of the mind—of one who loves thinking, knowing, and contemplating, all of them ends in themselves; but the object of contemplation is in no measure meaningless. As in Spinoza and others (e.g., Plato), there is a felt unity with the cosmic order, once it is known and meditated upon.⁴¹



Anticipations of many of the resounding ideas in *Reason in Religion* can be found in the essays collected in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900). These blasphemous words appear on its first page:

For the dignity of religion, like that of poetry, lies precisely in its ideal adequacy, in its fit rendering of the meanings and values of life, in its anticipation of perfection; so that the excellence of religion is due to an idealisation of experience which, while making religion noble if treated as poetry, makes it necessarily false if treated as science.⁴²

³⁷ *Society*, 189.

³⁸ *Dialogues in Limbo* (New York: Scribner’s, 1926).

³⁹ *Society*, 192.

⁴⁰ *Society*, 202. Santayana immediately adds, “Of course, if these symbols had no real points of reference, if they were symbols of nothing, they could have no great claim to consideration and no rational character; at most they would be agreeable sensations.”

⁴¹ Santayana says it eloquently in *The Genteel Tradition at Bay*: “In raising truth to intuition of truth, in surveying the forms and places of many things at once and conceiving their movement, the intellect performs the most vital of possible acts, locks flying existence, as it were, in its arms, and stands, all eyes and breathless, at the top of life” (New York: Scribner’s, London: “The Adelphi,” 1931), 39.

⁴² *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 3.

Religion is ignoble if it is regarded as a truthful depiction of real beings and events; but regarded as poetry it might be the greatest source of wisdom. Santayana regards those who are religious seekers, who are most spiritual, as those most fitted to discern the elements of ideal life. "Spirituality has never flourished apart from religion.... [E]very religion worthy of the name has put into its gods some element of real goodness, something by which they become representative of those scattered excellences and self-justifying bits of experience in which the Life of Reason consists."⁴³ Yet religion is invariably corrupted, degraded from its noble essence, and the result is that the life of reason is rendered obscure, mysterious, and ineffectual. The ideal has been divorced from its natural basis. Worship of the ideal becomes superstition; its pursuit becomes magical; and the form of the ideal becomes rigid and invariant.

Religious doctrine and religious life must, therefore, be understood with great sympathy and imagination, coupled with intellectual discipline. Perhaps no author equals Santayana in this practice. His genius is displayed in several books and articles, particularly in *Reason in Religion*, where those contemptuous of religion as science will find intimations of ideal life as a naturalistic quest. All religions do not teach the same lessons, to be sure. The Homeric myths embody the ideals of a triumphant warrior culture while still recognizing a variety of forms of human excellence and remaining profoundly aware of the perils of *hubris*. The Jewish and Christian myths tell quite another story. Both derive from conditions of oppression and want. In the case of Christians, self-denial and relief of suffering become paramount and exclusive of virtually all other excellences. Religious history is more complex than just suggested, to be sure. It is woven from a multitude of sources and undergoes striking changes. Santayana's sympathies are decidedly with pagan Christianity; that is, Catholicism. Protestantism, the barbarian religion from northern Europe, is Christian in name only. Each of these differences and variations represents a corresponding development in a given religion regarding its assessment of what is most worthy in life. Each religion proposes "another world to live in"⁴⁴—an ideal world—into which the religion will help us pass.

⁴³ *Reason in Religion*, volume III in *The Life of Reason* (New York: Scribner's, 1905), 212.

⁴⁴ *Religion*, 6.

Santayana discerns the ideal values displayed in conspicuous religious practices, such as sacrifice and prayer, but he is at his best, for the most part, in his analyses of four characteristic religious concerns: piety, spirituality, charity, and immortality. Piety, in its fundamental sense, is typically thought to be directed to God, the source of all being; but Santayana understands its ideal import in naturalistic terms. "Piety, in its nobler and Roman sense, may be said to mean man's reverent attachment to the sources of his being and the steadying of his life by that attachment."⁴⁵ The sources of a man's being are all in nature, but they vary from individual to individual. They are ancestors and parents, homeland—with its lands and seas and its history; faithful friends, inspiring teachers, schools, and books; perhaps legendary heroes, historical epics, philosophies, customs, culture, and traditions of one's native soil; surely artistic and religious traditions as well. Such are the sources of one's being; they comprise much of the substance of one's life. One who is reflective and appreciative is *reverently* attached to them, and at the same time his life is "steadied." Presumably it is steadied by being part of a larger and beloved whole—in many ways an enduring whole. This larger whole gives him, in significant part, his identity and his attachment to life. The alternative is rootlessness and trendiness, with little to love and honor. Lacking such anchors, one's thinking likewise tends to be severed from the serious. "Piety, in spite of its allegories, contains a much greater wisdom than a half-enlightened and pert intellect can attain."⁴⁶

In traditional orthodoxy, spirituality, like piety, is understood to be an earnest devotion to God. Once again, Santayana's interpretation is naturalistic. While piety is retrospective, spirituality looks ahead and beyond. It gathers and directs components of one's heritage and turns them to what is ideal. "A man is spiritual when he lives in the presence of the ideal, and whether he eat or drink does so for the sake of a true and ultimate good."⁴⁷ Those who are devoted to things beautiful and noble, whether by striving to bring them into existence or whether by cherishing them with a discriminating and appreciative love, live in the spirit. Once again the true Platonist, Santayana recognizes a native affinity for the ideal within the human breast. "[S]pirituality, or life in

⁴⁵ *Religion*, 179.

⁴⁶ *Religion*, 183.

⁴⁷ *Religion*, 193.

the ideal, must be regarded as the fundamental and native type of all life...."⁴⁸ Yet spirituality is easily corrupted, if not aborted. In general, "arrest and absorption in the instrumentalities of life"⁴⁹ is our fundamental sin.

There is a remarkable feature of Santayana's naturalistic analysis that he does not make explicit in these pages. Christianity and other religions and philosophies have been tortured by the problem of evil: How can we avoid imputing to the Creator the willful propagation of evil? If this god is omnipotent and the source of all being, then the immeasurable agonies and sorrows of human existence must be attributed to his will. Yet this god is also conceived as the sum of all possible perfections. Hence he does *not* will evil. Every manner of intellectual gymnastic and evasion has been used to solve this contradiction. But it is insoluble. "The human spirit has not passed in historical times through a more critical situation or a greater revulsion than that involved in accepting Christianity."⁵⁰

In Santayana's pagan naturalism, the source of our being is nature, to discriminated features of which piety is owing. Spirituality, on the other hand, is addressed to the ideal, a creature of imagination and reason, which act in concert with relevant natural agencies. In this portrayal, the sources of being are distinguished from the consummations of being, and the deities that would symbolize origins are not the same as those that would symbolize the emergent ideal. Hence the conflation of gods is avoided. More important, the ineradicable moral confusion born of Hebraic and Christian monotheism is obviated.

Santayana's study of spirituality and its corruptions is followed by his interpretation of charity. In essence, it is a profound feeling of tolerance for all ways of life and sympathy towards all humans. When reflected upon as a constituent part of the life of reason, Santayana says, one finds that charity must replace "pagan" justice (presumably the justice articulated in Book V of *Nicomachean Ethics*): "[J]ustice carries with it a charity which is its highest expression, without which justice remains only an organised wrong."⁵¹ "Justice and charity are identical,"⁵² he says; and he adds that justice, mercy, and reason are

⁴⁸ *Religion*, 195.

⁴⁹ *Religion*, 209.

⁵⁰ *Religion*, 148. He means, of course, accepting Christianity as science.

⁵¹ *Religion*, 217.

⁵² *Religion*, 216.

“three principles essentially identical.”⁵³ Accordingly, justice, mercy, reason, and charity are indistinguishable; they have merged into a unity.

This is not Santayana at his most free and disillusioned. We might ask how tolerance and universal sympathy would issue in practice. Any decent person must be capable of genuine tolerance and sympathy and will display them on many occasions, but it is a difficult matter to decide just when and how to do so. We suppose that some people are deserving of sympathy and others not; some forms of conduct should be tolerated and others not. We suppose that some persons are deserving of contempt and punishment, others of praise and honor. The difference between guilt and innocence is likewise indispensable and must be observed in conduct. These are often difficult discriminations to make, but if we made no conscientious attempt to do so, social life would be impossible. Here, just the same, Santayana seems to be urging us to be indiscriminate. Inasmuch as he is such a discriminating person, this is an uncharacteristic posture. He has, for example, repeatedly expressed scorn and contempt for occupation with the instrumental. Perhaps he means that we should always have the *feelings* appropriate to charity, regardless of what *action* is appropriate. Does this mean, after all, that in matters of practice we must *distinguish* justice and charity?

The treatment of charity seems unsatisfactory, but the discussion of immortality is wise and profound. He is not considering the question whether we survive death. His analysis is focused primarily on *ideal* immortality, which one might achieve in mortal life. The desire for endless life is, indeed, ignoble.

It may indeed be said that no man of any depth of soul has made his prolonged existence the touchstone of his enthusiasms. Such an instinct is carnal, and if immortality is to add a higher inspiration to life it must not be an immortality of selfishness. What a despicable creature must a man be, and how sunk below the level of the most barbaric virtue, if he cannot bear to live for his children, for his art, or for country!⁵⁴

Santayana is not saying that ideal immortality eradicates the fear of death. (That fear, of course, varies in intensity with different persons, and in some it is nonexistent.) He wishes to point out that the life of reason, in addition to its intrinsic happiness, shows the way for

⁵³ *Religion*, 217.

⁵⁴ *Religion*, 247.

mortal man to share in immortal or timeless things, and he can live in a manner that will bestow on his successors the imprint of his soul, and he can believe that the imprint will live on.

Ideal immortality can be experienced in different ways. One of them takes the form of biological reproduction and family life, in which one is aware that his children can carry on the life and ideals of the parent and in time transmit them to their own children. One might also live in the eternal in the sense that the objects of his contemplation are eternal: That which is contemplated is timeless, experienced without awareness of time, beheld out of all context of change. “Unconsciousness of temporal conditions and of the very flight of time makes the thinker sink for a moment into identity with timeless objects.”⁵⁵ If one has lived a spiritual life, moreover, he leaves a noble legacy, one that is apt to be emulated and will thereby endure and survive in honor.

Since the ideal has this perpetual pertinence to mortal struggles, he who lives in the ideal and leaves it expressed in society or in art enjoys a double immortality. The eternal has absorbed him while he lived, and when he is dead his influence brings others to the same absorption, making them, through that ideal identity with the best in him, reincarnations and perennial seats of all in him which he could rationally hope to rescue from destruction. He can say, without any subterfuge or desire to delude himself, that he shall not wholly die; for he will have a better notion than the vulgar of what constitutes his being.⁵⁶



Thanks to Santayana’s study of reason in religion—most especially to his characterization of piety, spirituality, and immortality—many of his readers have been given “another world to live in.” He moves on in this almost epic work to *Reason in Art*, volume IV of *The Life of Reason*.

Santayana immediately situates art in the context of nature, thereby to dispose of any occult interpretations of this entrancing phenomenon. Art is perfectly native to human endeavor; it is the paradigm of all productive activity.

⁵⁵ *Religion*, 271.

⁵⁶ *Religion*, 272–73.

Man exists amid a universal ferment of being, and not only needs plasticity in his habits and pursuits but finds plasticity also in the surrounding world. Life is an equilibrium which is maintained now by accepting modification and now by imposing it...

Sometimes ... man's traces are traces of useful action which has so changed natural objects as to make them congenial to his mind.... Such propitious forms given by man to matter are no less instrumental in the Life of Reason than are propitious forms assumed by man's own habit or fancy. Any operation which thus humanises and rationalises objects is called art.⁵⁷

He adds that human progress "is art bettering the conditions of existence."⁵⁸ It is a rational process in two senses: It serves a rational end, and the making of the object requires planning, selection of constituent parts, knowledge of their powers, and composing them in an order that will serve the intended purpose. The process requires imagination and intelligence. In the case of the fine arts, it requires extraordinary talents, and the creative process demands exceptional insight into the nature of the subject matter, long incubation—often to the point of suffering—and repeated trials. It is not a rational process in the sense of proceeding in some sort of invariant order. Reason is successful imagination, and imagination is rarely orderly.

In the workaday world, determining the purpose of productive activity is rarely problematic. Some problem needs remedy, or some function would benefit by improved efficiency. In the fine arts, if they are to be truly fine, the work must serve some manner of moral purpose, Santayana insists. It must be instructive of vital features of the human condition, in sympathy with the deepest pangs and aspirations of the soul, and responsive to the nuances and structures of experience. Recall *Reason in Religion*, where the founders of religions are understood as poets: They expressed the supreme values of their culture and they formulated the ideal goods appropriate to a way of life. So it must be with any great art.⁵⁹

Many will quarrel with Santayana's insistence that art has a broadly moral function. They are appreciative of exquisite works representative of nothing: The artwork is self-enclosed and self-sufficient in its aesthetic qualities; and they are sure to add that the idea of an artist under moral constraint is an abomination, if not a contradiction in terms. Santayana has no wish to have artists report to an official. He

⁵⁷ *Art*, 3–4.

⁵⁸ *Art*, 13.

⁵⁹ The exception is music, which Santayana regards as essentially non-representative.

simply believes that their work is inconsequential if it does not contribute in some way to a moral ideal. It is historical fact that the works generally praised as masterpieces, from Homer onwards, are full of perceptions and lessons of profound pertinence to the meaning of life, and we find illumination and wisdom in their counsel.

This is an arguable issue, but we continue with art in the life of reason. Any worthwhile work of art creates an organic whole of some kind, and the whole appeals to many facets of one's nature: his senses, sensibilities, emotions, imagination, memory, intelligence, and moral yearnings. It appeals to the whole person. That is beautiful which brings these many feelings and powers into harmony. "When ... [beauty] has appeared, we may perceive that its influence is rational, since it both expresses and fosters a harmony of impressions and impulses in the soul."⁶⁰ "[I]t rests not on the material constitution of each existence taken apart, but on their conspiring ideally together, so that each furthers the other's endeavour."⁶¹

This conception of art and beauty leads to a remarkable treatment of the criterion of taste. It does not appeal to a presumed aesthetic faculty, but, again, to "the whole man."

Good taste is indeed nothing but a name for those appreciations which the swelling incidents of life recall and reinforce. Good taste is that taste which is a good possession, a friend to the whole man. It must not alienate him from anything except to ally him to something greater and more fertile in satisfactions. It will not suffer him to dote on things, however seductive, which rob him of some nobler companionship. To have a foretaste of such a loss, and to reject instinctively whatever will cause it, is the very essence of refinement.⁶²

These pages are filled with observations about the differences between good taste and "mere taste." Taste can be cultivated and refined, just as good character can be. Many art forms and great works of art are all but incomprehensible to the beginner, so a suitable tutelage is essential for their full appropriation. Cultivation of artistic taste requires still more: an apposite chorus of educated sensibilities and aptitudes. Its benefits are not just those of having a more discerning and sustaining experience. They contribute to the further growth and

⁶⁰ *Art*, 130.

⁶¹ *Art*, 131. There is little to compare between *Reason in Art* and the earlier (1896) work, *The Sense of Beauty* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988). The earlier work, about aesthetic theory, is technical. It does not deal with art in the context of nature and the life of reason. Beauty is defined in terms of pleasure, rather than in terms of the ideality of a harmonized self.

⁶² *Art*, 206–7.

harmonization of the self in all its worthwhile activities. Santayana's analysis is reminiscent of Aristotle's treatment of practical wisdom: There is no single consideration, but many, that must be taken into account in order to make the best choice, and there are many faculties of the soul, not just one, that are requisite to moral wisdom. So it is with the cultivation necessary to harvest the full revelation of the arts.

Art, "the remodeling of nature by reason," is the most generic form of rational activity; so the life of reason falls within its domain. "Moral harmonies ... are not given; they have to be made."⁶³ The unification of the soul and of the soul with the world is a work of art; so it is art that actualizes ideal happiness. The conduct of the life of reason is the supreme art. "A happy result can be secured in art, as in life, only by intelligence. Intelligence consists in having read the heart and deciphered the promptings latent there, and then in reading the world and deciphering its law and constitution, to see how and where the heart's ideal may be embodied."⁶⁴ By art we create a unity of man and nature. In this context, an otherwise cryptic statement becomes profound: "Art, in its nobler acceptance, is an achievement, not an indulgence. It prepares the world in some sense to receive the soul, and the soul to master the world; it disentangles those threads in each that can be woven into the other."⁶⁵ Art prepares the world for the soul by discerning and displaying those features of nature that are supportive of and congenial to man, and by imagination of nature's possibilities; and it is art to take overt action to construct the discovered potentialities of union. The soul is prepared to master the world so far as it gains a mastery of art, and so far as art has revealed to the soul the qualities and potentialities of nature.

In remarking that the discernments of art are true of nature, Santayana has acknowledged that nature is indeed a swarm of powers and qualities—all those and more that have excited the artist. A Cartesian, or any reductionist, could never make such a claim. Santayana's philosophy of nature is vastly richer, truer, and more fertile than any reductionist could muster.

⁶³ *Art*, 166.

⁶⁴ *Art*, 222.

⁶⁵ *Art*, 228.

Uncharacteristically, Santayana becomes the rhapsodist of art in the inclusive sense. If society recognizes the great fecundity of art, he says, and when people routinely become practitioners of it, life would be transformed into a paradise. Admittedly, “we should have to abandon our vested illusions” and much else; it would be a “great revolution” in society.⁶⁶ Still, Santayana does not seem to think it intrinsically impossible.

There are several more topics in the volume, discussed at some length. He distinguishes the various arts and the unique capabilities of each. He places each of them in more or less definite relationships to the whole of the field. Fascinating as these discussions are, it is important to recall that this is a work in moral philosophy. What critics, aesthetes, and philosophers will say about the arts will surely be different when the art object is treated as an autonomous entity, rather than as a constituent of the life of reason.



Santayana was not particularly sophisticated in his knowledge of the sciences nor in his grasp of the nature of scientific methods. Even so, he has sometimes astonishing insights into the subject. In *Reason in Science*, the final volume of *The Life of Reason*, he is not centrally interested in scientific method, but in developing ideas about science as a function of the natural world, its bearings on our conception of nature, and its import for the life of reason. Insofar as he speaks of the formal nature of scientific activity, he adopts the ideas of pragmatism, if not always the terminology: scientific theories are fallible, and the method is self-correcting. Claims are not verified by their origins in experience (as the empiricists had long and fruitlessly taught) but by what they predict of future experience; thus a scientifically determined truth is an instrument for predicting the outcome of a specified nexus of events. He gives one acknowledgment of the fact that the formation of hypotheses is imaginative and creative, as is the design of experiments. He even notes on one occasion that the meaning of scientific

⁶⁶ *Art*, 225.

terms is determined by what the denoted objects *do* under conditions of controlled inquiry.⁶⁷

Anyone who accepts the dualism of experience and nature must suppose that scientific knowledge is a (miraculous) leap beyond the solitary confinement of experience into a realm where direct cognition of law occurs, and then it is a leap back again into unbroken subjectivity. Santayana, in contrast, observes that scientific inquiry is a methodical continuation of routine investigations within ordinary experience. He points out that science begins its interrogations with events of common experience and also terminates there to test its theories. Science does not transcend experience; it explains how the events of the experienced world occur. Otherwise, material reality, as such, would be unknowable. “Appearances are the qualities of reality, else realities would be without place, time, character, or interrelation.”⁶⁸ (A philosophical naturalist must insist that if one accepts the reality of science as it is actually conducted in the world, then he must deny the dualism of experience and nature. Santayana had already rejected the dualism; his treatment of science is one more reason to do so.)

To be sure, he affirms, the achievements of science are intelligible only on the assumption that nature is an ordered mechanism. The fact that laws of nature are stated without reference to immediate qualities does not mean, however, that these qualities are somehow unreal. He suggests, briefly, an extraordinarily promising theory of quality, according to which the existence of qualities depends on context. “And why is the sun dark and cold,” he asks, “if it is bright and hot only to animal sensitivity?” Why should we fall into this “senseless lamentation?” On such logic we could as well say that if the sun is bright and hot to animal sensitivity, then it is never dark and cold. The point is that nature has a seemingly infinite array of potentialities, and they are not displayed—could not be displayed—all at once. There are conditions in nature—namely, when sentient life is present—when the power of the sun to be qualitatively hot changes from potential to actual. “Beauty being an appearance and life an operation, that is

⁶⁷ Santayana’s accents are those of Charles S. Peirce, not William James. It is uncertain, however, what Santayana had studied of Peirce. On the other hand, he was outspoken in his distaste for the pragmatism of James.

⁶⁸ *Reason in Science*, volume V of *The Life of Reason* (New York: Scribner’s, 1906), 165.

surely beautiful and living which so operates and so appears as to manifest those qualities.”⁶⁹

Imaginative intelligence is further displayed in another tantalizingly short analysis, this one pertaining to the question of how it can be that mathematics, a seemingly *a priori* science, happens to apply to nature. It has seemed to many philosophers a miracle, unaccountable in any way but divine design. Santayana replies, “Mathematical principles in particular are not imposed on existence or on nature *ab extra*, but are found in and abstracted from the subject-matter and march of experience.”⁷⁰ The development of mathematical and logical distinctions is “tentative, observant, and subject to control by the subject-matter.”⁷¹ According to this hypothesis, there is no need somehow to unite experimental and *a priori* disciplines, for mathematics itself is derivative of experiment with empirical subject matter.

Santayana analyzes historical inquiry to estimate the extent to which it can lay claim to science. Its claim is tenuous. The evidence needed to verify broad historical hypotheses with confidence is typically unavailable—permanently so in many cases—and it is often ambiguous. If history has a diminished status as science, it still has vital moral responsibilities. It is legitimate and even desirable for historians to recall great persons and events in a nation’s history for the purpose of exhibiting inspiring precedents and for retaining the energy and authority of a nation’s traditions. In both political and literary history there are abundant materials to assist in arousing, focusing, and directing the emerging *eros* in the young.

It is important to recall that *The Life of Reason* is a history—admittedly a selective one. Santayana supposes that the subject matter of liberal life cannot be comprehended when confined to the mere slice of time of the present. There is a great heritage of thinking and acting in regard to ideal life, and he would interpret and preserve that history. To do so is an act of piety: Many of the sources of our moral and intel-

⁶⁹ *Science*, 92.

⁷⁰ *Science*, 188.

⁷¹ *Science*, 189. Many years later, Dewey presented his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938), which argued at length that logical forms develop, in effect, from experiment within inquiry to determine which of them are most effective in carrying inquiry ahead propitiously. Many of the ideas and suggestions that Santayana published in *The Life of Reason* appear also in Dewey’s works, usually at greater length. It is impossible to determine what, precisely, were Dewey’s debts to Santayana regarding these questions.

lectual being come from this heritage, and we might have a reverent attachment to it, as Santayana did. To possess this heritage is to enlarge one's sense of identity into the archaic past. At the same time, it is to provide the mind with an indispensable and widely varying diet of experience and ideas. We must evaluate the heritage, to be sure, and we should appropriate it with discerning judgment. This process is essential to a mind that would be mature and independent. This source of our being is thus a bountiful inheritance, without which our thinking would be puerile and superficial.⁷²

The fact that history falls short of science is, then, no excuse for anyone to ignore it or for the historian to be dishonest. Historical materials are a "hothouse in which to force our seedling fancy to a rational growth."⁷³ And candor about the realities of life and history is essential not just to the life of reason, but to any morally defensible life. Santayana does not respect philosophies of history which teach that the historical process is teleological or which otherwise propound the inevitability of progress. His criticism of Hegel is both biting and unusually witty, even for Santayana.⁷⁴

Psychology's pretensions to science come off more poorly than those of history, but Santayana believes that we are often capable of understanding why people behave the way they do by means of the imaginative attribution to them of desires, fears, ambitions, and the like that we have already become familiar with in ourselves, in literature, history, politics, and biographical reports. Of more immediate importance in *Reason in Science* is to investigate how it is that the moral life partakes of scientific inquiry. The chapters "The Nature of Intent" and "Dialectic" are necessary to that understanding.

Santayana had already distinguished two broad but inseparable parts within science: physics and dialectic. "Physics" is that group of sciences that "describes existences," and dialectic is the group that "elaborates ideas." Descriptions, of course, utilize meanings, or dialectic; so, as he puts it, "the science of existence is a portion of the art of

⁷²In *Persons and Places*, Santayana describes himself as "the child" of the religion, literature, and philosophy of the western tradition. They are the "moorings" of his life. He says that lacking such moorings, a philosopher "would lapse into a frivolous sightseer and his mind into an album of snap-shots and clippings" (449).

⁷³*Science*, 128.

⁷⁴*Science*, 109–10, 195.

discourse,” and “discourse, in its operation, is a part of existence.”⁷⁵ Dialectic is the science of reasoning, whether it is abstract, like mathematics, formal logic, and the elaboration of the meaning of ideas, or it is experimental, wherein one inquires into physical and social processes the better to understand their operations and interactions, especially for the sake of rational conduct. Employment of the dialectical branch of science is what makes ethics, so far as possible, scientific. We will examine that idea shortly.

The idea of intent (intention, purpose) is familiar, but its great importance for Santayana lies in (a) its functions and (b) the fact that it is natural and, for each individual, his own. Intent creates a context for both thought and action. In that way it gives dialectic its moral function. The subject of dialectic “is fixed by the mind’s intent...” Intent is “the vital act ... by which consciousness becomes cognitive and practical...”⁷⁶ In the context of action, wherein the objects in one’s environment can function in a variety of ways to a variety of purposes, intent “picks out what that object’s function and meaning shall be.... It is intent that makes objects objects; and the same intent, defining the function of things, defines the scope of those qualities which are essential to them.”⁷⁷

Moral deliberation (or moral dialectic, if you will) begins with intent, but intent itself can and does undergo change, largely in consequence of changes in self or in self-knowledge. Self-knowledge includes, most pertinently, an awareness of what one most wants in his inmost self. This will be the prime source of his ideal interests and hence of his devotion to the realization of the ideal in his own life. In many of his comments about self-knowledge, Santayana seems to suggest that it is a matter of immediate self-intuition. If that is what he meant, he was a bit hasty. Self-knowledge of that sort can be obscured or distorted in numerous ways: immaturity, fantasy, inexperience, ignorance, inattention, bad influences, and so forth. He puts the matter more suitably by reference to the greater context of activity, learning, and reflection:

⁷⁵ *Science*, 30.

⁷⁶ *Science*, 197, 183.

⁷⁷ *Science*, 199. I noted earlier that immediate qualities are for Santayana a function of context. Intent is a crucial determinant of context. Are we enjoying the light and warmth of the sunshine on a summer’s day, or are we an astronomer who is measuring the mass and circumference of the sun? Two distinctly different operations of intent are at work in the presence of the sun.

Wisdom and happiness consist in having recast natural energies in the furnace of experience. Nor is this experience merely a repressive force. It enshrines the successful expressions of spirit as well as the shocks and vetoes of circumstance; it enables a man to know himself in knowing the world and to discover his ideal by the very ring, true or false, of fortune's coin.⁷⁸

Once one's ideal has been more or less defined, his intent is to pursue and hold it—a life's work. The ambition requires accumulation of experience and much reflection; it requires foresight, knowledge of the powers of persons and things, and identification of resources. All of this is the office of dialectic in company with one's imagination and affective nature. In the terms of volume IV, dialectic is the intellectual instrument of art. It makes art possible. Pursuit of the life of reason also requires a certain character and at the same time builds a certain character. Intent is animated by impulse; more precisely, it is a form of impulse, but any individual is inhabited by impulses inconsistent with the ideal or contrary to it, and these must somehow be reduced in efficacy or at best extinguished. (At the same time one has many impulses that are compatible with the ideal and are commonly allied with it.)

Dialectic, to which reason is generic, is a participant in the process of formation of self; but dialectic *per se* moves nothing. It is not a straw boss that drags a laborer around by the collar. Even so, dialectic and experience have some efficacy in sculpting one's nature into the desired form. Dialectic is the sun that illuminates the landscape—populated with many people, objects, potentialities, and ways of life—and the individual responds to the matters revealed in the light. He has desire for some and would move toward them, aversion to others and would withdraw from them. He can imagine how his exertions might rearrange the landscape in a manner more appealing to him, and he responds to the imagined arrangement favorably and is moved to achieve it in fact. His intent has now found a preferred direction. His subsequent actions will teach him much that dialectic had missed or was unable to determine: Certain kinds of behavior that seemed attractive in prospect turn out to be unwelcome in fact; so the desire for that behavior diminishes. Or it is found that even friendly objects divert him from the ideal; so they must not detain him further.

Human instincts are ignorant, multitudinous, and contradictory. To satisfy them as they come is often impossible, and often disastrous, in that such satisfaction prevents

⁷⁸ *Science*, 253.

the satisfaction of other instincts inherently no less fecund and legitimate. When we apply reason to life we immediately demand that life be consistent, complete, and satisfactory when reflected upon and viewed as a whole.⁷⁹

Santayana makes the same point by speaking of affinities and estimations. “To esteem a thing good is to express certain affinities between that thing and the speaker....”⁸⁰ If we take that one thing in isolation, the estimation is “invulnerable,” provided that the estimate is “done with self-knowledge and knowledge of the thing.” But of course affinities do not exist in isolation; there are affinities and more affinities within broad and complex environments. We also have revulsions, which are likewise powerfully affective. Hence the estimation of one affinity will be qualified—perhaps reversed, perhaps intensified—when it is conceived or experienced as a part of a large and active whole. One’s intent thereby gives a finer definition to the ideal with which nature beckons to him.

For Santayana, it is crucial to found life in the ideal on one’s informed intent, because true intent is an expression of one’s true nature; and estimations founded candidly on one’s intent are unimpeachable. Otherwise, we are subjected to all manner of prescriptions for ideal life, most if not all of them foreign to our nature. Not only are they impositions, destructive of happiness, but they are also tendered with some form of contrived and dishonest justification, attributed to an allegedly divine or *a priori* source. The life of reason, in contrast, is a natural *self*-fulfillment, crowned with happiness: the only life that is not starved in its nature and an imposture. Why must we contrive mythologies to justify ways of life that are perfectly in accord with the highest and most satisfying affinities of human nature? We may pursue these ways by understanding their status in nature, rather than propitiate the gods for their benefactions.

It is reasonable to point out that there are fundamental moral problems and demands that are not contingent upon self-knowledge and intent: Like it or not, we have duties to perform, we have obligations to fulfill, we must keep our promises, we must deal fairly and honestly with others, and we must refrain from harming them, to name some conspicuous, if indeterminate, moral requirements. In the context of *The Life of Reason*, Santayana is deliberately inattentive to

⁷⁹ *Science*, 249.

⁸⁰ *Science*, 214.

such considerations. He is occupied with ideal life, with its plurality of forms. He might have made a distinction between moral philosophy, which is his concern, and ethics, which addresses the more mundane but unmistakably vital moral practices. He mentions the latter in passing: "Intuitive morality is adequate while it simply enforces those obvious and universal laws which are indispensable to any society, and which impose themselves everywhere on men under pain of quick extinction—a penalty which many an individual and many a nation continually prefers to pay."⁸¹ He is confident, too, that the disciplines of the life of reason will establish the character and sympathies that are necessary for the observance of elementary moral decency. (His confidence might be premature. Once again, a discussion of moral education would be a desirable addition to *The Life of Reason*.)

A final word on intent and dialectic: His aim is to show wherein the life of reason is scientific. Clearly it cannot be taken to be exclusively scientific. Intent lies at the origin of life in the ideal as a deliberate process. Intent determines the direction of moral striving; and intent is unique to the nature of each individual. It is part of the glory of rational morality that it has this autonomy: the unique intent of each individual would be fulfilled. There is no science, as such, that alone underlies or otherwise justifies estimation or that in itself could bring moral agreement to rival estimations. Santayana sees that there is no *kind* of thing with which to modify an estimation except another estimation. We criticize the will to kill innocents because our estimation of it is that it is an abomination. The blessing of dialectic lies elsewhere: It alone makes conduct as art possible; and it also assists in the growth and refinement of moral sensibilities.

Santayana distinguishes three kinds of morality: prerational, rational, and postrational. All three are founded on impulse. Prerational morality is familiar, and it has its own sort of sturdiness. It is the form of life embodied in the habitual observance of those common practices that we defy at the risk of social dissolution; a variety of additional rules of conduct flourish as well. They have developed unsystematically and at times incoherently. Although some *ad hoc* reasoning is found in them, there is no rational overview. Inasmuch as they are retained as customs and with the force of custom, Santayana

⁸¹ *Science*, 231.

might have sympathy with them; but they have no power to conceive rational ideals. “Reason has not begun to educate her children.”⁸²

Rational morality—the union of dialectic and ideal affinities—is an “interweaving of this logic of practice with various natural sciences that have man or society for their theme.”⁸³ It would establish rational art and the life of reason together. It is the life “founded by Socrates, glorified by Plato, and sobered and solidified by Aristotle.”⁸⁴ Its genius lies in discerning the ideal possibilities of common life. But “A truly rational morality, or social regimen, has never existed in the world and is hardly to be looked for.”⁸⁵ Still, he ultimately concludes, the social regimen is not impossible, and certainly the idea of this morality can ignite and lead the aspirations of individuals and be approximated in a life, as it was in that of Socrates. Inasmuch as a rational morality does not now exist, Santayana prefers the expression, “rational ethics.” *The Life of Reason*, overall, is a rendering of just such an ethics. (We might say an *ideal* ethics.) At the same time, it is an account of the naturalistic presuppositions of this consummation of the moral life.

A rational life would fulfill the aspiration for happiness. “If pleasure, because it is commonly a result of satisfied instinct, may by a figure of speech be called the aim of impulse, happiness, by a like figure, may be called the aim of reason.”⁸⁶

Happiness is hidden from a free and casual will; it belongs rather to one chastened by a long education and unfolded in an atmosphere of sacred and perfected institutions. It is discipline that renders men rational and capable of happiness, by suppressing without hatred what needs to be suppressed to attain a beautiful naturalness. Discipline discredits the random pleasures of illusion, hope, and triumph, and substitutes those which are self-reproductive, perennial, and serene, because they express an equilibrium maintained with reality.⁸⁷

Post-rational moralities are those that followed the dissolution of the grandeur of classical Greek civilization—that is, every prominent morality since the death of Alexander the Great. An immediate successor to the golden age, Epicurus, coined a philosophy that “expresses well the genuine sentiment of persons, at once mild and emancipated,

⁸² *Science*, 212.

⁸³ *Science*, 214.

⁸⁴ *Science*, 240.

⁸⁵ *Science*, 239.

⁸⁶ *Science*, 251–52.

⁸⁷ *Science*, 252–53.

who find themselves floating on the ebb-tide of some civilisation, and enjoying its fruits, without any longer representing the forces that brought that civilisation about.”⁸⁸ Even Spinoza’s *Ethics* has a prominent postrational theme. Most of these philosophies “embodied a more or less complete despair.”⁸⁹ “Pessimism, and all the moralities founded on despair, are not pre-rational but post-rational.”⁹⁰

Postrational systems are a gamble—a desperate gamble that places all its hopes and yearning on but one eventual good.

For it occurs to the founders of these systems that by estranging oneself from the world, or resting in the moment’s pleasure, or mortifying the passions, or enduring all sufferings in patience, or studying a perfect conformity with the course of affairs, one may gain admission to some sort of residual mystical paradise; and this thought, once conceived, is published as a revelation and accepted as a panacea.⁹¹

These moralities tended increasingly to be explicitly religious, propagating theologies and moral principles that prescribe belief and conduct of a sort to preserve the postrational salvation. Here, on a universal scale, we see the invention of elaborate supernatural systems to explain what is in fact perfectly natural.⁹² Santayana explains, “When human life is in an acute crisis, the sick dreams that visit the soul are the only evidence of her continued existence. Through them she still envisages a good; and when the delirium passes and the normal world gradually re-establishes itself in her regard, she attributes her regeneration to the ministry of those phantoms, a regeneration due, in truth, to the restored nutrition and circulation within her.”⁹³

Santayana’s pessimism about the actualization of the life of reason is surely warranted if we construe that life in the same manner as he. But must we? The ideal of the harmony of the soul and harmony with all that the soul depends upon is certainly out of reach; but must we suppose that happiness in ideal life requires that much? Some good measure of harmony in the self and with the world is surely necessary, but certainly one can have a deep and abiding happiness with something less than perfection. A truly free and disillusioned person, more-

⁸⁸ *Science*, 271.

⁸⁹ *Science*, 263.

⁹⁰ *Science*, 266.

⁹¹ *Science*, 267.

⁹² The invention need not be supernatural. Any fiction will do, and they proliferate from the hands of philosophers today.

⁹³ *Science*, 267.

over, could not and should not be at peace with all of existence, which is riddled with irremediable tragedy and defect. As noted earlier, Santayana does not show the same enthusiasm for virtue as his justly beloved Greeks did. In his praises of virtue, Aristotle acknowledges that there are inevitable limitations and sufferings even in the best of lives, but they are much ameliorated and endured with greater equanimity when one is in possession of virtue—and without sacrifice of one's affirmation of life. If Santayana had treated rational morality with a more inclusive definition—I do not say a more permissive definition—the life of reason would be no less alluring and ideal, and it would accommodate lovers of the good without risk that they would hover at the brink of postrational despair.

Santayana's masterwork is by no means essentially damaged by such questions. No one in his time or since has written of ideal life with such breadth and penetration as he. Indeed, his many robust and engaging accounts of ideal goods in *The Life of Reason* can stand on their own: their validity and their satisfaction of *eros* do not depend on their incorporation into a fully unified self.

Volume V—and the entirety of *The Life of Reason*—concludes with an argument in defense of science and a critique of major rivals to the cognitive ascendancy of science. On the validity of science depends “that whole Life of Reason which science crowns...”⁹⁴ This seems an overstatement in light of all the praise given the Socratics, who knew nothing of experimental science. The claim will perhaps seem less overdrawn if we return to Santayana's distinction between poetry and science. Socratic philosophy was, after all, enclosed in myth. The utterly superb *Symposium* has no science in it, but as poetry it is unmatched in its evocation of the ideal; and for that reason it deserves our love and praise. But we cannot praise it as literal experimental truth. Insofar as scientific dialectic is needful to bring the life of reason deliberately to fruition, we can suppose that the Greek vision is lacking. (The prevalence of postrational moralities will continue, moreover, with the discrediting of science in the moral life.)

⁹⁴ *Science*, 301.



There are many continuities between the earlier work of Santayana, which includes *The Life of Reason*, and the later; and there are also significant differences. As yet, no one has sorted them fully. It is safe to say, just the same, that scholars and philosophers have been divided in their allegiance between the earlier and later. I confine my comment to the stature of *The Life of Reason*. The philosophical naturalism in that book captivated many of Santayana's peers, especially those in the Faculty of Philosophy at Columbia, where Dewey had recently settled. They, and not his successors at Harvard, became the principal authors of philosophical naturalism in America for the next several decades; and they acknowledged their abiding debt to Santayana.⁹⁵

Even before mid-century, however, the influence of naturalism began to fade. It is difficult to say why this happened. It seems that the high vitality required to continue the achievements of a Santayana or a Dewey and their immediate successors cannot be easily sustained. At the same time, the increasing professionalization of philosophy seems to smother love of wisdom and replace it with concerns for personal advancement and reputation. Professionalization in the academy, that is, brings its own mortal obsession with instrumentalities.

The fate of *The Life of Reason* today depends in part on the fate of philosophical naturalism. Ordinary language philosophy and logical positivism, neither of which is naturalistic in the intended sense, came to dominate English-speaking philosophy, and James, Santayana, and Dewey went into eclipse. In time, nevertheless, many persons became impatient with the barren state of philosophy, and many of them returned to classic American philosophy, especially to the same three: James, Santayana, and Dewey. Today the scholarship on these figures is decidedly on the increase, and perhaps it will help to return naturalism to prominence.

Still, no one knows what will rescue philosophy from its accustomed practice of feeding on itself. The influence that Santayana

⁹⁵ One of the most prominent members of that faculty, Justus Buchler, refers to Santayana as a "great philosopher" and one who "revolutionized naturalism," saying, "His contribution to the philosophic heritage and to the idiom of the human imagination is enormous." (Justus Buchler, "One Santayana or Two?" in *Animal Faith and Spiritual Life*, edited by John Lachs [New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967], 71.) This assessment was shared by many of Buchler's predecessors and colleagues at Columbia.

might have on such a happy event is not wholly dependent upon his naturalism, as such. His achievement as the poet of the life of reason might be equally inspirational, if not more so; and that is also the chief avenue of entry into his naturalism. Naturalism, once again, is never engaged in the pursuit of technicalities as an end in itself. It is distinguished for its attention to life experience and for its intent to clarify and strengthen it. *The Life of Reason* is an excellent case in point. Its subject matter is of the highest import, and for that reason alone it is uncommonly attractive. Although Santayana himself would be much dismayed at the thought of separating *The Life of Reason* from its intrinsic naturalism, the separation is only temporary: Once an erotic and inquisitive soul has been seized by Santayana's insight and artistry, that soul might well gain an increased appreciation for the ideal's perennial foundations in philosophic naturalism. Might this bring "restored nutrition and circulation" to naturalism and hence to philosophy?

The nature and value of naturalism are well exemplified by Santayana and others, yet a full discussion of this philosophic stance is yet to be written. Although it is impossible to predict what will befall naturalism in times to come, a confident assessment of *The Life of Reason* needn't wait upon the future. We can judge Santayana's achievement as a moralist in comparison to his peers and predecessors. Dewey published a perceptive and highly laudatory review of *The Life of Reason* in 1907 (but not without reservations). In it he declared these volumes "the most adequate contribution America has yet made—always excepting Emerson—to moral philosophy."⁹⁶ The exception of Emerson is unconvincing: a brilliant and exciting essayist on moral topics, unmistakably, but of little substance as a philosopher. The status of Santayana as an American moral philosopher depends, in fact, on how one rates him in comparison to Dewey. On most issues regarding the status of the moral life in nature, Dewey's thought is more developed; but Dewey is not the equal of Santayana in either the characterization of ideal life or in the quickening of *eros*.

On that score, Santayana has few challengers in all of modern philosophy. Spinoza surely is superior in this regard, and one could

⁹⁶John Dewey, review of *The Life of Reason*, in *John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899–1924*, volume 4: 1907–1909, edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 241.

make a strong case for Nietzsche (whom Santayana disdained, largely due to his extreme romanticism). Be that as it may, if one seeks a book in philosophy not for academic formalities but for sustained wisdom about the ideal goods that could promise happiness and meaning in his life, then he would do well to choose *The Life of Reason*, learning of these goods throughout the sweep of Western history and in the most consequential sorts of human endeavor; and he would know them not as random or unintelligible events but as emergent of the fecundity of nature. The seeker of ideal life would inherit entry to the moral resources of nature and history. In the right hands such a work could again be enough to stimulate some manner of renewal and accomplishment.

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INTRODUCTION

THE SUBJECT OF THIS WORK, ITS METHOD AND ANTECEDENTS

Whatever forces may govern human life, if they are to be recognised by man, must betray themselves in human experience. Progress in science or religion, no less than in morals and art, is a dramatic episode in man's career, a welcome variation in his habit and state of mind; although this variation may often regard or propitiate things external, adjustment to which may be important for his welfare. The importance of these external things, as well as their existence, he can establish only by the function and utility which a recognition of them may have in his life. The entire history of progress is a moral drama, a tale man might unfold in a great autobiography, could his myriad heads and countless scintillas of consciousness conspire, like the seventy Alexandrian sages, in a single version of the truth committed to each for interpretation. What themes would prevail in such an examination of heart? In what order and with what emphasis would they be recounted? In which of its adventures would the human race, reviewing its whole experience, acknowledge a progress and a gain? To answer these questions, as they may be answered speculatively and provisionally by an individual, is the purpose of the following work.

Progress is relative to an ideal which reflection creates.

A philosopher could hardly have a higher ambition than to make himself a mouth-piece for the memory and judgment of his race. Yet the most casual consideration of affairs already involves an attempt to do the same thing. Reflection is pregnant from the beginning with all the principles of synthesis and valuation needed in the most comprehensive criticism. So soon as man ceases to be wholly immersed in sense, he looks before and after, he regrets and desires; and the moments in which prospect or retrospect takes place constitute the reflective or represen-

Efficacious reflection is reason.

tative part of his life, in contrast to the unmitigated flux of sensations in which nothing ulterior is regarded. Representation, however, can hardly remain idle and merely speculative. To the ideal function of envisaging the absent, memory and reflection will add (since they exist and constitute a new complication in being) the practical function of modifying the future. Vital impulse, however, when it is modified by reflection and veers in sympathy with judgments pronounced on the past, is properly called reason. Man's rational life consists in those moments in which reflection not only occurs but proves efficacious. What is absent then works in the present, and values are imputed where they cannot be felt. Such representation is so far from being merely speculative that its presence alone can raise bodily change to the dignity of action. Reflection gathers experiences together and perceives their relative worth; which is as much as to say that it expresses a new attitude of will in the presence of a world better understood and turned to some purpose. The limits of reflection mark those of concerted and rational action; they circumscribe the field of cumulative experience, or, what is the same thing, of profitable living.

The Life of Reason a name for all practical thought and all action justified by its fruits in consciousness.

Thus if we use the word life in a eulogistic sense to designate the happy maintenance against the world of some definite ideal interest, we may say with Aristotle that life is reason in operation. The *Life of Reason* will then be a name for that part of experience which perceives and pursues ideals—all conduct so controlled and all sense so interpreted as to perfect natural happiness.

Without reason, as without memory, there might still be pleasures and pains in existence. To increase those pleasures and reduce those pains would be to introduce an improvement into the sentient world, as if a devil suddenly died in hell or in heaven a new angel were created. Since the beings, however, in which these values would reside, would, by hypothesis, know nothing of one another, and since the betterment would take place unprayed-for and unnoticed, it could hardly be called a progress; and certainly not a progress in man, since man, without the ideal continuity given by memory and reason, would have no moral being. In human progress, therefore, reason is not a casual instrument, having its sole value in its service to sense; such a betterment in sentience would not be progress unless it were a progress in reason, and the increasing pleasure revealed some object

that could please; for without a picture of the situation from which a heightened vitality might flow, the improvement could be neither remembered nor measured nor desired. The Life of Reason is accordingly neither a mere means nor a mere incident in human progress; it is the total and embodied progress itself, in which the pleasures of sense are included in so far as they can be intelligently enjoyed and pursued. To recount man's rational moments would be to take an inventory of all his goods; for he is not himself (as we say with unconscious accuracy) in the others. If he ever appropriates them in recollection or prophecy, it is only on the ground of some physical relation which they may have to his being.

Reason is as old as man and as prevalent as human nature; for we should not recognise an animal to be human unless his instincts were to some degree conscious of their ends and rendered his ideas in that measure relevant to conduct. Many sensations, or even a whole world of dreams, do not amount to intelligence until the images in the mind begin to represent in some way, however symbolic, the forces and realities confronted in action. There may well be intense consciousness in the total absence of rationality. Such consciousness is suggested in dreams, in madness, and may be found, for all we know, in the depths of universal nature. Minds peopled only by desultory visions and lusts would not have the dignity of human souls even if they seemed to pursue certain objects unerringly; for that pursuit would not be illumined by any vision of its goal. Reason and humanity begin with the union of instinct and ideation, when instinct becomes enlightened, establishes values in its objects, and is turned from a process into an art, while at the same time consciousness becomes practical and cognitive, beginning to contain some symbol or record of the coordinate realities among which it arises.

Reason accordingly requires the fusion of two types of life, commonly led in the world in well-nigh total separation, one a life of impulse expressed in affairs and social passions, the other a life of reflection expressed in religion, science, and the imitative arts. In the Life of Reason, if it were brought to perfection, intelligence would be at once the universal method of practice and its continual reward. All reflection would then be applicable in action and all action fruitful in happiness. Though this be an ideal, yet everyone gives it from time to time a partial embodiment when he practises useful arts, when his

passions happily lead him to enlightenment, or when his fancy breeds visions pertinent to his ultimate good. Everyone leads the Life of Reason in so far as he finds a steady light behind the world's glitter and a clear residuum of joy beneath pleasure or success. No experience not to be repented of falls without its sphere. Every solution to a doubt, in so far as it is not a new error, every practical achievement not neutralised by a second maladjustment consequent upon it, every consolation not the seed of another greater sorrow, may be gathered together and built into this edifice. The Life of Reason is the happy marriage of two elements—impulse and ideation—which if wholly divorced would reduce man to a brute or to a maniac. The rational animal is generated by the union of these two monsters. He is constituted by ideas which have ceased to be visionary and actions which have ceased to be vain.

Thus the Life of Reason is another name for what, in the widest sense of the word, might be called Art. Operations become arts when their purpose is conscious and their method teachable. In perfect art the whole idea is creative and exists only to be embodied, while every part of the product is rational and gives delightful expression to that idea. Like art, again, the Life of Reason is not a power but a result, the spontaneous expression of liberal genius in a favouring environment. Both art and reason have natural sources and meet with natural checks; but when a process is turned successfully into an art, so that its issues have value and the ideas that accompany it become practical and cognitive, reflection, finding little that it cannot in some way justify and understand, begins to boast that it directs and has created the world in which it finds itself so much at home. Thus if art could extend its sphere to include every activity in nature, reason, being everywhere exemplified, might easily think itself omnipotent. This ideal, far as it is from actual realisation, has so dazzled men, that in their religion and mythical philosophy they have often spoken as if it were already actual and efficient. This anticipation amounts, when taken seriously, to a confusion of purposes with facts and of functions with causes, a confusion which in the interests of wisdom and progress it is important to avoid; but these speculative fables, when we take them for what they are—poetic expressions of the ideal—help us to see how deeply rooted this ideal is in man's mind, and afford us a standard by which to measure his

It is the
sum of Art.

approaches to the rational perfection of which he dreams. For the Life of Reason, being the sphere of all human art, is man's imitation of divinity.

To study such an ideal, dimly expressed though it be in human existence, is no prophetic or visionary undertaking. Every genuine ideal has a natural basis; anyone may understand and safely interpret it who is attentive to the life from which it springs. To decipher the Life of Reason nothing is needed but an analytic spirit and a judicious love of man, a love quick to distinguish success from failure in his great and confused experiment of living. The historian of reason should not be a romantic poet, vibrating impotently to every impulse he finds afoot, without a criterion of excellence or a vision of perfection. Ideals are free, but they are neither more numerous nor more variable than the living natures that generate them. Ideals are legitimate, and each initially envisages a genuine and innocent good; but they are not realisable together, nor even singly when they have no deep roots in the world. Neither is the philosopher compelled by his somewhat judicial office to be a satirist or censor, without sympathy for those tentative and ingenuous passions out of which, after all, his own standards must arise. He is the chronicler of human progress, and to measure that progress he should be equally attentive to the impulses that give it direction and to the circumstances amid which it stumbles toward its natural goal.

It has a natural basis which makes it definable.

There is unfortunately no school of modern philosophy to which a critique of human progress can well be attached. Almost every school, indeed, can furnish something useful to the critic, sometimes a physical theory, sometimes a piece of logical analysis. We shall need to borrow from current science and speculation the picture they draw of man's conditions and environment, his history and mental habits. These may furnish a theatre and properties for our drama; but they offer no hint of its plot and meaning. A great imaginative apathy has fallen on the mind. One-half the learned world is amused in tinkering obsolete armour, as Don Quixote did his helmet; deputing it, after a series of catastrophes, to be at last sound and invulnerable. The other half, the naturalists who have studied psychology and evolution, look at life from the outside, and the processes of Nature make them forget her uses. Bacon indeed had

Modern philosophy not helpful.

prized science for adding to the comforts of life, a function still commemorated by positivists in their eloquent moments. Habitually, however, when they utter the word progress it is, in their mouths, a synonym for inevitable change, or at best for change in that direction which they conceive to be on the whole predominant. If they combine with physical speculation some elements of morals, these are usually purely formal, to the effect that happiness is to be pursued (probably, alas! because to do so is a psychological law); but what happiness consists in we gather only from casual observations or by putting together their national prejudices and party saws.

The truth is that even this radical school, emancipated as it thinks itself, is suffering from the after-effects of supernaturalism. Like children escaped from school, they find their whole happiness in freedom. They are proud of what they have rejected, as if a great wit were required to do so; but they do not know what they want. If you astonish them by demanding what is their positive ideal, further than that there should be a great many people and that they should be all alike, they will say at first that what ought to be is obvious, and later they will submit the matter to a majority vote. They have discarded the machinery in which their ancestors embodied the ideal; they have not perceived that those symbols stood for the Life of Reason and gave fantastic and embarrassed expression to what, in itself, is pure humanity; and they have thus remained entangled in the colossal error that ideals are something adventitious and unmeaning, not having a soil in mortal life nor a possible fulfilment there.

The profound and pathetic ideas which inspired Christianity were attached in the beginning to ancient myths and soon crystallised into many new ones. The mythical manner pervades Christian philosophy; but myth succeeds in expressing ideal life only by misrepresenting its history and conditions. This method was indeed not original with the Fathers; they borrowed it from Plato, who appealed to parables himself in an open and harmless fashion, yet with disastrous consequences to his school. Nor was he the first; for the instinct to regard poetic fictions as revelations of supernatural facts is as old as the soul's primitive incapacity to distinguish dreams from waking perceptions, sign from thing signified, and inner emotions

Positivism no
positive ideal.

Christian
philosophy
mythical: it
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facts and
conditions.

from external powers. Such confusions, though in a way they obey moral forces, make a rational estimate of things impossible. To misrepresent the conditions and consequences of action is no merely speculative error; it involves a false emphasis in character and an artificial balance and co-ordination among human pursuits. When ideals are hypostasised into powers alleged to provide for their own expression, the Life of Reason cannot be conceived; in theory its field of operation is pre-empted and its function gone, while in practice its inner impulses are turned awry by artificial stimulation and repression.

The Patristic systems, though weak in their foundations, were extraordinarily wise and comprehensive in their working out; and while they inverted life they preserved it. Dogma added to the universe fabulous perspectives; it interpolated also innumerable incidents and powers which gave a new dimension to experience. Yet the old world remained standing in its strange setting, like the Pantheon in modern Rome; and, what is more important, the natural springs of human action were still acknowledged, and if a supernatural discipline was imposed, it was only because experience and faith had disclosed a situation in which the pursuit of earthly happiness seemed hopeless. Nature was not destroyed by its novel appendages, nor did reason die in the cloister: it hibernated there, and could come back to its own in due season, only a little dazed and weakened by its long confinement. Such, at least, is the situation in Catholic regions, where the Patristic philosophy has not appreciably varied. Among Protestants Christian dogma has taken a new and ambiguous direction, which has at once minimised its disturbing effect in practice and isolated its primary illusion. The symptoms have been cured and the disease driven in.

The tenets of Protestant bodies are notoriously varied and on principle subject to change. There is hardly a combination of tradition and spontaneity which has not been tried in some quarter. If we think, however, of broad tendencies and ultimate issues, it appears that in Protestantism myth, without disappearing, has changed its relation to reality: instead of being an extension to the natural world myth has become its substratum. Religion no longer reveals divine personalities, future rewards, and tenderer Elysian consolations; nor

**Liberal
theology a
superstitious
attitude toward
a natural world.**

does it seriously propose a heaven to be reached by a ladder nor a purgatory to be shortened by prescribed devotions. It merely gives the real world an ideal status and teaches men to accept a natural life on supernatural grounds. The consequence is that the most pious can give an unvarnished description of things. Even immortality and the idea of God are submitted, in liberal circles, to scientific treatment. On the other hand, it would be hard to conceive a more inveterate obsession than that which keeps the attitude of these same minds inappropriate to the objects they envisage. They have accepted natural conditions; they will not accept natural ideals. The Life of Reason has no existence for them, because, although its field is clear, they will not tolerate any human or finite standard of value, and will not suffer extant interests, which can alone guide them in action or judgment, to define the worth of life.

The after-effects of Hebraism are here contrary to its foundations; for the Jews loved the world so much that they brought themselves, in order to win and enjoy it, to an intense concentration of purpose; but this effort and discipline, which had of course been mythically sanctioned, not only failed of its object, but grew far too absolute and sublime to think its object could ever have been earthly; and the supernatural machinery which was to have secured prosperity, while that still enticed, now had to furnish some worthier object for the passion it had artificially fostered. Fanaticism consists in redoubling your effort when you have forgotten your aim.

An earnestness which is out of proportion to any knowledge or love of real things, which is therefore dark and inward and thinks itself deeper than the earth's foundations—such an earnestness, until culture turns it into intelligent interests, will naturally breed a new mythology. It will try to place some world of Afrites and shadowy giants behind the constellations, which it finds too distinct and constant to be its companions or supporters; and it will assign to itself vague and infinite tasks, for which it is doubtless better equipped than for those which the earth now sets before it. Even these, however, since they are parts of an infinite whole, the mystic may (histrionically, perhaps, yet zealously) undertake; but as his eye will be perpetually fixed on something invisible beyond, and nothing will be done for its own sake or enjoyed in its own fugitive presence, there will be little art and little joy in existence. All will be a tossing servitude and illiberal mist,

where the parts will have no final values and the whole no pertinent direction.

In Greek philosophy the situation is far more auspicious. The ancients led a rational life and envisaged the various spheres of speculation as men might whose central interests were rational. In physics they leaped at once to the conception of a dynamic unity and general evolution, thus giving that background to human life which shrewd observation would always have descried, and which modern science has laboriously rediscovered. Two great systems offered, in two legitimate directions, what are doubtless the final and radical accounts of physical being. Heraclitus, describing the immediate, found it to be in constant and pervasive change: no substances, no forms, no identities could be arrested there, but as in the human soul, so in nature, all was instability, contradiction, reconstruction, and oblivion. This remains the empirical fact; and we need but to rescind the artificial division which Descartes has taught us to make between nature and life, to feel again the absolute aptness of Heraclitus's expressions. These were thought obscure only because they were so disconcertingly penetrating and direct. The immediate is what nobody sees, because convention and reflection turn existence, as soon as they can, into ideas; a man who discloses the immediate seems profound, yet his depth is nothing but innocence recovered and a sort of intellectual abstention. Mysticism, scepticism, and transcendentalism have all in their various ways tried to fall back on the immediate; but none of them has been ingenuous enough. Each has added some myth, or sophistry, or delusive artifice to its direct observation. Heraclitus remains the honest prophet of immediacy: a mystic without raptures or bad rhetoric, a sceptic who does not rely for his results on conventions unwittingly adopted, a transcendentalist without false pretensions or incongruous dogmas.

The Greeks thought straight in both physics and morals.

Heraclitus and the immediate.

The immediate is not, however, a good subject for discourse, and the expounders of Heraclitus were not unnaturally blamed for monotony. All they could do was to iterate their master's maxim, and declare everything to be in flux. In suggesting laws of recurrence and a reason in which what is common to many might be expressed, Heraclitus had opened the door into another region: had he passed through, his philosophy would have been greatly modified, for per-

manent forms would have forced themselves on his attention no less than shifting materials. Such a Heraclitus would have anticipated Plato; but the time for such a synthesis had not yet arrived.

At the opposite pole from immediacy lies intelligibility. To reduce phenomena to constant elements, as similar and simple as possible,

**Democritus and
the naturally
intelligible.**

and to conceive their union and separation to obey constant laws, is what a natural philosopher will inevitably do so soon as his interest is not merely to utter experience but to understand it. Democritus brought this scientific ideal to its ultimate expression. By including psychic existence in his atomic system, he indicated a problem which natural science has since practically abandoned but which it may some day be compelled to take up. The atoms of Democritus seem to us gross, even for chemistry, and their quality would have to undergo great transformation if they were to support intelligibly psychic being as well; but that very grossness and false simplicity had its merits, and science must be for ever grateful to the man who at its inception could so clearly formulate its mechanical ideal. That the world is not so intelligible as we could wish is not to be wondered at. In other respects also it fails to respond to our ideals; yet our hope must be to find it more propitious to the intellect as well as to all the arts in proportion as we learn better how to live in it.

The atoms of what we call hydrogen or oxygen may well turn out to be worlds, as the stars are which make atoms for astronomy. Their inner organisation might be negligible on our rude plane of being; did it disclose itself, however, it would be intelligible in its turn only if constant parts and constant laws were discernible within each system. So that while atomism at a given level may not be a final or metaphysical truth, it will describe, on every level, the practical and efficacious structure of the world. We owe to Democritus this ideal of practical intelligibility; and he is accordingly an eternal spokesman of reason. His system, long buried with other glories of the world, has been partly revived; and although it cannot be verified in haste, for it represents an ultimate ideal, every advance in science reconstitutes it in some particular. Mechanism is not one principle of explanation among others. In natural philosophy, where to explain means to discover origins, transmutations, and laws, mechanism is explanation itself.

Heraclitus had the good fortune of having his physics absorbed by Plato. It is a pity that Democritus' physics was not absorbed by Aristotle. For with the flux observed, and mechanism conceived to explain it, the theory of existence is complete; and had a complete physical theory been incorporated into the Socratic philosophy, wisdom would have lacked none of its parts. Democritus, however, appeared too late, when ideal science had overrun the whole field and initiated a verbal and dialectical physics; so that Aristotle, for all his scientific temper and studies, built his natural philosophy on a lamentable misunderstanding, and condemned thought to confusion for two thousand years.

If the happy freedom of the Greeks from religious dogma made them the first natural philosophers, their happy political freedom made them the first moralists. It was no accident that Socrates walked the Athenian agora; it was no petty patriotism that made him shrink from any other scene. His science had its roots there, in the personal independence, intellectual vivacity, and clever dialectic of his countrymen. Ideal science lives in discourse; it consists in the active exercise of reason, in signification, appreciation, intent, and self-expression. Its sum total is to know oneself, not as psychology or anthropology might describe a man, but to know, as the saying is, one's own mind. Nor is he who knows his own mind forbidden to change it; the dialectician has nothing to do with future possibilities or with the opinion of anyone but the man addressed. This kind of truth is but adequate veracity; its only object is its own intent. Having developed in the spirit the consciousness of its meanings and purposes, Socrates rescued logic and ethics for ever from authority. With his friends the Sophists, he made man the measure of all things, after bidding him measure himself, as they neglected to do, by his own ideal. That brave humanity which had first raised its head in Hellas and had endowed so many things in heaven and earth, where everything was hitherto monstrous, with proportion and use, so that man's works might justify themselves to his mind, now found in Socrates its precise definition; and it was naturally where the Life of Reason had been long cultivated that it came finally to be conceived.

**Socrates and
the autonomy
of mind.**

Socrates had, however, a plebeian strain in his humanity, and his utilitarianism, at least in its expression, hardly did justice to what gives

utility to life. His condemnation for atheism—if we choose to take it symbolically—was not altogether unjust: the gods of Greece were not honoured explicitly enough in his philosophy. Human good appeared there in its principle; you would not set a pilot to mend shoes, because you knew your own purpose; but what purposes a civilised soul might harbour, and in what highest shapes the good might appear, was a problem that seems not to have attracted his genius. It was reserved to Plato to bring the Socratic ethics to its sublimest expression and to elicit from the depths of the Greek conscience those ancestral ideals which had inspired its legislators and been embodied in its sacred civic traditions. The owl of Minerva flew, as Hegel says, in the dusk of evening; and it was horror at the abandonment of all creative virtues that brought Plato to conceive them so sharply and to preach them in so sad a tone. It was after all but the love of beauty that made him censure the poets; for like a true Greek and a true lover he wished to see beauty flourish in the real world. It was love of freedom that made him harsh to his ideal citizens, that they might be strong enough to preserve the liberal life. And when he broke away from political preoccupations and turned to the inner life, his interpretations proved the absolute sufficiency of the Socratic method; and he left nothing pertinent unsaid on ideal love and ideal immortality.

Beyond this point no rendering of the Life of Reason has ever been carried. Aristotle improved the detail, and gave breadth and precision to many a part. If Plato possessed greater imaginative splendour and more enthusiasm in austerity, Aristotle had perfect sobriety and adequacy, with greater fidelity to the common sentiments of his race. Plato, by virtue of his scope and plasticity, together with a certain prophetic zeal, outran at times the limits of the Hellenic and the rational; he saw human virtue so surrounded and oppressed by physical dangers that he wished to give it mythical sanctions, and his fondness for transmigration and nether punishments was somewhat more than playful. If as a work of imagination his philosophy holds the first place, Aristotle's has the decisive advantage of being the unalloyed expression of reason. In Aristotle the conception of human nature is perfectly sound; everything ideal has a natural basis and everything natural an ideal development. His ethics, when thoroughly digested

Plato gave the ideal its full expression.

Aristotle supplied its natural basis.

and weighed, especially when the meagre outlines are filled in with Plato's more discursive expositions, will seem therefore entirely final. The Life of Reason finds there its classic explication.

As it is improbable that there will soon be another people so free from preoccupations, so gifted, and so fortunate as the Greeks, or capable in consequence of so well exemplifying humanity, so also it is improbable that a philosopher will soon arise with Aristotle's scope, judgment, or authority, one knowing so well how to be both reasonable and exalted. It might seem vain, therefore, to try to do afresh what has been done before with unapproachable success; and instead of writing inferior things at great length about the Life of Reason, it might be simpler to read and to propagate what Aristotle wrote with such immortal justness and masterly brevity. But times change; and though the principles of reason remain the same the facts of human life and of human conscience alter. A new background, a new basis of application, appears for logic, and it may be useful to restate old truths in new words, the better to prove their eternal validity. Aristotle is, in his morals, Greek, concise, and elementary. As a Greek, he mixes with the ideal argument illustrations, appreciations, and conceptions which are not inseparable from its essence. In themselves, no doubt, these accessories are better than what in modern times would be substituted for them, being less sophisticated and of a nobler stamp; but to our eyes they disguise what is profound and universal in natural morality by embodying it in images which do not belong to our life. Our direst struggles and the last sanctions of our morality do not appear in them. The pagan world, because its maturity was simpler than our crudeness, seems childish to us. We do not find there our sins and holiness, our love, charity, and honour.

The Greek too would not find in our world the things he valued most, things to which he surrendered himself, perhaps, with a more constant self-sacrifice—piety, country, friendship, and beauty; and he might add that his ideals were rational and he could attain them, while ours are extravagant and have been missed. Yet even if we acknowledged his greater good fortune, it would be impossible for us to go back and become like him. To make the attempt would show no sense of reality and little sense of humour. We must dress in our own clothes, if we do not wish to substitute a masquerade for practical existence.

Philosophy thus complete, yet in need of restatement.

What we can adopt from Greek morals is only the abstract principle of their development; their foundation in all the extant forces of human nature and their effort toward establishing a perfect harmony among them. These forces themselves have perceptibly changed, at least in their relative power. Thus we are more conscious of wounds to stanch and wrongs to fight against, and less of goods to attain. The movement of conscience has veered; the centre of gravity lies in another part of the character.

Another circumstance that invites a restatement of rational ethics is the impressive illustration of their principle which subsequent history has afforded. Mankind has been making extraordinary experiments of which Aristotle could not dream; and their result is calculated to clarify even his philosophy. For in some respects it needed experiments and clarification. He had been led into a systematic fusion of dialectic with physics, and of this fusion all pretentious modern philosophy is the aggravated extension. Socrates' pupils could not abandon his ideal principles, yet they could not bear to abstain from physics altogether; they therefore made a mock physics in moral terms, out of which theology was afterward developed. Plato, standing nearer to Socrates and being no naturalist by disposition, never carried the fatal experiment beyond the mythical stage. He accordingly remained the purer moralist, much as Aristotle's judgment may be preferred in many particulars. Their relative position may be roughly indicated by saying that Plato had no physics and that Aristotle's physics was false; so that ideal science in the one suffered from want of environment and control, while in the other it suffered from misuse in a sphere where it had no application.

What had happened was briefly this: Plato, having studied many sorts of philosophy and being a bold and universal genius, was not satisfied to leave all physical questions pending, as his master had done. He adopted, accordingly, Heraclitus's doctrine of the immediate, which he now called the realm of phenomena; for what exists at any instant, if you arrest and name it, turns out to have been an embodiment of some logical essence, such as discourse might define; in every fact some idea makes its appearance, and such an apparition of the ideal is a phenomenon. Moreover, another philosophy had made a deep impression on Plato's mind and had helped to develop Socratic definitions:

Plato's myths in lieu of physics.

Parmenides had called the concept of pure Being the only reality; and to satisfy the strong dialectic by which this doctrine was supported and at the same time to bridge the infinite chasm between one formless substance and many appearances irrelevant to it, Plato substituted the many Socratic ideas, all of which were relevant to appearance, for the one concept of Parmenides. The ideas thus acquired what is called metaphysical subsistence; for they stood in the place of the Eleatic Absolute, and at the same time were the realities that phenomena manifested.

The technique of this combination is much to be admired; but the feat is technical and adds nothing to the significance of what Plato has to say on any concrete subject. This barren triumph was, however, fruitful in misunderstandings. The characters and values a thing possessed were now conceived to subsist apart from it, and might even have preceded it and caused its existence; a mechanism composed of values and definitions could thus be placed behind phenomena to constitute a substantial physical world. Such a dream could not be taken seriously, until good sense was wholly lost and a bevy of magic spirits could be imagined peopling the infinite and yet carrying on the business of earth. Aristotle rejected the metaphysical subsistence of ideas, but thought they might still be essences operative in nature, if only they were identified with the life or form of particular things. The dream thus lost its frank wildness, but none of its inherent incongruity: for the sense in which characters and values make a thing what it is, is purely dialectical. They give it its status in the ideal world; but the appearance of these characters and values here and now is what needs explanation in physics, an explanation which can be furnished, of course, only by the physical concatenation and distribution of causes.

Aristotle himself did not fail to make this necessary distinction between efficient cause and formal essence; but as his science was only natural history, and mechanism had no plausibility in his eyes, the efficiency of the cause was always due, in his view, to its ideal quality; as in heredity the father's human character, not his physical structure, might seem to warrant the son's humanity. Every ideal, before it could be embodied, had to pre-exist in some other embodiment; but as when the ultimate purpose of the cosmos is con-

Aristotle's final causes. Modern science can avoid such expedients.

sidered it seems to lie beyond any given embodiment, the highest ideal must somehow exist disembodied. It must pre-exist, thought Aristotle, in order to supply, by way of magic attraction, a physical cause for perpetual movement in the world.

It must be confessed, in justice to this consummate philosopher, who is not less masterly in the use of knowledge than unhappy in divination, that the transformation of the highest good into a physical power is merely incidental with him, and due to a want of faith (at that time excusable) in mechanism and evolution. Aristotle's deity is always a moral ideal and every detail in its definition is based on discrimination between the better and the worse. No accommodation to the ways of nature is here allowed to cloud the kingdom of heaven; this deity is not condemned to do whatever happens nor to absorb whatever exists. It is mythical only in its physical application; in moral philosophy it remains a legitimate conception.

Truth certainly exists, if existence be not too mean an attribute for that eternal realm which is tenanted by ideals; but truth is repugnant to physical or psychical being. Moreover, truth may very well be identified with an impassible intellect, which should do nothing but possess all truth, with no point of view, no animal warmth, and no transitive process. Such an intellect and truth are expressions having a different metaphorical background and connotation, but, when thought out, an identical import. They both attempt to evoke that ideal standard which human thought proposes to itself. This function is their effective essence. It insures their eternal fixity, and this property surely endows them with a very genuine and sublime reality. What is fantastic is only the dynamic function attributed to them by Aristotle, which obliges them to inhabit some fabulous extension to the physical world. Even this physical efficacy, however, is spiritualised as much as possible, since deity is said to move the cosmos only as an object of love or an object of knowledge may move the mind. Such efficacy is imputed to a hypostasised end, but evidently resides in fact in the functioning and impulsive spirit that conceives and pursues an ideal, endowing it with whatever attraction it may seem to have. The absolute intellect described by Aristotle remains, therefore, as pertinent to the Life of Reason as Plato's idea of the good. Though less comprehensive (for it abstracts from all animal interests, from all passion and mortality), it is more adequate and distinct in the region

it dominates. It expresses sublimely the goal of speculative thinking; which is none other than to live as much as may be in the eternal and to absorb and be absorbed in the truth.

The rest of ancient philosophy belongs to the decadence and rests in physics on eclecticism and in morals on despair. That creative breath which had stirred the founders and legislators of Greece no longer inspired their descendants. Helpless to control the course of events, they took refuge in abstention or in conformity, and their ethics became a matter of private economy and sentiment, no longer aspiring to mould the state or give any positive aim to existence. The time was approaching when both speculation and morals were to regard the other world; reason had abdicated the throne, and religion, after that brief interregnum, resumed it for long ages.

Such are the threads which tradition puts into the hands of an observer who at the present time might attempt to knit the Life of Reason ideally together. The problem is to unite a trustworthy conception of the conditions under which man lives with an adequate conception of his interests. Both conceptions, fortunately, lie before us. Heraclitus and Democritus, in systems easily seen to be complementary, gave long ago a picture of nature such as all later observation, down to our own day, has done nothing but fill out and confirm. Psychology and physics still repeat their ideas, often with richer detail, but never with a more radical or prophetic glance. Nor does the transcendental philosophy, in spite of its self-esteem, add anything essential. It was a thing taken for granted in ancient and scholastic philosophy that a being dwelling, like man, in the immediate, whose moments are in flux, needed constructive reason to interpret his experience and paint in his unstable consciousness some symbolic picture of the world. To have reverted to this constructive process and studied its stages is an interesting achievement; but the construction is already made by common-sense and science, and it was visionary insolence in the Germans to propose to make that construction otherwise. Retrospective self-consciousness is dearly bought if it inhibits the intellect and embarrasses the inferences which, in its spontaneous operation, it has known perfectly how to make. In the heat of scientific theorising or dialectical argument it is sometimes salutary to be

**Transcendentalism
true but
inconsequential.**

reminded that we are men thinking; but, after all, it is no news. We know that life is a dream, and how should thinking be more? Yet the thinking must go on, and the only vital question is to what practical or poetic conceptions it is able to lead us.

Similarly the Socratic philosophy affords a noble and genuine account of what goods may be realised by living. Modern theory has not done so much to help us here, however, as it has in physics. It seldom occurs to modern moralists that theirs is the science of all good and the art of its attainment; they think only of some set of categorical precepts or some theory of moral sentiments, abstracting altogether from the ideals reigning in society, in science, and in art. They deal with the secondary question, What ought I to do? without having answered the primary question, What ought to be? They attach morals to religion rather than to politics, and this religion unhappily long ago ceased to be wisdom expressed in fancy in order to become superstition overlaid with reasoning. They divide man into compartments and the less they leave in the one labelled "morality" the more sublime they think their morality is; and sometimes pedantry and scholasticism are carried so far that nothing but an abstract sense of duty remains in the broad region which should contain all human goods.

Such trivial sanctimony in morals is doubtless due to artificial views about the conditions of welfare; the basis is laid in authority rather than in human nature, and the goal in salvation rather than in happiness. One great modern philosopher, however, was free from these preconceptions, and might have reconstituted the Life of Reason had he had a sufficient interest in culture. Spinoza brought man back into nature, and made him the nucleus of all moral values, showing how he may recognise his environment and how he may master it. But Spinoza's sympathy with mankind fell short of imagination; any noble political or poetical ideal eluded him. Everything impassioned seemed to him insane, everything human necessarily petty. Man was to be a pious tame animal, with the stars shining above his head. Instead of imagination Spinoza cultivated mysticism, which is indeed an alternative. A prophet in speculation, he remained a levite in sentiment. Little or nothing would need to be changed in his system if the Life of Reason, in its higher ranges, were to be grafted upon it; but such affili-

Spinoza and
the Life of
Reason.

ation is not necessary, and it is rendered unnatural by the lack of sweep and generosity in Spinoza's practical ideals.

For moral philosophy we are driven back, then, upon the ancients; but not, of course, for moral inspiration. Industrialism and democracy, the French Revolution, the Renaissance, and even the Catholic system, which in the midst of ancient illusions enshrines so much tenderness and wisdom, still live in the world, though forgotten by philosophers, and point unmistakably toward their several goals. Our task is not to construct but only to interpret ideals, confronting them with one another and with the conditions which, for the most part, they alike ignore. There is no need of refuting anything, for the will which is behind all ideals and behind most dogmas cannot itself be refuted; but it may be enlightened and led to reconsider its intent, when its satisfaction is seen to be either naturally impossible or inconsistent with better things. The age of controversy is past; that of interpretation has succeeded.

**Modern and
classic sources
of inspiration.**

Here, then, is the programme of the following work: Starting with the immediate flux, in which all objects and impulses are given, to describe the Life of Reason; that is, to note what facts and purposes seem to be primary, to show how the conception of nature and life gathers around them, and to point to the ideals of thought and action which are approached by this gradual mastering of experience by reason. A great task, which it would be beyond the powers of a writer in this age either to execute or to conceive, had not the Greeks drawn for us the outlines of an ideal culture at a time when life was simpler than at present and individual intelligence more resolute and free.

REASON IN COMMON SENSE

CHAPTER I

THE BIRTH OF REASON

Whether Chaos or Order lay at the beginning of things is a question once much debated in the schools but afterward long in abeyance, not so much because it had been solved as because one party had been silenced by social pressure. The question is bound to recur in an age when observation and dialectic again freely confront each other. Naturalists look back to chaos since they observe everything growing from seeds and shifting its character in regeneration. The order now established in the world may be traced back to a situation in which it did not appear. Dialecticians, on the other hand, refute this presumption by urging that every collocation of things must have been preceded by another collocation in itself no less definite and precise; and further that some principle of transition or continuity must always have obtained, else successive states would stand in no relation to one another, notably not in the relation of cause and effect, expressed in a natural law, which is presupposed in this instance. Potentialities are dispositions, and a disposition involves an order, as does also the passage from any specific potentiality into act. Thus the world, we are told, must always have possessed a structure.

Existence
always has an
Order, called
Chaos when
incompatible
with a chosen
good.

The two views may perhaps be reconciled if we take each with a qualification. Chaos doubtless has existed and will return—nay, it reigns now, very likely, in the remoter and inmost parts of the universe—if by chaos we understand a nature containing none of the objects we are wont to distinguish, a nature such that human life and human thought would be impossible in its bosom; but this nature must be presumed to have an order, an order directly importing, if the tendency of its movement be taken into account, all the complexities and beauties, all the sense and reason which exist now. Order is accordingly continual; but only when order means not a specific arrange-

ment, favourable to a given form of life, but any arrangement whatsoever. The process by which an arrangement which is essentially unstable gradually shifts cannot be said to aim at every stage which at any moment it involves. For the process passes beyond. It presently abolishes all the forms which may have arrested attention and generated love; its initial energy defeats every purpose which we may fondly attribute to it. Nor is it here necessary to remind ourselves that to call results their own causes is always preposterous; for in this case even the mythical sense which might be attached to such language is inapplicable. Here the process, taken in the gross, does not, even by mechanical necessity, support the value which is supposed to guide it. That value is realised for a moment only; so that if we impute to Cronos any intent to beget his children we must also impute to him an intent to devour them.

Of course the various states of the world, when we survey them retrospectively, constitute another and now static order called historic truth. To this absolute and impotent order every detail is essential. If we wished to abuse language so much as to speak of will in an "Absolute" where change is excluded, so that nothing can be or be conceived beyond it, we might say that the Absolute willed everything that ever exists, and that the eternal order terminated in every fact indiscriminately; but such language involves an afterimage of motion and life, of preparation, risk, and subsequent accomplishment, adventures all presupposing refractory materials and excluded from eternal truth by its very essence. The only function those traditional metaphors have is to shield confusion and sentimentality. Because Jehovah once fought for the Jews, we need not continue to say that the truth is solicitous about us, when it is only we that are fighting to attain it. The universe can wish particular things only in so far as particular beings wish them; only in its relative capacity can it find things good, and only in its relative capacity can it be good for anything.

The efficacious or physical order which exists at any moment in the world and out of which the next moment's order is developed, may accordingly be termed a relative chaos: a chaos, because the values suggested and supported by the second moment could not have belonged to the first; but merely a relative chaos, first because it probably carried values of its own which rendered it an order in a moral

**Absolute
order, or
truth, is
static,
impotent,
indifferent.**

and eulogistic sense, and secondly because it was potentially, by virtue of its momentum, a basis for the second moment's values as well.

Human life, when it begins to possess intrinsic value, is an incipient order in the midst of what seems a vast though, to some extent, a vanishing chaos. This reputed chaos can be deciphered and appreciated by man only in proportion as the order in himself is confirmed and extended. For man's consciousness is evidently practical; it clings to his fate, registers, so to speak, the higher and lower temperature of his fortunes, and, so far as it can, represents the agencies on which those fortunes depend. When this dramatic vocation of consciousness has not been fulfilled at all, consciousness is wholly confused; the world it envisages seems consequently a chaos. Later, if experience has fallen into shape, and there are settled categories and constant objects in human discourse, the inference is drawn that the original disposition of things was also orderly and indeed mechanically conducive to just those feats of instinct and intelligence which have been since accomplished. A theory of origins, of substance, and of natural laws may thus be framed and accepted, and may receive confirmation in the further march of events. It will be observed, however, that what is credibly asserted about the past is not a report which the past was itself able to make when it existed nor one it is now able, in some oracular fashion, to formulate and to impose upon us. The report is a rational construction based and seated in present experience; it has no cogency for the inattentive and no existence for the ignorant. Although the universe, then, may not have come from chaos, human experience certainly has begun in a private and dreamful chaos of its own, out of which it still only partially and momentarily emerges. The history of this awakening is of course not the same as that of the environing world ultimately discovered; it is the history, however, of that discovery itself, of the knowledge through which alone the world can be revealed. We may accordingly dispense ourselves from preliminary courtesies to the real universal order, nature, the absolute, and the gods. We shall make their acquaintance in due season and better appreciate their moral status, if we strive merely to recall our own experience, and to retrace the visions and reflections out of which those apparitions have grown.

In experience order is relative to interests, which determine the moral status of all powers.

To revert to primordial feeling is an exercise in mental disintegration, not a feat of science. We might, indeed, as in animal psychology, retrace the situations in which instinct and sense seem first to appear and write, as it were, a genealogy of reason based on circumstantial evidence. Reason was born, as it has since discovered, into a world already wonderfully organised, in which it found its precursor in what is called life, its seat in an animal body of unusual plasticity, and its function in rendering that body's volatile instincts and sensations harmonious with one another and with the outer world on which they depend. It did not arise until the will or conscious stress, by which any modification of living bodies' inertia seems to be accompanied, began to respond to represented objects, and to maintain that inertia not absolutely by resistance but only relatively and indirectly through labour. Reason has thus supervened at the last stage of an adaptation which had long been carried on by irrational and even unconscious processes. Nature preceded, with all that fixation of impulses and conditions which gives reason its tasks and its *point-d'appui*. Nevertheless, such a matrix or cradle for reason belongs only externally to its life. The description of conditions involves their previous discovery and a historian equipped with many data and many analogies of thought. Such scientific resources are absent in those first moments of rational living which we here wish to recall; the first chapter in reason's memoirs would no more entail the description of its real environment than the first chapter in human history would include true accounts of astronomy, psychology, and animal evolution.

In order to begin at the beginning we must try to fall back on uninterpreted feeling, as the mystics aspire to do. We need not expect, however, to find peace there, for the immediate is in flux. Pure feeling rejoices in a logical nonentity very deceptive to dialectical minds. They often think, when they fall back on elements necessarily indescribable, that they have come upon true nothingness. If they are mystics, distrusting thought and craving the largeness of indistinction, they may embrace this alleged nothingness with joy, even if it seem positively painful, hoping to find rest there through self-abnegation. If on the contrary they are rationalists they may reject the immediate with scorn and deny that it exists at all, since in their books they cannot define it satisfactorily. Both mystics and rationalists, however, are deceived by their mental agility; the immedi-

The discovered conditions of reason not its beginning.

The flux first.

ate exists, even if dialectic cannot explain it. What the rationalist calls nonentity is the substrate and locus of all ideas, having the obstinate reality of matter, the crushing irrationality of existence itself; and one who attempts to override it becomes to that extent an irrelevant rhapsodist, dealing with thin afterimages of being. Nor has the mystic who sinks into the immediate much better appreciated the situation. This immediate is not God but chaos; its nothingness is pregnant, restless, and brutish; it is that from which all things emerge in so far as they have any permanence or value, so that to lapse into it again is a dull suicide and no salvation. Peace, which is after all what the mystic seeks, lies not in indistinction but in perfection. If he reaches it in a measure himself, it is by the traditional discipline he still practises, not by his heats or his languors.

The seed-bed of reason lies, then, in the immediate, but what reason draws thence is momentum and power to rise above its source. It is the perturbed immediate itself that finds or at least seeks its peace in reason, through which it comes in sight of some sort of ideal permanence. When the flux manages to form an eddy and to maintain by breathing and nutrition what we call a life, it affords some slight foothold and object for thought and becomes in a measure like the ark in the desert, a moving habitation for the eternal.

Life begins to have some value and continuity so soon as there is something definite that lives and something definite to live for. The primacy of will, as Fichte and Schopenhauer conceived it, is a mythical way of designating this situation. Of course a will can have no being in the absence of realities or ideas marking its direction and contrasting the eventualities it seeks with those it flies from; and tendency, no less than movement, needs an organised medium to make it possible, while aspiration and fear involve an ideal world. Yet a principle of choice is not deducible from mere ideas, and no interest is involved in the formal relations of things. All survey needs an arbitrary starting-point; all valuation rests on an irrational bias. The absolute flux cannot be physically arrested; but what arrests it ideally is the fixing of some point in it from which it can be measured and illumined. Otherwise it could show no form and maintain no preference; it would be impossible to approach or recede from a represented state, and to suffer or to exert will in view of events. The irrational fate that lodges the transcendental self in this or that body, inspires it with definite passions, and subjects

Life the
fixation of
interests.

it to particular buffets from the outer world—this is the prime condition of all observation and inference, of all failure or success.

Those sensations in which a transition is contained need only analysis to yield two ideal and related terms—two points in space or two characters in feeling. Hot and cold, here and there, good and bad, now and then, are dyads that spring into being when the flux accentuates some term and so makes possible a discrimination of parts and directions in its own movement. An initial attitude sustains incipient interests. What we first discover in ourselves, before the influence we obey has given rise to any definite idea, is the working of instincts already in motion. Impulses to appropriate and to reject first teach us the points of the compass, and space itself, like charity, begins at home.

The guide in early sensuous education is the same that conducts the whole Life of Reason, namely, impulse checked by experiment, and experiment judged again by impulse. What teaches the child to distinguish the nurse's breast from sundry blank or disquieting presences? What induces him to arrest that image, to mark its associates, and to recognise them with alacrity? The discomfort of its absence and the comfort of its possession. To that image is attached the chief satisfaction he knows, and the force of that satisfaction disentangles it before all other images from the feeble and fluid continuum of his life. What first awakens in him a sense of reality is what first is able to appease his unrest.

Had the group of feelings, now welded together in fruition, found no instinct in him to awaken and become a signal for, the group would never have persisted; its loose elements would have been allowed to pass by unnoticed and would not have been recognised when they recurred. Experience would have remained absolute inexperience, as foolishly perpetual as the gurglings of rivers or the flickerings of sunlight in a grove. But an instinct was actually present, so formed as to be aroused by a determinate stimulus; and the image produced by that stimulus, when it came, could have in consequence a meaning and an individuality. It seemed by divine right to signify something interesting, something real, because by natural contiguity it flowed from something pertinent and important to life. Every accompanying sensation which shared that privilege, or in time was engrossed in that function, would ultimately become a part of that conceived reality, a quality of that thing.

Primary dualities.

First gropings. Instinct the nucleus of reason.

The same primacy of impulses, irrational in themselves but expressive of bodily functions, is observable in the behaviour of animals, and in those dreams, obsessions, and primary passions which in the midst of sophisticated life sometimes lay bare the obscure groundwork of human nature. Reason's work is there undone. We can observe sporadic growths, disjointed fragments of rationality, springing up in a moral wilderness. In the passion of love, for instance, a cause unknown to the sufferer, but which is doubtless the springflood of hereditary instincts accidentally let loose, suddenly checks the young man's gayety, dispels his random curiosity, arrests perhaps his very breath; and when he looks for a cause to explain his suspended faculties, he can find it only in the presence or image of another being, of whose character, possibly, he knows nothing and whose beauty may not be remarkable; yet that image pursues him everywhere, and he is dominated by an unaccustomed tragic earnestness and a new capacity for suffering and joy. If the passion be strong there is no previous interest or duty that will be remembered before it; if it be lasting the whole life may be reorganised by it; it may impose new habits, other manners, and another religion. Yet what is the root of all this idealism? An irrational instinct, normally intermittent, such as all dumb creatures share, which has here managed to dominate a human soul and to enlist all the mental powers in its more or less permanent service, upsetting their usual equilibrium. This madness, however, inspires method; and for the first time, perhaps, in his life, the man has something to live for. The blind affinity that like a magnet draws all the faculties around it, in so uniting them, suffuses them with an unwonted spiritual light.

Here, on a small scale and on a precarious foundation, we may see clearly illustrated and foreshadowed that Life of Reason which is simply the unity given to all existence by a mind *in love with the good*. In the higher reaches of human nature, as much as in the lower, rationality depends on distinguishing the excellent; and that distinction can be made, in the last analysis, only by an irrational impulse. As life is a better form given to force, by which the universal flux is subdued to create and serve a somewhat permanent interest, so reason is a better form given to interest itself, by which it is fortified and propagated, and ultimately, perhaps, assured of satisfaction. The substance to which this form is given remains irrational; so that rationality, like all

Better and worse the fundamental categories.

excellence, is something secondary and relative, requiring a natural being to possess or to impute it. When definite interests are recognised and the values of things are estimated by that standard, action at the same time veering in harmony with that estimation, then reason has been born and a moral world has arisen.

CHAPTER II

FIRST STEPS AND FIRST FLUCTUATIONS

Consciousness is a born hermit. Though subject, by divine dispensation, to spells of fervour and apathy, like a singing bird, it is at first quite unconcerned about its own conditions or maintenance. To acquire a notion of such matters, or an interest in them, it would have to lose its hearty simplicity and begin to reflect; it would have to forget the present with its instant joys in order laboriously to conceive the absent and the hypothetical. The body may be said to make for self-preservation, since it has an organic equilibrium which, when not too rudely disturbed, restores itself by growth and co-operative action; but no such principle appears in the soul. Foolish in the beginning and generous in the end, consciousness thinks of nothing so little as of its own interests. It is lost in its objects; nor would it ever acquire even an indirect concern in its future, did not love of things external attach it to their fortunes. Attachment to ideal terms is indeed what gives consciousness its continuity; its parts have no relevance or relation to one another save what they acquire by depending on the same body or representing the same objects. Even when consciousness grows sophisticated and thinks it cares for itself, it really cares only for its ideals; the world it pictures seems to it beautiful, and it may incidentally prize itself also, when it has come to regard itself as a part of that world. Initially, however, it is free even from that honest selfishness; it looks straight out; it is interested in the movements it observes; it swells with the represented world, suffers with its commotion, and subsides, no less willingly, in its interludes of calm.

Dreams
before
thoughts.

Natural history and psychology arrive at consciousness from the outside, and consequently give it an artificial articulation and rationality which are wholly alien to its essence. These sciences infer feeling

from habit or expression; so that only the expressible and practical aspects of feeling figure in their calculation. But these aspects are really peripheral; the core is an irresponsible, ungoverned, irrevocable dream. Psychologists have discussed perception *ad nauseam* and become horribly entangled in a combined idealism and physiology; for they must perforce approach the subject from the side of matter, since all science and all evidence are external; nor could they ever reach consciousness at all if they did not observe its occasions and then interpret those occasions dramatically. At the same time, the inferred mind they subject to examination will yield nothing but ideas, and it is a marvel how such a dream can regard those natural objects from which the psychologist has inferred it. Perception is in fact no primary phase of consciousness; it is an ulterior practical function acquired by a dream which has become symbolic of its conditions, and therefore relevant to its own destiny. Such relevance and symbolism are indirect and slowly acquired; their status cannot be understood unless we regard them as forms of imagination happily grown significant. In imagination, not in perception, lies the substance of experience, while knowledge and reason are but its chastened and ultimate form.

Every actual animal is somewhat dull and somewhat mad. He will at times miss his signals and stare vacantly when he might well act, while at other times he will run off into convulsions and raise a dust in his own brain to no purpose. These imperfections are so human that we should hardly recognise ourselves if we could shake them off altogether. Not to retain any dulness would mean to possess untiring attention and universal interests, thus realising the boast about deeming nothing human alien to us; while to be absolutely without folly would involve perfect self-knowledge and self-control. The intelligent man known to history flourishes within a dullard and holds a lunatic in leash. He is encased in a protective shell of ignorance and insensibility which keeps him from being exhausted and confused by this too complicated world; but that integument blinds him at the same time to many of his nearest and highest interests. He is amused by the antics of the brute dreaming within his breast; he gloats on his passionate reveries, an amusement which sometimes costs him very dear. Thus the best human intelligence is still decidedly barbarous; it fights in heavy armour and keeps a fool at court.

The mind
vegetates
uncontrolled
save by
physical
forces.

If consciousness could ever have the function of guiding conduct better than instinct can, in the beginning it would be most incompetent for that office. Only the routine and equilibrium which healthy instinct involves keep thought and will at all within the limits of sanity. The predetermined interests we have as animals fortunately focus our attention on practical things, pulling it back, like a ball with an elastic cord, within the radius of pertinent matters. Instinct alone compels us to neglect and seldom to recall the irrelevant infinity of ideas. Philosophers have sometimes said that all ideas come from experience; they never could have been poets and must have forgotten that they were ever children. The great difficulty in education is to get experience out of ideas. Shame, conscience, and reason continually disallow and ignore what consciousness presents; and what are they but habit and latent instinct asserting themselves and forcing us to disregard our midsummer madness? Idiocy and lunacy are merely reversion to a condition in which present consciousness is in the ascendant and has escaped the control of unconscious forces. We speak of people being "out of their senses," when they have in fact fallen back into them; or of those who have "lost their mind," when they have lost merely that habitual control over consciousness which prevented it from flaring into all sorts of obsessions and agonies. Their bodies having become deranged, their minds, far from correcting that derangement, instantly share and betray it. A dream is always simmering below the conventional surface of speech and reflection. Even in the highest reaches and serenest meditations of science it sometimes breaks through. Even there we are seldom constant enough to conceive a truly natural world; somewhere passionate, fanciful, or magic elements will slip into the scheme and baffle rational ambition.

**Internal
order
supervenes.**

A body seriously out of equilibrium, either with itself or with its environment, perishes outright. Not so a mind. Madness and suffering can set themselves no limit; they lapse only when the corporeal frame that sustains them yields to circumstances and changes its habit. If they are unstable at all, it is because they ordinarily correspond to strains and conjunctions which a vigorous body overcomes, or which dissolve the body altogether. A pain not incidental to the play of practical instincts may easily be recurrent, and it might be perpetual if even the worst habits were not intermittent and the most useless agitations exhausting. Some respite will therefore ensue upon pain, but no magic

cure. Madness, in like manner, if pronounced, is precarious, but when speculative enough to be harmless or not strong enough to be debilitating, it too may last for ever.

An imaginative life may therefore exist parasitically in a man, hardly touching his action or environment. There is no possibility of exorcising these apparitions by their own power. A nightmare does not dispel itself; it endures until the organic strain which caused it is relaxed either by natural exhaustion or by some external influence. Therefore human ideas are still for the most part sensuous and trivial, shifting with the chance currents of the brain, and representing nothing, so to speak, but personal temperature. Personal temperature, moreover, is sometimes tropical. There are brains like a South American jungle, as there are others like an Arabian desert, strewn with nothing but bones. While a passionate sultriness prevails in the mind there is no end to its luxuriance. Languages intricately articulate, flaming mythologies, metaphysical perspectives lost in infinity, arise in remarkable profusion. In time, however, there comes a change of climate and the whole forest disappears.

It is easy, from the stand-point of acquired practical competence, to deride a merely imaginative life. Derision, however, is not interpretation, and the better method of overcoming erratic ideas is to trace them out dialectically and see if they will not recognise their own fatuity. The most irresponsible vision has certain principles of order and valuation by which it estimates itself; and in these principles the Life of Reason is already broached, however halting may be its development. We should lead ourselves out of our dream, as the Israelites were led out of Egypt, by the promise and eloquence of that dream itself. Otherwise we might kill the goose that lays the golden egg, and by proscribing imagination abolish science.

Visionary experience has a first value in its possible pleasantness. Why any form of feeling should be delightful is not to be explained

**Intrinsic
pleasure in
existence.** transcendentally: a physiological law may, after the fact, render every instance predictable; but no logical affinity between the formal quality of an experience and the impulse to welcome it will thereby be disclosed. We find, however, that pleasure suffuses certain states of mind and pain others; which is another way of saying that, for no reason, we love the first and detest the second. The polemic which certain moralists have waged against pleasure and in favour of pain is intelligible when we remem-

ber that their chief interest is edification, and that ability to resist pleasure and pain alike is a valuable virtue in a world where action and renunciation are the twin keys to happiness. But to deny that pleasure is a good and pain an evil is a grotesque affectation: it amounts to giving “good” and “evil” artificial definitions and thereby reducing ethics to arbitrary verbiage. Not only is good that adherence of the will to experience of which pleasure is the basal example, and evil the corresponding rejection which is the very essence of pain, but when we pass from good and evil in sense to their highest embodiments, pleasure remains eligible and pain something which it is a duty to prevent. A man who without necessity deprived any person of a pleasure or imposed on him a pain, would be a contemptible knave, and the person so injured would be the first to declare it, nor could the highest celestial tribunal, if it was just, reverse that sentence. For it suffices that one being, however weak, loves or abhors anything, no matter how slightly, for that thing to acquire a proportionate value which no chorus of contradiction ringing through all the spheres can ever wholly abolish. An experience good or bad in itself remains so for ever, and its inclusion in a more general order of things can only change that totality proportionately to the ingredient absorbed, which will infect the mass, so far as it goes, with its own colour. The more pleasure a universe can yield, other things being equal, the more beneficent and generous is its general nature; the more pains its constitution involves, the darker and more malign is its total temper. To deny this would seem impossible, yet it is done daily; for there is nothing people will not maintain when they are slaves to superstition; and candour and a sense of justice are, in such a case, the first things lost.

Pleasures differ sensibly in intensity; but the intensest pleasures are often the blindest, and it is hard to recall or estimate a feeling with which no definite and complex object is conjoined. The first step in making pleasure intelligible and capable of being pursued is to make it pleasure in something. The object it suffuses acquires a value, and gives the pleasure itself a place in rational life. The pleasure can now be named, its variations studied in reference to changes in its object, and its comings and goings foreseen in the order of events. The more articulate the world that produces emotion the more controllable and recoverable is the emotion itself. Therefore diversity and

Pleasure a
good,

but not
pursued or
remembered
unless it
suffuses an
object.

order in ideas makes the life of pleasure richer and easier to lead. A voluminous dumb pleasure might indeed outweigh the pleasure spread thin over a multitude of tame perceptions, if we could only weigh the two in one scale; but to do so is impossible, and in memory and prospect, if not in experience, diversified pleasure must needs carry the day.

Here we come upon a crisis in human development which shows clearly how much the Life of Reason is a natural thing, a growth that a

**Subhuman
delights.** different course of events might well have excluded. Laplace is reported to have said on his death-bed that science was mere trifling and that nothing was real but love.

Love, for such a man, doubtless involved objects and ideas: it was love of persons. The same revulsion of feeling may, however, be carried further. Lucretius says that passion is a torment because its pleasures are not pure, that is, because they are mingled with longing and entangled in vexatious things. Pure pleasure would be without ideas. Many a man has found in some moment of his life an unutterable joy which made all the rest of it seem a farce, as if a corpse should play it was living. Mystics habitually look beneath the Life of Reason for the substance and infinity of happiness. In all these revulsions, and many others, there is a certain justification, inasmuch as systematic living is after all an experiment, as is the formation of animal bodies, and the inorganic pulp out of which these growths have come may very likely have had its own incommunicable values, its absolute thrills, which we vainly try to remember and to which, in moments of dissolution, we may half revert. Protoplasmic pleasures and strains may be the substance of consciousness; and as matter seeks its own level, and as the sea and the flat waste to which all dust returns have a certain primordial life and a certain sublimity, so all passions and ideas, when spent, may rejoin the basal note of feeling, and enlarge their volume as they lose their form. This loss of form may not be unwelcome, if it is the formless that, by anticipation, speaks through what is surrendering its being. Though to acquire or impart form is delightful in art, in thought, in generation, in government, yet a euthanasia of finitude is also known. All is not affectation in the poet who says, "Now more than ever seems it rich to die"; and, without any poetry or affectation, men may love sleep, and opiates, and every luxurious escape from humanity.

The step by which pleasure and pain are attached to ideas, so as to be predictable and to become factors in action, is therefore by no

means irrevocable. It is a step, however, in the direction of reason; and though reason's path is only one of innumerable courses perhaps open to existence, it is the only one that we are tracing here; the only one, obviously, which human discourse is competent to trace.

When consciousness begins to add diversity to its intensity, its value is no longer absolute and inexpressible. The felt variations in its tone are attached to the observed movement of its objects; in these objects its values are imbedded. A world loaded with dramatic values may thus arise in imagination; terrible and delightful presences may chase one another across the void; life will be a kind of music made by all the senses together. Many animals probably have this form of experience; they are not wholly submerged in a vegetative stupor; they can discern what they love or fear. Yet all this is still a disordered apparition that reels itself off amid sporadic movements, efforts, and agonies. Now gorgeous, now exciting, now indifferent, the landscape brightens and fades with the day. If a dog, while sniffing about contentedly, sees afar off his master arriving after long absence, the change in the animal's feeling is not merely in the quantity of pure pleasure; a new circle of sensations appears, with a new principle governing interest and desire; instead of waywardness subjection, instead of freedom love. But the poor brute asks for no reason why his master went, why he has come again, why he should be loved, or why presently while lying at his feet you forget him and begin to grunt and dream of the chase—all that is an utter mystery, utterly unconsidered. Such experience has variety, scenery, and a certain vital rhythm; its story might be told in dithyrambic verse. It moves wholly by inspiration; every event is providential, every act unpremeditated. Absolute freedom and absolute helplessness have met together: you depend wholly on divine favour, yet that unfathomable agency is not distinguishable from your own life. This is the condition to which some forms of piety invite men to return; and it lies in truth not far beneath the level of ordinary human consciousness.

The story which such animal experience contains, however, needs only to be better articulated in order to disclose its underlying machinery. The figures even of that disordered drama have their exits and their entrances; and their cues can be gradually discovered by a being capable of fixing his attention and retaining the order of events. Thereupon a third step is made in imaginative experience. As pleasures and pains were for-

**Animal
living.**

**Causes
at last
discerned.**

merly distributed among objects, so objects are now marshalled into a world. *Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas*, said a poet who stood near enough to fundamental human needs and to the great answer which art and civilisation can make to them, to value the Life of Reason and think it sublime. To discern causes is to turn vision into knowledge and motion into action. It is to fix the associates of things, so that their respective transformations are collated, and they become significant of one another. In proportion as such understanding advances each moment of experience becomes consequential and prophetic of the rest. The calm places in life are filled with power and its spasms with resource. No emotion can overwhelm the mind, for of none is the basis or issue wholly hidden; no event can disconcert it altogether, because it sees beyond. Means can be looked for to escape from the worst predicament; and whereas each moment had been formerly filled with nothing but its own adventure and surprised emotion, each now makes room for the lesson of what went before and surmises what may be the plot of the whole.

At the threshold of reason there is a kind of choice. Not all impressions contribute equally to the new growth; many, in fact, which were formerly equal in rank to the best, now grow obscure. Attention ignores them, in its haste to arrive at what is significant of something more. Nor are the principles of synthesis, by which the aristocratic few establish their oligarchy, themselves unequivocal. The first principles of logic are like the senses, few but arbitrary. They might have been quite different and yet produced, by a now unthinkable method, a language no less significant than the one we speak. Twenty-six letters may suffice for a language, but they are a wretched minority among all possible sounds. So the forms of perception and the categories of thought, which a grammarian's philosophy might think primordial necessities, are no less casual than words or their syntactical order. Why, we may ask, did these forms assert themselves here? What principles of selection guide mental growth?

To give a logical ground for such a selection is evidently impossible, since it is logic itself that is to be accounted for. A natural ground is, in strictness, also irrelevant, since natural connections, where thought has not reduced them to a sort of equivalence and necessity, are mere data and juxtapositions. Yet it is not necessary to leave the question altogether unanswered. By using our senses we may discover, not indeed why each sense has its specific quality or exists at all, but

what are its organs and occasions. In like manner we may, by developing the Life of Reason, come to understand its conditions. When consciousness awakes the body has, as we long afterward discover, a definite organisation. Without guidance from reflection bodily processes have been going on, and most precise affinities and reactions have been set up between its organs and the surrounding objects.

**Attention
guided by
bodily
impulse.**

On these affinities and reactions sense and intellect are grafted. The plants are of different nature, yet growing together they bear excellent fruit. It is as the organs receive appropriate stimulations that attention is riveted on definite sensations. It is as the system exercises its natural activities that passion, will, and meditation possess the mind. No syllogism is needed to persuade us to eat, no prophecy of happiness to teach us to love. On the contrary, the living organism, caught in the act, informs us how to reason and what to enjoy. The soul adopts the body's aims; from the body and from its instincts she draws a first hint of the right means to those accepted purposes. Thus reason enters into partnership with the world and begins to be respected there; which it would never be if it were not expressive of the same mechanical forces that are to preside over events and render them fortunate or unfortunate for human interests. Reason is significant in action only because it has begun by taking, so to speak, the body's side; that sympathetic bias enables her to distinguish events pertinent to the chosen interests, to compare impulse with satisfaction, and, by representing a new and circular current in the system, to preside over the formation of better habits, habits expressing more instincts at once and responding to more opportunities.

CHAPTER III

THE DISCOVERY OF NATURAL OBJECTS

At first sight it might seem an idle observation that the first task of intelligence is to represent the environing reality, a reality actually represented in the notion, universally prevalent among men, of a cosmos in space and time, an animated material engine called nature. In trying to conceive nature the mind lisps its first lesson; natural phenomena are the mother tongue of imagination no less than of science and practical life. Men and gods are not conceivable otherwise than as inhabitants of nature. Early experience knows no mystery which is not somehow rooted in transformations of the natural world, and fancy can build no hope which would not be expressible there. But we are grown so accustomed to this ancient apparition that we may be no longer aware how difficult was the task of conjuring it up. We may even have forgotten the possibility that such a vision should never have arisen at all. A brief excursion into that much abused subject, the psychology of perception, may here serve to remind us of the great work which the budding intellect must long ago have accomplished unawares.

Nature man's home.

Consider how the shocks out of which the notion of material things is to be built first strike home into the soul. Eye and hand, if we may neglect the other senses, transmit their successive impressions, all varying with the position of outer objects and with the other material conditions. A chaos of multitudinous impressions rains in from all sides at all hours. Nor have the external or cognitive senses an original primacy. The taste, the smell, the alarming sounds of things are continually distracting attention. There are infinite reverberations in memory of all former impressions, together with fresh fancies created in the brain, things at first in no wise subordinated to external objects. All these incongruous elements are mingled like a witches' brew. And more:

Difficulties in conceiving nature.

there are indications that inner sensations, such as those of digestion, have an overpowering influence on the primitive mind, which has not learned to articulate or distinguish permanent needs. So that to the whirl of outer sensations we must add, to reach some notion of what consciousness may contain before the advent of reason, interruptions and lethargies caused by wholly blind internal feelings; trances such as fall even on comparatively articulate minds in rage, lust, or madness. Against all these bewildering forces the new-born reason has to struggle; and we need not wonder that the costly experiments and disillusion of the past have not yet produced a complete enlightenment.

The onslaught made in the last century by the transcendental philosophy upon empirical traditions is familiar to everybody: it seemed a pertinent attack, yet in the end proved quite trifling and unavailing. Thought, we are told rightly enough, cannot be accounted for by enumerating its conditions.

**Transcendental
qualms.** A number of detached sensations, being each its own little world, cannot add themselves together nor conjoin themselves in the void. Again, experiences having an alleged common cause would not have, merely for that reason, a common object. Nor would a series of successive perceptions, no matter how quick, logically involve a sense of time nor a notion of succession. Yet, in point of fact, when such a succession occurs and a living brain is there to acquire some structural modification by virtue of its own passing states, a memory of that succession and its terms may often supervene. It is quite true also that the simultaneous presence or association of images belonging to different senses does not carry with it by intrinsic necessity any fusion of such images nor any notion of an object having them for its qualities. Yet, in point of fact, such a group of sensations does often merge into a complex image; instead of the elements originally perceptible in isolation, there arises a familiar term, a sort of personal presence. To this felt presence, certain instinctive reactions are attached, and the sensations that may be involved in that apparition, when each for any reason becomes emphatic, are referred to it as its qualities or its effects.

Such complications of course involve the gift of memory, with capacity to survey at once vestiges of many perceptions, to feel their implication and absorption in the present object, and to be carried, by this sense of relation, to the thought that those perceptions have a representative function. And this is a great step. It manifests the mind's powers. It illustrates those transformations of consciousness the prin-

ciple of which, when abstracted, we call intelligence. We must accordingly proceed with caution, for we are digging at the very roots of reason.

The chief perplexity, however, which besets this subject and makes discussions of it so often end in a cloud, is quite artificial. Thought is not a mechanical calculus, where the elements and the method exhaust the fact. Thought is a form of life, and should be conceived on the analogy of nutrition, generation, and art. Reason, as Hume said with profound truth, is an unintelligible instinct. It could not be otherwise if reason is to remain something transitive and existential; for transition is unintelligible, and yet is the deepest characteristic of existence. Philosophers, however, having perceived that the function of thought is to fix static terms and reveal eternal relations, have inadvertently transferred to the living act what is true only of its ideal object; and they have expected to find in the process, treated psychologically, that luminous deductive clearness which belongs to the ideal world it tends to reveal. The intelligible, however, lies at the periphery of experience, the surd at its core; and intelligence is but one centrifugal ray darting from the slime to the stars. Thought must execute a metamorphosis; and while this is of course mysterious, it is one of those familiar mysteries, like motion and will, which are more natural than dialectical lucidity itself; for dialectic grows cogent by fulfilling intent, but intent or meaning is itself vital and inexplicable.

Thought an aspect of life and transitive.

The process of counting is perhaps as simple an instance as can be found of a mental operation on sensible data. The clock, let us say, strikes two: if the sensorium were perfectly elastic and after receiving the first blow reverted exactly to its previous state, retaining absolutely no trace of that momentary oscillation and no altered habit, then it is certain that a sense for number or a faculty of counting could never arise. The second stroke would be responded to with the same reaction which had met the first. There would be no summation of effects, no complication. However numerous the successive impressions might come to be, each would remain fresh and pure, the last being identical in character with the first. One, one, one, would be the monotonous response for ever. Just so generations of ephemeral insects that succeeded one another without transmitting experience might repeat the same round of impressions—an everlasting progression without a shadow of prog-

Perception cumulative and synthetic.

ress. Such, too, is the idiot's life: his liquid brain transmits every impulse without resistance and retains the record of no impression.

Intelligence is accordingly conditioned by a modification of both structure and consciousness by dint of past events. To be aware that a second stroke is not itself the first, I must retain something of the old sensation. The first must reverberate still in my ears when the second arrives, so that this second, coming into a consciousness still filled by the first, is a different experience from the first, which fell into a mind perfectly empty and unprepared. Now the newcomer finds in the subsisting One a sponsor to christen it by the name of Two. The first stroke was a simple 1. The second is not simply another 1, a mere iteration of the first. It is 1^1 , where the coefficient represents the reverberating first stroke, still persisting in the mind, and forming a background and perspective against which the new stroke may be distinguished. The meaning of "two," then, is "this after that" or "this again," where we have a simultaneous sense of two things which have been separately perceived but are identified as similar in their nature. Repetition must cease to be pure repetition and become cumulative before it can give rise to the consciousness of repetition.

The first condition of counting, then, is that the sensorium should retain something of the first impression while it receives the second, or (to state the corresponding mental fact) that the second sensation should be felt together with a survival of the first from which it is distinguished in point of existence and with which it is identified in point of character.

Now, to secure this, it is not enough that the sensorium should be materially continuous, or that a "spiritual substance" or a "transcendental ego" should persist in time to receive the second sensation after having received and registered the first. A perfectly elastic sensorium, a wholly unchanging soul, or a quite absolute ego might remain perfectly identical with itself through various experiences without collating them. It would then remain, in fact, more truly and literally identical than if it were modified somewhat by those successive shocks. Yet a sensorium or a spirit thus unchanged would be incapable of memory, unfit to connect a past perception with one present or to become aware of their relation. It is not identity in the substance impressed, but growing complication in the phenomenon presented, that makes possible a sense of diversity and relation between things. The identity of substance or

No identical
agent
needed.

spirit, if it were absolute, would indeed prevent comparison, because it would exclude modifications, and it is the survival of past modifications within the present that makes comparisons possible. We may impress any number of forms successively on the same water, and the identity of the substance will not help those forms to survive and accumulate their effects. But if we have a surface that retains our successive stampings we may change the substance from wax to plaster and from plaster to bronze, and the effects of our labour will survive and be superimposed upon one another. It is the actual plastic form in both mind and body, not any unchanging substance or agent, that is efficacious in perpetuating thought and gathering experience.

Were not Nature and all her parts such models of patience and pertinacity, they never would have succeeded in impressing their existence on something so volatile and irresponsible as thought is. A sensation needs to be violent, like the sun's blinding light, to arrest attention, and keep it taut, as it were, long enough for the system to acquire a respectful attitude, and grow predisposed to resume it. A repetition of that sensation will thereafter meet with a prepared response which we call recognition; the concomitants of the old experience will form themselves afresh about the new one and by their convergence give it a sort of welcome and interpretation. The movement, for instance, by which the face was raised toward the heavens was perhaps one element which added to the first sensation, brightness, a concomitant sensation, height; the brightness was not bright merely, but high. Now when the brightness reappears the face will more quickly be lifted up; the place where the brightness shone will be looked for; the brightness will have acquired a claim to be placed somewhere. The heat which at the same moment may have burned the forehead will also be expected and, when felt, projected into the brightness, which will now be hot as well as high. So with whatever other sensations time may associate with this group. They will all adhere to the original impression, enriching it with an individuality which will render it before long a familiar complex in experience, and one easy to recognise and to complete in idea.

In the case of so vivid a thing as the sun's brightness many other sensations beside those out of which science draws the qualities attributed to that heavenly body adhere in the primitive mind to the phenomenon. Before he is a substance the sun is a god. He is beneficent and necessary no less than bright

**Example of
the sun.**

**His primitive
divinity.**

and high; he rises upon all happy opportunities and sets upon all terrors. He is divine, since all life and fruitfulness hang upon his miraculous revolutions. His coming and going are life and death to the world. As the sensations of light and heat are projected upward together to become attributes of his body, so the feelings of pleasure, safety, and hope which he brings into the soul are projected into his spirit; and to this spirit, more than to anything else, energy, independence, and substantiality are originally attributed. The emotions felt in his presence being the ultimate issue and term of his effect in us, the counterpart or shadow of those emotions is regarded as the first and deepest factor in his causality. It is his divine life, more than aught else, that underlies his apparitions and explains the influences which he propagates. The substance or independent existence attributed to objects is therefore by no means only or primarily a physical notion. What is conceived to support the physical qualities is a pseudo-psychic or vital force. It is a moral and living object that we construct, building it up out of all the materials, emotional, intellectual, and sensuous, which lie at hand in our consciousness to be synthesised into the hybrid reality which we are to fancy confronting us. To discriminate and redistribute those miscellaneous physical and psychical elements, and to divorce the god from the material sun, is a much later problem, arising at a different and more reflective stage in the Life of Reason.

When reflection, turning to the comprehension of a chaotic experience, busies itself about recurrences, when it seeks to normalise in some way things coming and going, and to straighten out the causes of events, that reflection is inevitably turned toward something dynamic and independent, and can have no successful issue except in mechanical science.

When on the other hand reflection stops to challenge and question the fleeting object, not so much to prepare for its possible return as to conceive its present nature, this reflection is turned no less unmistakably in the direction of ideas, and will terminate in logic or the morphology of being. We attribute independence to things in order to normalise their recurrence. We attribute essences to them in order to normalise their manifestations or constitution. Independence will ultimately turn out to be an assumed constancy in material processes, essence an assumed constancy in ideal meanings or points of reference

Causes and
essences
contrasted.

in discourse. The one marks the systematic distribution of objects, the other their settled character.

We talk of recurrent perceptions, but materially considered no perception recurs. Each recurrence is one of a finite series and holds for ever its place and number in that series. Yet human attention, while it can survey several simultaneous impressions and find them similar, cannot keep them distinct if they grow too numerous. The mind has a native bias and inveterate preference for form and identification. Water does not run down hill more persistently than attention turns experience into constant terms. The several repetitions of one essence given in consciousness will tend at once to be neglected, and only the essence itself—the character shared by those sundry perceptions—will stand and become a term in mental discourse. After a few strokes of the clock, the reiterated impressions merge and cover one another; we lose count and perceive the quality and rhythm but not the number of the sounds. If this is true of so abstract and mathematical a perception as is counting, how emphatically true must it be of continuous and infinitely varied perceptions flowing in from the whole spatial world. Glimpses of the environment follow one another in quick succession, like a regiment of soldiers in uniform; only now and then does the stream take a new turn, catch a new ray of sunlight, or arrest our attention at some break.

Voracity of intellect.

The senses in their natural play revert constantly to familiar objects, gaining impressions which differ but slightly from one another. These slight differences are submerged in apperception, so that sensation comes to be not so much an addition of new items to consciousness as a reburnishing there of some imbedded device. Its character and relations are only slightly modified at each fresh rejuvenation. To catch the passing phenomenon in all its novelty and idiosyncrasy is a work of artifice and curiosity. Such an exercise does violence to intellectual instinct and involves an æsthetic power of diving bodily into the stream of sensation, having thrown overboard all rational ballast and escaped at once the inertia and the momentum of practical life. Normally every datum of sense is at once devoured by a hungry intellect and digested for the sake of its vital juices. The result is that what ordinarily remains in memory is no representative of particular moments or shocks—though sensation, as in dreams, may be incidentally recreated from within—but rather a logical possession, a sense of

acquaintance with a certain field of reality, in a word, a consciousness of *knowledge*.

But what, we may ask, is this reality, which we boast to know? May not the sceptic justly contend that nothing is so unknown and indeed unknowable as this pretended object of knowledge? The sensations which reason treats so cavalierly were at least something actual while they lasted and made good their momentary claim to our interest; but what is this new ideal figment, unseizable yet ever present, invisible but indispensable, unknowable yet alone interesting or important? Strange that the only possible object or theme of our knowledge should be something we cannot know.

Can the transcendent be known?

An answer to these doubts will perhaps appear if we ask ourselves what sort of contact with reality would satisfy us, and in what terms we expect or desire to possess the subject-matter of our thoughts. Is it simply corroboration that we look for? Is it a verification of truth in sense? It would be unreasonable, in that case, after all the evidence we demand has been gathered, to complain that the ideal term thus concurrently suggested, the supersensible substance, reality, or independent object, does not itself descend into the arena of immediate sensuous presentation. Knowledge is not eating, and we cannot expect to devour and possess *what we mean*. Knowledge is recognition of something absent; it is a salutation, not an embrace. It is an advance on sensation precisely because it is representative. The terms or goals of thought have for their function to subtend long tracts of sensuous experience, to be ideal links between fact and fact, invisible wires behind the scenes, threads along which inference may run in making phenomena intelligible and controllable. An idea that should become an image would cease to be ideal; a principle that is to remain a principle can never become a fact. A God that you could see with the eyes of the body, a heaven you might climb into by a ladder planted at Bethel, would be parts of this created and interpretable world, not terms in its interpretation nor objects in a spiritual sphere. Now external objects are thought to be principles and sources of experience; they are accordingly conceived realities on an ideal plane. We may look for all the evidence we choose before we declare our inference to be warranted; but we must not ask for something more than evidence, nor expect to

Can the immediate be meant?

know realities without inferring them anew. They are revealed only to understanding. We cannot cease to think and still continue to know.

It may be said, however, that principles and external objects are interesting only because they symbolise further sensations, that thought is an expedient of finite minds, and that representation is a ghostly process which we crave to materialise into bodily possession. We may grow sick of inferring truth and long rather to become reality. Intelligence is after all no compulsory possession; and while some of us would gladly have more of it, others find that they already have too much. The tension of thought distresses them and to represent what they cannot and would not be is not a natural function of their spirit. To such minds experience that should merely corroborate ideas would prolong dissatisfaction. The ideas must be realised; they must pass into immediacy. If reality (a word employed generally in a eulogistic sense) is to mean this desired immediacy, no ideal of thought can be real. All intelligible objects and the whole universe of mental discourse would then be an unreal and conventional structure, impinging ultimately on sense from which it would derive its sole validity.

**Is thought a
bridge from
sensation to
sensation?**

There would be no need of quarrelling with such a philosophy, were not its use of words rather misleading. Call experience in its existential and immediate aspect, if you will, the sole reality; that will not prevent reality from having an ideal dimension. The intellectual world will continue to give beauty, meaning, and scope to those bubbles of consciousness on which it is painted. Reality would not be, in that case, what thought aspires to reach. Consciousness is the least ideal of things when reason is taken out of it. Reality would then need thought to give it all those human values of which, in its substance, it would have been wholly deprived; and the ideal would still be what lent music to throbs and significance to being.

The equivocation favoured by such language at once begins to appear. Is not thought with all its products a part of experience? Must not sense, if it be the only reality, be sentient sometimes of the ideal? What the site is to a city that is immediate experience to the universe of discourse. The latter is all held materially within the limits defined by the former; but if immediate experience be the seat of the moral world, the moral world is the only interesting possession of immediate experience. When a waste is built on, however, it is a violent paradox

to call it still a waste; and an immediate experience that represents the rest of sentience, with all manner of ideal harmonies read into the whole in the act of representing it, is an immediate experience raised to its highest power: it is the Life of Reason. In vain, then, will a philosophy of intellectual abstention limit so Platonic a term as reality to the immediate aspect of existence, when it is the ideal aspect that endows existence with character and value, together with representative scope and a certain lien upon eternity.

More legitimate, therefore, would be the assertion that knowledge reaches reality when it touches its ideal goal. Reality is known when, as in mathematics, a stable and unequivocal object is developed by thinking. The locus or material embodiment of such a reality is no longer in view; these questions seem to the logician irrelevant. If necessary ideas find no illustration in sense, he deems the fact an argument against the importance and validity of sensation, not in the least a disproof of his ideal knowledge. If no site be found on earth for the Platonic city, its constitution is none the less recorded and enshrined in heaven; nor is that the only true ideal that has not where to lay its head. What in the sensualistic or mystical system was called reality will now be termed appearance, and what there figured as an imaginary construction borne by the conscious moment will now appear to be a prototype for all existence and an eternal standard for its estimation.

It is this rationalistic or Platonic system (little as most men may suspect the fact) that finds a first expression in ordinary perception. When you distinguish your sensations from their cause and laugh at the idealist (as this kind of sceptic is called) who says that chairs and tables exist only in your mind, you are treating a figment of reason as a deeper and truer thing than the moments of life whose blind experience that reason has come to illumine. What you call the evidence of sense is pure confidence in reason. You will not be so idiotic as to make no inferences from your sensations; you will not pin your faith so unimaginatively on momentary appearance as to deny that the world exists when you stop thinking about it. You feel that your intellect has wider scope and has discovered many a thing that goes on behind the scenes, many a secret that would escape a stupid and gaping observation. It is the fool that looks to look and stops at the barely visible: you not only look but *see*; for you understand.

Now the practical burden of such understanding, if you take the trouble to analyse it, will turn out to be what the sceptic says it is: assurance of eventual sensations. But as these sensations, in memory and expectation, are numerous and indefinitely variable, you are not able to hold them clearly before the mind; indeed, the realisation of all the potentialities which you vaguely feel to lie in the future is a task absolutely beyond imagination. Yet your present impressions, dependent as they are on your chance attitude and disposition and on a thousand trivial accidents, are far from representing adequately all that might be discovered or that is actually known about the object before you. This object, then, to your apprehension, is not identical with any of the sensations that reveal it, nor is it exhausted by all these sensations when they are added together; yet it contains nothing assignable but what they might conceivably reveal. As it lies in your fancy, then, this object, the reality, is a complex and elusive entity, the sum at once and the residuum of all particular impressions which, underlying the present one, have bequeathed to it their surviving linkage in discourse and consequently endowed it with a large part of its present character. With this hybrid object, sensuous in its materials and ideal in its locus, each particular glimpse is compared, and is recognised to be but a glimpse, an aspect which the object presents to a particular observer. Here are two identifications. In the first place various sensations and felt relations, which cannot be kept distinct in the mind, fall together into one term of discourse, represented by a sign, a word, or a more or less complete sensuous image. In the second place the new perception is referred to that ideal entity of which it is now called a manifestation and effect.

Identity and independence predicated of things.

Such are the primary relations of reality and appearance. A reality is a term of discourse based on a psychic complex of memories, associations, and expectations, but constituted in its ideal independence by the assertive energy of thought. An appearance is a passing sensation, recognised as belonging to that group of which the object itself is the ideal representative, and accordingly regarded as a manifestation of that object.

Thus the notion of an independent and permanent world is an ideal term used to mark and as it were to justify the cohesion in space and the recurrence in time of recognisable groups of sensations. This

coherence and recurrence force the intellect, if it would master experience at all or understand anything, to frame the idea of such a reality. If we wish to defend the use of such an idea and prove to ourselves its necessity, all we need do is to point to that coherence and recurrence in external phenomena. That brave effort and flight of intelligence which in the beginning raised man to the conception of reality, enabling him to discount and interpret appearance, will, if we retain our trust in reason, raise us continually anew to that same idea, by a no less spontaneous and victorious movement of thought.

CHAPTER IV

ON SOME CRITICS OF THIS DISCOVERY

The English psychologists who first disintegrated the idea of substance, and whose traces we have in general followed in the above account, did not study the question wholly for its own sake or in the spirit of a science that aims at nothing but a historical analysis of mind. They had a more or less malicious purpose behind their psychology. They thought that if they could once show how metaphysical ideas are made they would discredit those ideas and banish them for ever from the world. If they retained confidence in any notion—as Hobbes in body, Locke in matter and in God, Berkeley in spirits, and Kant, the inheritor of this malicious psychology, in the thing-in-itself and in heaven—it was merely by inadvertence or want of courage. The principle of their reasoning, where they chose to apply it, was always this, that ideas whose materials could all be accounted for in consciousness and referred to sense or to the operations of mind were thereby exhausted and deprived of further validity. Only the unaccountable, or rather the uncriticised, could be true. Consequently the advance of psychology meant, in this school, the retreat of reason; for as one notion after another was clarified and reduced to its elements it was *ipso facto* deprived of its function.

Psychology as
a solvent.

So far were these philosophers from conceiving that validity and truth are ideal relations, accruing to ideas by virtue of dialectic and use, that while on the one hand they pointed out vital affinities and pragmatic sanctions in the mind's economy they confessed on the other that the outcome of their philosophy was sceptical; for no idea could be found in the mind which was not a phenomenon there, and no inference could be drawn from these phenomena not based on some inherent "tendency to feign." The analysis which was in truth

legitimising and purifying knowledge seemed to them absolutely to blast it, and the closer they came to the bed-rock of experience the more incapable they felt of building up anything upon it. Self-knowledge meant, they fancied, self-detection; the representative value of thought decreased as thought grew in scope and elaboration. It became impossible to be at once quite serious and quite intelligent; for to use reason was to indulge in subjective fiction, while conscientiously to abstain from using it was to sink back upon inarticulate and brutish instinct.

In Hume this sophistication was frankly avowed. Philosophy discredited itself; but a man of parts, who loved intellectual games even better than backgammon, might take a hand with the wits and historians of his day, until the clock struck twelve and the party was over. Even in Kant, though the mood was more cramped and earnest, the mystical sophistication was quite the same. Kant, too, imagined that the bottom had been knocked out of the world; that in comparison with some unutterable sort of truth empirical truth was falsehood, and that validity for all possible experience was weak validity, in comparison with validity of some other and unmentionable sort. Since space and time could not repel the accusation of being the necessary forms of perception, space and time were not to be much thought of; and when the sad truth was disclosed that causality and the categories were instruments by which the idea of nature had to be constructed, if such an idea was to exist at all, then nature and causality shrivelled up and were dishonoured together; so that, the soul's occupation being gone, she must needs appeal to some mysterious oracle, some abstract and irrelevant omen within the breast, and muster up all the stern courage of an accepted despair to carry her through this world of mathematical illusion into some green and infantile paradise beyond.

What idea, we may well ask ourselves, did these modern philosophers entertain regarding the pretensions of ancient and mediæval metaphysics? What understanding had they of the spirit in which the natural organs of reason had been exercised and developed in those schools? Frankly, very little; for they accepted from ancient philosophy and from common-sense the distinction between reality and appearance, but they forgot the function of that distinction and dislocated its meaning, which was nothing but to translate the chaos of perception into the regular play of stable natures and objects congenial to discursive thought and valid in

Misconceived rôle of intelligence.

the art of living. Philosophy had been the natural science of perception raised to the reflective plane, the objects maintaining themselves on this higher plane being styled realities, and those still floundering below it being called appearances or mere ideas. The function of envisaging reality, ever since Parmenides and Heraclitus, had been universally attributed to the intellect. When the moderns, therefore, proved anew that it was the mind that framed that idea, and that what we call reality, substance, nature, or God, can be reached only by an operation of reason, they made no very novel or damaging discovery.

Of course, it is possible to disregard the suggestions of reason in any particular case and it is quite possible to believe, for instance, that the hypothesis of an external material world is an erroneous one. But that this hypothesis is erroneous does not follow from the fact that it is a hypothesis. To discard it on that ground would be to discard all reasoned knowledge and to deny altogether the validity of thought. If intelligence is assumed to be an organ of cognition and a vehicle for truth, a given hypothesis about the causes of perception can only be discarded when a better hypothesis on the same subject has been supplied. To be better such a hypothesis would have to meet the multiplicity of phenomena and their mutations with a more intelligible scheme of comprehension and a more useful instrument of control.

Scepticism is always possible while it is partial. It will remain the privilege and resource of a free mind that has elasticity enough to disintegrate its own formations and to approach its experience from a variety of sides and with more than a single method. But the method chosen must be coherent in itself and the point of view assumed must be adhered to during that survey; so that whatever reconstruction the novel view may produce in science will be science still, and will involve assumptions and dogmas which must challenge comparison with the dogmas and assumptions they would supplant. People speak of dogmatism as if it were a method to be altogether outgrown and something for which some non-assertive philosophy could furnish a substitute. But dogmatism is merely a matter of degree. Some thinkers and some systems retreat further than others into the stratum beneath current conventions and make us more conscious of the complex machinery which, working silently in the soul, makes possible all the rapid and facile operations of reason. The deeper this retrospective glance the less dogmatic the philosophy. A primordial constitution or tendency, however, must always remain,

All criticism
dogmatic.

having structure and involving a definite life; for if we thought to reach some wholly vacant and indeterminate point of origin, we should have reached something wholly impotent and indifferent, a blank pregnant with nothing that we wished to explain or that actual experience presented. When, starting with the inevitable preformation and constitutional bias, we sought to build up a simpler and nobler edifice of thought, to be a palace and fortress rather than a prison for experience, our critical philosophy would still be dogmatic, since it would be built upon inexplicable but actual data by a process of inference underived but inevitable.

No doubt Aristotle and the scholastics were often uncritical. They were too intent on building up and buttressing their system on the broad human or religious foundations which they had chosen for it. They nursed the comfortable conviction that whatever their thought contained was eternal and objective truth, a copy of the divine intellect or of the world's intelligible structure. A sceptic may easily deride that confidence of theirs; their system may have been their system and nothing more. But the way to proceed if we wish to turn our shrewd suspicions and our sense of insecurity into an articulate conviction and to prove that they erred, is to build another system, a more modest one, perhaps, which will grow more spontaneously and inevitably in the mind out of the data of experience. Obviously the rival and critical theory will make the same tacit claim as the other to absolute validity. If all our ideas and perceptions conspire to reinforce the new hypothesis, this will become inevitable and necessary to us. We shall then condemn the other hypothesis, not indeed for having been a hypothesis, which is the common fate of all rational and interpretative thought, but for having been a hypothesis artificial, misleading, and false; one not following necessarily nor intelligibly out of the facts, nor leading to a satisfactory reaction upon them, either in contemplation or in practice.

Now this is in truth exactly the conviction which those malicious psychologists secretly harboured. Their critical scruples and transcendental qualms covered a robust rebellion against being fooled by authority. They rose to abate abuses among which, as Hobbes said, "the frequency of insignificant speech is one." Their psychology was not merely a cathartic, but a gospel. Their young criticism was sent into the world to make straight the path of a new positivism, as now, in its old age, it is

A choice of hypotheses.

Critics disguised enthusiasts.

invoked to keep open the door to superstition. Some of those reformers, like Hobbes and Locke, had at heart the interests of a physical and political mechanism, which they wished to substitute for the cumbrous and irritating constraints of tradition. Their criticism stopped at the frontiers of their practical discontent; they did not care to ask how the belief in matter, space, motion, God, or whatever else still retained their allegiance, could withstand the kind of psychology which, as they conceived, had done away with individual essences and nominal powers. Berkeley, whose interests lay in a different quarter, used the same critical method in support of a different dogmatism; armed with the traditional pietistic theory of Providence he undertook with a light heart to demolish the whole edifice which reason and science had built upon spatial perception. He wished the lay intellect to revert to a pious idiocy in the presence of Nature, lest consideration of her history and laws should breed "mathematical atheists"; and the outer world being thus reduced to a sensuous dream and to the blur of immediate feeling, intelligence and practical faith would be more unremittingly employed upon Christian mythology. Men would be bound to it by a necessary allegiance, there being no longer any rival object left for serious or intelligent consideration.

The psychological analysis on which these partial or total negations were founded was in a general way admirable; the necessary artifices to which it had recourse in distinguishing simple and complex ideas, principles of association and inference, were nothing but premonitions of what a physiological psychology would do in referring the mental process to its organic and external supports; for experience has no other divisions than those it creates in itself by distinguishing its objects and its organs. Reference to external conditions, though seldom explicit in these writers, who imagined they could appeal to an introspection not revealing the external world, was pervasive in them; as, for instance, where Hume made his fundamental distinction between impressions and ideas, where the discrimination was based nominally on relative vividness and priority in time, but really on causation respectively by outer objects or by spontaneous processes in the brain.

Hume it was who carried this psychological analysis to its goal, giving it greater simplicity and universal scope; and he had also the further advantage of not nursing any metaphysical changeling of his own to substitute for the legitimate offspring of human understanding.

His curiosity was purer and his scepticism more impartial, so that he laid bare the natural habits and necessary fictions of thought with singular lucidity, and sufficient accuracy for general purposes. But the malice of a psychology intended as a weapon against superstition here recoils on science itself. Hume, like Berkeley, was extremely young, scarce five-and-twenty, when he wrote his most incisive work; he was not ready to propose in theory that test of ideas by their utility which in practice he and the whole English school have instinctively adopted. An ulterior test of validity would not have seemed to him satisfactory, for though inclined to rebellion and positivism he was still the pupil of that mythical philosophy which attributed the value of things to their origin rather than to their uses, because it had first, in its parabolic way, erected the highest good into a First Cause. Still breathing, in spite of himself, this atmosphere of materialised Platonism, Hume could not discover the true origin of anything without imagining that he had destroyed its value. A natural child meant for him an illegitimate one; his philosophy had not yet reached the wisdom of that French lady who asked if all children were not natural. The outcome of his psychology and criticism seemed accordingly to be an inhibition of reason; he was left free to choose between the distractions of backgammon and “sitting down in a forlorn scepticism.”

In his first youth, while disintegrating reflection still overpowered the active interests of his mind, Hume seems to have had some moments of genuine suspense and doubt: but with years and prosperity the normal habits of inference which he had so acutely analysed asserted themselves in his own person and he yielded to the “tendency to feign” so far at least as to believe languidly in the histories he wrote, the compliments he received, and the succulent dinners he devoured. There is a kind of courtesy in scepticism. It would be an offence against polite conventions to press our doubts too far and question the permanence of our estates, our neighbours’ independent existence, or even the justification of a good bishop’s faith and income. Against metaphysicians, and even against bishops, sarcasm was not without its savour; but the line must be drawn somewhere by a gentleman and a man of the world. Hume found no obstacle in his speculations to the adoption of all necessary and useful conceptions in the sphere to which he limited his mature interests. That he never extended this liberty to believe into more speculative and comprehensive regions

Hume’s
gratuitous
scepticism.

was due simply to a voluntary superficiality in his thought. Had he been interested in the rationality of things he would have laboured to discover it, as he laboured to discover that historical truth or that political utility to which his interests happened to attach.

Kant, like Berkeley, had a private mysticism in reserve to raise upon the ruins of science and common-sense. Knowledge was to be removed to make way for faith. This task is ambiguous, and the equivocation involved in it is perhaps the deepest of those confusions with which German metaphysics has since struggled, and which have made it waver between the deepest introspection and the dreariest mythology. To substitute faith for knowledge might mean to teach the intellect humility, to make it aware of its theoretic and transitive function as a faculty for hypothesis and rational fiction, building a bridge of methodical inferences and ideal unities between fact and fact, between endeavour and satisfaction. It might be to remind us, sprinkling over us, as it were, the Lenten ashes of an intellectual contrition, that our thoughts are air even as our bodies are dust, momentary vehicles and products of an immortal vitality in God and in nature, which fosters and illumines us for a moment before it lapses into other forms.

**Kant's
substitute for
knowledge.**

Had Kant proposed to humble and concentrate into a practical faith *the same natural ideas* which had previously been taken for absolute knowledge, his intention would have been innocent, his conclusions wise, and his analysis free from venom and *arrière-pensée*. Man, because of his finite and propulsive nature and because he is a pilgrim and a traveller throughout his life, is obliged to have faith: the absent, the hidden, the eventual, is the necessary object of his concern. But what else shall his faith rest in except in what the necessary forms of his perception present to him and what the indispensable categories of his understanding help him to conceive? What possible objects are there for faith except objects of a possible experience? What else should a practical and moral philosophy concern itself with, except the governance and betterment of the real world? It is surely by using his only possible forms of perception and his inevitable categories of understanding that man may yet learn, as he has partly learned already, to live and prosper in the universe. Had Kant's criticism amounted simply to such a confession of the tentative, practical, and hypothetical nature of human reason, it would have been wholly acceptable to the wise; and its appeal to faith would have been nothing

but an expression of natural vitality and courage, just as its criticism of knowledge would have been nothing but a better acquaintance with self. This faith would have called the forces of impulse and passion to reason's support, not to its betrayal. Faith would have meant faith in the intellect, a faith naturally expressing man's practical and ideal nature, and the only faith yet sanctioned by its fruits.

Side by side with this reinstatement of reason, however, which was not absent from Kant's system in its critical phase and in its application to science, there lurked in his substitution of faith for knowledge another and sinister intention. He wished to blast as insignificant, because "subjective," the whole structure of human intelligence, with all the lessons of experience and all the triumphs of human skill, and to attach absolute validity instead to certain echoes of his rigoristic religious education. These notions were surely just as subjective, and far more local and transitory, than the common machinery of thought; and it was actually proclaimed to be an evidence of their sublimity that they remained entirely without practical sanction in the form of success or of happiness. The "categorical imperative" was a shadow of the ten commandments; the postulates of practical reason were the minimal tenets of the most abstract Protestantism. These fossils, found unaccountably imbedded in the old man's mind, he regarded as the evidences of an inward but supernatural revelation.

Only the quaint severity of Kant's education and character can make intelligible to us the restraint he exercised in making supernatural postulates. All he asserted was his inscrutable moral imperative and a God to reward with the pleasures of the next world those who had been Puritans in this. But the same principle could obviously be applied to other cherished imaginations: there is no superstition which it might not justify in the eyes of men accustomed to see in that superstition the sanction of their morality. For the "practical" proofs of freedom, immortality, and Providence—of which all evidence in reason or experience had previously been denied—exceed in perfunctory sophistry anything that can be imagined. Yet this lamentable epilogue was in truth the guiding thought of the whole investigation. Nature had been proved a figment of human imagination so that, once rid of all but a mock allegiance to her facts and laws, we might be free to invent any world we chose and believe it to be absolutely real and independent of our nature. Strange

**False
subjectivity
attributed
to reason.**

**Chimerical
reconstruction.**

prepossession, that while part of human life and mind was to be an avenue to reality and to put men in relation to external and eternal things, the whole of human life and mind should not be able to do so! Conceptions rooted in the very elements of our being, in our senses, intellect, and imagination, which had shaped themselves through many generations under a constant fire of observation and disillusion, these were to be called subjective, not only in the sense in which all knowledge must obviously be so, since it is knowledge that someone possesses and has gained, but subjective in a disparaging sense, and in contrast to some better form of knowledge. But what better form of knowledge is this? If it be a knowledge of things as they really are and not as they appear, we must remember that reality means what the intellect infers from the data of sense; and yet the principles of such inference, by which the distinction between appearance and reality is first instituted, are precisely the principles now to be discarded as subjective and of merely empirical validity.

“Merely empirical” is a vicious phrase: what is other than empirical is less than empirical, and what is not relative to eventual experience is something given only in present fancy. The gods of genuine religion, for instance, are terms in a continual experience: the pure in heart may see God. If the better and less subjective principle be said to be the moral law, we must remember that the moral law which has practical importance and true dignity deals with facts and forces of the natural world, that it expresses interests and aspirations in which man’s fate in time and space, with his pains, pleasures, and all other empirical feelings, is concerned. This was not the moral law to which Kant appealed, for this is a part of the warp and woof of nature. His moral law was a personal superstition, irrelevant to the impulse and need of the world. His notions of the supernatural were those of his sect and generation, and did not pass to his more influential disciples: what was transmitted was simply the contempt for sense and understanding and the practice, authorised by his modest example, of building air-castles in the great clearing which the *Critique* was supposed to have made.

It is noticeable in the series of philosophers from Hobbes to Kant that as the metaphysical residuum diminished the critical and psychological machinery increased in volume and value. In Hobbes and Locke, with the beginnings of empirical psychology, there is mixed an abstract materialism; in Berkeley, with an extension of analytic criti-

cism, a popular and childlike theology, entirely without rational development; in Hume, with a completed survey of human habits of ideation, a withdrawal into practical conventions; and in Kant, with the conception of the creative understanding firmly grasped and elaborately worked out, a flight from the natural world altogether.

The *Critique*, in spite of some artificialities and pedantries in arrangement, presented a conception never before attained of the rich architecture of reason. It revealed the intricate organisation, comparable to that of the body, possessed by that fine web of intentions and counter-intentions whose pulsations are our thoughts. The dynamic logic of intelligence was laid bare, and the hierarchy of ideas, if not always correctly traced, was at least manifested in its principle. It was as great an enlargement of Hume's work as Hume's had been of Locke's or Locke's of Hobbes's. And the very fact that the metaphysical residuum practically disappeared—for the weak reconstruction in the second *Critique* may be dismissed as irrelevant—renders the work essentially valid, essentially a description of something real. It is therefore a great source of instruction and a good compendium or storehouse for the problems of mind. But the work has been much overestimated. It is the product of a confused though laborious mind. It contains contradictions not merely incidental, such as any great novel work must retain (since no man can at once remodel his whole vocabulary and opinions) but contradictions absolutely fundamental and inexcusable, like that between the transcendental function of intellect and its limited authority, or that between the efficacy of things-in-themselves and their unknowability. Kant's assumptions and his conclusions, his superstitions and his wisdom, alternate without neutralising each other.

That experience is a product of two factors is an assumption made by Kant. It rests on a psychological analogy, namely on the fact that organ and stimulus are both necessary to sensation. That experience is the substance or matter of nature, which is a construction in thought, is Kant's conclusion, based on intrinsic logical analysis. Here experience is evidently viewed as something uncaused and without conditions, being itself the source and condition of all thinkable objects. The relation between the transcendental function of experience and its empirical causes Kant never understood. The transcendentalism which—if we have it at all—must be fundamen-

**The *Critique*
a work on
mental
architecture.**

Incoherences.

tal, he made derivative; and the realism, which must then be derivative, he made absolute. Therefore his metaphysics remained fabulous and his idealism sceptical or malicious.

Ask what can be meant by “conditions of experience” and Kant’s bewildering puzzle solves itself at the word. Condition, like cause, is a term that covers a confusion between dialectical and natural connections. The conditions of experience, in the dialectical sense, are the characteristics a thing must have to deserve the name of experience; in other words, its conditions are its nominal essence. If experience be used in a loose sense to mean any given fact or consciousness in general, the condition of experience is merely immediacy. If it be used, as it often is in empirical writers, for the shock of sense, its conditions are two: a sensitive organ and an object capable of stimulating it. If finally experience be given its highest and most pregnant import and mean a fund of knowledge gathered by living, the condition of experience is intelligence. Taking the word in this last sense, Kant showed in a confused but essentially conclusive fashion that only by the application of categories to immediate data could knowledge of an ordered universe arise; or, in other language, that knowledge is a vista, that it has a perspective, since it is the presence to a given thought of a diffused and articulated landscape. The categories are the principles of interpretation by which the flat datum acquires this perspective in thought and becomes representative of a whole system of successive or collateral existences.

The circumstance that experience, in the second sense, is a term reserved for what has certain natural conditions, namely, for the spark flying from the contact of stimulus and organ, led Kant to shift his point of view, and to talk half the time about conditions in the sense of natural causes or needful antecedents. Intelligence is not an antecedent of thought and knowledge but their character and logical energy. Synthesis is not a natural but only a dialectical condition of pregnant experience; it does not introduce such experience but constitutes it. Nevertheless, the whole skeleton and dialectical mould of experience came to figure, in Kant’s mythology, as machinery behind the scenes, as a system of non-natural efficient forces, as a partner in a marriage the issue of which was human thought. The idea could thus suggest itself—favoured also by remembering inopportunately the actual psychological situation—that all experience, in every sense of the word, had supernatural antecedents, and that the dialectical conditions of

experience, in the highest sense, were efficient conditions of experience in the lowest.

It is hardly necessary to observe that absolute experience can have no natural conditions. Existence in the abstract can have no cause; for every real condition would have to be a factor in absolute experience, and every cause would be something existent. Of course there is a modest and non-exhaustive experience—that is, any particular sensation, thought, or life—which it would be preposterous to deny was subject to natural conditions. Saint Lawrence’s experience of being roasted, for instance, had conditions; some of them were the fire, the decree of the court, and his own stalwart Christianity. But these conditions are other parts or objects of conceivable experience which, as we have learned, fall into a system with the part we say they condition. In our groping and inferential thought one part may become a ground for expecting or supposing the other. Nature is then the sum total of its own conditions; the whole object, the parts observed *plus* the parts interpolated, is the self-existent fact. The mind, in its empirical flux, is a part of this complex; to say it is its own condition or that of the other objects is a grotesque falsehood. A babe’s casual sensation of light is a condition neither of his own existence nor of his mother’s. The true conditions are those other parts of the world without which, as we find by experience, sensations of light do not appear.

Had Kant been trained in a better school of philosophy he might have felt that the phrase “subjective conditions” is a contradiction in terms. When we find ourselves compelled to go behind the actual and imagine something antecedent or latent to pave the way for it, we are *ipso facto* conceiving the potential, that is, the “objective” world. All antecedents, by transcendental necessity, are therefore objective and all conditions natural. An imagined potentiality that holds together the episodes which are actual in consciousness is the very definition of an object or thing. Nature is the sum total of things potentially observable, some observed actually, others interpolated hypothetically; and common-sense is right as against Kant’s subjectivism in regarding nature as the condition of mind and not mind as the condition of nature. This is not to say that experience and feeling are not the only given existence, from which the material part of nature, something essentially dynamic and potential, must be intelligently inferred. But are not “conditions” inferred? Are they not, in their deepest essence,

Nature the true system of conditions.

potentialities and powers? Kant's fabled conditions also are inferred; but they are inferred illegitimately since the "subjective" ones are dialectical characters turned into antecedents, while the thing-in-itself is a natural object without a natural function. Experience alone being given, it is the ground from which its conditions are inferred: its conditions, therefore, are empirical. The secondary position of nature goes with the secondary position of all causes, objects, conditions, and ideals. To have made the conditions of experience metaphysical, and prior in the order of knowledge to experience itself, was simply a piece of surviving Platonism. The form was hypostasised into an agent, and mythical machinery was imagined to impress that form on whatever happened to have it.

All this was opposed to Kant's own discovery and to his critical doctrine which showed that the world (which is the complex of those conditions which experience assigns to itself as it develops and progresses in knowledge) is not before experience in the order of knowledge, but after it. His fundamental oversight and contradiction lay in not seeing that the concept of a set of conditions was the precise and exact concept of nature, which he consequently reduplicated, having one nature before experience and another after. The first thus became mythical and the second illusory: for the first, said to condition experience, was a set of verbal ghosts, while the second, which alone could be observed or discovered scientifically, was declared fictitious. The truth is that the single nature or set of conditions for experience which the intellect constructs is the object of our thoughts and perceptions ideally completed. This is neither mythical nor illusory. It is, strictly speaking, in its system and in many of its parts, hypothetical; but the hypothesis is absolutely safe. At whatever point we test it, we find the experience we expect, and the inferences thence made by the intellect are verified in sense at every moment of existence.

The ambiguity in Kant's doctrine makes him a confusing representative of that criticism of perception which malicious psychology has to offer. When the mind has made its great discovery; when it has recognised independent objects, and thus taken a first step in its rational life, we need to know unequivocally whether this step is a false or a true one. If it be false, reason is itself misleading, since a hypothesis indispensable in the intellectual mastery of experience is a false hypothesis and the detail of experience has no substructure. Now Kant's answer was that

**Artificial
pathos in
subjectivism.**

the discovery of objects was a true and valid discovery in the field of experience; there were, scientifically speaking, causes for perception which could be inferred from perception by thought. But this inference was not true absolutely or metaphysically because there was a real world beyond possible experience, and there were oracles, not intellectual, by which knowledge of that unrealisable world might be obtained. This mysticism undid the intellectualism which characterised Kant's system in its scientific and empirical application; so that the justification for the use of such categories as that of cause and substance (categories by which the idea of reality is constituted) was invalidated by the counter-assertion that empirical reality was not true reality but, being an object reached by inferential thought, was merely an idea. Nor was the true reality appearance itself in its crude immediacy, as sceptics would think; it was a realm of objects present to a supposed intuitive thought, that is, to a non-inferential inference or non-discursive discourse.

So that while Kant insisted on the point, which hardly needed pressing, that it is mind that discovers empirical reality by making inferences from the data of sense, he admitted at the same time that such use of understanding is legitimate and even necessary, and that the idea of nature so framed has empirical truth. There remained, however, a sense that this empirical truth was somehow insufficient and illusory. Understanding was a superficial faculty, and we might by other and oracular methods arrive at a reality that was not empirical. Why any reality—such as God, for instance—should not be just as empirical as the other side of the moon, if experience suggested it and reason discovered it, or why, if not suggested by experience and discovered by reason, anything should be called a reality at all or should hold for a moment a man's waking attention—that is what Kant never tells us and never himself knew.

Clearer upon this question of perception is the position of Berkeley; we may therefore take him as a fair representative of those critics who seek to invalidate the discovery of material objects.

Our ideas, said Berkeley, were in our minds; the material world was patched together out of our ideas; it therefore existed only in our minds. To the suggestion that the idea of the external world is of course in our minds, but that our minds have constructed it by treating sensations as effects of a permanent substance distributed in a permanent space, he would reply that this means nothing, because “sub-

stance," "permanence," and "space" are non-existent ideas, *i.e.*, they are not images in sense. They might, however, be "notions" like that of "spirit," which Berkeley ingenuously admitted into his system, to be, mysteriously enough, *that which has* ideas. Or they might be (what would do just as well for our purpose) that which he elsewhere called them, algebraic signs used to facilitate the operations of thought. This is, indeed, what they are, if we take the word algebraic in a loose enough sense. They are like algebraic signs in being, in respect of their object or signification, not concrete images but terms in a mental process, elements in a method of inference. Why, then, denounce them? They could be used with all confidence to lead us back to the concrete values for which they stood and to the relations which they enabled us to state and discover. Experience would thus be furnished with an intelligible structure and articulation, and a psychological analysis would be made of knowledge into its sensuous material and its ideal objects. What, then, was Berkeley's objection to these algebraic methods of inference and to the notions of space, matter, independent existence, and efficient causality which these methods involve?

Berkeley's
algebra of
perception.

What he abhorred was the belief that such methods of interpreting experience were ultimate and truly valid, and that by thinking after the fashion of "mathematical atheists" we could understand experience as well as it can be understood. If the flux of ideas had no other key to it than that system of associations and algebraic substitutions which is called the natural world we should indeed know just as well what to expect in practice and should receive the same education in perception and reflection; but what difference would there be between such an idealist and the most pestilential materialist, save his even greater wariness and scepticism? Berkeley at this time—long before days of "Siris" and tar-water—was too ignorant and hasty to understand how inane all spiritual or poetic ideals would be did they not express man's tragic dependence on nature and his congruous development in her bosom. He lived in an age when the study and dominion of external things no longer served directly spiritual uses. The middle-men had appeared, those spirits in whom the pursuit of the true and the practical never leads to possession of the good, but loses itself, like a river in sand, amid irrational habits and passions. He was accordingly repelled by whatever philosophy was in him, no less than by his religious prejudices, from submergence in

Horror of
physics.

external interests, and he could see no better way of vindicating the supremacy of moral goods than to deny the reality of matter, the finality of science, and the constructive powers of reason altogether. With honest English empiricism he saw that science had nothing absolute or sacrosanct about it, and rightly placed the value of theory in its humane uses; but the complementary truth escaped him altogether that only the free and contemplative expression of reason, of which science is a chief part, can render anything else humane, useful, or practical. He was accordingly a party man in philosophy, where partisanship is treason, and opposed the work of reason in the theoretical field, hoping thus to advance it in the moral.

Of the moral field he had, it need hardly be added, a quite childish and perfunctory conception. There the prayer-book and the catechism could solve every problem. He lacked the feeling, possessed by all large and mature minds, that there would be no intelligibility or value in things divine were they not interpretations and sublimations of things natural. To master the real world was an ancient and not too promising ambition: it suited his youthful radicalism better to exorcise or to cajole it. He sought to refresh the world with a water-spout of idealism, as if to change the names of things could change their values. Away with all arid investigation, away with the cold algebra of sense and reason, and let us have instead a direct conversation with heaven, an unclouded vision of the purposes and goodness of God; as if there were any other way of understanding the sources of human happiness than to study the ways of nature and man.

Converse with God has been the life of many a wiser and sadder philosopher than Berkeley; but they, like Plato, for instance, or Spinoza, have made experience the subject as well as the language of that intercourse, and have thus given the divine revelation some degree of pertinence and articulation. Berkeley in his positive doctrine was satisfied with the vaguest generalities; he made no effort to find out how the consciousness that God is the direct author of our incidental perceptions is to help us to deal with them; what other insights and principles are to be substituted for those that disclose the economy of nature; how the moral difficulties incident to an absolute providentialism are to be met, or how the existence and influence of fellow-minds is to be defended. So that to a piety inspired by conventional theology and a psychology that refused to pass, except grudgingly and unintel-

Puerility in morals.

ligerly, beyond the sensuous stratum, Berkeley had nothing to add by way of philosophy. An insignificant repetition of the truism that ideas are all “in the mind” constituted his total wisdom. To be was to be perceived. That was the great maxim by virtue of which we were asked, if not to refrain from conceiving nature at all, which was perhaps impossible at so late a stage in human development, at least to refrain from regarding our necessary thoughts on nature as true or rational. Intelligence was but a false method of imagination by which God trained us in action and thought; for it was apparently impossible to endow us with a true method that would serve that end. And what shall we think of the critical acumen or practical wisdom of a philosopher who dreamed of some other criterion of truth than necessary implication in thought and action?

In the melodramatic fashion so common in what is called philosophy we may delight ourselves with such flashes of lightning as this: *esse est percipi*. The truth of this paradox lies in the fact that through perception alone can we get at being—a modest Truism and
sophism. and familiar notion which makes, as Plato’s *Theætetus* shows, not a bad point of departure for a serious theory of knowledge. The sophistical intent of it, however, is to deny our right to make a distinction which in fact we do make and which the speaker himself is making as he utters the phrase; for he would not be so proud of himself if he thought he was thundering a tautology. If a thing were never perceived, or inferred from perception, we should indeed never know that it existed; but once perceived or inferred it may be more conducive to comprehension and practical competence to regard it as existing independently of our perception; and our ability to make this supposition is registered in the difference between the two words *to be* and *to be perceived*—words which are by no means synonymous but designate two very different relations of things in thought. Such idealism at one fell swoop, through a collapse of assertive intellect and a withdrawal of reason into self-consciousness, has the puzzling character of any clever pun, that suspends the fancy between two incompatible but irresistible meanings. The art of such sophistry is to choose for an axiom some ambiguous phrase which taken in one sense is a truism and taken in another is an absurdity; and then, by showing the truth of that truism, to give out that the absurdity has also been proved. It is a truism to say that I am the only seat or locus of my ideas, and that

whatever I know is known by me; it is an absurdity to say that I am the only object of my thought and perception.

To confuse the instrument with its function and the operation with its meaning has been a persistent foible in modern philosophy. It could thus come about that the function of intelligence should be altogether misconceived and in consequence denied, when it was discovered that figments of reason could never become elements of sense but must always remain, as of course they should, ideal and regulative objects, and therefore objects to which a practical and energetic intellect will tend to give the name of realities. Matter is a reality to the practical intellect because it is a necessary and ideal term in the mastery of experience; while negligible sensations, like dreams, are called illusions by the same authority because, though actual enough while they last, they have no sustained function and no right to practical dominion.

Let us imagine Berkeley addressing himself to that infant or animal consciousness which first used the category of substance and passed from its perceptions to the notion of an independent thing. "Beware, my child," he would have said, "you are taking a dangerous step, one which may hereafter produce a multitude of mathematical atheists, not to speak of cloisterfuls of scholastic triflers. Your ideas can exist only in your mind; if you suffer yourself to imagine them materialised in mid-air and subsisting when you do not perceive them, you will commit a great impiety. If you unthinkingly believe that when you shut your eyes the world continues to exist until you open them again, you will inevitably be hurried into an infinity of metaphysical quibbles about the discrete and the continuous, and you will be so bewildered and deafened by perpetual controversies that the clear light of the gospel will be extinguished in your soul." "But," that tender Peripatetic might answer, "I cannot forget the things about me when I shut my eyes: I know and almost feel their persistent presence, and I always find them again, upon trial, just as they were before, or just in that condition to which the operation of natural causes would have brought them in my absence. If I believe they remain and suffer steady and imperceptible transformation, I know what to expect, and the event does not deceive me; but if I had to resolve upon action before knowing whether the conditions for action were to exist or no, I should never understand what sort of a world I lived in."

Reality is the practical made intelligible.

“Ah, my child,” the good Bishop would reply, “you misunderstand me. You may indeed, nay, you must, live and think *as if* everything remained independently real. That is part of your education for heaven, which God in his goodness provides for you in this life. He will send into your soul at every moment the impressions needed to verify your necessary hypotheses and support your humble and prudent expectations. Only you must not attribute that constancy to the things themselves which is due to steadfastness in the designs of Providence. *Think and act* as if a material world existed, but do not for a moment *believe* it to exist.”

With this advice, coming reassuringly from the combined forces of scepticism and religion, we may leave the embryonic mind to its own devices, satisfied that even according to the most malicious psychologists its first step toward the comprehension of experience is one it may congratulate itself on having taken and which, for the present at least, it is not called upon to retrace. The Life of Reason is not concerned with speculation about unthinkable and gratuitous “realities”; it seeks merely to attain those conceptions which are necessary and appropriate to man in his acting and thinking. The first among these, underlying all arts and philosophies alike, is the indispensable conception of permanent external objects, forming in their congeries, shifts, and secret animation the system and life of nature.

Vain
“realities”
and
trustworthy
“fictions.”

NOTE—There is a larger question raised by Berkeley’s arguments which I have not attempted to discuss here, namely, whether knowledge is possible at all, and whether any mental representation can be supposed to inform us about anything. Berkeley of course assumed this power in that he continued to believe in God, in other spirits, in the continuity of experience, and in its discoverable laws. His objection to material objects, therefore, could not consistently be that they are objects of knowledge rather than absolute feelings, exhausted by their momentary possession in consciousness. It could only be that they are unthinkable and invalid objects, in which the materials of sense are given a mode of existence inconsistent with their nature. But if the only criticism to which material objects were obnoxious were a dialectical criticism, such as that contained in Kant’s antinomies, the royal road to idealism coveted by Berkeley would be blocked; to be an idea in the mind would not involve lack of cognitive and representative value in that idea. The fact that material objects were represented or conceived would not of itself prove that they could not have a real existence. It would be necessary, to prove their unreality, to study their nature and function and to compare them with such conceptions as those of Providence and a spirit-world in order to determine their relative validity. Such a critical com-

parison would have augured ill for Berkeley's prejudices; what its result might have been we can see in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. In order to escape such evil omens and prevent the collapse of his mystical paradoxes, Berkeley keeps in reserve a much more insidious weapon, the sceptical doubt as to the representative character of anything mental, the possible illusive-ness of all knowledge. This doubt he invokes in all those turns of thought and phrase in which he suggests that if an idea is in the mind it cannot have its counterpart elsewhere, and that a given cognition exhausts and contains its object. There are, then, two separate maxims in his philosophy, one held consistently, viz., that nothing can be known which is different in character or nature from the object present to the thinking mind; the other, held incidentally and inconsistently, since it is destructive of all predication and knowledge, viz., that nothing can exist beyond the mind which is similar in nature or character to the "ideas" within it; or, to put the same thing in other words, that nothing can be revealed by an idea which is different from that idea in point of existence. The first maxim does not contradict the existence of external objects in space; the second contradicts every conception that the human mind can ever form, the most airy no less than the grossest. No idealist can go so far as to deny that his memory represents his past experience by inward similarity and conscious intention, or, if he prefers this language, that the moments or aspects of the divine mind represent one another and their general system. Else the idealist's philosophy itself would be an insignificant and momentary illusion.

CHAPTER V

NATURE UNIFIED AND MIND DISCERNED

When the mind has learned to distinguish external objects and to attribute to them a constant size, shape, and potency, in spite of the variety and intermittence ruling in direct experience, there yet remains a great work to do before attaining a clear, even if superficial, view of the world. An animal's customary habitat may have constant features and their relations in space may be learned by continuous exploration; but probably many other landscapes are also within the range of memory and fancy that stand in no visible relation to the place in which we find ourselves at a given moment. It is true that, at this day, we take it for granted that all real places, as we call them, lie in one space, in which they hold definite geometric relations to one another; and if we have glimpses of any region for which no room can be found in the single map of the universe which astronomy has drawn, we unhesitatingly relegate that region to the land of dreams. Since the Elysian Fields and the Coast of Bohemia have no assignable latitude and longitude, we call these places imaginary, even if in some dream we remember to have visited them and dwelt there with no less sense of reality than in this single and geometrical world of commerce. It belongs to sanity and common-sense, as men now possess them, to admit no countries unknown to geography and filling no part of the conventional space in three dimensions. All our waking experience is understood to go on in some part of this space, and no court of law would admit evidence relating to events in some other sphere.

Man's feeble
grasp of
nature.

This principle, axiomatic as it has become, is in no way primitive, since primitive experience is sporadic and introduces us to detached scenes separated by lapses in our senses and attention. These scenes do not hang together in any local contiguity. To construct a chart of the

world is a difficult feat of synthetic imagination, not to be performed without speculative boldness and a heroic insensibility to the claims of fancy. Even now most people live without topographical ideas and have no clear conception of the spatial relations that keep together the world in which they move. They feel their daily way about like animals, following a habitual scent, without dominating the range of their instinctive wanderings. Reality is rather a story to them than a system of objects and forces, nor would they think themselves mad if at any time their experience should wander into a fourth dimension. Vague dramatic and moral laws, when they find any casual application, seem to such dreaming minds more notable truths, deeper revelations of efficacious reality, than the mechanical necessities of the case, which they scarcely conceive of; and in this primordial prejudice they are confirmed by superstitious affinities often surviving in their religion and philosophy. In the midst of cities and affairs they are like landsmen at sea, incapable of an intellectual conception of their position: nor have they any complete confidence in their principles of navigation. They know the logarithms by rote merely, and if they reflect are reduced to a stupid wonder and only half believe they are in a known universe or will ever reach an earthly port. It would not require superhuman eloquence in some prophetic passenger to persuade them to throw compass and quadrant overboard and steer enthusiastically for El Dorado. The theory of navigation is essentially as speculative as that of salvation, only it has survived more experiences of the judgment and repeatedly brought those who trust in it to their promised land.

The theory that all real objects and places lie together in one even and homogeneous space, conceived as similar in its constitution to the parts of extension of which we have immediate intuition, is a theory of the greatest practical importance and validity. By its light we carry on all our affairs, and the success of our action while we rely upon it is the best proof of its truth. The imaginative parsimony and discipline which such a theory involves are balanced by the immense extension and certitude it gives to knowledge. It is at once an act of allegiance to nature and a Magna Charta which mind imposes on the tyrannous world, which in turn pledges itself before the assembled faculties of man not to exceed its constitutional privilege and to harbour no magic monsters in unattainable lairs from which they might

**Its unity
ideal and
discoverable
only by
steady
thought.**

issue to disturb human labours. Yet that spontaneous intelligence which first enabled men to make this genial discovery and take so fundamental a step toward taming experience should not be laid by after this first victory; it is a weapon needed in many subsequent conflicts. To conceive that all nature makes one system is only a beginning; the articulation of natural life has still to be discovered in detail and, what is more, a similar articulation has to be given to the psychic world which now, by the very act that constitutes Nature and makes her consistent, appears at her side or rather in her bosom.

That the unification of nature is eventual and theoretical is a point useful to remember: else the relation of the natural world to poetry, metaphysics, and religion will never become intelligible. Lalande, or whoever it was, who searched the heavens with his telescope and could find no God, would not have found the human mind if he had searched the brain with a microscope. Yet God existed in man's apprehension long before mathematics or even, perhaps, before the vault of heaven; for the objectification of the whole mind, with its passions and motives, naturally precedes that abstraction by which the idea of a material world is drawn from the chaos of experience, an abstraction which culminates in such atomic and astronomical theories as science is now familiar with. The sense for life in things, be they small or great, is not derived from the abstract idea of their bodies but is an ancient concomitant to that idea, inseparable from it until it became abstract. Truth and materiality, mechanism and ideal interests, are collateral projections from one rolling experience, which shows up one aspect or the other as it develops various functions and dominates itself to various ends. When one ore is abstracted and purified, the residuum subsists in that primeval quarry in which it originally lay. The failure to find God among the stars, or even the attempt to find him there, does not indicate that human experience affords no avenue to the idea of God—for history proves the contrary—but indicates rather the atrophy in this particular man of the imaginative faculty by which his race had attained to that idea. Such an atrophy might indeed become general, and God would in that case disappear from human experience as music would disappear if universal deafness attacked the race. Such an event is made conceivable by the loss of allied imaginative habits, which is observable in historic times. Yet possible variations in human faculty do not involve the illegitimacy of such faculties as actually subsist; and the abstract world known to science, unless it dries up the

ancient fountains of ideation by its habitual presence in thought, does not remove those parallel dramatisations or abstractions which experience may have suggested to men.

What enables men to perceive the unity of nature is the unification of their own wills. A man half-asleep, without fixed purposes, without intellectual keenness or joy in recognition, might graze about like an animal, forgetting each satisfaction in the next and banishing from his frivolous mind the memory of every sorrow; what had just failed to kill him would leave him as thoughtless and unconcerned as if it had never crossed his path. Such irrational elasticity and innocent improvidence would never put two and two together. Every morning there would be a new world with the same fool to live in it. But let some sobering passion, some serious interest, lend perspective to the mind, and a point of reference will immediately be given for protracted observation; then the laws of nature will begin to dawn upon thought. Every experiment will become a lesson, every event will be remembered as favourable or unfavourable to the master-passion. At first, indeed, this keen observation will probably be animistic and the laws discovered will be chiefly habits, human or divine, special favours or envious punishments and warnings. But the same constancy of aim which discovers the dramatic conflicts composing society, and tries to read nature in terms of passion, will, if it be long sustained, discover behind this glorious chaos a deeper mechanical order. Men's thoughts, like the weather, are not so arbitrary as they seem and the true master in observation, the man guided by a steadfast and superior purpose, will see them revolving about their centres in obedience to quite calculable instincts, and the principle of all their flutterings will not be hidden from his eyes. Belief in indeterminism is a sign of indetermination. No commanding or steady intellect flirts with so miserable a possibility, which in so far as it actually prevailed would make virtue impotent and experience, in its pregnant sense, impossible.

We have said that those objects which cannot be incorporated into the one space which the understanding envisages are relegated to another sphere called imagination. We reach here a most important corollary. As material objects, making a single system which fills space and evolves in time, are conceived by abstraction from the flux of sensuous experience, so, *pari passu*, the rest of experience, with all its other outgrowths and concretions, falls out with the physical world and forms the sphere

Mind the
erratic
residue of
existence.

of mind, the sphere of memory, fancy, and the passions. We have in this discrimination the *genesis of mind*, not of course in the transcendental sense in which the word mind is extended to mean the sum total and mere fact of existence—for mind, so taken, can have no origin and indeed no specific meaning—but the genesis of mind as a determinate form of being, a distinguishable part of the universe known to experience and discourse, the mind that unravels itself in meditation, inhabits animal bodies, and is studied in psychology.

Mind, in this proper sense of the word, is the residue of existence, the leavings, so to speak, and parings of experience when the material world has been cut out of the whole cloth. Reflection underlines in the chaotic continuum of sense and longing those aspects that have practical significance; it selects the efficacious ingredients in the world. The trustworthy object which is thus retained in thought, the complex of connected events, is nature, and though so intelligible an object is not soon nor vulgarly recognised, because human reflection is perturbed and halting, yet every forward step in scientific and practical knowledge is a step toward its clearer definition. At first much parasitic matter clings to that dynamic skeleton. Nature is drawn like a sponge heavy and dripping from the waters of sentience. It is soaked with inefficacious passions and overlaid with idle accretions. Nature, in a word, is at first conceived mythically, dramatically, and retains much of the unintelligible, sporadic habit of animal experience itself. But as attention awakes and discrimination, practically inspired, grows firm and stable, irrelevant qualities are stripped off, and the mechanical process, the efficacious infallible order, is clearly disclosed beneath. Meantime the incidental effects, the “secondary qualities,” are relegated to a personal inconsequential region; they constitute the realm of appearance, the realm of mind.

Mind is therefore sometimes identified with the unreal. We oppose, in an antithesis natural to thought and language, the imaginary to the true, fancy to fact, idea to thing. But this thing, fact, or external reality is, as we have seen, a completion and hypostasis of certain portions of experience, packed into such shapes as prove cogent in thought and practice. The stuff of external reality, the matter out of which its idea is made, is therefore continuous with the stuff and matter of our own minds. Their common substance is the immediate flux. This living worm has propagated by fission, and the two halves into which it

Ghostly
character of
mind.

has divided its life are mind and nature. Mind has kept and clarified the crude appearance, the dream, the purpose that seethed in the mass; nature has appropriated the order, the constant conditions, the causal substructure, disclosed in reflection, by which the immediate flux is explained and controlled. The chemistry of thought has precipitated these contrasted terms, each maintaining a recognisable identity and having the function of a point of reference for memory and will. Some of these terms or objects of thought we call things and marshal in all their ideal stability—for there is constancy in their motions and transformations—to make the intelligible external world of practice and science. Whatever stuff has not been absorbed in this construction, whatever facts of sensation, ideation, or will, do not coalesce with the newest conception of reality, we then call the mind.

Raw experience, then, lies at the basis of the idea of nature and approves its reality; while an equal reality belongs to the residue of experience, not taken up, as yet, into that idea. But this residual sensuous reality often seems comparatively unreal because what it presents is entirely without practical force apart from its mechanical associates. This inconsequential character of what remains over follows of itself from the concretion of whatever is constant and efficacious into the external world. If this fact is ever called in question, it is only because the external world is vaguely conceived, and loose wills and ideas are thought to govern it by magic. Yet in many ways falling short of absolute precision people recognise that thought is not dynamic or, as they call it, not real. The idea of the physical world is the first flower or thick cream of practical thinking. Being skimmed off first and proving so nutritious, it leaves the liquid below somewhat thin and unsavoury. Especially does this result appear when science is still unpruned and mythical, so that what passes into the idea of material nature is much more than the truly causal network of forces, and includes many spiritual and moral functions.

The material world, as conceived in the first instance, had not that clear abstractness, nor the spiritual world that wealth and interest, which they have acquired for modern minds. The complex reactions of man's soul had been objectified together with those visual and tactile sensations which, reduced to a mathematical baldness, now furnish terms to natural science. Mind then dwelt in the world, not only in the warmth and beauty with which it literally clothed material objects, as it still does in poetic perception, but in a literal animistic way; for

human passion and reflection were attributed to every object and made a fairy-land of the world. Poetry and religion discerned life in those very places in which sense and understanding perceived body; and when so much of the burden of experience took wing into space, and the soul herself floated almost visibly among the forms of nature, it is no marvel that the poor remnant, a mass of merely personal troubles, an uninteresting distortion of things in individual minds, should have seemed a sad and unsubstantial accident. The inner world was all the more ghostly because the outer world was so much alive.

This movement of thought, which clothed external objects in all the wealth of undeciphered dreams, has long lost its momentum and yielded to a contrary tendency. Just as the hypostasis of some terms in experience is sanctioned by reason, when the objects so fixed and externalised can serve as causes and explanations for the order of events, so the criticism which tends to retract that hypostasis is sanctioned by reason when the hypostasis has exceeded its function and the external object conceived is loaded with useless ornament. The transcendental and functional secret of such hypostases, however, is seldom appreciated by the head-long mind; so that the ebb no less than the flow of objectification goes on blindly and impulsively, and is carried to absurd extremes. An age of mythology yields to an age of subjectivity; reason being equally neglected and exceeded in both. The reaction against imagination has left the external world, as represented in many minds, stark and bare. All the interesting and vital qualities which matter had once been endowed with have been attributed instead to an irresponsible sensibility in man. And as habits of ideation change slowly and yield only piecemeal to criticism or to fresh intuitions, such a revolution has not been carried out consistently, but instead of a thorough renaming of things and a new organisation of thought it has produced chiefly distress and confusion. Some phases of this confusion may perhaps repay a moment's attention; they may enable us, when seen in their logical sequence, to understand somewhat better the hypostasising intellect that is trying to assert itself and come to the light through all these gropings.

**Hypostasis
and criticism
both need
control.**

What helps in the first place to disclose a permanent object is a permanent sensation. There is a vast and clear difference between a floating and a fixed feeling; the latter, in normal circumstances, is present only when continuous stimulation renews it at every moment.

Attention may wander, but the objects in the environment do not cease to radiate their influences on the body, which is thereby not allowed to lose the modification which those influences provoke. The consequent perception is therefore always at hand and in its repetitions substantially identical.

**Comparative
constancy in
objects and in
ideas.**

Perceptions not renewed in this way by continuous stimulation come and go with cerebral currents; they are rare visitors, instead of being, like external objects, members of the household. Intelligence is most at home in the ultimate, which is the object of intent. Those realities which it can trust and continually recover are its familiar and beloved companions. The mists that may originally have divided it from them, and which psychologists call the mind, are gladly forgotten so soon as intelligence avails to pierce them, and as friendly communication can be established with the real world. Moreover, perceptions not sustained by a constant external stimulus are apt to be greatly changed when they reappear, and to be changed unaccountably, whereas external things show some method and proportion in their variations. Even when not much changed in themselves, mere ideas fall into a new setting, whereas things, unless something else has intervened to move them, reappear in their old places. Finally things are acted upon by other men, but thoughts are hidden from them by divine miracle.

Existence reveals reality when the flux discloses something permanent that dominates it. What is thus dominated, though it is the primary existence itself, is thereby degraded to appearance. Perceptions caused by external objects are, as we have just seen, long sustained in comparison with thoughts and fancies; but the objects are themselves in flux and a man's relation to them may be even more variable; so that very often a memory or a sentiment will recur, almost unchanged in character, long after the perception that first aroused it has become impossible. The brain, though mobile, is subject to habit; its formations, while they lapse instantly, return again and again. These ideal objects may accordingly be in a way more real and enduring than things external. Hence no primitive mind puts all reality, or what is most real in reality, in an abstract material universe. It finds, rather, ideal points of reference by which material mutation itself seems to be controlled. An ideal world is recognised from the beginning and placed, not in the immediate foreground, nearer than material things,

but much farther off. It has greater substantiality and independence than material objects are credited with. It is divine.

When agriculture, commerce, or manual crafts have given men some knowledge of nature, the world thus recognised and dominated is far from seeming ultimate. It is thought to lie between two others, both now often called mental, but in their original quality altogether disparate: the world of spiritual forces and that of sensuous appearance. The notions of permanence and independence by which material objects are conceived apply also, of course, to everything spiritual; and while the dominion exercised by spirits may be somewhat precarious, they are as remote as possible from immediacy and sensation. They come and go; they govern nature or, if they neglect to do so, it is from aversion or high indifference; they visit man with obsessions and diseases; they hasten to extricate him from difficulties; and they dwell in him, constituting his powers of conscience and invention. Sense, on the other hand, is a mere effect, either of body or spirit or of both in conjunction. It gives a vitiated personal view of these realities. Its pleasures are dangerous and unintelligent, and it perishes as it goes.

Such are, for primitive apperception, the three great realms of being: nature, sense, and spirit. Their frontiers, however, always remain uncertain. Sense, because it is insignificant when made an object, is long neglected by reflection. No attempt is made to describe its processes or ally them systematically to natural changes. Its illusions, when noticed, are regarded as scandals calculated to foster scepticism. The spiritual world is, on the other hand, a constant theme for poetry and speculation. In the absence of ideal science, it can be conceived only in myths, which are naturally as shifting and self-contradictory as they are persistent. They acquire no fixed character until, in dogmatic religion, they are defined with reference to natural events, foretold or reported. Nature is what first acquires a form and then imparts form to the other spheres. Sense admits definition and distribution only as an effect of nature and spirit only as its principle.

The form nature acquires is, however, itself vague and uncertain and can ill serve, for long ages, to define the other realms which depend on it for definition. Hence it has been common, for instance, to treat the spiritual as a remote or finer form of the natural. Beyond

Spirit and sense defined by their relation to nature.

the moon everything seemed permanent; it was therefore called divine and declared to preside over the rest. The breath that escaped from the lips at death, since it took away with it the spiritual control and miraculous life that had quickened the flesh, was itself the spirit. On the other hand, natural processes have been persistently attributed to spiritual causes, for it was not matter that moved itself but intent that moved it. Thus spirit was barbarously taken for a natural substance and a natural force. It was identified with everything in which it was manifested, so long as no natural causes could be assigned for that operation.

Vague notions of nature involve vague notions of spirit.

If the unification of nature were complete sense would evidently fall within it; since it is to subtend and sustain the sensible flux that intelligence acknowledges first stray material objects and then their general system. The elements of experience not taken up into the constitution of objects remain attached to them as their life. In the end the dynamic skeleton, without losing its articulation, would be clothed again with its flesh. Suppose my notions of astronomy allowed me to believe that the sun, sinking into the sea, was extinguished every evening, and that what appeared the next morning was his younger brother, hatched in a sun-producing nest to be found in the Eastern regions. My theory would have robbed yesterday's sun of its life and brightness; it would have asserted that during the night no sun existed anywhere; but it would have added the sun's qualities afresh to a matter that did not previously possess them, namely, to the imagined egg that would produce a sun for to-morrow. Suppose we substitute for that astronomy the one that now prevails: we have deprived the single sun—which now exists and spreads its influences without interruption—of its humanity and even of its metaphysical unity. It has become a congeries of chemical substances. The facts revealed to perception have partly changed their locus and been differently deployed throughout nature. Some have become attached to operations in the human brain. Nature has not thereby lost any quality she had ever manifested; these have merely been redistributed so as to secure a more systematic connection between them all. They are the materials of the system, which has been conceived by making existences continuous, whenever this extension of their being was needful to render their recurrences intelligible. Sense, which was for-

Sense and spirit the life of nature, which science redistributes but does not deny.

merly regarded as a sad distortion of its objects, now becomes an original and congruent part of nature, from which, as from any other part, the rest of nature might be scientifically inferred.

Spirit is not less closely attached to nature, although in a different manner. Taken existentially it is a part of sense; taken ideally it is the form or value which nature acquires when viewed from the vantage-ground of any interest. Individual objects are recognisable for a time not because the flux is materially arrested but because it somewhere circulates in a fashion which awakens an interest and brings different parts of the surrounding process into definable and prolonged relations with that interest. Particular objects may perish yet others may continue, like the series of suns imagined by Heraclitus, to perform the same office. The function will outlast the particular organ. That interest in reference to which the function is defined will essentially determine a perfect world of responsive extensions and conditions. These ideals will be a spiritual reality; and they will be expressed in nature in so far as nature supports that regulative interest. Many a perfect and eternal realm, merely potential in existence but definite in constitution, will thus subtend nature and be what a rational philosophy might call the ideal. What is called spirit would be the ideal in so far as it obtained expression in nature; and the power attributed to spirit would be the part of nature's fertility by which such expression was secured.

CHAPTER VI

DISCOVERY OF FELLOW-MINDS

When a ghostly sphere, containing memory and all ideas, has been distinguished from the material world, it tends to grow at the expense of the latter, until nature is finally reduced to a mathematical skeleton. This skeleton itself, but for the need of a bridge to connect calculably episode with episode in experience, might be transferred to mind and identified with the scientific thought in which it is represented. But a scientific theory inhabiting a few scattered moments of life cannot connect those episodes among which it is itself the last and the least substantial; nor would such a notion have occurred even to the most reckless sceptic, had the world not possessed another sort of reputed reality—the minds of others—which could serve, even after the supposed extinction of the physical world, to constitute an independent order and to absorb the potentialities of being when immediate consciousness nodded. But other men's minds, being themselves precarious and ineffectual, would never have seemed a possible substitute for nature, to be in her stead the background and intelligible object of experience. Something constant, omnipresent, infinitely fertile is needed to support and connect the given chaos. Just these properties, however, are actually attributed to one of the minds supposed to confront the thinker, namely, the mind of God. The divine mind has therefore always constituted in philosophy either the alternative to nature or her other name: it is *par excellence* the seat of all potentiality and, as Spinoza said, the refuge of all ignorance.

Another background for current experience may be found in alien minds.

Speculative problems would be greatly clarified, and what is genuine in them would be more easily distinguished from what is artificial, if we could gather together again the original sources for the belief in separate minds and compare these sources with those we have already assigned to the conception of nature. But speculative problems are not

alone concerned, for in all social life we envisage fellow-creatures conceived to share the same thoughts and passions and to be similarly affected by events. What is the basis of this conviction? What are the forms it takes, and in what sense is it a part or an expression of reason?

This question is difficult, and in broaching it we cannot expect much aid from what philosophers have hitherto said on the subject. For the most part, indeed, they have said nothing, as by nature's kindly disposition most questions which it is beyond a man's power to answer do not occur to him at all. The suggestions which have actually been made in the matter may be reduced to two: first, that we conceive other men's minds by projecting into their bodies those feelings which we immediately perceive to accompany similar operations in ourselves, that is, we infer alien minds by analogy; and second, that we are immediately aware of them and feel them to be friendly or hostile counterparts of our own thinking and effort, that is, we evoke them by dramatic imagination.

Two usual accounts of this conception criticised:

The first suggestion has the advantage that it escapes solipsism by a reasonable argument, provided the existence of the material world has already been granted. But if the material world is called back into the private mind, it is evident that every soul supposed to inhabit it or to be expressed in it must follow it thither, as inevitably as the characters and forces in an imagined story must remain with it in the inventor's imagination. When, on the contrary, nature is left standing, it is reasonable to suppose that animals having a similar origin and similar physical powers should have similar minds, if any of them was to have a mind at all. The theory, however, is not satisfactory on other grounds. We do not in reality associate our own grimaces with the feelings that accompany them and subsequently, on recognising similar grimaces in another, proceed to attribute emotions to him like those we formerly experienced. Our own grimaces are not easily perceived, and other men's actions often reveal passions which we have never had, at least with anything like their suggested colouring and intensity. This first view is strangely artificial and mistakes for the natural origin of the belief in question what may be perhaps its ultimate test.

analogy between bodies,

The second suggestion, on the other hand, takes us into a mystic region. That we evoke the felt souls of our fellows by dramatic imagi-

nation is doubtless true; but this does not explain how we come to do so, under what stimulus and in what circumstances. Nor does it avoid solipsism; for the felt counterparts of my own will are echoes within me, while if other minds actually exist they cannot have for their essence to play a game with me in my own fancy. Such society would be mythical, and while the sense for society may well be mythical in its origin, it must acquire some other character if it is to have practical and moral validity. But practical and moral validity is above all what society seems to have. This second theory, therefore, while its feeling for psychological reality is keener, does not make the recognition of other minds intelligible and leaves our faith in them without justification.

and dramatic
dialogue in
the soul.

In approaching the subject afresh we should do well to remember that crude experience knows nothing of the distinction between subject and object. This distinction is a division in things, a contrast established between masses of images which show different characteristics in their modes of existence and relation. If this truth is overlooked, if subject and object are made conditions of experience instead of being, like body and mind, its contrasted parts, the revenge of fate is quick and ironical; either subject or object must immediately collapse and evaporate altogether. All objects must become modifications of the subject or all subjects aspects or fragments of the object.

Subject
and object
empirical, not
transcendental,
terms.

Now the fact that crude experience is innocent of modern philosophy has this important consequence: that for crude experience all data whatever lie originally side by side in the same field; extension is passionate, desire moves bodies, thought broods in space and is constituted by a visible metamorphosis of its subject matter. Animism or mythology is therefore no artifice. Passions naturally reside in the object they agitate—our own body, if that be the felt seat of some pang, the stars, if the pang can find no nearer resting-place. Only a long and still unfinished education has taught men to separate emotions from things and ideas from their objects. This education was needed because crude experience is a chaos, and the qualities it jumbles together do not march together in time. Reflection must accordingly separate them, if knowledge (that is, ideas with eventual application and practical transcendence) is to exist at all. In other words, action must be adjusted to certain elements of experience and

Objects
originally
soaked in
secondary
and tertiary
qualities.

not to others, and those chiefly regarded must have a certain interpretation put upon them by trained apperception. The rest must be treated as moonshine and taken no account of except perhaps in idle and poetic revery. In this way crude experience grows reasonable and appearance becomes knowledge of reality.

The fundamental reason, then, why we attribute consciousness to natural bodies is that those bodies, before they are conceived to be merely material, are conceived to possess all the qualities which our own consciousness possesses when we behold them. Such a supposition is far from being a paradox, since only this principle justifies us to this day in believing in whatever we may decide to believe in. The qualities attributed to reality must be qualities found in experience, and if we deny their presence in ourselves (*e.g.*, in the case of omniscience), that is only because the idea of self, like that of matter, has already become special and the region of ideals (in which omniscience lies) has been formed into a third sphere. But before the idea of self is well constituted and before the category of ideals has been conceived at all, every ingredient ultimately assigned to those two regions is attracted into the perceptual vortex for which such qualities as pressure and motion supply a nucleus. The moving image is therefore impregnated not only with secondary qualities—colour, heat, etc.—but with qualities which we may call tertiary, such as pain, fear, joy, malice, feebleness, expectancy. Sometimes these tertiary qualities are attributed to the object in their fulness and just as they are felt. Thus the sun is not only bright and warm in the same way as he is round, but by the same right he is also happy, arrogant, ever-young, and all-seeing; for a suggestion of these tertiary qualities runs through us when we look at him, just as immediately as do his warmth and light. The fact that these imaginative suggestions are not constant does not impede the instant perception that they are actual, and for crude experience whatever a thing possesses in appearance it possesses indeed, no matter how soon that quality may be lost again. The moment when things have most numerous and best defined tertiary qualities is accordingly, for crude experience, the moment when they are most adequately manifested and when their inner essence is best revealed; for it is then that they appear in experience most splendidly arrayed and best equipped for their eventual functions. The sun is a better expression of all his ulterior effects when he is conceived to be an arrogant and all-seeing spirit than when he is stupidly felt to be merely

hot; so that the attentive and devout observer, to whom those tertiary qualities are revealed, stands in the same relation to an ordinary sensualist, who can feel only the sun's material attributes, as the sensualist in turn stands in to one born blind, who cannot add the sun's brightness to its warmth except by faith in some happier man's reported intuition. The mythologist or poet, before science exists, is accordingly the man of truest and most adequate vision. His persuasion that he knows the heart and soul of things is no fancy reached by artificial inference or analogy but is a direct report of his own experience and honest contemplation.

More often, however, tertiary qualities are somewhat transposed in projection, as sound in being lodged in the bell is soon translated into sonority, made, that is, into its own potentiality. In the same way painfulness is translated into malice or wickedness, terror into hate, and every felt tertiary quality into whatever tertiary quality is in experience its more quiescent or potential form. So religion, which remains for the most part on the level of crude experience, attributes to the gods not only happiness—the object's direct tertiary quality—but goodness—its tertiary quality transposed and made potential; for goodness is that disposition which is fruitful in happiness throughout imagined experience. The devil, in like manner, is cruel and wicked as well as tormented. Uncritical science still attributes these transposed tertiary qualities to nature; the mythical notion of force, for instance, being a transposed sensation of effort. In this case we may distinguish two stages or degrees in the transposition: first, before we think of our own pulling, we say the object itself pulls; in the first transposition we say it pulls against us, its pull is the counterpart or rival of ours but it is still conceived in the same direct terms of effort; and in the second transposition this intermittent effort is made potential or slumbering in what we call strength or force.

It is obvious that the feelings attributed to other men are nothing but the tertiary qualities of their bodies. In beings of the same species, however, these qualities are naturally exceedingly numerous, variable, and precise. Nature has made man man's constant study. His thought, from infancy to the drawing up of his last will and testament, is busy about his neighbour. A smile makes a child happy; a caress, a moment's sympathetic attention, wins a heart and gives the

**Tertiary
qualities
transposed.**

**Imputed mind
consists of the
tertiary qualities
of perceived
body.**

friend's presence a voluminous and poignant value. In youth all seems lost in losing a friend. For the tertiary values, the emotions attached to a given image, the moral effluence emanating from it, pervade the whole present world. The sense of union, though momentary, is the same that later returns to the lover or the mystic, when he feels he has plucked the heart of life's mystery and penetrated to the peaceful centre of things. What the mystic beholds in his ecstasy and loses in his moments of dryness, what the lover pursues and adores, what the child cries for when left alone, is much more a spirit, a person, a haunting mind, than a set of visual sensations; yet the visual sensations are connected inextricably with that spirit, else the spirit would not withdraw when the sensations failed. We are not dealing with an articulate mind whose possessions are discriminated and distributed into a mastered world where everything has its department, its special relations, its limited importance; we are dealing with a mind all pulp, all confusion, keenly sensitive to passing influences and reacting on them massively and without reserve.

This mind is feeble, passionate, and ignorant. Its sense for present spirit is no miracle of intelligence or of analogical reasoning; on the contrary, it betrays a vagueness natural to rudimentary consciousness. Those visual sensations suddenly cut off cannot there be recognised for what they are. The consequences which their present disappearance may have for subsequent experience are in no wise foreseen or estimated, much less are any inexperienced feelings invented and attached to that retreating figure, otherwise a mere puppet. What happens is that by the loss of an absorbing stimulus the whole chaotic mind is thrown out of gear; the child cries, the lover faints, the mystic feels hell opening before him. All this is a present sensuous commotion, a derangement in an actual dream. Yet just at this lowest plunge of experience, in this drunkenness of the soul, does the overwhelming reality and externality of the other mind dawn upon us. Then we feel that we are surrounded not by a blue sky or an earth known to geographers but by unutterable and most personal hatreds and loves. For then we allow the half-deciphered images of sense to drag behind them every emotion they have awakened. We endow each overmastering stimulus with all its diffuse effects; and any dramatic potentiality that our dream acts out under that high pressure—and crude experience is rich in dreams—becomes our notion of the life going on before us. We cannot regard it as our own life, because it is not felt to be a

passion in our own body, but attaches itself rather to images we see moving about in the world; it is consequently, without hesitation, called the life of those images, or those creatures' souls.

The pathetic fallacy is accordingly what originally peoples the imagined world. All the feelings aroused by perceived things are merged in those things and made to figure as the spiritual and invisible part of their essence, a part, moreover, quite as well known and as directly perceived as their motions. To ask why such feelings are objectified would be to betray a wholly sophisticated view of experience and its articulation. They do not need to be objectified, seeing they were objective from the beginning, inasmuch as they pertain to objects and have never, any more than those objects, been "subjectified" or localised in the thinker's body, nor included in that train of images which as a whole is known to have in that body its seat and thermometer. The thermometer for these passions is, on the contrary, the body of another; and the little dream in us, the quick dramatic suggestion which goes with our perception of his motions, is our perception of his thoughts.

"Pathetic
fallacy"
normal yet
ordinarily
fallacious.

A sense for alien thought is accordingly at its inception a complete illusion. The thought is one's own, it is associated with an image moving in space, and is uncritically supposed to be a hidden part of that image, a metaphysical signification attached to its motion and actually existing behind the scenes in the form of an unheard soliloquy. A complete illusion this sense remains in mythology, in animism, in the poetic forms of love and religion. A better mastery of experience will in such cases dispel those hasty conceits by showing the fundamental divergence which at once manifests itself between the course of phenomena and the feelings associated with them. It will appear beyond question that those feelings were private fancies merged with observation in an undigested experience. They indicated nothing in the object but its power of arousing emotional and playful reverberations in the mind. Criticism will tend to clear the world of such poetic distortion; and what vestiges of it may linger will be avowed fables, metaphors employed merely in conventional expression. In the end even poetic power will forsake a discredited falsehood: the poet himself will soon prefer to describe nature in natural terms and to represent human emotions in their pathetic humility, not extended beyond their actual sphere nor fantastically uprooted from their necessary soil and occasions. He will sing the power of nature over the soul, the joys of the

soul in the bosom of nature, the beauty visible in things, and the steady march of natural processes, so rich in momentous incidents and collocations. The precision of such a picture will accentuate its majesty, as precision does in the poems of Lucretius and Dante, while its pathos and dramatic interest will be redoubled by its truth.

A primary habit producing widespread illusions may in certain cases become the source of rational knowledge. This possibility will surprise no one who has studied nature and life to any purpose. Nature and life are tentative in all their processes, so that there is nothing exceptional in the fact that, since in crude experience image and emotion are inevitably regarded as constituting a single event, this habit should usually lead to childish absurdities, but also, under special circumstances, to rational insight and morality. There is evidently one case in which the pathetic fallacy is not fallacious, the case in which the object observed happens to be an animal similar to the observer and similarly affected, as for instance when a flock or herd are swayed by panic fear. The emotion which each, as he runs, attributes to the others is, as usual, the emotion he feels himself; but this emotion, fear, is the same which in fact the others are then feeling. Their aspect thus becomes the recognised expression for the feeling which really accompanies it. So in hand-to-hand fighting: the intention and passion which each imputes to the other is what he himself feels; but the imputation is probably just, since pugnacity is a remarkably contagious and monotonous passion. It is awakened by the slightest hostile suggestion and is greatly intensified by example and emulation; those we fight against and those we fight with arouse it concurrently and the universal battle-cry that fills the air, and that each man instinctively emits, is an adequate and exact symbol for what is passing in all their souls.

Whenever, then, feeling is attributed to an animal similar to the percipient and similarly employed the attribution is mutual and correct. Contagion and imitation are great causes of feeling, but in so far as they are its causes and set the pathetic fallacy to work they forestall and correct what is fallacious in that fallacy and turn it into a vehicle of true and, as it were, miraculous insight.

Let the reader meditate for a moment upon the following point: to know reality is, in a way, an impossible pretension, because knowledge means significant representation, discourse about an existence not contained in the knowing thought, and different in duration or

Case where
it is not a
fallacy.

locus from the ideas which represent it. But if knowledge does not possess its object how can it intend it? And if knowledge possesses its object, how can it be knowledge or have any practical, prophetic, or retrospective value? Consciousness is not knowledge unless it indicates or signifies what actually it is not. This transcendence is what gives knowledge its cognitive and useful essence, its transitive function and validity. In knowledge, therefore, there must be some such thing as a justified illusion, an irrational pretension by chance fulfilled, a chance shot hitting the mark. For dead logic would stick at solipsism; yet irrational life, as it stumbles along from moment to moment, and multiplies itself in a thousand centres, is somehow amenable to logic and finds uses for the reason it breeds.

**Knowledge
succeeds only
by accident.**

Now, in the relation of a natural being to similar beings in the same habitat there is just the occasion we require for introducing a miraculous transcendence in knowledge, a leap out of solipsism which, though not prompted by reason, will find in reason a continual justification. For tertiary qualities are imputed to objects by psychological or pathological necessity. Something not visible in the object, something not possibly revealed by any future examination of that object, is thus united with it, felt to be its core, its metaphysical truth. Tertiary qualities are emotions or thoughts present in the observer and in his rudimentary consciousness not yet connected with their proper concomitants and antecedents, not yet relegated to his private mind, nor explained by his personal endowment and situation. To take these private feelings for the substance of other beings is evidently a gross blunder; yet this blunder, without ceasing to be one in point of method, ceases to be one in point of fact when the other being happens to be similar in nature and situation to the mythologist himself and therefore actually possesses the very emotions and thoughts which lie in the mythologist's bosom and are attributed by him to his fellow. Thus an imaginary self-transcendence, a rash pretension to grasp an independent reality and to know the unknowable, may find itself accidentally rewarded. Imagination will have drawn a prize in its lottery and the pathological accidents of thought will have begotten knowledge and right reason. The inner and unattainable core of other beings will have been revealed to private intuition.

This miracle of insight, as it must seem to those who have not understood its natural and accidental origin, extends only so far as

does the analogy between the object and the instrument of perception. The gift of intuition fails in proportion as the observer's bodily habit differs from the habit and body observed. Misunderstanding begins with constitutional divergence and deteriorates rapidly into false imputations and absurd myths. The limits of mutual understanding coincide with the limits of similar structure and common occupation, so that the distortion of insight begins very near home. It is hard to understand the minds of children unless we retain unusual plasticity and capacity to play; men and women do not really understand each other, what rules between them being not so much sympathy as habitual trust, idealisation, or satire; foreigners' minds are pure enigmas, and those attributed to animals are a grotesque compound of Æsop and physiology. When we come to religion the ineptitude of all the feelings attributed to nature or the gods is so egregious that a sober critic can look to such fables only for a pathetic expression of human sentiment and need; while, even apart from the gods, each religion itself is quite unintelligible to infidels who have never followed its worship sympathetically or learned by contagion the human meaning of its sanctions and formulas. Hence the stupidity and want of insight commonly shown in what calls itself the history of religions. We hear, for instance, that Greek religion was frivolous, because its mystic awe and momentous practical and poetic truths escape the Christian historian accustomed to a catechism and a religious morality; and similarly Catholic piety seems to the Protestant an æsthetic indulgence, a religion appealing to sense, because such is the only emotion its externals can awaken in him, unused as he is to a supernatural economy reaching down into the incidents and affections of daily life.

Language is an artificial means of establishing unanimity and transferring thought from one mind to another. Every symbol or phrase, like every gesture, throws the observer into an attitude to which a certain idea corresponded in the speaker; to fall exactly into the speaker's attitude is exactly to understand. Every impediment to contagion and imitation in expression is an impediment to comprehension. For this reason language, like all art, becomes pale with years; words and figures of speech lose their contagious and suggestive power; the feeling they once expressed can no longer be restored by their repetition. Even the most inspired verse, which boasts not without a relative justification to be immortal, becomes in the course of

ages a scarcely legible hieroglyphic; the language it was written in dies; a learned education and an imaginative effort are requisite to catch even a vestige of its original force. Nothing is so irrevocable as mind.

Unsure the ebb and flood of thought,
The moon comes back, the spirit not.

There is, however, a wholly different and far more positive method of reading the mind, or what in a metaphorical sense is called by that name. This method is to read character. Any object with which we are familiar teaches us to divine its habits; slight indications, which we should be at a loss to enumerate separately, betray what changes are going on and what promptings are simmering in the organism. Hence the expression of a face or figure; hence the traces of habit and passion visible in a man and that indescribable something about him which inspires confidence or mistrust. The gift of reading character is partly instinctive, partly a result of experience; it may amount to foresight and is directed not upon consciousness but upon past or eventual action. Habits and passions, however, have metaphorical psychic names, names indicating dispositions rather than particular acts (a disposition being mythically represented as a sort of wakeful and haunting genius waiting to whisper suggestions in a man's ear). We may accordingly delude ourselves into imagining that a pose or a manner which really indicates habit indicates feeling instead. In truth the feeling involved, if conceived at all, is conceived most vaguely, and is only a sort of reverberation or penumbra surrounding the pictured activities.

It is a mark of the connoisseur to be able to read character and habit and to divine at a glance all a creature's potentialities. This sort of penetration characterises the man with an eye for horse-flesh, the dog-fancier, and men and women of the world. It guides the born leader in the judgments he instinctively passes on his subordinates and enemies; it distinguishes every good judge of human affairs or of natural phenomena, who is quick to detect small but telling indications of events past or brewing. As the weather-prophet reads the heavens so the man of experience reads other men. Nothing concerns him less than their consciousness; he can allow that to run itself off when he is sure of their temper and habits. A great master of affairs is usually unsympa-

Perception of character.

Conduct divined, consciousness ignored.

thetic. His observation is not in the least dramatic or dreamful, he does not yield himself to animal contagion or re-enact other people's inward experience. He is too busy for that, and too intent on his own purposes. His observation, on the contrary, is straight calculation and inference, and it sometimes reaches truths about people's character and destiny which they themselves are very far from divining. Such apprehension is masterful and odious to weaklings, who think they know themselves because they indulge in copious soliloquy (which is the discourse of brutes and madmen), but who really know nothing of their own capacity, situation, or fate.

If Rousseau, for instance, after writing those *Confessions* in which candour and ignorance of self are equally conspicuous, had heard some intelligent friend, like Hume, draw up in a few words an account of their author's true and contemptible character, he would have been loud in protestations that no such ignoble characteristics existed in his eloquent consciousness; and they might not have existed there, because his consciousness was a histrionic thing, and as imperfect an expression of his own nature as of man's. When the mind is irrational no practical purpose is served by stopping to understand it, because such a mind is irrelevant to practice, and the principles that guide the man's practice can be as well understood by eliminating his mind altogether. So a wise governor ignores his subjects' religion or concerns himself only with its economic and temperamental aspects; if the real forces that control life are understood, the symbols that represent those forces in the mind may be disregarded. But such a government, like that of the British in India, is more practical than sympathetic. While wise men may endure it for the sake of their material interests, they will never love it for itself. There is nothing sweeter than to be sympathised with, while nothing requires a rarer intellectual heroism than willingness to see one's equation written out.

Nevertheless this same algebraic sense for character plays a large part in human friendship. A chief element in friendship is trust, and trust is not to be acquired by reproducing consciousness but only by penetrating to the constitutional instincts which, in determining action and habit, determine consciousness as well. Fidelity is not a property of ideas. It is a virtue possessed pre-eminently by nature, from the animals to the seasons and the stars. But fidelity gives friendship its deepest sanctity, and the respect we have for a man, for his force, ability, constancy,

Consciousness
untrustworthy.

and dignity, is no sentiment evoked by his floating thoughts but an assurance founded on our own observation that his conduct and character are to be counted upon. Smartness and vivacity, much emotion and many conceits, are obstacles both to fidelity and to merit. There is a high worth in rightly constituted natures independent of incidental consciousness. It consists in that ingrained virtue which under given circumstances would insure the noblest action and with that action, of course, the noblest sentiments and ideas; ideas which would arise spontaneously and would make more account of their objects than of themselves.

The expression of habit in psychic metaphors is a procedure known also to theology. Whenever natural or moral law is declared to reveal the divine mind, this mind is a set of formal or ethical principles rather than an imagined consciousness, re-enacted dramatically. What is conceived is the god's operation, not his emotions. In this way God's goodness becomes a symbol for the advantages of life, his wrath a symbol for its dangers, his commandments a symbol for its laws. The deity spoken of by the Stoics had exclusively this symbolic character; it could be called a city—dear City of Zeus—as readily as an intelligence. And that intelligence which ancient and ingenuous philosophers said they saw in the world was always intelligence in this algebraic sense, it was intelligible order. Nor did the Hebrew prophets, in their emphatic political philosophy, seem to mean much more by Jehovah than a moral order, a principle giving vice and virtue their appropriate fruits.

True society, then, is limited to similar beings living similar lives and enabled by the contagion of their common habits and arts to attribute to one another, each out of his own experience, what the other actually endures. A fresh thought may be communicated to one who has never had it before, but only when the speaker so dominates the auditor's mind by the instrumentalities he brings to bear upon it that he compels that mind to reproduce his experience. Analogy between actions and bodies is accordingly the only test of valid inference regarding the existence or character of conceived minds; but this eventual test is far from being the source of such a conception. Its source is not inference at all but direct emotion and the pathetic fallacy. In the beginning, as in the end, what is attributed to others is something directly felt, a dream dreamed through and dramatically enacted, but uncritically attributed to the object by whose

**Metaphorical
mind.**

Summary.

motions it is suggested and controlled. In a single case, however, tertiary qualities happen to correspond to an experience actually animating the object to which they are assigned. This is the case in which the object is a body similar in structure and action to the percipient himself, who assigns to that body a passion he has caught by contagion from it and by imitation of its actual attitude. Such are the conditions of intelligible expression and true communion; beyond these limits nothing is possible save myth and metaphor, or the algebraic designation of observed habits under the name of moral dispositions.

CHAPTER VII

CONCRETIONS IN DISCOURSE AND IN EXISTENCE

Ideas of material objects ordinarily absorb the human mind, and their prevalence has led to the rash supposition that ideas of all other kinds are posterior to physical ideas and drawn from the latter by a process of abstraction. The table, people said, was a particular and single reality; its colour, form, and material were parts of its integral nature, qualities which might be attended to separately, perhaps, but which actually existed only in the table itself. Colour, form, and material were therefore abstract elements. They might come before the mind separately and be contrasted objects of attention, but they were incapable of existing in nature except together, in the concrete reality called a particular thing. Moreover, as the same colour, shape, or substance might be found in various tables, these abstract qualities were thought to be general qualities as well; they were universal terms which might be predicated of many individual things. A contrast could then be drawn between these qualities or ideas, which the mind may envisage, and the concrete reality existing beyond. Thus philosophy could reach the familiar maxim of Aristotle that the particular alone exists in nature and the general alone in the mind.

So-called
abstract
qualities
primary.

Such language expresses correctly enough a secondary conventional stage of conception, but it ignores the primary fictions on which convention itself must rest. Individual physical objects must be discovered before abstractions can be made from their conceived nature; the bird must be caught before it is plucked. To discover a physical object is to pack in the same part of space, and fuse in one complex body, primary data like coloured form and tangible surface. Intelligence, observing these sensible qualities to evolve together, and to be controlled

General
qualities
prior to
particular
things.

at once by external forces, or by one's own voluntary motions, identifies them in their operation although they remain for ever distinct in their sensible character. A physical object is accordingly conceived by fusing or interlacing spatial qualities, in a manner helpful to practical intelligence. It is a far higher and remoter thing than the elements it is compacted of and that suggest it; what habits of appearance and disappearance the latter may have, the object reduces to permanent and calculable principles. It is altogether erroneous, therefore, to view an object's sensible qualities as abstractions from it, seeing they are its original and component elements; nor can the sensible qualities be viewed as generic notions arising by comparison of several concrete objects, seeing that these concretions would never have been made or thought to be permanent, did they not express observed variations and recurrences in the sensible qualities immediately perceived and already recognised in their recurrence. These are themselves the true particulars. They are the first objects discriminated in attention and projected against the background of consciousness.

The immediate continuum may be traversed and mapped by two different methods. The prior one, because it is so very primitive and rudimentary, and so much a condition of all mental discourse, is usually ignored in psychology. The secondary method, by which external things are discovered, has received more attention. The latter consists in the fact that when several disparate sensations, having become recognisable in their repetitions, are observed to come and go together, or in fixed relation to some voluntary operation on the observer's part, they may be associated by contiguity and merged in one portion of perceived space. Those having, like sensations of touch and sight, an essentially spatial character, may easily be superposed; the surface I see and that I touch may be identified by being presented together and being found to undergo simultaneous variations and to maintain common relations to other perceptions. Thus I may come to attribute to a single object, the term of an intellectual synthesis and ideal intention, my experiences through all the senses within a certain field of association, defined by its practical relations. That ideal object is thereby endowed with as many qualities and powers as I had associable sensations of which to make it up. This object is a concretion of my perceptions in space, so that the redness, hardness, sweetness, and roundness of the apple are all fused together in my practical regard and given one local habitation and one name.

This kind of synthesis, this superposition and mixture of images into notions of physical objects, is not, however, the only kind to which perceptions are subject. They fall together by virtue of their qualitative identity even before their spatial superposition; for in order to be known as repeatedly simultaneous, and associable by contiguity, they must be associated by similarity and known as individually repeated. The various recurrences of a sensation must be recognised as recurrences, and this implies the collection of sensations into classes of similars and the apperception of a common nature in several data. Now the more frequent a perception is the harder it will be to discriminate in memory its past occurrences from one another, and yet the more readily will its present recurrence be recognised as familiar. The perception in sense will consequently be received as a repetition not of any single earlier sensation but of a familiar and generic experience. This experience, a spontaneous reconstruction based on all previous sensations of that kind, will be the one habitual *idea* with which recurring sensations will be henceforth identified. Such a living concretion of similars succeeding one another in time, is the idea of a nature or quality, the universal falsely supposed to be an abstraction from physical objects, which in truth are conceived by putting together these very ideas into a spatial and permanent system.

Universals are concretions in discourse.

Here we have, if I am not mistaken, the origin of the two terms most prominent in human knowledge, ideas and things. Two methods of conception divide our attention in common life; science and philosophy develop both, although often with an unjustifiable bias in favour of one or the other. They are nothing but the old principles of Aristotelian psychology, association by similarity and association by contiguity. Only now, after logicians have exhausted their ingenuity in criticising them and psychologists in applying them, we may go back of the traditional position and apply the ancient principles at a deeper stage of mental life.

Association by similarity is a fusion of impressions merging what is common in them, interchanging what is peculiar, and cancelling in the end what is incompatible; so that any excitement reaching that centre revives one generic reaction which yields the idea. These concrete generalities are actual feelings, the first terms in mental discourse, the first distinguishable particulars in knowledge, and the first bear-

Similar reactions, merged in one habit of reproduction, yield an idea.

ers of names. Intellectual dominion of the conscious stream begins with the act of recognising these pervasive entities, which having character and ideal permanence can furnish common points of reference for different moments of discourse. Save for ideas no perception could have significance, or acquire that indicative force which we call knowledge. For it would refer to nothing to which another perception might also have referred; and so long as perceptions have no common reference, so long as successive moments do not enrich by their contributions the same object of thought, evidently experience, in the pregnant sense of the word, is impossible. No fund of valid ideas, no wisdom, could in that case be acquired by living.

Ideas, although their material is of course sensuous, are not sensations nor perceptions nor objects of any possible immediate experience: they are creatures of intelligence, goals of thought, ideal terms which cogitation and action circle about. As the centre of mass in a body, while it may by chance coincide with one or another of its atoms, is no atom itself and no material constituent of the bulk that obeys its motion, so an idea, the centre of mass of a certain mental system, is no material fragment of that system, but an ideal term of reference and signification by allegiance to which the details of consciousness first become parts of a system and of a thought. An idea is an ideal. It represents a functional relation in the diffuse existences to which it gives a name and a rational value. An idea is an expression of life, and shares with life that transitive and elusive nature which defies definition by mere enumeration of its materials. The peculiarity of life is that it lives; and thought also, when living, passes out of itself and directs itself on the ideal, on the eventual. It is an activity. Activity does not consist in velocity of change but in constancy of purpose; in the conspiracy of many moments and many processes toward one ideal harmony and one concomitant ideal result. The most rudimentary apperception, recognition, or expectation, is already a case of representative cognition, of transitive thought resting in a permanent essence. Memory is an obvious case of the same thing; for the past, in its truth, is a system of experiences in relation, a system now non-existent and never, as a system, itself experienced, yet confronted in retrospect and made the ideal object and standard for all historical thinking.

These arrested and recognisable ideas, concretions of similars succeeding one another in time, are not abstractions; but they may come

to be regarded as such after the other kind of concretions in experience, concretions of superposed perceptions in space, have become the leading objects of attention. The sensuous material for both concretions is the same; the perception which, recurring in different objects otherwise not retained in memory gives the idea of roundness, is the same perception which helps to constitute the spatial concretion called the sun.

So-called
abstractions
complete
facts.

Roundness may therefore be carelessly called an abstraction from the real object “sun”; whereas the peculiar optical and muscular feelings by which the sense of roundness is constituted—probably feelings of gyration and perpetual unbroken movement—are much earlier than any solar observations; they are a self-sufficing element in experience which, by repetition in various accidental contests, has come to be recognised and named, and to be a characteristic by virtue of which more complex objects can be distinguished and defined. The idea of the sun is a much later product, and the real sun is so far from being an original datum from which roundness is abstracted, that it is an ulterior and quite ideal construction, a spatial concretion into which the logical concretion roundness enters as a prior and independent factor. Roundness may be felt in the dark, by a mere suggestion of motion, and is a complete experience in itself. When this recognisable experience happens to be associated by contiguity with other recognisable experiences of heat, light, height, and yellowness, and these various independent objects are projected into the same portion of a real space; then a concretion occurs, and these ideas being recognised in that region and finding a momentary embodiment there, become the qualities of a thing.

A conceived thing is doubly a product of mind, more a product of mind, if you will, than an idea, since ideas arise, so to speak, by the mind’s inertia and conceptions of things by its activity. Ideas are mental sediment; conceived things are mental growths. A concretion in discourse occurs by repetition and mere emphasis on a datum, but a concretion in existence requires a synthesis of disparate elements and relations. An idea is nothing but a sensation apperceived and rendered cognitive, so that it envisages its own recognised character as its object and ideal: yellowness is only some sensation of yellow raised to the cognitive power and employed as the symbol for its own specific essence. It is consequently capable of entering as a term into rational discourse and

Things
concretions of
concretions.

of becoming the subject or predicate of propositions eternally valid. A thing, on the contrary, is discovered only when the order and grouping of such recurring essences can be observed, and when various themes and strains of experience are woven together into elaborate progressive harmonies. When consciousness first becomes cognitive it frames ideas; but when it becomes cognitive of causes, that is, when it becomes practical, it perceives things.

Concretions of qualities recurrent in time and concretions of qualities associated in existence are alike involved in daily life and inextricably ingrown into the structure of reason. In consciousness and for logic, association by similarity, with its aggregations and identifications of recurrences in time, is fundamental rather than association by contiguity and its existential syntheses; for recognition identifies similars perceived in succession, and without recognition of similars there

Ideas prior in the order of knowledge, things in the order of nature.

could be no known persistence of phenomena. But physiologically and for the observer association by contiguity comes first. All instinct—without which there would be no fixity or recurrence in ideation—makes movement follow impression in an immediate way which for consciousness becomes a mere juxtaposition of sensations, a juxtaposition which it can neither explain nor avoid. Yet this juxtaposition, in which pleasure, pain, and striving are prominent factors, is the chief stimulus to attention and spreads before the mind that moving and variegated field in which it learns to make its first observations. Facts—the burdens of successive moments—are all associated by contiguity, from the first facts of perception and passion to the last facts of fate and conscience. We undergo events, we grow into character, by the subterranean working of irrational forces that make their incalculable irruptions into life none the less wonderfully in the revelations of a man's heart to himself than in the cataclysms of the world around him. Nature's placid procedure, to which we yield so willingly in times of prosperity, is a concatenation of states which can only be understood when it is made its own standard and law. A sort of philosophy without wisdom may seek to subjugate this natural life, this blind budding of existence, to some logical or moral necessity; but this very attempt remains, perhaps, the most striking monument to that irrational fatality that rules affairs, a monument which reason itself is compelled to raise with unsuspected irony.

Reliance on external perception, constant appeals to concrete fact and physical sanctions, have always led the mass of reasonable men to magnify concretions in existence and belittle concretions in discourse. They are too clever, as they feel, to mistake words for things. The most authoritative thinker on this subject, because the most mature, Aristotle himself, taught that things had reality, individuality, independence, and were the outer cause of perception, while general ideas, products of association by similarity, existed only in the mind. The public, pleased at its ability to understand this doctrine and overlooking the more incisive part of the philosopher's teaching, could go home comforted and believing that material things were primary and perfect entities, while ideas were only abstractions, effects those realities produced on our incapable minds. Aristotle, however, had a juster view of general concepts and made in the end the whole material universe gravitate around them and feel their influence, though in a metaphysical and magic fashion to which a more advanced natural science need no longer appeal. While in the shock of life man was always coming upon the accidental, in the quiet of reflection he could not but recast everything in ideal moulds and retain nothing but eternal natures and intelligible relations. Aristotle conceived that while the origin of knowledge lay in the impact of matter upon sense its goal was the comprehension of essences, and that while man was involved by his animal nature in the accidents of experience he was also by virtue of his rationality a participator in eternal truth. A substantial justice was thus done both to the conditions and to the functions of human life, although, for want of a natural history inspired by mechanical ideas, this dualism remained somewhat baffling and incomprehensible in its basis. Aristotle, being a true philosopher and pupil of experience, preferred incoherence to partiality.

**Aristotle's
compromise.**

Active life and the philosophy that borrows its concepts from practice have thus laid a great emphasis on association by contiguity. Hobbes and Locke made knowledge of this kind the only knowledge of reality, while recognising it to be quite empirical, tentative, and problematical. It was a kind of acquaintance with fact that increased with years and brought the mind into harmony with something initially alien to it. Besides this practical knowledge or prudence there was a sort of verbal and merely ideal knowledge, a knowledge of the meaning and relation

**Empirical
bias in favour
of contiguity.**

of abstract terms. In mathematics and logic we might carry out long trains of abstracted thought and analyse and develop our imaginations *ad infinitum*. These speculations, however, were in the air or—what for these philosophers is much the same thing—in the mind; their applicability and their relevance to practical life and to objects given in perception remained quite problematical. A self-developing science, a synthetic science *a priori*, had a value entirely hypothetical and provisional; its practical truth depended on the verification of its results in some eventual sensible experience. Association was invoked to explain the adjustment of ideation to the order of external perception. Association, by which association by contiguity was generally understood, thus became the battle-cry of empiricism; if association by similarity had been equally in mind, the philosophy of pregnant reason could also have adopted the principle for its own. But logicians and mathematicians naturally neglect the psychology of their own processes and, accustomed as they are to an irresponsible and constructive use of the intellect, regard as a confused and uninspired intruder the critic who, by a retrospective and naturalistic method, tries to give them a little knowledge of themselves.

Rational ideas must arise somehow in the mind, and since they are not meant to be without application to the world of experience, it is interesting to discover the point of contact between the two and the nature of their interdependence. This would have been found in the mind's initial capacity to frame objects of two sorts, those compacted of sensations that are persistently similar, and those compacted of sensations that are momentarily fused. In empirical philosophy the applicability of logic and mathematics remains a miracle or becomes a misinterpretation: a miracle if the process of nature independently follows the inward elaboration of human ideas; a misinterpretation if the bias of intelligence imposes *a priori* upon reality a character and order not inherent in it. The mistake of empiricists—among which Kant is in this respect to be numbered—which enabled them to disregard this difficulty, was that they admitted, beside rational thinking, another instinctive kind of wisdom by which men could live, a wisdom the Englishmen called experience and the Germans practical reason, spirit, or will. The intellectual sciences could be allowed to spin themselves out in abstracted liberty while man practised his illogical and inspired art of life.

**Artificial
divorce of
logic from
practice.**

Here we observe a certain elementary crudity or barbarism which the human spirit often betrays when it is deeply stirred. Not only are chance and divination welcomed into the world but they are revered all the more, like the wind and fire of idolaters, precisely for not being amenable to the petty rules of human reason. In truth, however, the English duality between prudence and science is no more fundamental than the German duality between reason and understanding.* The true contrast is between impulse and reflection, instinct and intelligence. When men feel the primordial authority of the animal in them and have little respect for a glimmering reason which they suspect to be secondary but cannot discern to be ultimate, they readily imagine they are appealing to something higher than intelligence when in reality they are falling back on something deeper and lower. The rudimentary seems to them at such moments divine; and if they conceive a Life of Reason at all they despise it as a mass of artifices and conventions. Reason is indeed not indispensable to life, nor needful if living anyhow be the sole and indeterminate aim; as the existence of animals and of most men sufficiently proves. In so far as man is not a rational being and does not live in and by the mind, in so far as his chance volitions and dreamful ideas roll by without mutual representation or adjustment, in so far as his body takes the lead and even his galvanised action is a form of passivity, we may truly say that his life is not intellectual and not dependent on the application of general concepts to experience; for he lives by instinct.

The Life of Reason, the comprehension of causes and pursuit of aims, begins precisely where instinctive operation ceases to be merely such by becoming conscious of its purposes and representative of its conditions. Logical forms of thought impregnate and constitute practical intellect. The shock of experience can indeed correct, disappoint, or inhibit rational expectation, but it cannot take its place. The very first lesson that experience should again teach us after our disappointment would be a rebirth of reason in the soul. Reason has the indomitable persistence of all natu-

**Their mutual
involution.**

*This distinction, in one sense, is Platonic: but Plato's Reason was distinguished from understanding (which dealt with phenomenal experience) because it was a moral faculty defining those values and meanings which in Platonic nomenclature took the title of reality. The German Reason was only imagination, substituting a dialectical or poetic history of the world for its natural development. German idealism, accordingly, was not, like Plato's, a moral philosophy hypostasised but a false physics adored.

ral tendencies; it returns to the attack as waves beat on the shore. To observe its defeat is already to give it a new embodiment. Prudence itself is a vague science, and science, when it contains real knowledge, is but a clarified prudence, a description of experience and a guide to life. Speculative reason, if it is not also practical, is not reason at all. Propositions irrelevant to experience may be correct in form, the method they are reached by may parody scientific method, but they cannot be true in substance, because they refer to nothing. Like music, they have no object. They merely flow, and please those whose unattached sensibility they somehow flatter.

Hume, in this respect more radical and satisfactory than Kant himself, saw with perfect clearness that reason was an ideal expression of instinct, and that consequently no rational spheres could exist other than the mathematical and the empirical, and that what is not a datum must certainly be a construction. In establishing his "tendencies to feign" at the basis of intelligence, and in confessing that he yielded to them himself no less in his criticism of human nature than in his practical life, he admitted the involution of reason—that unintelligible instinct—in all the observations and maxims vouchsafed to an empiricist or to a man. He veiled his doctrine, however, in a somewhat unfair and satirical nomenclature, and he has paid the price of that indulgence in personal humour by incurring the immortal hatred of sentimentalists who are too much scandalised by his tone ever to understand his principles.

If the common mistake in empiricism is not to see the omnipresence of reason in thought, the mistake of rationalism is not to admit its variability and dependence, not to understand its natural life. Parmenides was the Adam of that race, and first tasted the deceptive kind of knowledge which, promising to make man God, banishes him from the paradise of experience. His sin has been transmitted to his descendants, though hardly in its magnificent and simple enormity. "The whole is one," Xenophanes had cried, gazing into heaven; and that same sense of a permeating identity, translated into rigid and logical terms, brought his sublime disciple to the conviction that an indistinguishable immutable substance was omnipresent in the world. Parmenides carried association by similarity to such lengths that he arrived at the idea of what alone is similar in everything, viz., the fact that it is. Being exists, and nothing else does; whereby every relation and variation in experience is reduced to a

**Rationalistic
suicide.**

negligible illusion, and reason loses its function at the moment of asserting its absolute authority. Notable lesson, taught us like so many others by the first experiments of the Greek mind, in its freedom and insight, a mind led quickly by noble self-confidence to the ultimate goals of thought.

Such a pitch of heroism and abstraction has not been reached by any rationalist since. No one else has been willing to ignore entirely all the data and constructions of experience, save the highest concept reached by assimilations in that experience; no one else has been willing to demolish all the scaffolding and all the stones of his edifice, hoping still to retain the sublime symbol which he had planted on the summit. Yet all rationalists have longed to demolish or to degrade some part of the substructure, like those Gothic architects who wished to hang the vaults of their churches upon the slenderest possible supports, abolishing and turning into painted crystal all the dead walls of the building. So experience and its crowning conceptions were to rest wholly on a skeleton of general natures, physical forces being assimilated to logical terms, and concepts gained by identification of similars taking the place of those gained by grouping disparate things in their historical conjunctions. These contiguous sensations, which occasionally exemplify the logical contrasts in ideas and give them incidental existence, were either ignored altogether and dismissed as unmeaning, or admitted merely as illusions. The eye was to be trained to pass from that parti-coloured chaos to the firm lines and permanent divisions that were supposed to sustain it and frame it in.

Rationalism is a kind of builder's bias which the impartial public cannot share; for the dead walls and glass screens which may have no function in supporting the roof are yet as needful as the roof itself to shelter and beauty. So the incidental filling of experience which remains unclassified under logical categories retains all its primary reality and importance. The outlines of it emphasised by logic, though they may be the essential vehicle of our most soaring thoughts, are only a method and a style of architecture. They neither absorb the whole material of life nor monopolise its values. And as each material imposes upon the builder's ingenuity a different type of construction, and stone, wood, and iron must be treated on different structural principles, so logical methods of comprehension, spontaneous though they be in their mental origin, must prove themselves fitted to the natural

order and affinity of the facts.* Nor is there in this necessity any violence to the spontaneity of reason: for reason also has manifold forms, and the accidents of experience are more than matched in variety by the multiplicity of categories. Here one principle of order and there another shoots into the mind, which breeds more genera and species than the most fertile terrestrial slime can breed individuals.

Language, then, with the logic imbedded in it, is a repository of terms formed by identifying successive perceptions, as the external world is a repository of objects conceived by superposing perceptions that exist together. Being formed on different principles these two orders of conception—the logical and the physical—do not coincide, and the attempt to fuse them into one system of demonstrable reality or moral physics is doomed to failure by the very nature of the terms compared. When the Eleatics proved the impossibility—*i.e.*, the inexpressibility—of motion, or when Kant and his followers proved the unreal character of all objects of experience and of all natural knowledge, their task was made easy by the native diversity between the concretions in existence which were the object of their thought and the concretions in discourse which were its measure. The two do not fit; and intrenched as these philosophers were in the forms of logic they compelled themselves to reject as unthinkable everything not fully expressible in those particular forms. Thus they took their revenge upon the vulgar who, being busy chiefly with material things and dwelling in an atmosphere of sensuous images, call unreal and abstract every product of logical construction or reflective analysis. These logical products, however, are not really abstract, but, as we have seen, concretions arrived at by a different method than that which results in

Complementary character of essence and existence.

*This natural order and affinity is something imputed to the ultimate object of thought—the reality—by the last act of judgment assuming its own truth. It is, of course, not observable by consciousness before the first experiment in comprehension has been made; the act of comprehension which first imposes on the sensuous material some subjective category is the first to arrive at the notion of an objective order. The historian, however, has a well-tried and mature conception of the natural order arrived at after many such experiments in comprehension. From the vantage-ground of this latest hypothesis, he surveys the attempts others have made to understand events and compares them with the objective order which he believes himself to have discovered. This observation is made here lest the reader should confuse the natural order, imagined to exist before any application of human categories, with the last conception of that order attained by the philosopher. The latter is but faith, the former is faith's ideal object.

material conceptions. Whereas the conception of a thing is a local conglomerate of several simultaneous sensations, logical entity is a homogeneous revival in memory of similar sensations temporally distinct.

Thus the many armed with prejudice and the few armed with logic fight an eternal battle, the logician charging the physical world with unintelligibility and the man of common-sense charging the logical world with abstractness and unreality. The former view is the more profound, since association by similarity is the more elementary and gives constancy to meanings; while the latter view is the more practical, since association by contiguity alone informs the mind about the mechanical sequence of its own experience. Neither principle can be dispensed with, and each errs only in denouncing the other and wishing to be omnivorous, as if on the one hand logic could make anybody understand the history of events and the conjunction of objects, or on the other hand as if cognitive and moral processes could have any other terms than constant and ideal natures. The namable essence of things or the standard of values must always be an ideal figment; existence must always be an empirical fact. The former remains always remote from natural existence and the latter irreducible to a logical principle.*

*For the sake of simplicity only such ideas as precede conceptions of things have been mentioned here. After things are discovered, however, they may be used as terms in a second ideal synthesis and a concretion in discourse on a higher plane may be composed out of sustained concretions in existence. Proper names are such secondary concretions in discourse. "Venice" is a term covering many successive aspects and conditions, not distinguished in fancy, belonging to an object existing continuously in space and time. Each of these states of Venice constitutes a natural object, a concretion in existence, and is again analysable into a mass of fused but recognisable qualities—light, motion, beauty—each of which was an original concretion in discourse, a primordial term in experience. A quality is recognised by its own idea or permanent nature, a thing by its constituent qualities, and an embodied spirit by fusion into an ideal essence of the constant characters possessed by a thing. To raise natural objects into historic entities it is necessary to repeat upon a higher plane that concretion in discourse by which sensations were raised to ideas. When familiar objects attain this ideal character they have become poetical and achieved a sort of personality. They then possess a spiritual status. Thus sensuous experience is solidified into logical terms, these into ideas of things, and these, recast and smelted again in imagination, into forms of spirit.

CHAPTER VIII

ON THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THINGS AND IDEAS

Those who look back upon the history of opinion for many centuries commonly feel, by a vague but profound instinct, that certain consecrated doctrines have an inherent dignity and spirituality, while other speculative tendencies and other vocabularies seem wedded to all that is ignoble and shallow. So fundamental is this moral tone in philosophy that people are usually more firmly convinced that their opinions are precious than that they are true. They may avow, in reflective moments, that they may be in error, seeing that thinkers of no less repute have maintained opposite opinions, but they are commonly absolutely sure that if their own views could be generally accepted, it would be a boon to mankind, that in fact the moral interests of the race are bound up, not with discovering what may chance to be true, but with discovering the truth to have a particular complexion. This predominant trust in moral judgments is in some cases conscious and avowed, so that philosophers invite the world to embrace tenets for which no evidence is offered but that they chime in with current aspirations or traditional bias. Thus the substance of things hoped for becomes, even in philosophy, the evidence of things not seen.

**Moral tone of
opinions
derived from
their logical
principle.**

Such faith is indeed profoundly human and has accompanied the mind in all its gropings and discoveries; preference being the primary principle of discrimination and attention. Reason in her earliest manifestations already discovered her affinities and incapacities, and loaded the ideas she framed with friendliness or hostility. It is not strange that her latest constructions should inherit this relation to the will; and we shall see that the moral tone and affinity of metaphysical systems corresponds exactly with the primary function belonging to that type of

idea on which they are based. Idealistic systems, still cultivating concretions in discourse, study the first conditions of knowledge and the last interests of life; materialistic systems, still emphasising concretions in existence, describe causal relations, and the habits of nature. Thus the spiritual value of various philosophies rests in the last instance on the kind of good which originally attached the mind to that habit and plane of ideation.

We have said that perceptions must be recognised before they can be associated by contiguity, and that consequently the fusion of temporally diffused experiences must precede their local fusion into material objects. It might be urged in opposition to this statement that concrete objects can be recognised in practice before their general qualities have been distinguished in discourse. Recognition may be instinctive, that is, based on the repetition of a felt reaction or emotion, rather than on any memory of a former occasion on which the same perception occurred. Such an objection seems to be well grounded, for it is instinctive adjustments and suggested action that give cognitive value to sensation and endow it with that transitive force which makes it consciously representative of what is past, future, or absent. If practical instinct did not stretch what is given into what is meant, reason could never recognise the datum for a copy of an ideal object.

This description of the case involves an application or extension of our theory rather than an argument against it. For where recognition is instinctive and a familiar action is performed with absent-minded confidence and without attending to the indications that justify that action, there is in an eminent degree a qualitative concretion in experience. Present impressions are merged so completely in structural survivals of the past that instead of arousing any ideas distinct enough to be objectified they merely stimulate the inner sense, remain imbedded in the general feeling of motion or life, and constitute in fact a heightened sentiment of pure vitality and freedom. For the lowest and vaguest of concretions in discourse are the ideas of self and of an embosoming external being, with the felt continuity of both; what Fichte would call the Ego, the Non-Ego, and Life. Where no particular events are recognised there is still a feeling of continuous existence. We trail after us from our whole past some sense of the continuous energy and movement both of our passionate fancies and of the phantasmagoria capri-

**Concretions
in discourse
express
instinctive
reactions.**

**Idealism
rudimentary.**

ciously at work beyond. An ignorant mind believes itself omniscient and omnipotent; those impulses in itself which really represent the inertia and unspent momentum of its last dream it regards as the creative forces of nature.

The first lines of cleavage and the first recognisable bulks at which attention is arrested are in truth those shadowy Fichtean divisions: such are the rude beginnings of logical architecture. In its inability to descry anything definite and fixed, for want of an acquired empirical background and a distinct memory, the mind flounders forward in a dream full of prophecies and wayward identifications. The world possesses as yet in its regard only the superficial forms that appear in revery, it has no hidden machinery, no third dimension in which unobserved and perpetual operations are going on. Its only terms, in a word, are concretions in discourse, ideas combined in their æsthetic and logical harmonies, not in their habitual and efficacious conjunctions. The disorder of such experience is still a spontaneous disorder; it has not discovered how calculable are its unpremeditated shocks. The cataclysms that occur seem to have only ideal grounds and only dramatic meaning. Though the dream may have its terrors and degenerate at moments into a nightmare, it has still infinite plasticity and buoyancy. What perceptions are retained merge in those haunting and friendly presences, they have an intelligible and congenial character because they appear as parts and effluences of an inner fiction, evolving according to the barbaric prosody of an almost infant mind.

This is the fairy-land of idealism where only the miraculous seems a matter of course and every hint of what is purely natural is disregarded, for the truly natural still seems artificial, dead, and remote. New and disconcerting facts, which intrude themselves inopportunely into the story, chill the currents of spontaneous imagination and are rejected as long as possible for being alien and perverse. Perceptions, on the contrary, which can be attached to the old presences as confirmations or corollaries, become at once parts of the warp and woof of what we call ourselves. They seem of the very substance of spirit, obeying a vital momentum and flowing from the inmost principle of being; and they are so much akin to human presumptions that they pass for manifestations of necessary truth. Thus the demonstrations of geometry being but the intent explication of a long-consolidated ideal concretion which we call space, are welcomed by the mind as in a sense familiar and as revelations of a truth implicit in the soul, so that

Plato could plausibly take them for recollections of prenatal wisdom. But a rocket that bursts into sparks of a dozen colours, even if expected, is expected with anxiety and observed with surprise; it assaults the senses at an incalculable moment with a sensation individual and new. The exciting tension and lively stimulus may please in their way, yet the badge of the accidental and unmeaning adheres to the thing. It is a trivial experience and one quickly forgotten. The shock is superficial and were it repeated would soon fatigue. We should retire with relief into darkness and silence, to our permanent and rational thoughts.

It is a remarkable fact, which may easily be misinterpreted, that while all the benefits and pleasures of life seem to be associated with external things, and all certain knowledge seems to describe material laws, yet a deified nature has generally inspired a religion of melancholy. Why should the only intelligible philosophy seem to defeat reason and the chief means of benefiting mankind seem to blast our best hopes? Whence this profound aversion to so beautiful and fruitful a universe? Whence this persistent search for invisible regions and powers and for metaphysical explanations that can explain nothing, while nature's voice without and within man cries aloud to him to look, act, and enjoy? And when someone, in protest against such senseless oracular prejudices, has actually embraced the life and faith of nature and taught others to look to the natural world for all motives and sanctions, expecting thus to refresh and marvellously to invigorate human life, why have those innocent hopes failed so miserably? Why is that sensuous optimism we may call Greek, or that industrial optimism we may call American, such a thin disguise for despair? Why does each melt away and become a mockery at the first approach of reflection? Why has man's conscience in the end invariably rebelled against naturalism and reverted in some form or other to a cultus of the unseen?

We may answer in the words of Saint Paul: because things seen are temporal and things not seen are eternal. And we may add, remembering our analysis of the objects inhabiting the mind, that the eternal is the truly human, that which is akin to the first indispensable products of intelligence, which arise by the fusion of successive images in discourse, and transcend the particular in time, peopling the mind with permanent and recognisable objects, and strengthening it with a synthetic, dramatic apprehension of itself and its own experience. Concretion in

Naturalism
sad.

The soul akin
to the eternal
and ideal.

existence, on the contrary, yields essentially detached and empirical unities, foreign to mind in spite of their order, and unintelligible in spite of their clearness. Reason fails to assimilate in them precisely that which makes them real, namely, their presence here and now, in this order and number. The form and quality of them we can retain, domesticate, and weave into the texture of reflection, but their existence and individuality remain a datum of sense needing to be verified anew at every moment and actually receiving continual verification or disproof while we live in this world.

“This world” we call it, not without justifiable pathos, for many other worlds are conceivable and if discovered might prove more rational and intelligible and more akin to the soul than this strange universe which man has hitherto always looked upon with increasing astonishment. The materials of experience are no sooner in hand than they are transformed by intelligence, reduced to those permanent presences, those natures and relations, which alone can live in discourse. Those materials, rearranged into the abstract summaries we call history or science, or pieced out into the reconstructions and extensions we call poetry or religion, furnish us with ideas of as many dream-worlds as we please, all nearer to reason’s ideal than is the actual chaos of perceptual experience, and some nearer to the heart’s desire. When an empirical philosophy, therefore, calls us back from the irresponsible flights of imagination to the shock of sense and tries to remind us that in this alone we touch existence and come upon fact, we feel dispossessed of our nature and cramped in our life. The actuality possessed by external experience cannot make up for its instability, nor the applicability of scientific principles for their hypothetical character. The dependence upon sense, which we are reduced to when we consider the world of existences, becomes a too plain hint of our essential impotence and mortality, while the play of logical fancy, though it remain inevitable, is saddened by a consciousness of its own insignificance.

That dignity, then, which inheres in logical ideas and their affinity to moral enthusiasm, springs from their congruity with the primary habits of intelligence and idealisation. The soul or self or personality, which in sophisticated social life is so much the centre of passion and concern, is itself an idea, a concretion in discourse; and the level on which it swims comes to be, by association and affinity, **Her** the region of all the more vivid and massive human **inexperience.**

interests. The pleasures which lie beneath it are ignored, and the ideals which lie above it are not perceived. Aversion to an empirical or naturalistic philosophy accordingly expresses a sort of logical patriotism and attachment to homespun ideas. The actual is too remote and unfriendly to the dreamer; to understand it he has to learn a foreign tongue, which his native prejudice imagines to be unmeaning and unpoetical. The truth is, however, that nature's language is too rich for man; and the discomfort he feels when he is compelled to use it merely marks his lack of education. There is nothing cheaper than idealism. It can be had by merely not observing the ineptitude of our chance prejudices, and by declaring that the first rhymes that have struck our ear are the eternal and necessary harmonies of the world.

The thinker's bias is naturally favourable to logical ideas. The man of reflection will attribute, as far as possible, validity and reality to these alone. Platonism remains the classic instance of this way of thinking. Living in an age of rhetoric, with an education that dealt with nothing but ideal entities, verbal, moral, or mathematical, Plato saw in concretions in discourse the true elements of being. Definable meanings, being the terms of thought, must also, he fancied, be the constituents of reality. And with that directness and audacity which was possible to the ancients, and of which Pythagoreans and Eleatics had already given brilliant examples, he set up these terms of discourse, like the Pythagorean numbers, for absolute and eternal entities, existing before all things, revealed in all things, giving the cosmic artificer his models and the creature his goal. By some inexplicable necessity the creation had taken place. The ideas had multiplied themselves in a flux of innumerable images which could be recognised by their resemblance to their originals, but were at once cancelled and expunged by virtue of their essential inadequacy. What sounds are to words and words to thoughts, that was a thing to its idea.

Plato, however, retained the moral and significant essence of his ideas, and while he made them ideal absolutes, fixed meanings antecedent to their changing expressions, never dreamed that they could be natural existences, or psychological beings. In an original thinker, in one who really thinks and does not merely argue, to call a thing supernatural, or spiritual, or intelligible is to declare that it is no *thing* at all, no existence actual or possible, but a value, a term of thought, a merely ideal principle;

**Platonism
spontaneous.**

**Its essential
fidelity to
the ideal.**

and the more its reality in such a sense is insisted on the more its incommensurability with brute existence is asserted. To express this ideal reality myth is the natural vehicle; a vehicle Plato could avail himself of all the more freely that he inherited a religion still plastic and conscious of its poetic essence, and did not have to struggle, like his modern disciples, with the arrested childishness of minds that for a hundred generations have learned their metaphysics in the cradle. His ideas, although their natural basis was ignored, were accordingly always ideal; they always represented meanings and functions and were never degraded from the moral to the physical sphere. The counterpart of this genuine ideality was that the theory retained its moral force and did not degenerate into a bewildered and idolatrous pantheism. Plato conceived the soul's destiny to be her emancipation from those material things which in this illogical apparition were so alien to her essence. She should return, after her baffling and stupefying intercourse with the world of sense and accident, into the native heaven of her ideas. For animal desires were no less illusory, and yet no less significant, than sensuous perceptions. They engaged man in the pursuit of the good and taught him, through disappointment, to look for it only in those satisfactions which can be permanent and perfect. Love, like intelligence, must rise from appearance to reality, and rest in that divine world which is the fulfilment of the human.

A geometrician does a good service when he declares and explicates the nature of the triangle, an object suggested by many casual and recurring sensations. His service is not less real, even if less obvious, when he arrests some fundamental concretion in discourse, and formulates the first principles of logic. Mastering such definitions, sinking into the dry life of such forms, he may spin out and develop indefinitely, in the freedom of his irresponsible logic, their implications and congruous extensions, opening by his demonstration a depth of knowledge which we should otherwise never have discovered in ourselves. But if the geometer had a fanatical zeal and forbade us to consider space and the triangles it contains otherwise than as his own ideal science considers them: forbade us, for instance, to inquire how we came to perceive those triangles or that space; what organs and senses conspired in furnishing the idea of them; what material objects show that character, and how they came to offer themselves to our observation—then surely the geometer would qualify his service with a distinct injury and while

Equal
rights of
empiricism.

he opened our eyes to one fascinating vista would tend to blind them to others no less tempting and beautiful. For the naturalist and psychologist have also their rights and can tell us things well worth knowing; nor will any theory they may possibly propose concerning the origin of spatial ideas and their material embodiments ever invalidate the demonstrations of geometry. These, in their hypothetical sphere, are perfectly autonomous and self-generating, and their applicability to experience will hold so long as the initial images they are applied to continue to abound in perception.

If we awoke to-morrow in a world containing nothing but music, geometry would indeed lose its relevance to our future experience; but it would keep its ideal cogency, and become again a living language if any spatial objects should ever reappear in sense.

The history of such reappearances—natural history—is meantime a good subject for observation and experiment. Chronicler and critic can always approach experience with a method complementary to the deductive methods pursued in mathematics and logic: instead of developing the import of a definition, he can investigate its origin and describe its relation to other disparate phenomena. The mathematician develops the import of given ideas; the psychologist investigates their origin and describes their relation to the rest of human experience. So the prophet develops the import of his trance, and the theologian the import of the prophecy: which prevents not the historian from coming later and showing the origin, the growth, and the possible function of that maniacal sort of wisdom. True, the theologian commonly dreads a critic more than does the geometer, but this happens only because the theologian has probably not developed the import of his facts with any austerity or clearness, but has distorted that ideal interpretation with all sorts of concessions and side-glances at other tenets to which he is already pledged, so that he justly fears, when his methods are exposed, that the religious heart will be alienated from him and his conclusions be left with no foothold in human nature. If he had not been guilty of such misrepresentation, no history or criticism that reviewed his construction would do anything but recommend it to all those who found in themselves the primary religious facts and religious faculties which that construction had faithfully interpreted in its ideal deductions and extensions. All who perceived the facts would thus learn their import; and theology would reveal to the soul her natural religion, just as Euclid reveals to architects and naviga-

tors the structure of natural space, so that they value his demonstrations not only for their hypothetical cogency but for their practical relevance and truth.

Now, like the geometer and ingenuous theologian that he was, Plato developed the import of moral and logical experience. Even his followers, though they might give rein to narrower and more fantastic enthusiasms, often unveiled secrets, hidden in the oracular intent of the heart, which might never have been disclosed but for their lessons. But with a zeal unbecoming so well grounded a philosophy they turned their backs upon the rest of wisdom, they disparaged the evidence of sense, they grew hot against the ultimate practical sanctions furnished by impulse and pleasure, they proscribed beauty in art (where Plato had proscribed chiefly what to a fine sensibility is meretricious ugliness), and in a word they sought to abolish all human activities other than the one pre-eminent in themselves. In revenge for their hostility the great world has never given them more than a distrustful admiration and, confronted daily by the evident truths they denied, has encouraged itself to forget the truths they asserted. For they had the bias of reflection and man is born to do more than reflect; they attributed reality and validity only to logical ideas, and man finds other objects continually thrusting themselves before his eyes, claiming his affection and controlling his fortunes.

**Logic
dependent
on fact
for its
importance,**

The most legitimate constructions of reason soon become merely speculative, soon pass, I mean, beyond the sphere of practical application; and the man of affairs, adjusting himself at every turn to the opaque brutality of fact, loses his respect for the higher reaches of logic and forgets that his recognition of facts themselves is an application of logical principles. In his youth, perhaps, he pursued metaphysics, which are the love-affairs of the understanding; now he is wedded to convention and seeks in the passion he calls business or in the habit he calls duty some substitute for natural happiness. He fears to question the value of his life, having found that such questioning adds nothing to his powers; and he thinks the mariner would die of old age in port who should wait for reason to justify his voyage. Reason is indeed like the sad Iphigenia whom her royal father, the Will, must sacrifice before any wind can fill his sails. The emanation of all things from the One involves not only the incarnation but the crucifixion of the Logos. Reason must be eclipsed by its supposed expressions, and

can only shine in a darkness which does not comprehend it. For reason is essentially hypothetical and subsidiary, and can never constitute what it expresses in man, nor what it recognises in nature.

If logic should refuse to make this initial self-sacrifice and to subordinate itself to impulse and fact, it would immediately become irrational and forfeit its own justification. For it exists by **and for its subsistence.** virtue of a human impulse and in answer to a human need. To ask a man, in the satisfaction of a metaphysical passion, to forego every other good is to render him fanatical and to shut his eyes daily to the sun in order that he may see better by the star-light. The radical fault of rationalism is not any incidental error committed in its deductions, although such necessarily abound in every human system. Its great original sin is its denial of its own basis and its refusal to occupy its due place in the world, an ignorant fear of being invalidated by its history and dishonoured, as it were, if its ancestry is hinted at. Only bastards should fear that fate, and criticism would indeed be fatal to a bastard philosophy, to one that does not spring from practical reason and has no roots in life. But those products of reason which arise by reflection on fact, and those spontaneous and demonstrable systems of ideas which can be verified in experience, and thus serve to render the facts calculable and articulate, will lose nothing of their lustre by discovering their lineage. So the idea of nature remains true after psychology has analysed its origin, and not only true, but beautiful and beneficent. For unlike many negligible products of speculative fancy it is woven out of recurrent perceptions into a hypothetical cause from which further perceptions can be deduced as they are actually experienced.

Such a mechanism once discovered confirms itself at every breath we draw, and surrounds every object in history and nature with infinite and true suggestions, making it doubly interesting, fruitful, and potent over the mind. The naturalist accordingly welcomes criticism because his constructions, though no less hypothetical and speculative than the idealist's dreams, are such legitimate and fruitful fictions that they are obvious truths. For truth, at the intelligible level where it arises, means not sensible fact, but valid ideation, verified hypothesis, and inevitable, stable inference. If the idealist fears and deprecates any theory of his own origin and function, he is only obeying the instinct of self-preservation; for he knows very well that his past will not bear examination. He is heir to every superstition and by profession an

apologist; his deepest vocation is to rescue, by some logical *tour de force*, what spontaneously he himself would have taken for a consecrated error. Now history and criticism would involve, as he instinctively perceives, the reduction of his doctrines to their pragmatic value, to their ideal significance for real life. But he detests any admission of relativity in his doctrines, all the more because he cannot avow his reasons for detesting it; and zeal, here as in so many cases, becomes the cover and evidence of a bad conscience. Bigotry and craft, with a rhetorical vilification of enemies, then come to reinforce in the prophet that natural limitation of his interests which turns his face away from history and criticism; until his system, in its monstrous unreality and disingenuousness, becomes intolerable, and provokes a general revolt in which too often the truth of it is buried with the error in a common oblivion.

If idealism is entrenched in the very structure of human reason, empiricism represents all those energies of the external universe which, as Spinoza says, must infinitely exceed the energies of man. If meditation breeds science, wisdom comes by disillusion, even on the subject of science itself.

Reason and
docility.

Docility to the facts makes the sanity of science. Reason is only half grown and not really distinguishable from imagination so long as she cannot check and recast her own processes wherever they render the moulds of thought unfit for their subject-matter. Docility is, as we have seen, the deepest condition of reason's existence; for if a form of mental synthesis were by chance developed which was incapable of appropriating the data of sense, these data could not be remembered or introduced at all into a growing and cumulative experience. Sensations would leave no memorial; while logical thoughts would play idly, like so many parasites in the mind, and ultimately languish and die of inanition. To be nourished and employed, intelligence must have developed such structure and habits as will enable it to assimilate what food comes in its way; so that the persistence of any intellectual habit is a proof that it has some applicability, however partial, to the facts of sentience.

This applicability, the prerequisite of significant thought, is also its eventual test; and the gathering of new experiences, the consciousness of more and more facts crowding into the memory and demanding co-ordination, is at once the presentation to reason of her legitimate problem

Applicable thought and
clarified experience.

and a proof that she is already at work. It is a presentation of her problem, because reason is not a faculty of dreams but a method in living; and by facing the flux of sensations and impulses that constitute mortal life with the gift of ideal construction and the aspiration toward eternal goods, she is only doing her duty and manifesting what she is. To accumulate facts, moreover, is in itself to prove that rational activity is already awakened, because a consciousness of multitudinous accidents diversifying experience involves a wide scope in memory, good methods of classification, and keen senses, so that all working together they may collect many observations. Memory and all its instruments are embodiments, on a modest scale, of rational activities which in theory and speculation reappear upon a higher level. The expansion of the mind in point of retentiveness and wealth of images is as much an advance in knowledge as is its development in point of organisation. The structure may be widened at the base as well as raised toward its ideal summit, and while a mass of information imperfectly digested leaves something still for intelligence to do, it shows at the same time how much intelligence has done already.

The function of reason is to dominate experience; and obviously openness to new impressions is no less necessary to that end than is the possession of principles by which new impressions may be interpreted.

CHAPTER IX

HOW THOUGHT IS PRACTICAL

Nothing is more natural or more congruous with all the analogies of experience than that animals should feel and think. The relation of mind to body, of reason to nature, seems to be actually this: when bodies have reached a certain complexity and vital equilibrium, a sense begins to inhabit them which is focussed upon the preservation of that body and on its reproduction. This sense, as it becomes reflective and expressive of physical welfare, points more and more to its own persistence and harmony, and generates the Life of Reason. Nature is reason's basis and theme; reason is nature's consciousness; and, from the point of view of that consciousness when it has arisen, reason is also nature's justification and goal.

Functional relations of mind and body.

To separate things so closely bound together as are mind and body, reason and nature, is consequently a violent and artificial divorce, and a man of judgment will instinctively discredit any philosophy in which it is decreed. But to avoid divorce it is well first to avoid unnatural unions, and not to attribute to our two elements, which must be partners for life, relations repugnant to their respective natures and offices. Now the body is an instrument, the mind its function, the witness and reward of its operation. Mind is the body's entelechy, a value which accrues to the body when it has reached a certain perfection, of which it would be a pity, so to speak, that it should remain unconscious; so that while the body feeds the mind the mind perfects the body, lifting it and all its natural relations and impulses into the moral world, into the sphere of interests and ideas.

No connection could be closer than this reciprocal involution, as nature and life reveal it; but the connection is natural, not dialectical. The union will be denaturalised and, so far as philosophy goes, actually destroyed, if we seek to carry it on into logical equivalence. If we

isolate the terms mind and body and study the inward implications of each apart, we shall never discover the other. That matter cannot, by transposition of its particles, *become* what we call consciousness, is an admitted truth; that mind cannot *become* its own occasions or determine its own march, though it be a truth not recognised by all philosophers, is in itself no less obvious. Matter, dialectically studied, makes consciousness seem a superfluous and unaccountable addendum; mind, studied in the same way, makes nature an embarrassing idea, a figment which ought to be subservient to conscious aims and perfectly transparent, but which remains opaque and overwhelming. In order to escape these sophistications, it suffices to revert to immediate observation and state the question in its proper terms: nature lives, and perception is a private echo and response to ambient motions. The soul is the voice of the body's interests; in watching them a man defines the world that sustains him and that conditions all his satisfactions. In discerning his origin he christens Nature by the eloquent name of mother, under which title she enters the universe of discourse. Simultaneously he discerns his own existence and marks off the inner region of his dreams. And it behoves him not to obliterate these discoveries. By trying to give his mind false points of attachment in nature he would disfigure not only nature but also that reason which is so much the essence of his life.

Consciousness, then, is the expression of bodily life and the seat of all its values. Its place in the natural world is like that of its own ideal products, art, religion, or science; it translates natural relations into synthetic and ideal symbols by which things are interpreted with reference to the interests of consciousness itself. This representation is also an existence and has its place along with all other existences in the bosom of nature. In this sense its connection with its organs, and with all that affects the body or that the body affects, is a natural connection. If the word cause did not suggest dialectical bonds we might innocently say that thought was a link in the chain of natural causes. It is at least a link in the chain of natural events; for it has determinate antecedents in the brain and senses and determinate consequents in actions and words. But this dependence and this efficacy have nothing logical about them; they are habitual collocations in the world, like lightning and thunder. A more minute inspection of psycho-physical processes, were it practicable, would doubtless disclose undreamed of complexities and har-

**They form
one natural
life.**

monies in them; the mathematical and dynamic relations of stimulus and sensation might perhaps be formulated with precision. But the terms used in the equation, their quality and inward habit, would always remain data which the naturalist would have to assume after having learned them by inspection. Movement could never be deduced dialectically or graphically from thought nor thought from movement. Indeed no natural relation is in a different case. Neither gravity, nor chemical reaction, nor life and reproduction, nor time, space, and motion themselves are logically deducible, nor intelligible in terms of their limits. The phenomena have to be accepted at their face value and allowed to retain a certain empirical complexity; otherwise the seed of all science is sterilised and calculation cannot proceed for want of discernible and pregnant elements.

How fine nature's habits may be, where repetition begins, and down to what depth a mathematical treatment can penetrate, is a question for the natural sciences to solve. Whether consciousness, for instance, accompanies vegetative life, or even all motion, is a point to be decided solely by empirical analogy. When the exact physical conditions of thought are discovered in man, we may infer how far thought is diffused through the universe, for it will be coextensive with the conditions it will have been shown to have. Now, in a very rough way, we know already what these conditions are. They are first the existence of an organic body and then its possession of adaptable instincts, of instincts that can be modified by experience. This capacity is what an observer calls intelligence; docility is the observable half of reason. When an animal winces at a blow and readjusts his pose, we say he feels; and we say he thinks when we see him brooding over his impressions, and find him launching into a new course of action after a silent decoction of his potential impulses. Conversely, when observation covers both the mental and the physical process, that is, in our own experience, we find that felt impulses, the conceived objects for which they make, and the values they determine are all correlated with animal instincts and external impressions. A desire is the inward sign of a physical proclivity to act, an image in sense is the sign in most cases of some material object in the environment and always, we may presume, of some cerebral change. The brain seems to simmer like a caldron in which all sorts of matters are perpetually transforming themselves into all sorts of shapes. When this cerebral reorganisation is pertinent to the external situation and renders the man, when he

resumes action, more a master of his world, the accompanying thought is said to be practical; for it brings a consciousness of power and an earnest of success.

Cerebral processes are of course largely hypothetical. Theory suggests their existence, and experience can verify that theory only in an indirect and imperfect manner. The addition of a physical substratum to all thinking is only a scientific expedient, a hypothesis expressing the faith that nature is mechanically intelligible even beyond the reaches of minute verification. The accompanying consciousness, on the other hand, is something intimately felt by each man in his own person; it is a portion of crude and immediate experience. That it accompanies changes in his body and in the world is not an inference for him but a datum. But when crude experience is somewhat refined and the soul, at first mingled with every image, finds that it inhabits only her private body, to whose fortunes hers are altogether wedded, we begin to imagine that we know the cosmos at large better than the spirit; for beyond the narrow limits of our own person only the material phase of things is open to our observation. To add a mental phase to every part and motion of the cosmos is then seen to be an audacious fancy. It violates all empirical analogy, for the phenomenon which feeling accompanies in crude experience is not mere material existence, but reactive organisation and docility.

The limits set to observation, however, render the mental and material spheres far from coincident, and even in a rough way mutually supplementary, so that human reflection has fallen into a habit of interlarding them. The world, instead of being a living body, a natural system with moral functions, has seemed to be a bisectible hybrid, half material and half mental, the clumsy conjunction of an automaton with a ghost. These phases, taken in their abstraction, as they first forced themselves on human attention, have been taken for independent and separable facts. Experience, remaining in both provinces quite sensuous and superficial, has accordingly been allowed to link this purely mental event with that purely mechanical one. The linkage is practically not deceptive, because mental transformations are indeed signs of changes in bodies; and so long as a cause is defined merely as a sign, mental and physical changes may truly be said to cause one another. But so soon as this form of augury tries to overcome its crude empiricism and to establish phenomenal laws, the mental factor has to

Artifices
involved in
separating
them.

fall out of the efficient process and be represented there by what, upon accurate examination, it is seen to be really the sign of—I mean by some physiological event.

If philosophers of the Cartesian school had taken to heart, as the German transcendentalists did, the *cogito ergo sum* of their master, and had considered that a physical world is, for knowledge, nothing but an instrument to explain sensations and their order, they might have expected this collapse of half their metaphysics at the approach of their positive science: for if mental existence was to be kept standing only by its supposed causal efficacy nothing could prevent the whole world from becoming presently a *bête machine*. Psychic events have no links save through their organs and their objects; the function of the material world is, indeed, precisely to supply their linkage. The internal relations of ideas, on the other hand, are dialectical; their realm is eternal and absolutely irrelevant to the march of events. If we must speak, therefore, of causal relations between mind and body, we should say that matter determines the existence and distribution of mind, and mind determines the discovery and value of matter. To ask for an efficient cause, to trace back a force or investigate origins, is to have already turned one's face in the direction of matter and mechanical laws: no success in that undertaking can fail to be a triumph for materialism. To ask for a justification, on the other hand, is to turn no less resolutely in the direction of ideal results and actualities from which instrumentality and further use have been eliminated. Spirit is useless, being the end of things: but it is not vain, since it alone rescues all else from vanity. It is called practical when it is prophetic of its own better fulfilments, which is the case whenever forces are being turned to good uses, whenever an organism is exploring its relations and putting forth new tentacles with which to grasp the world.

We saw in the beginning that the exigences of bodily life gave consciousness its first articulation. A bodily feat, like nutrition or reproduction, is celebrated by a festival in the mind, and consciousness is a sort of ritual solemnising by prayer, jubilation, or mourning, the chief episodes in the body's fortunes. The organs, by their structure, select the impressions possible to them from the divers influences abroad in the world, all of which, if animal organisms had learned to feed upon them, might plausibly have offered a basis for sensation. Every instinct or habitual impulse further selects from the passing

Consciousness
expresses vital
equilibrium
and docility.

bodily affections those that are pertinent to its own operation and which consequently adhere to it and modify its reactive machinery. Prevalent and notable sensations are therefore signs, presumably marking the presence of objects important for the body's welfare or for the execution of its predestined offices. So that not only are the soul's aims transcripts of the body's tendencies, but all ideas are grafted upon the interplay of these tendencies with environing forces. Early images hover about primary wants as highest conceptions do about ultimate achievements.

Thought is essentially practical in the sense that but for thought no motion would be an action, no change a progress; but thought is in no way instrumental or servile; it is an experience realised, not a force to be used. That same spontaneity in nature which has suggested a good must be trusted to fulfil it. If we look fairly at the actual resources of our minds we perceive that we are as little informed concerning the means and processes of action as concerning the reason why our motives move us. To execute the simplest intention we must rely on fate: our own acts are mysteries to us. Do I know how I open my eyes or how I walk down stairs? Is it the supervising wisdom of consciousness that guides me in these acts? Is it the mind that controls the bewildered body and points out the way to physical habits uncertain of their affinities? Or is it not much rather automatic inward machinery that executes the marvellous work, while the mind catches here and there some glimpse of the operation, now with delight and adhesion, now with impotent rebellion? When impulses work themselves out unimpeded we say we act; when they are thwarted we say we are acted upon; but in neither case do we in the least understand the natural history of what is occurring. The mind at best vaguely forecasts the result of action: a schematic verbal sense of the end to be accomplished possibly hovers in consciousness while the act is being performed; but this premonition is itself the sense of a process already present and betrays the tendency at work; it can obviously give no aid or direction to the unknown mechanical process that produced it and that must realise its own prophecy, if that prophecy is to be realised at all.

That such an unknown mechanism exists, and is adequate to explain every so-called decision, is indeed a hypothesis far outrunning detailed verification, although conceived by legitimate analogy with

Its
worthlessness
as a cause
and value
as an
expression.

whatever is known about natural processes; but that the mind is not the source of itself or its own transformations is a matter of present experience; for the world is an unaccountable datum, in its existence, in its laws, and in its incidents. The highest hopes of science and morality look only to discovering those laws and bringing one set of incidents—facts of perception—into harmony with another set—facts of preference. This hoped-for issue, if it comes, must come about in the mind; but the mind cannot be its cause since, by hypothesis, it does not possess the ideas it seeks nor has power to realise the harmonies it desiderates. These have to be waited for and begged of destiny; human will, not controlling its basis, cannot possibly control its effects. Its existence and its efforts have at best the value of a good omen. They show in what direction natural forces are moving in so far as they are embodied in given men.

Men, like all things else in the world, are products and vehicles of natural energy, and their operation counts. But their conscious will, in its moral assertiveness, is merely a sign of that energy and of that will's eventual fortunes. Dramatic terror and dramatic humour both depend on contrasting the natural pregnancy of a passion with its conscious intent. Everything in human life is ominous, even the voluntary acts. We cannot, by taking thought, add a cubit to our stature, but we may build up a world without meaning it. Man is as full of potentiality as he is of impotence. A will that represents many active forces, and is skilful in divination and augury, may long boast to be almighty without being contradicted by the event.

**Thought's
march
automatic
and thereby
implicated
in events.**

That thought is not self-directive appears best in the most immaterial processes. In strife against external forces men, being ignorant of their deeper selves, attribute the obvious effects of their action to their chance ideas; but when the process is wholly internal the real factors are more evenly represented in consciousness and the magical, involuntary nature of life is better perceived. My hand, guided by I know not what machinery, is at this moment adding syllable to syllable upon this paper, to the general fulfilment, perhaps, of my felt intent, yet giving that intent an articulation wholly unforeseen, and often disappointing. The thoughts to be expressed simmer half-consciously in my brain. I feel their burden and tendency without seeing their form, until the mechanical train of impulsive association, started by the perusal of what precedes or by the accidental emergence of some new idea,

lights the fuse and precipitates the phrases. If this happens in the most reflective and deliberate of activities, like this of composition, how much more does it happen in positive action. “The die is cast,” said Cæsar, feeling a decision in himself of which he could neither count nor weigh the multitudinous causes; and so says every strong and clear intellect, every well-formed character, seizing at the same moment with comprehensive instinct both its purposes and the means by which they shall be attained. Only the fool, whose will signifies nothing, boasts to have created it himself.

We must not seek the function of thought, then, in any supposed power to discover either ends not suggested by natural impulse or means to the accomplishment of those irrational ends. Attention is utterly powerless to change or create its objects in either respect; it rather registers without surprise—for it expects nothing in particular—and watches eagerly the images bubbling up in the living mind and the processes evolving there. These processes are themselves full of potency and promise; will and reflection are no more inconsequential than any other processes bound by natural links to the rest of the world. Even if an atomic mechanism suffices to mark the concatenation of everything in nature, including the mind, it cannot rob what it abstracts from of its natural weight and reality: a thread that may suffice to hold the pearls together is not the whole cause of the necklace. But this pregnancy and implication of thought in relation to its natural environment is purely empirical. Since natural connection is merely a principle of arrangement by which the contiguities of things may be described and inferred, there is no difficulty in admitting consciousness and all its works into the web and woof of nature. Each psychic episode would be heralded by its material antecedents; its transformations would be subject to mechanical laws, which would also preside over the further transition from thought into its material expression.

This inclusion of mind in nature, however, is as far as possible from constituting the mind’s function and value, or its efficacy in a moral and rational sense. To have prepared changes in matter would give no rationality to mind unless those changes in turn paved the way to some better mental existence. The worth of natural efficacy is therefore always derivative; the utility of mind would be no more precious than the utility of matter; both borrow all their worth from the part they

**Contemplative
essence of
action.**

**Mechanical
efficacy alien
to thought’s
essence.**

may play empirically in introducing those moral values which are intrinsic and self-sufficing. In so far as thought is instrumental it is not worth having, any more than matter, except for its promise; it must terminate in something truly profitable and ultimate which, being good in itself, may lend value to all that led up to it. But this ultimate good is itself consciousness, thought, rational activity; so that what instrumental mentality may have preceded might be abolished without loss, if matter suffices to sustain reason in being; or if that instrumental mentality is worth retaining, it is so only because it already contains some premonition and image of its own fulfilment. In a word, the value of thought is ideal. The material efficacy which may be attributed to it is the proper efficacy of matter—an efficacy which matter would doubtless claim if we knew enough of its secret mechanism. And when that imputed and incongruous utility was subtracted from ideas they would appear in their proper form of expressions, realisations, ultimate fruits.

The incongruity of making thought, in its moral and logical essence, an instrument in the natural world will appear from a different point of view if we shift the discussion for a moment to a transcendental level. Since the material world is an object for thought, and potential in relation to immediate experience, it can hardly lie in the same plane of reality with the thought to which it appears. The spectator on this side of the foot-lights, while surely regarded by the play as a whole, cannot expect to figure in its mechanism or to see himself strutting among the actors on the boards. He listens and is served, being at once impotent and supreme. It has been well said that

Consciousness
transcendental

Only the free divine the laws,
The causeless only know the cause.

Conversely, what in such a transcendental sense is causeless and free will evidently not be causal or determinant, being something altogether universal and notional, without inherent determinations or specific affinities. The objects figuring in consciousness will have implications and will require causes; not so the consciousness itself. The Ego to which all things appear equally, whatever their form or history, is the ground of nothing incidental: no specific characters or order found in the world can be attributed to its efficacy. The march of experience is not determined by the mere fact that experience

exists. Another experience, differently logical, might be equally real. Consciousness is not itself dynamic, for it has no body, no idiosyncrasy or particular locus, to be the point of origin for definite relationships. It is merely an abstract name for the actuality of its random objects. All force, implication, or direction inhere in the constitution of specific objects and live in their interplay. Logic is revealed to thought no less than nature is, and even what we call invention or fancy is generated not by thought itself but by the chance fertility of nebulous objects, floating and breeding in the primeval chaos. Where the natural order lapses, if it ever does, not mind or will or reason can possibly intervene to fill the chasm—for these are parcels and expressions of the natural order—but only nothingness and pure chance.

Thought is thus an expression of natural relations, as will is of natural affinities; yet consciousness of an object's value, while it declares the blind disposition to pursue that object, constitutes its entire worth. Apart from the pains and satisfactions involved, an impulse and its execution would be alike destitute of importance. It would matter nothing how chaotic or how orderly the world became, or what animal bodies arose or perished there; any tendencies afoot in nature, whatever they might construct or dissolve, would involve no progress or disaster, since no preferences would exist to pronounce one eventual state of things better than another. These preferences are **and transcendent.** in themselves, if the dynamic order alone be considered, works of supererogation, expressing force but not producing it, like a statue of Hercules; but the principle of such preferences, the force they express and depend upon, is some mechanical impulse itself involved in the causal process. Expression gives value to power, and the strength of Hercules would have no virtue in it had it contributed nothing to art and civilisation. That conceived basis of all life which we call matter would be a mere potentiality, an inferred instrument deprived of its function, if it did not actually issue in life and consciousness. What gives the material world a legitimate status and perpetual pertinence in human discourse is the conscious life it supports and carries in its own direction, as a ship carries its passengers or rather as a passion carries its hopes. Conscious interests first justify and moralise the mechanisms they express. Eventual satisfactions, while their form and possibility must be determined by animal tendencies, alone render these tendencies vehicles of the good. The direction in which benefit shall lie must be determined by irratio-

nal impulse, but the attainment of benefit consists in crowning that impulse with its ideal achievement. Nature dictates what men shall seek and prompts them to seek it; a possibility of happiness is thus generated and only its fulfilment would justify nature and man in their common venture.

Satisfaction is the touchstone of value; without reference to it all talk about good and evil, progress or decay, is merely confused verbiage, pure sophistry in which the juggler adroitly with- It is the seat
of value. draws attention from what works the wonder—namely, that human and moral colouring to which the terms he plays with owe whatever efficacy they have. Metaphysicians sometimes so define the good as to make it a matter of no importance; not seldom they give that name to the sum of all evils. A good, absolute in the sense of being divorced from all natural demand and all possible satisfaction, would be as remote as possible from goodness: to call it good is mere disloyalty to morals, brought about by some fantastic or dialectical passion. In excellence there is an essential bias, an opposition to the possible opposite; this bias expresses a mechanical impulse, a situation that has stirred the senses and the will. Impulse makes value possible; and the value becomes actual when the impulse issues in processes that give it satisfaction and have a conscious worth. Character is the basis of happiness and happiness the sanction of character.*

That thought is nature's concomitant expression or entelechy, never one of her instruments, is a truth long ago divined by the more judicious thinkers, like Aristotle and Spinoza; but it has not met with general acceptance or even consideration. It is obstructed by superficial empiricism, which associates the better-known aspects of events directly together, without considering what mechanical bonds may secretly unite them; it is obstructed also by the traditional mythical idealism, intent as this philosophy is on proving nature to be the

* Aristippus asked Socrates "whether he knew anything good, so that if he answered by naming food or drink or money or health or strength or valour or anything of that sort, he might at once show that it was sometimes an evil. Socrates, however, knew very well that if anything troubles us what we demand is its cure, and he replied in the most pertinent fashion. 'Are you asking me,' he said, 'if I know anything good for a fever?' 'Oh, no,' said the other. 'Or for sore eyes?' 'Not that, either.' 'Or for hunger?' 'No, not for hunger.' 'Well, then,' said he, 'if you ask me whether I know a good that is good for nothing, I neither know it nor want to know it.'"—Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, iii., 8.

expression of something ulterior and non-natural and on hugging the fatal misconception that ideals and eventual goods are creative and miraculous forces, without perceiving that it thereby renders goods and ideals perfectly senseless; for how can anything be a good at all to which some existing nature is not already directed? It may therefore be worth while, before leaving this phase of the subject, to consider one or two prejudices which might make it sound paradoxical to say, as we propose, that ideals are ideal and nature natural.

Of all forms of consciousness the one apparently most useful is pain, which is also the one most immersed in matter and most opposite to ideality and excellence. Its utility lies in the warning

Apparent utility of pain.

it gives: in trying to escape pain we escape destruction.

That we desire to escape pain is certain; its very definition can hardly go beyond the statement that pain is that element of feeling which we seek to abolish on account of its intrinsic quality. That this desire, however, should know how to initiate remedial action is a notion contrary to experience and in itself unthinkable. If pain could have cured us we should long ago have been saved. The bitterest quintessence of pain is its helplessness, and our incapacity to abolish it. The most intolerable torments are those we feel gaining upon us, intensifying and prolonging themselves indefinitely. This baffling quality, so conspicuous in extreme agony, is present in all pain and is perhaps its essence. If we sought to describe by a circumlocution what is of course a primary sensation, we might scarcely do better than to say that pain is consciousness at once intense and empty, fixing attention on what contains no character, and arrests all satisfactions without offering anything in exchange. The horror of pain lies in its intolerable intensity and its intolerable tedium. It can accordingly be cured either by sleep or by entertainment. In itself it has no resource; its violence is quite helpless and its vacancy offers no expedients by which it might be unknotted and relieved.

Its real impotence.

Pain is not only impotent in itself but is a sign of impotence in the sufferer. Its appearance, far from constituting its own remedy, is like all other organic phenomena subject to the law of inertia and tends only to its own continuance. A man's hatred of his own condition no more helps to improve it than hatred of other people tends to improve them. If we allowed ourselves to speak in such a case of efficacy at all, we should say that pain perpetuates and propagates itself in various ways,

now by weakening the system, now by prompting convulsive efforts, now by spreading to other beings through the contagion of sympathy or vengeance. In fact, however, it merely betrays a maladjustment which has more or less natural stability. It may be instantaneous only; by its lack of equilibrium it may involve the immediate destruction of one of its factors. In that case we fabulously say that the pain has instinctively removed its own cause. Pain is here apparently useful because it expresses an incipient tension which the self-preserving forces in the organism are sufficient to remove. Pain's appearance is then the sign for its instant disappearance; not indeed by virtue of its inner nature or of any art it can initiate, but merely by virtue of mechanical associations between its cause and its remedy. The burned child dreads the fire and, reading only the surface of his life, fancies that the pain once felt and still remembered is the ground of his new prudence. Punishments, however, are not always efficacious, as everyone knows who has tried to govern children or cities by the rod; suffering does not bring wisdom nor even memory, unless intelligence and docility are already there; that is, unless the friction which the pain betrayed sufficed to obliterate permanently one of the impulses in conflict. This readjustment, on which real improvement hangs and which alone makes "experience" useful, does not correspond to the intensity or repetition of the pains endured; it corresponds rather to such a plasticity in the organism that the painful conflict is no longer produced.

Threatened destruction would not involve pain unless that threatened destruction were being resisted; so that the reaction which pain is supposed to cause must already be taking place before pain can be felt. A will without direction cannot be thwarted; so that inhibition cannot be the primary source of any effort or of any ideal. Determinate impulses must exist already for their inhibition to have taken place or for the pain to arise which is the sign of that inhibition. The child's dread of the fire marks the acceleration of that impulse which, when he was burned, originally enabled him to withdraw his hand; and if he did not now shrink in anticipation he would not remember the pain nor know to what to attach his terror. Sight now suffices to awaken the reaction which touch at first was needed to produce; the will has extended its line of battle and thrown out its scouts farther afield; and pain has been driven back to the frontiers of the spirit. The conflicting reactions are now peripheral and feeble; the pain involved in aversion is nothing to that once

**Preformations
involved.**

involved in the burn. Had this aversion to fire been innate, as many aversions are, no pain would have been caused, because no profound maladjustment would have occurred. The surviving attraction, checked by fear, is a remnant of the old disorganisation in the brain which was the seat of conflicting reactions.

To say that this conflict is the guide to its own issue is to talk without thinking. The conflict is the sign of inadequate organisation, or of non-adaptation in the given organism to the various stimuli which irritate it. The reconstruction which follows this conflict, when it indeed follows, is of course a new and better adaptation; so that what involves the pain may often be a process of training which directs reaction into new and smoother channels. But the pain is present whether a permanent adaptation is being attained or not. It is present in progressive dissolution and in hopeless and exhausting struggles far more than in education or in profitable correction. Toothache and sea-sickness, birth-pangs and melancholia are not useful ills. The intenser the pain the more probable its uselessness. Only in vanishing is it a sign of progress; in occurring it is an omen of defeat, just as disease is an omen of death, although, for those diseased already, medicine and convalescence may be approaches to health again. Where a man's nature is out of gear and his instincts are inordinate, suffering may be a sign that a dangerous peace, in which impulse was carrying him ignorantly into paths without issue, is giving place to a peace with security in which his reconstructed character may respond without friction to the world, and enable him to gather a clearer experience and enjoy a purer vitality. The utility of pain is thus apparent only, and due to empirical haste in collating events that have no regular nor inward relation; and even this imputed utility pain has only in proportion to the worthlessness of those who need it.

A second current prejudice which may deserve notice suggests that an organ, when its function is perfect, becomes unconscious, so that if adaptation were complete life would disappear. The well-learned routine of any mechanical art passes into habit, and habit into unconscious operation. The virtuoso is not aware how he manipulates his instrument; what was conscious labour in the beginning has become instinct and miracle in the end. Thus it might appear that to eliminate friction and difficulty would be to eliminate consciousness, and therefore

**Its untoward
significance.**

**Perfect
function not
unconscious.**

value, from the world. Life would thus be involved in a contradiction and moral effort in an absurdity; for while the constant aim of practice is perfection and that of labour ease, and both are without meaning or standard unless directed to the attainment of these ends, yet such attainment, if it were actual, would be worthless, so that what alone justifies effort would lack justification and would in fact be incapable of existence. The good musician must strive to play perfectly, but, alas, we are told, if he succeeded he would have become an automaton. The good man must aspire to holiness, but, alas, if he reached holiness his moral life would have evaporated.

These melodramatic prophecies, however, need not alarm us. They are founded on nothing but rhetoric and small allegiance to any genuine good. When we attain perfection of function we lose consciousness of the medium, to become more clearly conscious of the result. The eye that does its duty gives no report of itself and has no sense of muscular tension or weariness; but it gives all the brighter and steadier image of the object seen. Consciousness is not lost when focussed, and the labour of vision is abolished in its fruition. So the musician, could he play so divinely as to be unconscious of his body, his instrument, and the very lapse of time, would be only the more absorbed in the harmony, more completely master of its unities and beauty. At such moments the body's long labour at last brings forth the soul. Life from its inception is simply some partial natural harmony raising its voice and bearing witness to its own existence; to perfect that harmony is to round out and intensify that life. This is the very secret of power, of joy, of intelligence. Not to have understood it is to have passed through life without understanding anything.

The analogy extends to morals, where also the means may be advantageously forgotten when the end has been secured. That leisure to which work is directed and that perfection in which virtue would be fulfilled are so far from being apathetic that they are states of pure activity, by containing which other acts are rescued from utter passivity and unconsciousness. Impure feeling ranges between two extremes: absolute want and complete satisfaction. The former limit is reached in anguish, madness, or the agony of death, when the accidental flux of things in contradiction has reached its maximum or vanishing point, so that the contradiction and the flux themselves disappear by diremption. Such feeling denotes inward disorganisation and a hopeless conflict of reflex actions tending toward dissolution. The second

limit is reached in contemplation, when anything is loved, understood, or enjoyed. Synthetic power is then at its height; the mind can survey its experience and correlate all the motions it suggests. Power in the mind is exactly proportionate to representative scope, and representative scope to rational activity. A steady vision of all things in their true order and worth results from perfection of function and is its index; it secures the greatest distinctness in thought together with the greatest decision, wisdom, and ease in action, as the lightning is brilliant and quick. It also secures, so far as human energies avail, its own perpetuity, since what is perfectly adjusted within and without lasts long and goes far.

To confuse means with ends and mistake disorder for vitality is not unnatural to minds that hear the hum of mighty workings but can imagine neither the cause nor the fruits of that portentous commotion. All functions, in such chaotic lives, seem instrumental functions. It is then supposed that what serves no further purpose can have no value, and that he who suffers no offuscation can have no feeling and no life. To attain an ideal seems to destroy its worth. Moral life, at that low level, is a fantastic game only, not having come in sight of humane and liberal interests. The barbarian's intensity is without seriousness and his passion without joy. His philosophy, which means to glorify all experience and to digest all vice, is in truth an expression of pathetic innocence. It betrays a rudimentary impulse to follow every beckoning hand, to assume that no adventure and no bewitchment can be anything but glorious. Such an attitude is intelligible in one who has never seen anything worth seeing nor loved anything worth loving. Immaturity could go no farther than to acknowledge no limits defining will and happiness. When such limits, however, are gradually discovered and an authoritative ideal is born of the marriage of human nature with experience, happiness becomes at once definite and attainable; for adjustment is possible to a world that has a fruitful and intelligible structure.

Such incoherences, which might well arise in ages without traditions, may be preserved and fostered by superstition. Perpetual servile employments and subjection to an irrational society may render people incapable even of conceiving a liberal life. They may come to think their happiness no longer separable from their misery and to fear the large emptiness, as they deem it, of a happy world. Like the prisoner of Chillon, after so long a captivity, they would regain their

**Inchoate
ethics.**

freedom with a sigh. The wholesome influences of nature, however, would soon revive their wills, contorted by unnatural oppression, and a vision of perfection would arise within them upon breathing a purer air. Freedom and perfection are synonymous with life. The peace they bring is one

whose names are also rapture, power,
Clear sight, and love; for these are parts of peace.

Thought belongs to the sphere of ultimate results. What, indeed, could be more fitting than that consciousness, which is self-revealing and transcendently primary, should be its own excuse for being and should contain its own total value, together with the total value of everything else? What could be more proper than that the whole worth of ideas should be ideal? To make an idea instrumental would be to prostitute what, being self-existent, should be self-justifying. That continual absolute-ness which consciousness possesses, since in it alone all heaven and earth are at any moment revealed, ought to convince any radical and heart-searching philosopher that all values should be continually integrated and realised there, where all energies are being momentarily focussed. Thought is a fulfilment; its function is to lend utility to its causes and to make actual those conceived and subterranean processes which find in it their ultimate expression. Thought is nature represented; it is potential energy producing life and becoming an actual appearance.

Thought the
entelechy
of being.

The conditions of consciousness, however, are far from being its only theme. As consciousness bears a transcendent relation to the dynamic world (for it is actual and spiritual, while the dynamic is potential and material) so it may be exuberant and irresponsibly rich. Although its elements, in point of distribution and derivation, are grounded in matter, as music is in vibrations, yet in point of character the result may be infinitely redundant. The complete musician would devote but a small part of his attention to the basis of music, its mechanism, psychology, or history. Long before he had represented to his mind the causes of his art, he would have proceeded to practise and enjoy it. So sense and imagination, passion and reason, may enrich the soil that breeds them and cover it with a maze of flowers.

Its exuberance.

The theme of consciousness is accordingly far more than the material world which constitutes its basis, though this also is one of its themes; thought is no less at home in various expressions and embroideries with which the material world can be overlaid in imagination. The material world is conceived by digging beneath experience to find its cause; it is the efficacious structure and skeleton of things. This is the subject of scientific retrospect and calculation. The forces disclosed by physical studies are of course not directed to producing a mind that might merely describe them. A force is expressed in many other ways than by being defined; it may be felt, resisted, embodied, transformed, or symbolised. Forces work; they are not, like mathematical concepts, exhausted in description. From that matter which might be describable in mechanical formulæ there issue notwithstanding all manner of forms and harmonies, visible, audible, imaginable, and passionately prized. Every phase of the ideal world emanates from the natural and loudly proclaims its origin by the interest it takes in natural existences, of which it gives a rational interpretation. Sense, art, religion, society, express nature exuberantly and in symbols long before science is added to represent, by a different abstraction, the mechanism which nature contains.

CHAPTER X

THE MEASURE OF VALUES IN REFLECTION

To put value in pleasure and pain, regarding a given quantity of pain as balancing a given quantity of pleasure, is to bring to practical ethics a worthy intention to be clear and, what is more precious, an undoubted honesty not always found in those moralists who maintain the opposite opinion and care more for edification than for truth. For in spite of all logical and psychological scruples, conduct that should not justify itself somehow by the satisfactions secured and the pains avoided would not justify itself at all. The most instinctive and unavoidable desire is forthwith chilled if you discover that its ultimate end is to be a preponderance of suffering; and what arrests this desire is not fear or weakness but conscience in its most categorical and sacred guise. Who would not be ashamed to acknowledge or to propose so inhuman an action?

**Honesty in
hedonism.**

By sad experience rooted impulses may be transformed or even obliterated. And quite intelligibly: for the idea of pain is already the sign and the beginning of a certain stoppage. To imagine failure is to interpret ideally a felt inhibition. To prophesy a check would be impossible but for an incipient movement already meeting an incipient arrest. Intensified, this prophecy becomes its own fulfilment and totally inhibits the opposed tendency. Therefore a mind that foresees pain to be the ultimate result of action cannot continue unreservedly to act, seeing that its foresight is the conscious transcript of a recoil already occurring. Conversely, the mind that surrenders itself wholly to any impulse must think that its execution would be delightful. A perfectly wise and representative will, therefore, would aim only at what, in its attainment, could continue to be aimed at and approved; and this is another way of saying that its aim would secure the maximum of satisfaction eventually possible.

In spite, however, of this involution of pain and pleasure in all deliberate forecast and volition, pain and pleasure are not the ultimate sources of value. A correct psychology and logic cannot allow that an eventual and, in strictness, unrepresentable feeling, can determine any act or volition, but must insist that, on the contrary, all beliefs about future experience, with all premonition of its emotional quality, are based on actual impulse and feeling; so that the source of value is nothing but the inner fountain of life and imagination, and the object of pursuit nothing but the ideal object, counterpart of the present demand. Abstract satisfaction is not pursued, but, if the will and the environment are constant, satisfaction will necessarily be felt in achieving the object desired. A rejection of hedonistic psychology, therefore, by no means involves any opposition to eudæmonism in ethics. Eudæmonism is another name for wisdom: there is no other *moral* morality. Any system that, for some sinister reason, should absolve itself from good-will toward all creatures, and make it somehow a duty to secure their misery, would be clearly disloyal to reason, humanity, and justice. Nor would it be hard, in that case, to point out what superstition, what fantastic obsession, or what private fury, had made those persons blind to prudence and kindness in so plain a matter. Happiness is the only sanction of life; where happiness fails, existence remains a mad and lamentable experiment. The question, however, what happiness shall consist in, its complexion if it should once arise, can only be determined by reference to natural demands and capacities; so that while satisfaction by the attainment of ends can alone justify their pursuit, this pursuit itself must exist first and be spontaneous, thereby fixing the goals of endeavour and distinguishing the states in which satisfaction might be found. Natural disposition, therefore, is the principle of preference and makes morality and happiness possible.

The standard of value, like every standard, must be one. Pleasures and pains are not only infinitely diverse but, even if reduced to their total bulk and abstract opposition, they remain two. Their values must be compared, and obviously neither one can be the standard by which to judge the other. This standard is an ideal involved in the judgment passed, whatever that judgment may be. Thus when Petrarch says that a thousand pleasures are not worth one pain, he establishes an ideal of value deeper than either pleasure or pain, an ideal which makes a life of satisfaction

Necessary
qualifications.

The will
must judge.

marred by a single pang an offence and a horror to his soul. If our demand for rationality is less acute and the miscellaneous affirmations of the will carry us along with a well-fed indifference to some single tragedy within us, we may aver that a single pang is only the thousandth part of a thousand pleasures and that a life so balanced is nine hundred and ninety-nine times better than nothing. This judgment, for all its air of mathematical calculation, in truth expresses a choice as irrational as Petrarch's. It merely means that, as a matter of fact, the mixed prospect presented to us attracts our wills and attracts them vehemently. So that the only possible criterion for the relative values of pains and pleasures is the will that chooses among them or among combinations of them; nor can the intensity of pleasures and pains, apart from the physical violence of their expression, be judged by any other standard than by the power they have, when represented, to control the will's movement.

Here we come upon one of those initial irrationalities in the world which theories of all sorts, since they are attempts to find rationality in things, are in serious danger of overlooking. In estimating the value of any experience, our endeavour, our pretension, is to weigh the value which that experience possesses when it is actual. But to weigh is to compare, and to compare is to represent, since the transcendental isolation and self-sufficiency of actual experience precludes its lying side by side with another datum, like two objects given in a single consciousness. Successive values, to be compared, must be represented; but the conditions of representation are such that they rob objects of the values they had at their first appearance to substitute the values they possess at their recurrence. For representation mirrors consciousness only by mirroring its objects, and the emotional reaction upon those objects cannot be represented directly, but is approached by indirect methods, through an imitation or assimilation of will to will and emotion to emotion. Only by the instrumentality of signs, like gesture or language, can we bring ourselves to reproduce in some measure an absent experience and to feel some premonition of its absolute value. Apart from very elaborate and cumulative suggestions to the contrary, we should always attribute to an event in every other experience the value which its image now had in our own. But in that case the pathetic fallacy would be present; for a volitional reaction upon an idea in one vital context is no index to what the volitional

**Injustice
inherent in
representation.**

reaction would be in another vital context upon the situation which that idea represents.

This divergence falsifies all representation of life and renders it initially cruel, sentimental, and mythical. We dislike to trample on a

Æsthetic and speculative cruelty. flower, because its form makes a kind of blossoming in our own fancy which we call beauty; but we laugh at pangs we endured in childhood and feel no tremor at the

incalculable sufferings of all mankind beyond our horizon, because no imitable image is involved to start a contrite thrill in our own bosom. The same cruelty appears in æsthetic pleasures, in lust, war, and ambition; in the illusions of desire and memory; in the unsympathetic quality of theory everywhere, which regards the uniformities of cause and effect and the beauties of law as a justification for the inherent evils in the experience described; in the unjust judgments, finally, of mystical optimism, that sinks so completely into its subjective commotion as to mistake the suspension of all discriminating and representative faculties for a true union in things, and the blur of its own ecstasy for a universal glory. These pleasures are all on the sensuous plane, the plane of levity and unintentional wickedness; but in their own sphere they have their own value. *Æsthetic and speculative emotions* make an important contribution to the total worth of existence, but they do not abolish the evils of that experience on which they reflect with such ruthless satisfaction. The satisfaction is due to a private flood of emotion submerging the images present in fancy, or to the exercise of a new intellectual function, like that of abstraction, synthesis, or comparison. Such a faculty, when fully developed, is capable of yielding pleasures as intense and voluminous as those proper to rudimentary animal functions, wrongly supposed to be more vital. The acme of vitality lies in truth in the most comprehensive and penetrating thought. The rhythms, the sweep, the impetuosity of impassioned contemplation not only contain in themselves a great vitality and potency, but they often succeed in engaging the lower functions in a sympathetic vibration, and we see the whole body and soul rapt, as we say, and borne along by the harmonies of imagination and thought. In these fugitive moments of intoxication the detail of truth is submerged and forgotten. The emotions which would be suggested by the parts are replaced by the rapid emotion of transition between them; and this exhilaration in survey, this mountain-top experience, is supposed to be also the truest vision of reality.

Absorption in a supervening function is mistaken for comprehension of all fact, and this inevitably, since all consciousness of particular facts and of their values is then submerged in the torrent of cerebral excitement.

That luminous blindness which in these cases takes an extreme form is present in principle throughout all reflection. We tend to regard our own past as good only when we still find some value in the memory of it. Last year, last week, even the feelings of the last five minutes, are not otherwise prized than by the pleasure we may still have in recalling them; the pulsations of pleasure or pain which they contained we do not even seek to remember or to discriminate. The period is called happy or unhappy merely as its ideal representation exercises fascination or repulsion over the present will. Hence the revulsion after physical indulgence, often most violent when the pleasure—judged by its concomitant expression and by the desire that heralded it—was most intense. For the strongest passions are intermittent, so that the unspeakable charm which their objects possess for a moment is lost immediately and becomes unintelligible to a chilled and cheated reflection. The situation, when yet unrealised, irresistibly solicited the will and seemed to promise incomparable ecstasy; and perhaps it yields an indescribable moment of excitement and triumph—a moment only half-appropriated into waking experience, so fleeting is it, and so unfit the mind to possess or retain its tenser attitudes. The same situation, if revived in memory when the system is in an opposite and relaxed state, forfeits all power to attract and fills the mind rather with aversion and disgust. For all violent pleasures, as Shakespeare says, are cruel and not to be trusted.

**Imputed
values: their
inconstancy.**

A bliss in proof and, proved, a very woe:
Before, a joy proposed; behind, a dream ...
Enjoyed no sooner but despised straight;
Past reason hunted and, no sooner had,
Past reason hated.

Past reason, indeed. For although an impulsive injustice is inherent in the very nature of representation and cannot be overcome altogether, yet reason, by attending to all the evidences that can be gathered and by confronting the first pronouncement by others fetched from every quarter of experience,

**Methods of
control.**

has power to minimise the error and reach a practically just estimate of absent values. This achieved rightness can be tested by comparing two experiences, each when it is present, with the same conventional permanent object chosen to be their expression. A love-song, for instance, can be pronounced adequate or false by various lovers; and it can thus remain a sort of index to the fleeting sentiments once confronted with it. Reason has, to be sure, no independent method of discovering values. They must be rated as the sensitive balance of present inclination, when completely laden, shows them to stand. In estimating values reason is reduced to data furnished by the mechanical processes of ideation and instinct, as in framing all knowledge; an absent joy can only be represented by a tinge of emotion dyeing an image that pictures the situation in which the joy was felt; but the suggested value being once projected into the potential world, that land of inferred being, this projection may be controlled and corroborated by other suggestions and associations relevant to it, which it is the function of reason to collect and compare. A right estimate of absent values must be conventional and mediated by signs. Direct sympathies, which suffice for instinctive present co-operation, fail to transmit alien or opposite pleasures. They over-emphasise momentary relations, while they necessarily ignore permanent bonds. Therefore the same intellect that puts a mechanical reality behind perception must put a moral reality behind sympathy.

Fame, for example, is a good; its value arises from a certain movement of will and emotion which is elicited by the thought that one's name might be associated with great deeds and with the memory of them. The glow of this thought bathes the object it describes, so that fame is felt to have a value quite distinct from that which the expectation of fame may have in the present moment. Should this expectation be foolish and destined to prove false, it would have no value, and be indeed the more ludicrous and repulsive the more pleasure its dupe took in it, and the longer his illusion lasted. The heart is resolutely set on its object and despises its own phenomena, not reflecting that its emotions have first revealed that object's worth and alone can maintain it. For if a man cares nothing for fame, what value has it?

This projection of interest into excellence takes place mechanically and is in the first instance irrational. Did all glow die out from memory and expectation, the events represented remaining unchanged,

we should be incapable of assigning any value to those events, just as, if eyes were lacking, we should be incapable of assigning colour to the world, which would, notwithstanding, remain as it is at present. So fame could never be regarded as a good if the idea of fame gave no pleasure; yet now, because the idea pleases, the reality is regarded as a good, absolute and intrinsic. This moral hypostasis involved in the love of fame could never be rationalised, but would subsist unmitigated or die out unobserved, were it not associated with other conceptions and other habits of estimating values. For the passions are humanised only by being juxtaposed and forced to live together. As fame is not man's only goal and the realisation of it comes into manifold relations with other interests no less vivid, we are able to criticise the impulse to pursue it.

Fame may be the consequence of benefits conferred upon mankind. In that case the abstract desire for fame would be reinforced and, as it were, justified by its congruity with the more voluminous and stable desire to benefit our fellow-men. Or, again, the achievements which insure fame and the genius that wins it probably involve a high degree of vitality and many profound inward satisfactions to the man of genius himself; so that again the abstract love of fame would be reinforced by the independent and more rational desire for a noble and comprehensive experience. On the other hand, the minds of posterity, whose homage is craved by the ambitious man, will probably have very false conceptions of his thoughts and purposes. What they will call by his name will be, in a great measure, a fiction of their own fancy and not his portrait at all. Would Cæsar recognise himself in the current notions of him, drawn from some school-history, or perhaps from Shakespeare's satirical portrait? Would Christ recognise himself upon our altars, or in the romances about him constructed by imaginative critics? And not only is remote experience thus hopelessly lost and misrepresented, but even this nominal memorial ultimately disappears.

The love of fame, if tempered by these and similar considerations, would tend to take a place in man's ideal such as its roots in human nature and its functions in human progress might seem to justify. It would be rationalised in the only sense in which any primary desire can be rationalised, namely, by being combined with all others in a consistent whole. How much of it would survive a thorough sifting and criticism, may well remain in doubt. The result would naturally differ

for different temperaments and in different states of society. The wisest men, perhaps, while they would continue to feel some love of honour and some interest in their image in other minds, would yet wish that posterity might praise them as Sallust praises Cato by saying: *Esse quam videri bonus maluit*; he preferred worth to reputation.

The fact that value is attributed to absent experience according to the value experience has in representation appears again in one of the most curious anomalies in human life—the exorbitant interest which thought and reflection take in the form of experience and the slight account they make of its intensity or volume. Sea-sickness and child-birth when they are over, the pangs of despised love when that love is finally forgotten or requited, the travail of sin when once salvation is assured, all melt away and dissolve like a morning mist leaving a clear sky without a vestige of sorrow. So also with merely remembered and not reproducible pleasures; the buoyancy of youth, when absurdity is not yet tedious, the rapture of sport or passion, the immense peace found in a mystical surrender to the universal, all these generous ardours count for nothing when they are once gone. The memory of them cannot cure a fit of the blues nor raise an irritable mortal above some petty act of malice or vengeance, or reconcile him to foul weather. An ode of Horace, on the other hand, a scientific monograph, or a well-written page of music is a better antidote to melancholy than thinking on all the happiness which one's own life or that of the universe may ever have contained. Why should overwhelming masses of suffering and joy affect imagination so little while it responds sympathetically to æsthetic and intellectual irritants of very slight intensity, objects that, it must be confessed, are of almost no importance to the welfare of mankind? Why should we be so easily awed by artistic genius and exalt men whose works we know only by name, perhaps, and whose influence upon society has been infinitesimal, like a Pindar or a Leonardo, while we regard great merchants and inventors as ignoble creatures in comparison? Why should we smile at the inscription in Westminster Abbey which calls the inventor of the spinning-jenny one of the *true* benefactors of mankind? Is it not probable, on the whole, that he has had a greater and less equivocal influence on human happiness than Shakespeare with all his plays and sonnets? But the cheapness of cotton cloth produces no particularly delightful image in the fancy to be compared with Hamlet or Imogen. There is a prodigious

Disproportionate
interest in the
æsthetic.

selfishness in dreams: they live perfectly deaf and invulnerable amid the cries of the real world.

The same æsthetic bias appears in the moral sphere. Utilitarians have attempted to show that the human conscience commends precisely those actions which tend to secure general happiness and that the notions of justice and virtue prevailing in any age vary with its social economy and the prizes it is able to attain. And, if due allowance is made for the complexity of the subject, we may reasonably admit that the precepts of obligatory morality bear this relation to the general welfare; thus virtue means courage in a soldier, probity in a merchant, and chastity in a woman. But if we turn from the morality required of all to the type regarded as perfect and ideal, we find no such correspondence to the benefits involved. The selfish imagination intervenes here and attributes an absolute and irrational value to those figures that entertain it with the most absorbing and dreamful emotions. The character of Christ, for instance, which even the least orthodox among us are in the habit of holding up as a perfect model, is not the character of a benefactor but of a martyr, a spirit from a higher world lacerated in its passage through this uncomprehending and perverse existence, healing and forgiving out of sheer compassion, sustained by his inner affinities to the supernatural, and absolutely disenchanted with all earthly or political goods. Christ did not suffer, like Prometheus, for having bestowed or wished to bestow any earthly blessing: the only blessing he bequeathed was the image of himself upon the cross, whereby men might be comforted in their own sorrows, rebuked in their worldliness, driven to put their trust in the supernatural, and united, by their common indifference to the world, in one mystic brotherhood. As men learned these lessons, or were inwardly ready to learn them, they recognised more and more clearly in Jesus their heaven-sent redeemer, and in following their own conscience and desperate idealism into the desert or the cloister, in ignoring all civic virtues and allowing the wealth, art, and knowledge of the pagan world to decay, they began what they felt to be an imitation of Christ.

**Irrational
religious
allegiance.**

All natural impulses, all natural ideals, subsisted of course beneath this theoretic asceticism, writhed under its unearthly control, and broke out in frequent violent irruptions against it in the life of each man as well as in the course of history. Yet the image of Christ remained in men's hearts and retained its marvellous authority, so that

even now, when so many who call themselves Christians, being pure children of nature, are without the least understanding of what Christianity came to do in the world, they still offer his person and words a sincere if inarticulate worship, trying to transform that sacrificial and crucified spirit, as much as their bungling fancy can, into a patron of Philistia Felix. Why this persistent adoration of a character that is the extreme negation of all that these good souls inwardly value and outwardly pursue? Because the image of Christ and the associations of his religion, apart from their original import, remain rooted in the mind: they remain the focus for such wayward emotions and mystic intuitions as their magnetism can still attract, and the value which this hallowed compound possesses in representation is transferred to its nominal object, and Christ is the conventional name for all the impulses of religion, no matter how opposite to the Christian.

Symbols, when their significance has been great, outlive their first significance. The image of Christ was a last refuge to the world; it was a consolation and a new ground for hope, from which no misfortune could drive the worshipper. Its value as an idea was therefore immense, as to the lover the idea of his untasted joys, or to the dying man the idea of health and invigorating sunshine. The votary can no more ask himself whether his deity, in its total operation, has really blessed him and deserved his praise than the lover can ask if his lady is worth pursuing or the expiring cripple whether it would be, in very truth, a benefit to be once more young and whole. That life is worth living is the most necessary of assumptions and, were it not assumed, the most impossible of conclusions. Experience, by its passive weight of joy and sorrow, can neither inspire nor prevent enthusiasm; only a present ideal will avail to move the will and, if realised, to justify it. A saint's halo is an optical illusion; it glorifies his actions whatever their eventual influence in the world, because they seem to have, when rehearsed dramatically, some tenderness or rapture or miracle about them.

Thus it appears that the great figures of art or religion, together with all historic and imaginative ideals, advance insensibly on the values they represent. The image has more lustre than the original, and is often the more important and influential fact. Things are esteemed as they weigh in representation. A *memorable thing*, people say in their eulogies, little thinking to touch the ground of their praise. For things are called great because they are memorable, they are not

Pathetic
idealisations.

remembered because they were great. The deepest pangs, the highest joys, the widest influences are lost to apperception in its haste, and if in some rational moment reconstructed and acknowledged, are soon forgotten again and cut off from living consideration. But the emptiest experience, even the most pernicious tendency, if embodied in a picturesque image, if reverberating in the mind with a pleasant echo, is idolised and enshrined. Fortunate indeed was Achilles that Homer sang of him, and fortunate the poets that make a public titillation out of their sorrows and ignorance. This imputed and posthumous fortune is the only happiness they have. The favours of memory are extended to those feeble realities and denied to the massive substance of daily experience. When life dies, when what was present becomes a memory, its ghost flits still among the living, feared or worshipped not for the experience it once possessed but for the aspect it now wears. Yet this injustice in representation, speculatively so offensive, is practically excusable; for it is in one sense right and useful that all things, whatever their original or inherent dignity, should be valued at each moment only by their present function and utility.

The error involved in attributing value to the past is naturally aggravated when values are to be assigned to the future. In the latter case imagination cannot be controlled by circumstantial evidence, and is consequently the only basis for judgment. But as the conception of a thing naturally evokes an emotion different from that involved in its presence, ideals of what is desirable for the future contain no warrant that the experience desired would, when actual, prove to be acceptable and good. An ideal carries no extrinsic assurance that its realisation would be a benefit. To convince ourselves that an ideal has rational authority and represents a better experience than the actual condition it is contrasted with, we must control the prophetic image by as many circumlocutions as possible. As in the case of fame, we must buttress or modify our spontaneous judgment with all the other judgments that the object envisaged can prompt: we must make our ideal harmonise with all experience rather than with a part only. The possible error remains even then; but a practical mind will always accept the risk of error when it has made every possible correction. A rational will is not a will that has reason for its basis or that possesses any other proof that its realisation would be possible or good than the oracle which a living will inspires and

**Inevitable
impulsiveness
in prophecy.**

**The test a
controlled
present ideal.**

pronounces. The rationality possible to the will lies not in its source but in its method. An ideal cannot wait for its realisation to prove its validity. To deserve loyalty it needs only to be adequate as an ideal, that is, to express completely what the soul at present demands, and to do justice to all extant interests.

CHAPTER XI

SOME ABSTRACT CONDITIONS OF THE IDEAL

Reason's function is to embody the good, but the test of excellence is itself ideal; therefore before we can assure ourselves that reason has been manifested in any given case we must make out the reasonableness of the ideal that inspires us. And in general, before we can convince ourselves that a Life of Reason, or practice guided by science and directed toward spiritual goods, is at all worth having, we must make out the possibility and character of its ultimate end. Yet each ideal is its own justification; so that the only sense in which an ultimate end can be established and become a test of general progress is this: that a harmony and co-operation of impulses should be conceived, leading to the maximum satisfaction possible in the whole community of spirits affected by our action. Now, without considering for the present any concrete Utopia, such, for instance, as Plato's Republic or the heavenly beatitude described by theologians, we may inquire what formal qualities are imposed on the ideal by its nature and function and by the relation it bears to experience and to desire.

The ultimate
end a
resultant.

The ideal has the same relation to given demands that the reality has to given perceptions. In the face of the ideal, particular demands forfeit their authority and the goods to which a particular being may aspire cease to be absolute; nay, the satisfaction of desire comes to appear an indifferent or unholy thing when compared or opposed to the ideal to be realised. So, precisely, in perception, flying impressions come to be regarded as illusory when contrasted with a stable conception of reality. Yet of course flying impressions are the only material out of which that conception can be formed. Life itself is a flying impression, and had we no personal and instant experience, importuning us at each

Demands the
substance of
ideals.

successive moment, we should have no occasion to ask for a reality at all, and no materials out of which to construct so gratuitous an idea. In the same way present demands are the only materials and occasions for any ideal: without demands the ideal would have no *locus standi* or foothold in the world, no power, no charm, and no prerogative. If the ideal can confront particular desires and put them to shame, that happens only because the ideal is the object of a more profound and voluminous desire and embodies the good which they blindly and perhaps deviously pursue. Demands could not be misdirected, goods sought could not be false, if the standard by which they are to be corrected were not constructed out of them. Otherwise each demand would render its object a detached, absolute, and unimpeachable good. But when each desire in turn has singed its wings and retired before some disillusion, reflection may set in to suggest residual satisfactions that may still be possible, or some shifting of the ground by which much of what was hoped for may yet be attained.

The force for this new trial is but the old impulse renewed; this new hope is a justified remnant of the old optimism. Each passion, in this second campaign, takes the field conscious that it has indomitable enemies and ready to sign a reasonable peace, and even to capitulate before superior forces. Such tameness may be at first merely a consequence of exhaustion and prudence; but a mortal will, though absolute in its deliverances, is very far from constant, and its sacrifices soon constitute a habit, its exile a new home. The old ambition, now proved to be unrealisable, begins to seem capricious and extravagant; the circle of possible satisfactions becomes the field of conventional happiness.

Discipline of the will. Experience, which brings about this humbler and more prosaic state of mind, has its own imaginative fruits.

Among those forces which compelled each particular impulse to abate its pretensions, the most conspicuous were other impulses, other interests active in oneself and in one's neighbours. When the power of these alien demands is recognised they begin, in a physical way, to be respected; when an adjustment to them is sought they begin to be understood, for it is only by studying their expression and tendency that the degree of their hostility can be measured. But to understand is more than to forgive, it is to adopt; and the passion that thought merely to withdraw into a sullen and maimed self-indulgence can feel itself expanded by sympathies which in its primal vehemence it would have excluded altogether. Experience, in bringing humility,

brings intelligence also. Personal interests begin to seem relative, factors only in a general voluminous welfare expressed in many common institutions and arts, moulds for whatever is communicable or rational in every passion. Each original impulse, when trimmed down more or less according to its degree of savageness, can then inhabit the state, and every good, when sufficiently transfigured, can be found again in the general ideal. The factors may indeed often be unrecognisable in the result, so much does the process of domestication transform them; but the interests that animated them survive this discipline and the new purpose is really esteemed; else the ideal would have no moral force. An ideal representing no living interest would be irrelevant to practice, just as a conception of reality would be irrelevant to perception which should not be composed of the materials that sense supplies, or should not re-embody actual sensations in an intelligible system.

Demands made practical and consistent.

Here we have, then, one condition which the ideal must fulfil: it must be a resultant or synthesis of impulses already afoot. An ideal out of relation to the actual demands of living beings is so far from being an ideal that it is not even a good. The pursuit of it would be not the acme but the atrophy of moral endeavour. Mysticism and asceticism run into this danger, when the intent to be faithful to a supreme good too symbolically presented breeds a superstitious repugnance toward everything naturally prized. So also an artificial scepticism can regard all experience as deceptive, by contrasting it with the chimera of an absolute reality. As an absolute reality would be indescribable and without a function in the elucidation of phenomena, so a supreme good which was good for nobody would be without conceivable value. Respect for such an idol is a dialectical superstition; and if zeal for that shibboleth should actually begin to inhibit the exercise of intelligent choice or the development of appreciation for natural pleasures, it would constitute a reversal of the Life of Reason which, if persistently indulged in, could only issue in madness or revert to imbecility.

The ideal natural.

No less important, however, than this basis which the ideal must have in extant demands, is the harmony with which reason must endow it. If without the one the ideal loses its value, without the other it loses its finality. Human nature is fluid and imperfect; its demands are expressed in incidental desires, elicited by a variety of objects which perhaps cannot

Need of unity and finality.

coexist in the world. If we merely transcribe these miscellaneous demands or allow these floating desires to dictate to us the elements of the ideal, we shall never come to a Whole or to an End. One new fancy after another will seem an embodiment of perfection, and we shall contradict each expression of our ideal by every other. A certain school of philosophy—if we may give that name to the systematic neglect of reason—has so immersed itself in the contemplation of this sort of inconstancy, which is indeed prevalent enough in the world, that it has mistaken it for a normal and necessary process. The greatness of the ideal has been put in its vagueness and in an elasticity which makes it wholly indeterminate and inconsistent. The goal of progress, beside being thus made to lie at every point of the compass in succession, is removed to an infinite distance, whereby the possibility of attaining it is denied and progress itself is made illusory. For a progress must be directed to attaining some definite type of life, the counterpart of a given natural endowment, and nothing can be called an improvement which does not contain an appreciable benefit. A victory would be a mockery that left us, for some new reason, as much impeded as before and as far removed from peace.

The picture of life as an eternal war for illusory ends was drawn at first by satirists, unhappily with too much justification in the facts. Some grosser minds, too undisciplined to have ever pursued a good either truly attainable or truly satisfactory, then proceeded to mistake that satire on human folly for a sober account of the whole universe; and finally others were not ashamed to represent it as the ideal itself—so soon is the dyer's hand subdued to what it works in. A barbarous mind cannot conceive life, like health, as a harmony continually preserved or restored, and containing those natural and ideal activities which disease merely interrupts. Such a mind, never having tasted order, cannot conceive it, and identifies progress with new conflicts and life with continual death. Its deification of unreason, instability, and strife comes partly from piety and partly from inexperience. There is piety in saluting nature in her perpetual flux and in thinking that since no equilibrium is maintained for ever none, perhaps, deserves to be. There is inexperience in not considering that wherever interests and judgments exist, the natural flux has fallen, so to speak, into a vortex, and created a natural good, a cumulative life, and an ideal purpose. Art, science, government, human nature itself, are self-defining and self-preserving: by partly fixing a structure they fix an ideal. But the barbarian can

hardly regard such things, for to have distinguished and fostered them would be to have founded a civilisation.

Reason's function in defining the ideal is in principle extremely simple, although all time and all existence would have to be gathered in before the applications of that principle could be exhausted. A better example of its essential working could hardly be found than one which Darwin gives to illustrate the natural origin of moral sense. A swallow, impelled by migratory instincts to leave a nest full of unfledged young, would endure a moral conflict. The more lasting impulse, memory being assumed, would prompt a moral judgment when it emerged again after being momentarily obscured by an intermittent passion. "While the mother bird is feeding or brooding over her nestlings, the maternal instinct is probably stronger than the migratory; but the instinct which is more persistent gains the victory, and at last, at a moment when her young ones are not in sight, she takes flight and deserts them. When arrived at the end of her long journey, and the migratory instinct ceases to act, what an agony of remorse each bird would feel if, from being endowed with great mental activity, she could not prevent the image continually passing before her mind of her young ones perishing in the bleak north from cold and hunger."* She would doubtless upbraid herself, like any sinner, for a senseless perfidy to her own dearest good. The perfidy, however, was not wholly senseless, because the forgotten instinct was not less natural and necessary than the remembered one, and its satisfaction no less true. Temptation has the same basis as duty. The difference is one of volume and permanence in the rival satisfactions, and the attitude conscience will assume toward these depends more on the representability of the demands compared than on their original vehemence or ultimate results.

Darwin on
moral sense.

A passionate conscience may thus arise in the play of impulses differing in permanence, without involving a judicial exercise of reason. Nor does such a conscience involve a synthetic ideal, but only the ideal presence of particular demands. Conflicts in the conscience are thus quite natural and would continually occur but for the narrowness that commonly characterises a mind inspired by passion. A life of sin and repentance is as remote as possible from a Life of Reason. Yet the same situation

Conscience
and reason
compared.

* *Descent of Man*, chapter iii.

which produces conscience and the sense of duty is an occasion for applying reason to action and for forming an ideal, so soon as the demands and satisfactions concerned are synthesised and balanced imaginatively. The stork might do more than feel the conflict of his two impulses, he might do more than embody in alternation the eloquence of two hostile thoughts. He might pass judgment upon them impartially and, in the felt presence of both, conceive what might be a union or compromise between them.

This resultant object of pursuit, conceived in reflection and in itself the initial goal of neither impulse, is the ideal of a mind occupied by the two: it is the aim prescribed by reason under the circumstances. It differs from the prescription of conscience, in that conscience is often the spokesman of one interest or of a group of interests in opposition to other primary impulses which it would annul altogether; while reason and the ideal are not active forces nor embodiments of passion at all, but merely a method by which objects of desire are compared in reflection. The goodness of an end is felt inwardly by conscience; by reason it can be only taken upon trust and registered as a fact. For conscience the object of an opposed will is an evil, for reason it is a good on the same ground as any other good, because it is pursued by a natural impulse and can bring a real satisfaction. Conscience, in fine, is a party to moral strife, reason an observer of it who, however, plays the most important and beneficent part in the outcome by suggesting the terms of peace. This suggested peace, inspired by sympathy and by knowledge of the world, is the ideal, which borrows its value and practical force from the irrational impulses which it embodies, and borrows its final authority from the truth with which it recognises them all and the necessity by which it imposes on each such sacrifices as are requisite to a general harmony.

Could each impulse, apart from reason, gain perfect satisfaction, it would doubtless laugh at justice. The divine, to exercise suasion, must use an *argumentum ad hominem*; reason must justify itself to the heart. But perfect satisfaction is what an irresponsible impulse can never hope for: all other impulses, though absent perhaps from the mind, are none the less present in nature and have possession of the field through their physical basis. They offer effectual resistance to a reckless intruder. To disregard them is therefore to gain nothing: reason, far from creating the partial renunciation and proportionate sacrifices which it imposes, really minimises

Reason
imposes
no new
sacrifice.

them by making them voluntary and fruitful. The ideal, which may seem to wear so severe a frown, really fosters all possible pleasures; what it retrenches is nothing to what blind forces and natural catastrophes would otherwise cut off; while it sweetens what it sanctions, adding to spontaneous enjoyments a sense of moral security and an intellectual light.

Those who are guided only by an irrational conscience can hardly understand what a good life would be. Their Utopias have to be supernatural in order that the irresponsible rules which they call morality may lead by miracle to happy results. But such a magical and undeserved happiness, if it were possible, would be unsavoury: only one phase of human nature would be satisfied by it, and so impoverished an ideal cannot really attract the will. For human nature has been moulded by the same natural forces among which its ideal has to be fulfilled, and, apart from a certain margin of wild hopes and extravagances, the things man's heart desires are attainable under his natural conditions and would not be attainable elsewhere. The conflict of desires and interests in the world is not radical any more than man's dissatisfaction with his own nature can be; for every particular ideal, being an expression of human nature in operation, must in the end involve the primary human faculties and cannot be essentially incompatible with any other ideal which involves them too.

Natural goods attainable and compatible in principle.

To adjust all demands to one ideal and adjust that ideal to its natural conditions—in other words, to live the Life of Reason—is something perfectly possible; for those demands, being akin to one another in spite of themselves, can be better furthered by co-operation than by blind conflict, while the ideal, far from demanding any profound revolution in nature, merely expresses her actual tendency and forecasts what her perfect functioning would be.

Reason as such represents or rather constitutes a single formal interest, the interest in harmony. When two interests are simultaneous and fall within one act of apprehension the desirability of harmonising them is involved in the very effort to realise them together. If attention and imagination are steady enough to face this implication and not to allow impulse to oscillate between irreconcilable tendencies, reason comes into being. Henceforth things actual and things desired are confronted by an ideal which has both pertinence and authority.

Harmony the formal and intrinsic demand of reason.

CHAPTER XII

FLUX AND CONSTANCY IN HUMAN NATURE

A conception of something called human nature arises not unnaturally on observing the passions of men, passions which under various disguises seem to reappear in all ages and countries. The tendency of Greek philosophy, with its insistence on general concepts, was to define this idea of human nature still further and to encourage the belief that a single and identical essence, present in all men, determined their powers and ideal destiny. Christianity, while it transposed the human ideal and dwelt on the superhuman affinities of man, did not abandon the notion of a specific humanity. On the contrary, such a notion was implied in the Fall and Redemption, in the Sacraments, and in the universal validity of Christian doctrine and precept. For if human nature were not one, there would be no propriety in requiring all men to preserve unanimity in faith or conformity in conduct. Human nature was likewise the entity which the English psychologists set themselves to describe; and Kant was so entirely dominated by the notion of a fixed and universal human nature that its constancy, in his opinion, was the source of all natural as well as moral laws. Had he doubted for a moment the stability of human nature, the foundations of his system would have fallen out; the forms of perception and thought would at once have lost their boasted necessity, since tomorrow might dawn upon new categories and a modified *a priori* intuition of space or time; and the avenue would also have been closed by which man was led, through his unalterable moral sentiments, to assumptions about metaphysical truths.

The force of this long tradition has been broken, however, by two influences of great weight in recent times, the theory of evolution and the revival of panthe-

Respectable
tradition that
human
nature is
fixed.

Contrary
currents
of opinion.

ism. The first has reintroduced flux into the conception of existence and the second into the conception of values. If natural species are fluid and pass into one another, human nature is merely a name for a group of qualities found by chance in certain tribes of animals, a group to which new qualities are constantly tending to attach themselves while other faculties become extinct, now in whole races, now in sporadic individuals. Human nature is therefore a variable, and its ideal cannot have a greater constancy than the demands to which it gives expression. Nor can the ideal of one man or one age have any authority over another, since the harmony existing in their nature and interests is accidental and each is a transitional phase in an indefinite evolution. The crystallisation of moral forces at any moment is consequently to be explained by universal, not by human, laws; the philosopher's interest cannot be to trace the implications of present and unstable desires, but rather to discover the mechanical law by which these desires have been generated and will be transformed, so that they will change irrevocably both their basis and their objects.

To this picture of physical instability furnished by popular science are to be added the mystical self-denials involved in pantheism. These come to reinforce the doctrine that human nature is a shifting thing with the sentiment that it is a finite and unworthy one: for every determination of being, it is said, has its significance as well as its origin in the infinite continuum of which it is a part. Forms are limitations, and limitations, according to this philosophy, would be defects, so that man's only goal would be to escape humanity and lose himself in the divine nebula that has produced and must invalidate each of his thoughts and ideals. As there would be but one spirit in the world, and that infinite, so there would be but one ideal and that indiscriminate. The despair which the naturalist's view of human instability might tend to produce is turned by this mystical initiation into a sort of ecstasy; and the deluge of conformity suddenly submerges that Life of Reason which science seemed to condemn to gradual extinction.

Reason is a human function. Though the name of reason has been applied to various alleged principles of cosmic life, vital or dialectical, these principles all lack the essence of rationality, in that they are not conscious movements toward satisfaction, not, in other words, moral and beneficent principles at all. Be the instability of human nature what it may, there-

Instability in existences does not dethrone their ideals.

fore, the instability of reason is not less, since reason is but a function of human nature. However relative and subordinate, in a physical sense, human ideals may be, these ideals remain the only possible moral standards for man, the only tests which he can apply for value or authority in any other quarter. And among unstable and relative ideals none is more relative and unstable than that which transports all value to a universal law, itself indifferent to good and evil, and worships it as a deity. Such an idolatry would indeed be impossible if it were not partial and veiled, arrived at in following out some human interest and clung to by force of moral inertia and the ambiguity of words. In truth mystics do not practise so entire a renunciation of reason as they preach: eternal validity and the capacity to deal with absolute reality are still assumed by them to belong to thought or at least to feeling. Only they overlook in their description of human nature just that faculty which they exercise in their speculation; their map leaves out the ground on which they stand. The rest, which they are not identified with for the moment, they proceed to regard *de haut en bas* and to discredit as a momentary manifestation of universal laws, physical or divine. They forget that this faith in law, this absorption in the blank reality, this enthusiasm for the ultimate thought, are mere human passions like the rest; that they endure them as they might a fever and that the animal instincts are patent on which those spiritual yearnings repose.

This last fact would be nothing against the feelings in question, if they were not made vehicles for absolute revelations. On the contrary, such a relativity in instincts is the source of their importance. In virtue of this relativity they have some basis and function in the world; for did they not repose on human nature they could never express or transform it. Religion and philosophy are not always beneficent or important, but when they are it is precisely because they help to develop human faculty and to enrich human life. To imagine that by means of them we can escape from human nature and survey it from without is an ostrich-like illusion obvious to all but to the victim of it. Such a pretension may cause admiration in the schools, where self-hypnotisation is easy, but in the world it makes its professors ridiculous. For in their eagerness to empty their mind of human prejudices they reduce its rational burden to a minimum, and if they still continue to dogmatise, it is sport for the satirist to observe what forgotten accident of language or training has

**Absolutist
philosophy
human and
halting.**

survived the crash of the universe and made the one demonstrable path to Absolute Truth.

Neither the path of abstraction followed by the mystics, nor that of direct and, as it avers, unbiassed observation followed by the naturalists, can lead beyond that region of common experience, traditional feeling, and conventional thought which all minds enter at birth and can elude only at the risk of inward collapse and extinction. The fact that observation involves the senses, and the senses their organs, is one which a naturalist can hardly overlook; and when we add that logical habits, sanctioned by utility, are needed to interpret the data of sense, the humanity of science and all its constructions becomes clearer than day. Superstition itself could not be more human. The path of unbiassed observation is not a path away from conventional life; it is a progress in conventions. It improves human belief by increasing the proportion of two of its ingredients, attentive perception and practical calculus. The whole resulting vision, as it is sustained from moment to moment by present experience and instinct, has no value apart from actual ideals. And if it proves human nature to be unstable, it can build that proof on nothing more stable than human faculty as at the moment it happens to be.

Nor is abstraction a less human process, as if by becoming very abstruse indeed we could hope to become divine. Is it not a commonplace of the schools that to form abstract ideas is the prerogative of man's reason? Is not abstraction a method by which mortal intelligence makes haste? Is it not the makeshift of a mind overloaded with its experience, the trick of an eye that cannot master a profuse and ever-changing world? Shall these diagrams drawn in fancy, this system of signals in thought, be the Absolute Truth dwelling within us? Do we attain reality by making a silhouette of our dreams? If the scientific world be a product of human faculties, the metaphysical world must be doubly so; for the material there given to human understanding is here worked over again by human art. This constitutes the dignity and value of dialectic, that in spite of appearances it is so human; it bears to experience a relation similar to that which the arts bear to the same, where sensible images, selected by the artist's genius and already coloured by his æsthetic bias, are redyed in the process of reproduction whenever he has a great style, and saturated anew with his mind.

All science a deliverance of momentary thought.

All criticism likewise.

There can be no question, then, of eluding human nature or of conceiving it and its environment in such a way as to stop its operation. We may take up our position in one region of experience or in another, we may, in unconsciousness of the interests and assumptions that support us, criticise the truth or value of results obtained elsewhere. Our criticism will be solid in proportion to the solidity of the unnamed convictions that inspire it, that is, in proportion to the deep roots and fruitful ramifications which those convictions may have in human life. Ultimate truth and ultimate value will be reasonably attributed to those ideas and possessions which can give human nature, as it is, the highest satisfaction. We may admit that human nature is variable; but that admission, if justified, will be justified by the satisfaction which it gives human nature to make it. We might even admit that human ideals are vain but only if they were nothing worth for the attainment of the veritable human ideal.

The given constitution of reason, with whatever a dialectical philosophy might elicit from it, obviously determines nothing about the causes that may have brought reason to its present pass or the phases that may have preceded its appearance. **Origins inessential.** Certain notions about physics might no doubt suggest themselves to the moralist, who never can be the whole man; he might suspect, for instance, that the transitive intent of intellect and will pointed to their vital basis. Transcendence in operation might seem appropriate only to a being with a history and with an organism subject to external influences, whose mind should thus come to represent not merely its momentary state but also its constitutive past and its eventual fortunes. Such suggestions, however, would be extraneous to dialectical self-knowledge. They would be tentative only, and human nature would be freely admitted to be as variable, as relative, and as transitory as the natural history of the universe might make it.

The error, however, would be profound and the contradiction hopeless if we should deny the ideal authority of human nature because we had discovered its origin and conditions. **Ideals functional.** Nature and evolution, let us say, have brought life to the present form; but this life lives, these organs have determinate functions, and human nature, here and now, in relation to the ideal energies it unfolds, is a fundamental essence, a collection of activities with determinate limits, relations, and ideals. The integration and determinateness of these faculties is the condition for any syn-

thetic operation of reason. As the structure of the steam-engine has varied greatly since its first invention, and its attributions have increased, so the structure of human nature has undoubtedly varied since man first appeared upon the earth; but as in each steam-engine at each moment there must be a limit of mobility, a unity of function and a clear determination of parts and tensions, so in human nature, as found at any time in any man, there is a definite scope by virtue of which alone he can have a reliable memory, a recognisable character, a faculty of connected thought and speech, a social utility, and a moral ideal. On man's given structure, on his activity hovering about fixed objects, depends the possibility of conceiving or testing any truth or making any progress in happiness.

Thinkers of different experience and organisation have *pro tanto* different logics and different moral laws. There are limits to communication even among beings of the same race, and the faculties and ideals of one intelligence are not transferable without change to any other. If this historic diversity in minds were complete, so that each lived in its own moral world, a science of each of these moral worlds would still be possible provided some inner fixity or constancy existed in its meanings. In every human thought together with an immortal intent there is a mortal and irrecoverable perception: something in it perishes instantly, the part that can be materially preserved being proportionate to the stability or fertility of the organ that produced it. If the function is imitable, the object it terminates in will reappear, and two or more moments, having the same ideal, will utter comparable messages and may perhaps be unanimous. Unanimity in thought involves identity of functions and similarity in organs. These conditions mark off the sphere of rational communication and society; where they fail altogether there is no mutual intelligence, no conversation, no moral solidarity.

The inner authority of reason, however, is no more destroyed because it has limits in physical expression or because irrational things exist, than the grammar of a given language is invalidated because other languages do not share it, or because some people break its rules and others are dumb altogether. Innumerable madmen make no difference to the laws of thought, which borrow their authority from the inward intent and cogency of each rational mind. Reason, like beauty, is its own excuse for being. It

They are transferable to similar beings.

Authority internal.

is useful, indeed, for living well, when to give reason satisfaction is made the measure of good.

The true philosopher, who is not one chiefly by profession, must be prepared to tread the winepress alone. He may indeed flourish like the baytree in a grateful environment, but more often he will rather resemble a reed shaken by the wind. Whether starved or fed by the accidents of fortune he must find his essential life in his own ideal. In spiritual life, heteronomy is suicide. That universal soul sometimes spoken of, which is to harmonise and correct individual demands, if it were a will and an intelligence in act, would itself be an individual like the others; while if it possessed no will and no intelligence, such as individuals may have, it would be a physical force or law, a dynamic system without moral authority and with a merely potential or represented existence. For to be actual and self-existent is to be individual. The living mind cannot surrender its rights to any physical power or subordinate itself to any figment of its own art without falling into manifest idolatry.

Human nature, in the sense in which it is the transcendental foundation of all science and morals, is a functional unity in each man; it is no general or abstract essence, the average of all men's characters, nor even the complex of the qualities common to all men. It is the entelechy of the living individual, **Reason autonomous.** be he typical or singular. That his type should be odd or common is merely a physical accident. If he can know himself by expressing the entelechy of his own nature in the form of a consistent ideal, he is a rational creature after his own kind, even if, like the angels of Saint Thomas, he be the only individual of his species. What the majority of human animals may tend to, or what the past or future variations of a race may be, has nothing to do with determining the ideal of human nature in a living man, or in an ideal society of men bound together by spiritual kinship. Otherwise Plato could not have reasoned well about the republic without adjusting himself to the politics of Buddha or Rousseau, and we should not be able to determine our own morality without making concessions to the cannibals or giving a vote to the ants. Within the field of an anthropology that tests humanity by the skull's shape, there might be room for any number of independent moralities, and although, as we shall see, there is actually a similar foundation in all human and even in all animal natures, which sup-

ports a rudimentary morality common to all, yet a perfect morality is not really common to any two men nor to any two phases of the same man's life.

The distribution of reason, though a subject irrelevant to pure logic or morals, is one naturally interesting to a rational man, for he is concerned to know how far beings exist with a congenial structure and an ideal akin to his own. That circumstance will largely influence his happiness if, being a man, he is a gregarious and sympathetic animal. His moral idealism itself will crave support from others, if not to give it direction, at least to give it warmth and courage. The best part of wealth is to have worthy heirs, and mind can be transmitted only to a kindred mind. Hostile natures cannot be brought together by mutual invective nor harmonised by the brute destruction and disappearance of either party. But when one or both parties have actually disappeared, and the combat has ceased for lack of combatants, natures not hostile to one another can fill the vacant place. In proportion to their inbred unanimity these will cultivate a similar ideal and rejoice together in its embodiment.

This has happened to some extent in the whole world, on account of natural conditions which limit the forms of life possible in one region; for nature is intolerant in her laxity and punishes too great originality and heresy with death. Such moral integration has occurred very markedly in every good race and society whose members, by adapting themselves to the same external forces, have created and discovered their common soul. Spiritual unity is a natural product. There are those who see a great mystery in the presence of eternal values and impersonal ideals in a moving and animal world, and think to solve that dualism, as they call it, by denying that nature can have spiritual functions or spirit a natural cause; but nothing can be simpler if we make, as we should, existence the test of possibility. *Ab esse ad posse valet illatio*. Nature is a perfect garden of ideals, and passion is the perpetual and fertile soil for poetry, myth, and speculation. Nor is this origin merely imputed to ideals by a late and cynical observer: it is manifest in the ideals themselves, by their subject matter and intent. For what are ideals about, what do they idealise, except natural existence and natural passions? That would be a miserable and superfluous ideal indeed that was nobody's ideal of nothing. The pertinence of ideals binds them to nature, and it is only the worst and flimsiest ideals, the ideals of a sick

Its
distribution.

Natural
selection
of minds.

soul, that elude nature's limits and belie her potentialities. Ideals are forerunners or heralds of nature's successes, not always followed, indeed, by their fulfilment, for nature is but nature and has to feel her way; but they are an earnest, at least, of an achieved organisation, an incipient accomplishment, that tends to maintain and root itself in the world.

To speak of nature's successes is, of course, to impute success retroactively; but the expression may be allowed when we consider that the same functional equilibrium which is looked back upon as a good by the soul it serves, first creates individual being and with it creates the possibility of preference and the whole moral world; and it is more than a metaphor to call that achievement a success which has made a sense of success possible and actual. That nature cannot intend or previously esteem those formations which are the condition of value or intention existing at all, is a truth too obvious to demand repetition; but when those formations arise they determine estimation, and fix the direction of preference, so that the evolution which produced them, when looked back upon from the vantage-ground thus gained, cannot help seeming to have been directed toward the good now distinguished and partly attained. For this reason creation is regarded as a work of love, and the power that brought order out of chaos is called intelligence.

These natural formations, tending to generate and realise each its ideal, are, as it were, eddies in the universal flux, produced no less mechanically, doubtless, than the onward current, yet seeming to arrest or to reverse it. Inheritance arrests the flux by repeating a series of phases with a recognisable rhythm; memory reverses it by modifying this rhythm itself by the integration of earlier phases into those that supervene. Inheritance and memory make human stability. This stability is relative, being still a mode of flux, and consists fundamentally in repetition. Repetition marks some progress on mere continuity, since it preserves form and disregards time and matter. Inheritance is repetition on a larger scale, not excluding spontaneous variations; while habit and memory are a sort of heredity within the individual, since here an old perception reappears, by way of atavism, in the midst of a forward march. Life is thus enriched and reaction adapted to a wider field; much as a note is enriched by its overtones, and by the tensions, inherited from the preceding notes, which give it a new setting.

**Living
stability.**

Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute there remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. In the first stage of life

**Continuity
necessary to
progress.**

the mind is frivolous and easily distracted; it misses progress by failing in consecutiveness and persistence. This is the condition of children and barbarians, in whom instinct has learned nothing from experience. In a second stage men are docile to events, plastic to new habits and suggestions, yet able to graft them on original instincts, which they thus bring to fuller satisfaction. This is the plane of manhood and true progress. Last comes a stage when retentiveness is exhausted and all that happens is at once forgotten; a vain, because unpractical, repetition of the past takes the place of plasticity and fertile readaptation. In a moving world readaptation is the price of longevity. The hard shell, far from protecting the vital principle, condemns it to die down slowly and be gradually chilled; immortality in such a case must have been secured earlier, by giving birth to a generation plastic to the contemporary world and able to retain its lessons. Thus old age is as forgetful as youth, and more incorrigible; it displays the same inattentiveness to conditions; its memory becomes self-repeating and degenerates into an instinctive reaction, like a bird's chirp.

Not all readaptation, however, is progress, for ideal identity must not be lost. The Latin language did not progress when it passed into

**Limits of
variation.
Spirit a
heritage.**

Italian. It died. Its amiable heirs may console us for its departure, but do not remove the fact that their parent is extinct. So every individual, nation, and religion has its limit of adaptation; so long as the increment it receives is digestible, so long as the organisation already attained is extended and elaborated without being surrendered, growth goes on; but when the foundation itself shifts, when what is gained at the periphery is lost at the centre, the flux appears again and progress is not real. Thus a succession of generations or languages or religions constitutes no progress unless some ideal present at the beginning is transmitted to the end and reaches a better expression there; without this stability at the core no common standard exists and all comparison of value with value must be external and arbitrary. Retentiveness, we must repeat, is the condition of progress.

The variation human nature is open to is not, then, variation in any direction. There are transformations that would destroy it. So long as it endures it must retain all that constitutes it now, all that it has so far gathered and worked into its substance. The genealogy of progress is like that of man, who can never repudiate a single ancestor. It starts, so to speak, from a single point, free as yet to take any direction. When once, however, evolution has taken a single step, say in the direction of vertebrates, that step cannot be retraced without extinction of the species. Such extinction may take place while progress in other lines is continued. All that preceded the forking of the dead and the living branch will be as well represented and as legitimately continued by the surviving radiates as it could have been by the vertebrates that are no more; but the vertebrate ideal is lost for ever, and no more progress is possible along that line.

The future of moral evolution is accordingly infinite, but its character is more and more determinate at every step. Mankind can never, without perishing, surrender its animal nature, its need to eat and drink, its sexual method of reproduction, its Perfectibility. vision of nature, its faculty of speech, its arts of music, poetry, and building. Particular races cannot subsist if they renounce their savage instincts, but die, like wild animals, in captivity; and particular individuals die when not suffered any longer to retain their memories, their bodies, or even their master passions. Thus human nature survives amid a continual fluctuation of its embodiments. At every step twigs and leaves are thrown out that last but one season; but the underlying stem may have meantime grown stronger and more luxuriant. Whole branches sometimes wither, but others may continue to bloom. Spiritual unity runs, like sap, from the common root to every uttermost flower; but at each forking in the growth the branches part company, and what happens in one is no direct concern of the others. The products of one age and nation may well be unintelligible to another; the elements of humanity common to both may lie lower down. So that the highest things are communicable to the fewest persons, and yet, among these few, are the most perfectly communicable. The more elaborate and determinate a man's heritage and genius are, the more he has in common with his next of kin, and the more he can transmit and implant in his posterity for ever. Civilisation is cumulative. The farther it goes the intenser it is, substituting articulate interests for animal fumes and for enigmatic passions. Such articulate interests can be

shared; and the infinite vistas they open up can be pursued for ever with the knowledge that a work long ago begun is being perfected and that an ideal is being embodied which need never be outworn.

So long as external conditions remain constant it is obvious that the greater organisation a being possesses the greater strength he will

**Nature and
human
nature.**

have. If indeed primary conditions varied, the finer creatures would die first; for their adaptation is more exquisite and the irreversible core of their being much larger relatively; but in a constant environment their equipment makes them irresistible and secures their permanence and multiplication. Now man is a part of nature and her organisation may be regarded as the foundation of his own: the word nature is therefore less equivocal than it seems, for every nature is Nature herself in one of her more specific and better articulated forms. Man therefore represents the universe that sustains him; his existence is a proof that the cosmic equilibrium that fostered his life is a natural equilibrium, capable of being long maintained. Some of the ancients thought it eternal; physics now suggests a different opinion. But even if this equilibrium, by which the stars are kept in their courses and human progress is allowed to proceed, is fundamentally unstable, it shows what relative stability nature may attain. Could this balance be preserved indefinitely, no one knows what wonderful adaptations might occur within it, and to what excellence human nature in particular might arrive. Nor is it unlikely that before the cataclysm comes time will be afforded for more improvement than moral philosophy has ever dreamed of. For it is remarkable how inane and unimaginative Utopias have generally been. This possibility is not uninspiring and may help to console those who think the natural conditions of life are not conditions that a good life can be lived in. The possibility of essential progress is bound up with the tragic possibility that progress and human life should some day end together. If the present equilibrium of forces were eternal all adaptations to it would have already taken place and, while no essential catastrophe would need to be dreaded, no essential improvement could be hoped for in all eternity. I am not sure that a humanity such as we know, were it destined to exist for ever, would offer a more exhilarating prospect than a humanity having indefinite elasticity together with a precarious tenure of life. Mortality has its compensations: one is that all evils are transitory, another that better times may come.

Human nature, then, has for its core the substance of nature at large, and is one of its more complex formations. Its determination is progressive. It varies indefinitely in its historic manifestations and fades into what, as a matter of natural history, might no longer be termed human. At each moment it has its fixed and determinate entelechy, the ideal of that being's life, based on his instincts, summed up in his character, brought to a focus in his reflection, and shared by all who have attained or may inherit his organisation. His perceptive and reasoning faculties are parts of human nature, as embodied in him; all objects of belief or desire, with all standards of justice and duty which he can possibly acknowledge, are transcripts of it, conditioned by it, and justifiable only as expressions of its inherent tendencies.

Human nature formulated.

This definition of human nature, clear as it may be in itself and true to the facts, will perhaps hardly make sufficiently plain how the Life of Reason, having a natural basis, has in the ideal world a creative and absolute authority. A more concrete description of human nature may accordingly not come amiss, especially as the important practical question touching the extension of a given moral authority over times and places depends on the degree of kinship found among the creatures inhabiting those regions. To give a general picture of human nature and its rational functions will be the task of the following books. The truth of a description which must be largely historical may not be indifferent to the reader, and I shall study to avoid bias in the presentation, in so far as is compatible with frankness and brevity; yet even if some bias should manifest itself and if the picture were historically false, the rational principles we shall be trying to illustrate will not thereby be invalidated. Illustrations might have been sought in some fictitious world, if imagination had not seemed so much less interesting than reality, which besides enforces with unapproachable eloquence the main principle in view, namely, that nature carries its ideal with it and that the progressive organisation of irrational impulses makes a rational life.

Its concrete description reserved for the sequel.

Chronology of the Life and Work of George Santayana

Adapted and abridged from William G. Holzberger, "Chronology," *The Letters of George Santayana*, 1:443–60.

- 1849 Josefina Borrás (c. 1826–1912), George Santayana's mother, marries George Sturgis (1817–57) of Boston, aboard British warship in Manila Bay.
- 1857 George Sturgis dies in Manila at age forty.
- 1862 Josefina Borrás Sturgis marries Agustín Santayana (1814–93) in Madrid.
- 1863 George Santayana born on 16 December at No. 69, Calle Ancha de San Bernardo, Madrid.
- 1864 Santayana christened Jorge Agustín Nicolás on 1 January in parish church of San Marcos, Madrid.
- 1868 (or 1869) Santayana's mother, with daughters Susana and Josephine, moves to Boston to honor first husband's wish that children be raised in America; Santayana remains with father in Spain.
- 1872 Santayana and father travel to America in June; father returns to Ávila several months later.
- 1882 Santayana graduates from Boston Latin School; attends Harvard College in autumn.
- 1883 Santayana visits father in Spain for first time since coming to America. Advised by William James at Harvard not to pursue philosophy.
- 1885 Meets John Francis ("Frank") Stanley, 2d Earl Russell and elder brother of Bertrand Russell, who becomes close friend.
- 1886 Santayana's Bachelor of Arts degree is awarded *summa cum laude* and *in absentia*. Begins study in Germany.
- 1889 Santayana completes dissertation on "Lotze's System of Philosophy" under direction of Josiah Royce; awarded Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy degrees by Harvard University; begins as Instructor in Philosophy at Harvard.
- 1893 Santayana's father dies at age 79 during summer in Ávila; Santayana's student and friend Warwick Potter dies in October; at end of this year Santayana undergoes his *metanoia* or fundamental change of heart resulting in renunciation of the world.
- 1896 Santayana's first book-length philosophical work is published by Scribner's: *The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory*. Spends

- year at Cambridge University; appears in court in October to testify on behalf of Frank Russell, defending against charges of estranged wife.
- 1897 Santayana resumes teaching at Harvard; lives with mother.
- 1898 Santayana promoted from instructor to assistant professor.
- 1899 Santayana's *Lucifer: A Theological Tragedy* published.
- 1900 *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* published.
- 1904 Santayana sails from New York to Plymouth, England, in mid-July; visits Paris, Rome, Venice, Naples, Pompeii, Sicily, and Greece.
- 1905 Visits Egypt, Palestine, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Damascus, Baalbeck, Beirut, Athens, Constantinople, Budapest, and Vienna. While still abroad, Santayana invited by Harvard to become Hyde Lecturer at the Sorbonne for 1905–6. First four volumes of *The Life of Reason; or, the Phases of Human Progress* published.
- 1906 Fifth volume of *The Life of Reason* published. Santayana returns to America in September; resumes teaching at Harvard.
- 1907 Santayana promoted from assistant professor to full professor.
- 1911 In April Santayana delivers final lecture at Harvard. Travels to Wisconsin and California.
- 1912 Santayana departs America for last time on 24 January. Mother dies on 5 February.
- 1913 *Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion* published.
- 1914 World War I breaks out; Santayana remains in Oxford until April 1919.
- 1916 *Egotism in German Philosophy* published.
- 1920 Santayana begins spending winters in Rome; continues to summer in Paris, Ávila, Glion, at Lake Geneva, or Cortina d'Ampezzo.
- 1923 *Scepticism and Animal Faith* and last collection of Santayana's poetry to appear during his lifetime, *Poems: Selected by the Author and Revised*, published.
- 1925 *Dialogues in Limbo* published.
- 1927 Santayana meets Daniel Cory, age 22, who will become his assistant and friend. *The Realm of Essence: Book First of Realms of Being* published.
- 1928 Santayana declines offer of the Norton Chair of Poetry at Harvard for 1928–29. Half sister Susana dies in Ávila, on 10 February, at age 77.
- 1930 Half sister Josephine dies in Ávila, on 15 October, at age 77. *The Realm of Matter: Book Second of Realms of Being* published.
- 1931 *The Genteel Tradition at Bay* published. In December Santayana declines offer to become William James Professor of Philosophy at Harvard.
- 1932 Santayana attends philosophical congress commemorating tercentenary of Spinoza's birth, held at The Hague on 6–10 September; delivers a lecture on "Ultimate Religion." Attends meeting in London to

- commemorate tercentenary of John Locke's birth; on 19 October delivers address on "Locke and the Frontiers of Common Sense."
- 1933 *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy* published.
- 1935 *The Last Puritan: A Memoir in the Form of a Novel* published in London (published in New York the next year).
- 1936 *The Last Puritan* becomes Book-of-the-Month Club bestseller.
- 1937 *The Realm of Truth: Book Third of Realms of Being* published in London (published in New York the next year).
- 1938 The first book-length biography, *George Santayana*, by George Washburne Howgate published.
- 1939 World War II breaks out in Europe; Santayana denied regular long-term visa by Swiss officials, decides to remain in Italy.
- 1940 *The Realm of Spirit: Book Fourth of Realms of Being* published. *The Philosophy of George Santayana* published.
- 1941 Santayana moves into nursing home operated by Blue Sisters of the Little Company of Mary, an order of Roman Catholic Irish nuns.
- 1944 *Persons and Places* published; becomes bestseller.
- 1945 *The Middle Span* published. Santayana awarded Nicholas Murray Butler Medal by Columbia University.
- 1946 *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels; or, God in Man: A Critical Essay* published.
- 1948 *Dialogues in Limbo, With Three New Dialogues* published.
- 1951 *Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society, and Government* published.
- 1952 On 4 June Santayana falls on the steps of the Spanish Consulate in Rome; injuries include three broken ribs, bleeding head wound, and patches of pneumonia on lungs; physician is amazed by Santayana's recovery. Santayana continues working until increasing blindness and illness make further labor impossible. On 26 September Santayana dies of stomach cancer. On 30 September his body is interred in the Tomb of the Spaniards.
- 1953 *My Host the World* published. *The Posthumous Poems*, together with two early plays, published as *The Poet's Testament: Poems and Two Plays*.
- 1955 *The Letters of George Santayana*, a selection of two hundred and ninety-six letters to eighty-six recipients, edited by Daniel Cory, published.

Appendix

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Twenty years separate me from the man I was when I wrote this book—years enlivened for me by many changes of scene and branded by a great war. There is hardly a page that would not need to be rewritten, if it was perfectly to express my present feelings.

*Mais quand l'homme change sans cesse,
Au passé pourquoi rien changer?*

Some readers would perhaps prefer the original to my revised version, and if I lived another twenty years I might myself prefer it. The written letter, then, may as well stand; especially as nothing hinders me from setting forth my matured views in fresh works, leaving it for others to decide whether I have changed for the better. After all, there has been no change in my deliberate doctrine; only some changes of mental habit. I now dwell by preference on other perspectives, in which the same objects appear with their relative bulks reversed, and inversely hiding one another; what lay before in the background—nature—has come forward, and the life of reason, which then held the centre of the stage, has receded. The vicissitudes of human belief absorb me less; the life of reason has become in my eyes a decidedly episodic thing, polyglot, interrupted, insecure. I cannot take every phase of art or religion or philosophy seriously, simply because it takes itself so. These things seem to me less tragic than they did, and more comic; and I am less eager to choose and to judge among them, as if only one form could be right. When our architecture is too pretentious, before we have set the cross on the spire, the foundations are apt to give way.

I am consequently far less inclined to take a transcendental point of view, as if the spirit at every point were absolute, and its objects its creations. Spirit is absolute enough, so to speak, relatively, and in its own eyes, since willy-nilly it must soliloquize; but any puppet in the hands of a ventriloquist seems to soliloquize, if we have no notion whence its voice comes. The self that speaks in us is deeper than we suppose, and less ours; but that is nothing against it. Spirit is always worth listening to, and worth understanding sympathetically; the ventriloquist, if not the manikin, deserves admiration. It is spirit, too, that listens and understands, and grows thereby riper and more secure. Yet the oracles of spirit all have to be discounted; they are uttered in a cave.

It was this murmur of nature, wayward and narcotic as it is, that I called reason in this book, and tried to catch and interpret nobly. I could hardly have undertaken or carried out such a task if I had not been accustomed to slip into the subjective, recovering at each step as far as I might the innocence of intellectual illusion, and painting things as they would seem from that angle, not as

they are. From childhood up I had lived in imagination, being fond of religion and poetry, and driven by circumstances to lead my inner life alone; and the philosophy that prevailed about me, though not one which I ever personally trusted, could not help encouraging me in this subjective habit, representing it as deeper, more critical, and more philosophical than any dogmatism. Nevertheless, subjectivity in me was never more than a method, a habit of poetic sympathy with the dreaming mind, whatever it might dream. It was a method appropriate to a book like this, a presumptive biography of the human intellect, which instead of the *Life of Reason* might have been called the *Romance of Wisdom*. Moreover, the thoughts I was endeavouring to evoke and to analyse were not all dead thoughts. Many of them survived in my own perplexities or in the various idealisms of those about me. One consequence was that I was often betrayed into expressions which, if not taken dramatically, would contradict my naturalism; that vulgar belief in material things about us which not only underlay the whole life of reason as I conceived it, but was also its explicit final deliverance. Another consequence was that, when I knew or feared that my reader might harbour the very illusion I was rehearsing, I was tempted to analyse it destructively, or argue against it: something really alien to the essential character of my task. It was only when the thoughts considered were unmistakably dead—as was Greek mythology or (to my probable reader) Catholic piety—that I could warm freely to my work, without fear of confusing myself or other people. On the other hand, when the idea considered was a living and indispensable one (no better description of the envisaged reality being as yet at hand) it was hard to relegate this idea to its native subjective sphere, where all ideas, of course, belong, without seeming to assert that its object also was a figment of human thought—a simply bottomless fallacy.

Let a single instance suffice as a hint to the critic, and as an apology for all the equivocations of this kind of which I may have been guilty. I find myself saying (Vol. I, page 125) that “nature is drawn like a sponge, heavy and dripping from the waters of sentience.” Obviously the “nature” in question is the *idea* of nature, vague at first and overloaded with myth, then growing distinct, constant, articulate. Existing nature could not be drawn either soaking or dray from the waters of sentience: for existing nature is a system of bodies long antedating sentience and making sentience appropriate and significant: or else (on the hypothesis of idealism) existing nature is the flood of sentience itself, from which nothing can ever emerge. That which on its first appearance comes drenched out of its watery element, is the dramatic notion of nature created by mythology. And matching this primitive notion of nature, and growing slowly distinguishable over against it, is another primitive notion which I mention in the same passage, the ghostly notion of mind. This, I say, is composed of the “parings of experi-

ence, when the material world has been cut out of the whole cloth." "Mind," too, is here a personage in the play of reason; it is the *category* of mind. Evidently the origin of existing mind could not lie in a discrimination which mind itself is making; but the discovery of mind may well come in that way. Shall I be blamed for giving the same name to the idea of nature and to existing nature, to the category of mind and to existing mind? I admit that, if the words are pressed, they become confusing; and yet at the play I might innocently say to a friend: "There is Hamlet coming on stage. What a get-up! He looks more like Bunthorne." Clearly the phenomenon I should then be calling Hamlet would not be the real Hamlet, neither the Danish prince nor the presumable ideal in the mind of Shakespeare. This Hamlet is only the absurd actor playing Hamlet for the time being. Why should the verbal ambiguity be more annoying if in reviewing the life of reason I confidentially turn to the friendly reader, whom I suppose to be watching the same drama, and say: "See mind and nature coming on the scene. What a travesty the green-room of fancy has made of them! Here is nature tricked out in will and purpose like a moral being, and mind tumbling about in motley and gibbering!"

This drama, as I conceived it, was far from being a mere comedy of errors, to be treated satirically; it was a chequered experience from which wisdom might be gleaned. The story might be romantic, but the moral of it was classical. Error, under the influence of the existing object which it attempts to describe, suffers correction: and those first mythical notions of nature and of mind may be gradually clarified, until nature is seen to be a mechanism, and mind to be pure intelligence. The life of reason will mark a real progress whenever it gives fuller expression to the interests that prompt its gropings, and reaches the truth about such facts as, for its own purposes, it is concerned to discover. I was not studying history or psychology for their own sake: my retrospect was to be frankly selective and critical, guided by a desire to discriminate the better from the worse.

But by what standard could I distinguish them? The first suggestion for such a work had come to me in my student days, on reading Hegel's *Phaenomenologie des Geistes*. It had seemed to me that myth and sophistry there spoilt a very fine subject. The subject was the history of human ideas: the sophistry was imposed on Hegel by his ambition to show that the episodes he happened to review formed a dialectical chain: and the myth sprang from the constant suggestion that this history of human ideas made up the whole of cosmic evolution, and that those episodes were the scattered syllables of a single eternal oracle. It occurred to me that a more honest criticism of progress might be based on tracing the distracted efforts of man to satisfy his natural impulses in his natural environment. Yet if these impulses were infinitely wayward and variable, and if the environment itself was inconstant or undiscoverable, what criterion of progress could it

be possible to set up? As for me, I was utterly without the learning and the romantic imagination that might have enabled some emancipated rival of Hegel, some systematic Nietzsche or some dialectical Walt Whitman, to write a history of the Will to Be Everything and Anything. An omnivorous spirit was no spirit for me, and I could not write the life of reason without distinguishing it from madness.

The suggestion of such a work accordingly lay dormant in my mind for years, until maturity, aided by Platonic studies, supplied me with a fresh point of departure, and enabled me to conceive the whole subject in a way that seemed to rescue it at once from pretension and from futility. All that was needed was to know oneself. No unnatural constancy need be imposed on human nature at large: it sufficed that the critic himself should have a determinate character and a sane capacity for happiness. He was not likely to be so original that, if he was sincere, nobody else would be found to share and approve his judgments. No conceited postulates need be made about the universe, commanding it to be exceptionally friendly, or to preserve us or those like us forever, or to "conserve values," as if the duration or the multiplication of instances had anything to do with excellence. The wisdom of Socrates was enough for living and judging rightly in any world, the most magical or the most mechanical, the best or the worst. I had no need to adopt the cosmology of Plato—a mythical and metaphysical creation, more or less playful and desperate, designed to buttress his moral philosophy. I was old enough, when I came under his influence, to discount this sort of priestcraft in thought, so familiar in Christian apologists. Experience, knowledge of my own heart, attachment to Spinoza, even the science of the day, protected me against those voluntary illusions. Indeed, to undermine them gently, by showing how unnecessary and treacherous they are in the healthy life of the spirit, was a chief part of my undertaking. In order to discern this healthy life, for the soul no less than for the body, not much learning is required; only a little experience, a little reflection, and a little candour.

Moral philosophy is not a science. It moves exclusively in the realm of familiar discourse. The units it distinguishes are dramatic units, like those of literary psychology and historical fiction: ideas, persons, passions, destinies such as imagination presents to me when I survey my own past, or conceive the adventures of another. This limitation is far from involving the assumption that nothing but human discourse can exist, or that nature must be composed of rhetorical unities of that description. On the contrary, it is important for sanity and for art that human discourse should acknowledge the far deeper embosoming realms of matter and of essence, to which physics and dialectic are respectively addressed; otherwise moral philosophy would threaten to become myth and discourse mere ravings. Nevertheless, the uses of science remain human, in that it employs the mind nobly, chastens the feelings, or increases the safety and comfort of life. To

investigate nature or refine dialectic beyond those uses, out of mere curiosity, may be an innocent automatic impulse in men of science, but it is vain. Physics and dialectic accordingly enter the life of reason only as developments of human discourse, coloured by human passions and serving them: the moralist accepts their reports, as he does those of memory and history, that they may enlighten him about the conditions and the possible forms of happiness. His own art, to which this book is essentially dedicated, is to express his reasoned preferences amongst all the forms of experience which his imagination can propose. To imagination the reader must appeal in turn if he would understand the argument; and if he would correct the conclusion, he must make sure that he is speaking for his heart, for his most secret dream of happiness.

May, 1922.

Variants to the Text that Appear in the One-Volume Edition of *The Life Of Reason*

The listing of variants which follows shows the changes made by Santayana and Daniel Cory in preparing the one-volume abridged edition of *The Life of Reason*, published by Charles Scribner's Sons in 1954. Although this volume has no relevance to the critical edition of the much earlier five-volume work, the changes and annotations are of interest in following Santayana's philosophical thought. Readings from the Scribner's first edition are listed to the left of the lemma bracket following the critical edition page and line numbers; variant readings from the one-volume edition are listed to the right followed by the page and line numbers from that edition. (See pages 207–9 for the "Editorial Sigla and Symbols.") The abridged edition does not include the Introduction, "The Subject of This Work, Its Method and Antecedents," nor Chapter IV, "On Some Critics of This Discovery," nor Chapter IX, "How Thought is Practical," from the original work. Santayana's marginal notes are not included in the one-volume edition and, therefore, the "Table of Contents" lists only titles of chapters. The one-volume edition does have a fourteen-page "Index"; no index is present in any of the first-edition volumes. Daniel Cory supplied a two-page "Preface" for the abridged edition.

23.1 CHAPTER I A_A] CHAPTER 1 *ALR*, 3.1

23.3–25.3 [¶] Whether ... well. [¶] Human A_A] [*not present*] HUMAN *ALR*, 3.3

25.8 evidently practical; it A_A] evidently realistic; it *ALR*, 3.7–8

25.14 if .experience A_A] $\sim \wedge \sim$ *ALR*, 3.13

25.15–16 the inference is drawn that A_A] the assumption is made that *ALR*,
3.14–15

25.37–38 those apparitions have A_A] those conceptions have *ALR*, 4.4

26.16 which had long A_A] which has long *ALR*, 4.19

27.23 some- / thing A_A] something *ALR*, 5.27

29.8 spring- / flood A_A] springflood *ALR*, 7.12

29.13 character, A_A] $\sim \wedge$ *ALR*, 7.16

- 31.1 CHAPTER II A_A] CHAPTER 2 *ALR*, 9.1
- 32.7 evidence is external A_A] evidence are external *ALR*, 10.2 [*emended*]
- 32.30 self- / knowledge A_A] self-knowledge *ALR*, 10.24
- 33.29–34.4 ambition. [¶] A body ... ever. [¶] An A_A] ambition. [¶] An *ALR*, 11.23–24
- 35.16 abhors A_A] abhors *ALR*, 12.35 [*emended*]
- 35.28–36.7 lost. [¶] Pleasures ... day. [¶] Here A_A] lost. [¶] Here *ALR*, 13.9–10
- 36.27 consciousness; and as matter seeks its own level, and A_A] consciousness; and *ALR*, 13.30
- 36.31–33 form. This ... being. Though A_A] form. Though *ALR*, 13.34
- 37.3–5 tracing here; the only one, obviously, which human discourse is competent to trace. [¶] When A_A] tracing here. [¶] When *ALR*, 14.5–6
- 37.9–16 imagination; ... day. If A_A] imagination. If *ALR*, 14.10
- 37.25–27 experience has ... It moves A_A] experience moves *ALR*, 14.19
- 37.30–33 life. This ... consciousness. [¶] The A_A] life. [¶] The *ALR*, 14.23–24
- 37.34–38.2 machinery. The ... world. *Felix* A_A] machinery. *Felix* *ALR*, 14.26
- 39.4–13 organisation. Without ... mind. No A_A] organisation. No *ALR*, 15.30
- 39.20 same mechanical forces A_A] same physical forces *ALR*, 15.37–38
- 41.1 CHAPTER III A_A] CHAPTER 3 *ALR*, 17.1
- 47.18–23 perceptions ... break. [¶] The A_A] perceptions. [¶] The *ALR*, 23.12–13
- 47.27–28 device. Its ... rejuvenation. To A_A] device. To *ALR*, 23.17
- 47.31 æsthetic A_A] aesthetic *ALR*, 23.20
- 47.31 of diving bodily into A_A] of sinking into *ALR*, 23.20
- 47.37–38 shocks–though ... within–but A_A] shocks–but *ALR*, 23.26
- 48.14–16 satisfy us, ... for? Is A_A] satisfy us. Is *ALR*, 23.39

- 48.19–20 complain that the ... suggested, the supersensible A_A] complain that the supersensible *ALR*, 24.2
- 48.20 super- / sensible A_A] supersensible *ALR*, 24.2
- 48.23 some- / thing A_A] something *ALR*, 24.6
- 48.29 An idea that A_A] An import that *ALR*, 24.11
- 48.30–34 be ideal; ... sphere. Now A_A] be indicative. Now *ALR*, 24.12
- 48.36 on an ideal plane. A_A] on a deeper plane. *ALR*, 24.14
- 48.37 our inference to A_A] our belief to *ALR*, 24.15–16
- 49.1 without inferring them A_A] without conceiving them *ALR*, 24.17
- 49.2–51.1 know. [¶] It ... understand. [¶] Now A_A] know. [¶] Now *ALR*, 24.19–20
- 51.8–10 present impressions, ... accidents, are A_A] present impressions are *ALR*, 24.27
- 51.17–20 particular impressions ... character. With A_A] particular impressions. With *ALR*, 24.34–35
- 51.21 recognised A_A] recognized *ALR*, 24.36
- 51.22–29 observer. Here ... effect. [¶] Such A_A] observer. [¶] Such *ALR*, 24.38–39
- 51.33–34 the ideal representative, A_A] the conceived representative, *ALR*, 25.4
- 53.1–72.16 CHAPTER IV / ON SOME CRITICS OF THIS DISCOVERY / The English ... illusion. A_A] [*not present*] *ALR*, 26
- 73.1 CHAPTER V A_A] CHAPTER 4 *ALR*, 26.1
- 73.4–74.27 [¶] When the mind ... promised land. [¶] The theory A_A] [*not present*] THE THEORY *ALR*, 26.3
- 75.23 until it became A_A] until both became *ALR*, 27.4
- 75.23–76.4 abstract. Truth ... men. [¶] What A_A] abstract. [¶] What *ALR*, 27.4–5

- 76.23 deeper mechanical order. A_A] deeper consecutive order. *ALR*, 27.25
- 76.37 by abstraction from A_A] by projection from *ALR*, 27.39
- 76.38 *passu*, A_A] *passu*, *ALR*, 27.40
- 76.39 concretions, falls out with the physical world and forms the A_A] concretions, withdraws into the *ALR*, 28.1–2
- 77.1–9 passions. We ... psychology. [¶] Mind, A_A] passions. [¶] Mind, *ALR*, 28.2–3
- 77.18–19 parasitic matter clings A_A] parasitic drapery clings *ALR*, 28.13
- 77.28 they constitute the A_A] they people the *ALR*, 28.23
- 77.33 we have seen, a A_A] we discern it, a *ALR*, 28.28
- 77.34 certain portions of A_A] certain suggestions of *ALR*, 28.29
- 77.34–36 experience, packed into such shapes as prove cogent in thought and practice. The stuff of A_A] experience. The idea of *ALR*, 28.29
- 77.36–37 external reality, the matter out of which its idea is made, is A_A] external reality is *ALR*, 28.29
- 77.37 the stuff and matter of A_A] the rest of *ALR*, 28.30
- 78.13 then call the A_A] then relegate to the *ALR*, 29.5
- 78.18–19 its mechanical associates. This A_A] its material organs. This *ALR*, 29.10–11
- 79.31–36 confusion. Some ... gropings. [¶] What A_A] confusion. [¶] What *ALR*, 30.24–25
- 80.12 from them, ... mind, are A_A] from them are *ALR*, 30.39
- 80.22–23 divine miracle. [¶] Existence A_A] divine privilege. [¶] Existence *ALR*, 31.9–10
- 80.24–31 it. What ... impossible. The A_A] it. The *ALR*, 31.11
- 80.33 accordingly be in A_A] accordingly seem in *ALR*, 31.13
- 81.9–12 to everything ... sensation. They A_A] to spirits. They *ALR*, 31.29

- 81.28–29 speculation. In ... myths, which A_A] speculation, which *ALR*, 32.4
- 82.14 first stray material A_A] first material *ALR*, 32.27
- 82.27 to- / morrow A_A] tomorrow *ALR*, 32.40
- 83.11–12 may continue, like A_A] may repeat them, like *ALR*, 33.24
- 83.13–21 particular organ. That ... nature; and A_A] particular organ and *ALR*, 33.26
- 85.1 CHAPTER VI A_A] CHAPTER 5 *ALR*, 34.1
- 85.26–86.1 ignorance. [¶] Speculative ... in all A_A] ignorance. [¶] In all *ALR*, 34.26–27
- 86.6 [¶] This question A_A] [*no new* ¶] This question *ALR*, 34.31
- 86.8 nature's A_A] Nature's *ALR*, 34.33
- 87.3 counter- / parts A_A] counterparts *ALR*, 35.31
- 87.12–87.24 justification. [¶] In ... object. [¶] Now A_A] justification. [¶] Now *ALR*, 35.40–36.1
- 87.26–27 field; extension is passionate, A_A] field; bodies are passionate, *ALR*, 36.3–4
- 87.27 moves bodies, thought A_A] moves them, thought *ALR*, 36.4
- 87.38 and practical transcendence) A_A] and correct transcendence) *ALR*, 36.14
- 87.39 certain elements of experience and A_A] certain objects and *ALR*, 36.15
- 88.6–7 to natural bodies A_A] to animal bodies *ALR*, 36.22
- 88.13 (*e.g.*, in A_A] (*e.g.*, in *ALR*, 36.28
- 88.39 all- / seeing A_A] all-seeing *ALR*, 37.15
- 89.33 the tertiary qualities of their bodies. In A_A] the moral suggestions of their behaviour. In *ALR*, 38.8
- 90.2–7 friend. For ... things. What A_A] friend. What *ALR*, 38.15
- 90.9–10 haunting mind, than A_A] haunting power, than *ALR*, 38.18

- 90.26 of an absorbing stimulus A_A] of a sustained stimulus *ALR*, 38.35
- 90.28–31 him. All ... us. Then A_A] him. Then *ALR*, 38.37
- 90.32–33 surrounded not by a blue sky or an earth known to geographers but by unutterable A_A] surrounded by unutterable *ALR*, 38.38
- 90.33–34 loves. For then we allow A_A] loves. We allow *ALR*, 38.39
- 91.3–92.14 souls. [¶] The ... morality. There is A_A] souls. [¶] There is *ALR*, 39.8–9
- 92.14–15 the pathetic fallacy is A_A] the “pathetic fallacy” is *ALR*, 39.9
- 94.24 æsthetic A_A] aesthetic *ALR*, 41.21
- 95.10 Any object with A_A] Any creature with *ALR*, 42.5–6
- 95.12 indications, A_A] $\sim \wedge$ *ALR*, 42.7
- 95.20 have metaphorical psychic names, names indicating A_A] have sensuous names, though indicating *ALR*, 42.15
- 96.2 re- / enact A_A] re-enact *ALR*, 42.36
- 96.24–25 understood, the symbols that represent those forces in the mind may A_A] understood, symbols that do not represent those forces may *ALR*, 43.19–20
- 97.3–11 upon. Smartness ... themselves. [¶] The A_A] upon. [¶] The *ALR*, 43.38–39
- 97.12–15 theology. Whenever ... dramatically. What A_A] theology. What *ALR*, 43.40
- 97.25–98.9 fruits. [¶] True ... dispositions. A_A] fruits. [*not present*] *ALR*, 44.11
- 99.1 CHAPTER VII A_A] CHAPTER 6 *ALR*, 45.1
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- 99.31–100.2 qualities to ... motions, identifies A_A] qualities, identifies *ALR*, 45.29
- 100.3–8 character. A ... principles. It A_A] character. It *ALR*, 45.31
- 100.9 seeing they A_A] seeing that, for us, they *ALR*, 45.32–33

- 100.10–18 elements; ... consciousness. [¶] The A_A] elements. [¶] The *ALR*, 45.33–34
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- 101.15–17 generic experience. This experience, a spontaneous reconstruction based on all previous sensations of that kind, will A_A] generic appearance. This will *ALR*, 46.36
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- 102.16 mass is a A_A] mass in a *ALR*, 47.26 [*emended*]
- 102.19–26 system, ... materials. The A_A] system. The *ALR*, 47.30
- 102.28 an activity. Activity does A_A] an act. An act does *ALR*, 47.32–33
- 102.32 of representative cognition, A_A] of indicative cognition, *ALR*, 47.37
- 102.34 of experiences in A_A] of events in *ALR*, 47.39
- 102.37 for all historical A_A] for historical *ALR*, 48.3
- 103.4–5 recurring in different objects otherwise A_A] recurring at different moments otherwise *ALR*, 48.9–10
- 104.38–105.31 irony. [¶] Reliance ... partiality. [¶] Active A_A] irony. [¶] Active *ALR*, 50.4–5
- 107.7–8 understanding.* The A_A] $\sim \wedge \sim$ *ALR*, 51.21
- 108.3 science, and A_A] $\sim \wedge \sim$ *ALR*, 52.11
- 108.20–21 somewhat unfair and A_A] somewhat meager and *ALR*, 52.29
- 109.20–23 conjunctions. These ... illusions. The A_A] conjunctions. The *ALR*, 53.27–28
- 109.24 parti- / coloured A_A] particoloured *ALR*, 53.28

110.1 facts.* Nor A_A] $\sim \cdot \wedge \sim$ *ALR*, 54.4

110.9–10 superposing perceptions that A_A] superposing qualities that *ALR*, 54.13–14

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111.1–5 conceptions. Whereas ... distinct. [¶] Thus A_A] conceptions. [¶] Thus *ALR*, 54.32–33

111.11–12 the mechanical sequence of A_A] the natural occasions of *ALR*, 54.40

111.17–37 natures. The ... spirit. A_A] natures. [*not present*] *ALR*, 55.6

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116.35 intelligence, A_A] intelligences, *ALR*, 56.14

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117.25–28 life. The ... character. The A_A] life. The *ALR*, 57.1

118.1 are ignored, A_A] are despised, *ALR*, 57.13

118.21 ancients, A_A] ancient, *ALR*, 57.34

119.12 force A_A] forces *ALR*, 58.24

120.16 approach experience with A_A] approach reality with *ALR*, 59.28

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120.39–121.24 religion, just ... fortunes. [¶] The A_A] religion. [¶] The *ALR*, 60.8–9

122.3–22 nature. [¶] If So the idea A_A] nature. The idea *ALR*, 60.28

122.28 a mechanism once A_A] a naturalism once *ALR*, 60.34

- 122.36–123.15 inference. If ... oblivion. [¶] If idealism A_A] inference. [¶] If idealism *ALR*, 61.2–3
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- 123.35 [¶] This applicability, A_A] [*no new ¶*] ~, *ALR*, 61.20
- 124.2–22 but a method in living; and by ... interpreted. A_A] but the art of living. [*not present*] *ALR*, 61.26
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- 143.1 CHAPTER X A_A] CHAPTER 8 *ALR*, 62.1
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- 144.14 Eudæmonism A_A] Eudaemonism *ALR*, 63.9
- 146.10 æsthetic A_A] aesthetic *ALR*, 65.5
- 146.29 lies in truth in the A_A] lies in the *ALR*, 65.24
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- 147.18–19 reflection. We ... when yet unrealised, A_A] reflection. Something yet unrealised, *ALR*, 65.33–34
- 148.1–36 values. This ... it? [¶] This projection A_A] values. [¶] This projection *ALR*, 66.15–16
- 149.39–150.5 society. The ... reputation. [¶] The fact A_A] society. [¶] The fact *ALR*, 67.22–23
- 150.31–38 Leonardo, while ... Imogen. There A_A] Leonardo. There *ALR*, 68.9
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- 153.11–12 daily experience. A_A] daily life. *ALR*, 68.30
- 153.29 better experience than the actual condition it A_A] better life than the actual one it *ALR*, 69.7–8
- 153.31 [*no new ¶*] As A_A] [¶] ~ *ALR*, 69.10

- 153.34–35 all experience rather A_A] all interests rather *ALR*, 69.12–13
- 153.36 a practical mind A_A] a prudent mind *ALR*, 69.14
- 153.38–154.1 any other proof that its realisation would be possible or good than the oracle which a living will inspires and pronounces. The A_A] any better proof that it is well inspired than the oracle of a living will. The *ALR*, 69.16–17
- 154.3 deserve adhesion it A_A] deserve loyalty it *ALR*, 69.19–20 [*emended*]
- 155.1 CHAPTER XI A_A] CHAPTER 9 *ALR*, 70.1
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- 155.14 co- / operation A_A] cooperation *ALR*, 70.12
- 155.21 The ideal A_A] The rational ideal *ALR*, 70.20
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- 156.39 excluded altogether. A_A] excluded. *ALR*, 71.32
- 157.2 expressed in A_A] secured by *ALR*, 71.35
- 157.11–25 force. An ... reality. As A_A] force. As *ALR*, 72.4
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- 157.38 are expressed in A_A] are based on *ALR*, 72.15
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- 163.1 CHAPTER XII A_A] CHAPTER 10 *ALR*, 74.1
- 164.29–30 that indiscriminate. A_A] that omnivorous. *ALR*, 75.25
- 165.33 ostrich- / like A_A] ostrich-like *ALR*, 76.28

- 166.16–17 practical calculus. A_A] relevant calculus. *ALR*, 77.10
- 167.32 authority of A_A] authority over ourselves of *ALR*, 78.26
- 167.37–168.1 fundamental essence, a ... reason. As A_A] fundamental source. As *ALR*, 78.31
- 168.10–13 ideal. On ... happiness. [¶] Thinkers A_A] ideal. [¶] Thinkers *ALR*, 78.40–79.1
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- 168.38–169.3 being. It ... good. [¶] The true A_A] being. [¶] The true *ALR*, 79.22–23
- 169.4 wine- / press A_A] winepress *ALR*, 79.24
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- 171.24–25 less mechanically, A_A] less normally, *ALR*, 82.9
- 174.12 own: A_A] \sim ; *ALR*, 84.38
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Editorial Appendix

Explanation of the Editorial Appendix

Editorial Sigla and Symbols: a listing of the abbreviations used to represent the various editions or printings of source texts and an explanation of symbols employed in the Editorial Appendix. The tilde (~) stands for the word or words cited to the left of the lemma bracket in the “List of Emendations” and in the “List of Variants.” The caret (^) indicates the absence of a punctuation mark. The ellipsis (...) indicates material omitted from citations in the Editorial Appendix. (The ellipsis is used to make the citation of manageable size for presentation in the lists.) The beginning and end of the material cited is keyed to the page and line numbers of the critical edition text for ready reference.

Standard Reference Bibliography: a bibliography of works by George Santayana and secondary source material which may be pertinent to this text. An abbreviation for each title is listed, based on those established by Angus Kerr-Lawson for the *Bulletin of the Santayana Society*. These abbreviations are used mainly in “Notes to the Text,” in footnotes, or in citations within the Editorial Appendix.

Notes to the Text: identifications of persons, places, books, and quotations referred to in the text; translations of foreign terms and quotations; and general information useful to a fuller understanding of the work. Organization is by order of appearance of the item in the text.

Textual Commentary: a thorough description of the editorial methods and textual principles and procedures used for the critical edition, a description of the history and development of the text of each particular book, and a discussion of the steps in establishing the critical text. The textual commentary and introduction of each book provide information important to scholars for the requisite source and reference study of Santayana’s writings and thought.

Discussions of Adopted Readings: comments on editorial decisions to emend or not to emend, requiring, in the opinion of the editors of the critical edition, more information than that reported in the “List of Emendations.” The reading of the critical edition is given first, to the left of the lemma bracket.

List of Emendations: all emendations (changes), both in substantives and in accidentals, made in the copy-text for the present critical edition. The critical edition reading is given to the left of the lemma bracket, the rejected copy-text reading to the right. The symbols following the emended readings indicate the

source of the emendations. Readings followed by the siglum *CE* have been supplied by the present editors.

Report of Line-End Hyphenation: a list of the editorially established forms of possible compounds which were hyphenated at the ends of lines in the copy-text, followed by a list of the copy-text forms of possible compounds which are hyphenated at the ends of lines in the critical edition text.

Since some possible compound words (not customarily hyphenated) are hyphenated at the ends of lines in the copy-text, the intended forms of these words (i.e., with or without hyphen) must be determined by editorial decision. When a word hyphenated at line-end appears elsewhere in the copy-text in only one form, that form is followed; however, when the spelling of the word is not consistent (and the inconsistency is acceptable as a form of the word), the form appearing more frequently in the copy-text is adopted for the critical edition text. If the word does not occur elsewhere in the copy-text, the form of the word is then determined by comparing it to Santayana's preferred form for similar words in the copy-text or, if necessary, in other Santayana manuscripts and printed texts.

The first list in the "Report of Line-End Hyphenation," called the "Copy-Text List," records editorial decisions by noting the critical edition forms of possible compounds which are hyphenated at the ends of lines in the copy-text. This list shows the editorially established form of each of these words, with or without hyphens, when appearing within the line. The "Copy-Text List" records information necessary to the reader in evaluating editorial decisions or in reconstructing the copy-text. The second list, called the "Critical Edition List," records the copy-text forms of possible compounds which are hyphenated at the ends of lines in the critical edition text. The second list is for the purpose of recording only those line-end hyphens that are to be retained in resetting, quoting from, or otherwise transcribing the critical edition text. The critical edition list does not, of course, involve editorial decisions.

List of Variants: variant readings in all versions of the text published during Santayana's lifetime, constituting a historical record. (These variant readings are discovered in the process of collation, that is, comparing the various texts. Therefore, this section is often referred to as the "Historical Collation.") Readings to the left of the lemma bracket are those of the copy-text. Listed to the right of the bracket are those readings that are at variance with the readings of the copy-text. When a critical edition reading differs from the copy-text reading and also from that of any published form of the text, it appears to the left of the bracket (preceding the copy-text reading) followed by the siglum *CE*,

in order to provide a reference to the text. Sigla for publications reported in the “List of Variants” are the same as those used in the “List of Emendations.”

Editorial Sigla and Symbols

The following abbreviations or sigla are used to designate the sources of readings in the various lists of the Editorial Appendix.

THE ORIGINAL PUBLISHED STATE OF THE TEXT:

- A_A The first edition, first issue of *Reason in Common Sense* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, [January] 1905). The first printing is used as copy-text. The second, third, and fourth printings (A_A^{1905} , A_A^{1906} , and A_A^{1911}) show no variation from the first.
- A_B The first edition, second issue (London: Constable Publishers, 1905). Published from the first four Scribner printings, with no priority of publication indicated. Scribner's sheets were again sent to Constable in 1906, 1910, and 1914; the initial 1905 issue date appears on all examined copies of A_B except for Santayana's working copy (A_B^{1914}), which bears a 1914 title page date.

THE SECOND PUBLISHED STATE OF THE TEXT:

- A_A^{1917} The first edition, fifth printing, in which the changes of the 1922 "revised edition" actually appear (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917). Re-printings occurred in 1920 and 1921 (the sixth and seventh cumulative printings) without variation.

THE THIRD PUBLISHED STATE OF THE TEXT:

- A_A^{1922} The first edition, third issue, so-called "second edition," which is actually the eighth cumulative printing of the Scribner's first edition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922). Two points of variation from the second state of 1917 makes A_A^{1922} a third state of variation. Six re-printings (1924, 1927, 1929, 1932, 1936, and 1948) result in a total of fourteen cumulative impressions for the first edition.
- A_B^{1922} The first edition, fourth issue (London: Constable Publishers, 1922), published from sheets of A_A^{1922} , with no priority of publication indicated. No further impressions are known.
- B_A The second edition of *Reason in Common Sense*, included in Volume III of the Triton Edition of *The Works of George Santayana* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936).

SUBSEQUENT AUTHORIAL INTENTIONS:

- GSC* Santayana's personal copy of the Constable issue of the 1914 printing of the first edition (*A_B¹⁹¹⁴*) with hand-written annotations and corrections by the author (George Santayana Collection, Georgetown University Library). Santayana extracted and marked pages from this copy to create *GSC_{LE}*, the condensed and rearranged source of *Little Essays (LE)*. The remaining pages, also containing revisions, were discarded from the *LE* process; these pages (designated *GSC_D*) are also at Georgetown.
- LE* *Little Essays: Drawn From the Writings of George Santayana by Logan Pearsall Smith, With the Collaboration of the Author* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable, 1920), containing excerpts from *Reason in Common Sense*.
- ALR* The one-volume edition of *The Life of Reason* revised by George Santayana in collaboration with Daniel Cory (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952). Portions of the five volumes marked for the publisher (*ALR_M*) and used to typeset the one-volume edition of *The Life of Reason* are housed in the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin.
- CE* The present critical edition.

For a complete listing of all editions and printings refer to the "Textual Commentary" (page 268 and following). The sigla for this volume have been designed to clarify the actual typesetting history of the successive editions and impressions where the British first edition is actually a simultaneous re-issue of the American first edition. Earlier volumes with similar histories (*The Sense of Beauty* and *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*) subsumed both the American and British issues of the first edition under a single siglum.

THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL SYMBOLS ARE USED IN THE EDITORIAL APPENDIX:

Asterisk *

The asterisk precedes emendations which are discussed in the “Discussions of Adopted Readings.”

Caret ^

The caret indicates the absence of a punctuation mark.

Ellipsis ...

The ellipsis indicates the omission of part of the text of a citation (to economize on space) in the “Notes to the Text,” the “Textual Commentary,” “Discussions of Adopted Readings,” the “List of Emendations,” and the “List of Variants.”

Lemma Bracket]

Critical edition readings and their sources are listed to the left of the lemma bracket in the “List of Emendations”; rejected copy-text readings are listed to the right of the bracket. Copy-text readings are listed to the left of the bracket in the “List of Variants”; the variant readings are listed to the right. In “Notes to the Text” and “Discussions of Adopted Readings” the critical edition reading is to the left of the bracket and editorial notes and discussions are to the right.

Marginal Notes MN

The marginal notes are the paragraph summaries in bold print which appear on the left or right side of the page in the critical edition text.

Paragraph Symbol ¶

The paragraph symbol indicates the beginning of a new paragraph.

Similar

Similar begins a parenthetical listing of additional lines where the forms of a variant or emendation are identical.

Slash or Virgule /

The slash or virgule is used to indicate separate lines of verse or lines of a title.

Table of Contents TOC

Indicates material from the “Contents” pages in the “List of Variants.”

Wavy Dash or Tilde ~

In the “List of Emendations” the wavy dash or tilde stands for the word or words cited to the left of the lemma bracket and signals that only punctuation is emended. In the “List of Variants” the wavy dash or tilde stands for the word or words cited to the left of the bracket and signals that only punctuation constitutes the variant.

Standard Reference Bibliography

The following is a list of abbreviations and bibliographical references to Santayana's works and secondary source materials. The abbreviations are used for books cited in the "Notes to the Text." Citations from the current work are referenced by the abbreviation followed by page number/s.

Primary Sources

- BR** *The Birth of Reason & Other Essays*. Edited by Daniel Cory. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968.
- COUS** *Character and Opinion in the United States: With Reminiscences of William James and Josiah Royce and Academic Life in America*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd.; Toronto: McLeod, 1920. Volume eleven of the critical edition of *The Works of George Santayana (WGS)*.
- CP** *The Complete Poems of George Santayana: A Critical Edition*. Edited by William G. Holzberger. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1979.
- DL** *Dialogues in Limbo*. London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1925; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926. Volume fourteen of the critical edition (*WGS*).
- DP** *Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society, and Government*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1951. Volume nineteen of the critical edition (*WGS*).
- EGP** *Egotism in German Philosophy*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1916. Volume ten of the critical edition (*WGS*).
- GTB** *The Genteel Tradition at Bay*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: "The Adelphi," 1931. Volume seventeen of the critical edition (*WGS*).
- HC** *A Hermit of Carmel and Other Poems*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901; London: R. Brimley Johnson, 1902.
- ICG** *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels; or, God in Man: A Critical Essay*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Toronto: Saunders, 1946. Volume eighteen of the critical edition (*WGS*).

- IPR** *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Black, 1900. Volume three of the critical edition (*WGS*) edited by William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., with an introduction by Joel Porte. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989. (Citations refer to critical edition page numbers.)
- LP** *The Last Puritan: A Memoir in the Form of a Novel*. London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1935; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936; Volume four of the critical edition (*WGS*) edited by William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., with an introduction by Irving Singer. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994. (Citations refer to critical edition page numbers.)
- LGS** *The Letters of George Santayana*. Volume five (in eight books) of the critical edition (*WGS*) edited by William G. Holzberger, Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., and Marianne S. Wokeck, with an introduction by William G. Holzberger. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000–2008. (Citations in the notes refer to book and page number; i.e., *LGS*, 8:150 is page 150 of Book Eight.)
- LR** *The Life of Reason: or, the Phases of Human Progress*. Five volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1905–06. Volume seven of the critical edition of *WGS* edited by Martin Coleman and Marianne Wokeck, with an introduction by James Gouinlock.
- LR1** *Introduction and Reason in Common Sense*. Book 1, 1905.
- LR2** *Reason in Society*. Book 2, 1905.
- LR3** *Reason in Religion*. Book 3, 1905.
- LR4** *Reason in Art*. Book 4, 1905.
- LR5** *Reason in Science*. Book 5, 1906.
- LE** *Little Essays: Drawn From the Writings of George Santayana by Logan Pearsall Smith, With the Collaboration of the Author*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1920.
- LUC** *Lucifer: A Theological Tragedy*. Chicago and New York: Herbert S. Stone, 1899.
- LHT** Revised limited second edition published as *Lucifer, or the Heavenly Truce: A Theological Tragedy*. Cambridge, MA: Dunster House; London: W. Jackson, 1924.

- OB** *Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays and Reviews*. Edited by Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1936.
- PP** *Persons and Places: Fragments of Autobiography*. Volume one of the critical edition (*WGS*) edited by William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., with an introduction by Richard C. Lyon. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986. (Citations refer to critical edition page numbers.)
- PP1** *Persons and Places: The Background of My Life*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1944.
- PP2** *The Middle Span*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1947.
- PP3** *My Host the World*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Cresset Press, 1953.
- POML** *Physical Order and Moral Liberty*. Edited by John Lachs. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969.
- PSL** *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1927. Volume fifteen of the critical edition (*WGS*).
- PSA** *Poems: Selected by the Author and Revised*. London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1922; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923.
- PT** *The Poet's Testament: Poems and Two Plays*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.
- RB** *Realms of Being*. Four volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1927–40. Volume sixteen of the critical edition (*WGS*).
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- RM** *The Realm of Matter: Book Second of Realms of Being*, 1930.
- RT** *The Realm of Truth: Book Third of Realms of Being*. London: Constable; Toronto: Macmillan Company, 1937; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938.
- RS** *The Realm of Spirit: Book Fourth of Realms of Being*, 1940.
- RB1** *Realms of Being*. One-volume edition, with a new introduction by the author. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942.

- SAF** *Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a System of Philosophy*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1923. Volume thirteen of the critical edition (*WGS*).
- SB** *The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: A. and C. Black, 1896. Volume two of the critical edition (*WGS*) edited by William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., with an introduction by Arthur C. Danto. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988. (Citations refer to critical edition page numbers.)
- SE** *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1922. Volume twelve of the critical edition (*WGS*).
- SOV** *Sonnets and Other Verses*. Cambridge and Chicago: Stone and Kimball, 1894.
- TTMP** *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy: Five Essays*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933. Volume seventeen of the critical edition (*WGS*).
- TPP** *Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1910. Volume eight of the critical edition (*WGS*) edited by Martin Coleman and Marianne Wokeck, with an introduction by James Seaton.
- WD** *Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1913. Volume nine of the critical edition (*WGS*).

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- LY** Cory, Daniel. *Santayana: The Later Years: A Portrait with Letters*. New York: George Braziller, 1963.
- UAS** Flamm, Matthew Caleb, and Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński, editors. *Under Any Sky: Contemporary Readings of George Santayana*. Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007.
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- JLGS** Lachs, John. *George Santayana*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988.
- OnS** Lachs, John. *On Santayana*. Belmont, CA; London: Wadsworth, 2001.
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- GSB** McCormick, John. *George Santayana: A Biography*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987.
- BSS** *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society*. Edited by Angus Kerr-Lawson.
<http://indiamond6.ulib.iupui.edu/Santayana/>
- PGS** Schilpp, Paul Arthur, editor. *The Philosophy of George Santayana*. Volume II of *The Library of Living Philosophers*. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1940.
- TRS** Singer, Beth. *The Rational Society: A Critical Study of Santayana's Thought*. Cleveland, OH: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1970.
- SAEP** Sprigge, Timothy L. S. *Santayana*. London and Boston: Routledge, 1995. Second edition of *Santayana: An Examination of his Philosophy*, with a new introduction, select bibliography, and a foreword by Angus Kerr-Lawson.
- LITE** Woodward, Anthony. *Living in the Eternal: A Study of George Santayana*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1988.

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Notes to the Text

SOURCES AND CITATIONS

The “Notes to the Text” are based on a collection of standard sources in addition to primary texts and scholarly studies. The standard sources are listed below and are not cited in the notes; some translations are taken from these sources. Citations to pre-Socratic texts, the works of Plato, the works of Aristotle, biblical texts, and the works of Shakespeare follow the conventions explained below. Other ancient works are typically cited by author, title, book number, and line number. Additional sources that occur in one note are cited in the particular note, and general allusions to classic works are usually cited only by author, title, and date.

Specific texts attributed to or about pre-Socratic philosophers are cited using Diels-Kranz (DK) numbers. They standardize references to classical works by or about pre-Socratic philosophers and appear widely in translations and commentaries. The numbers come from the nineteenth-century collection of pre-Socratic texts, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, compiled by the German scholar Hermann Diels (1848–1922) and revised by Walther Kranz (1884–1960), which has become the standard in the field of ancient philosophy. In this work each author is assigned a number. Entries for each author are divided into three groups: (a) testimonia: ancient accounts of the author’s life and teachings; (b) ipsissima verba: the words of the author; (c) imitations: works modeled on those of the author. Within each group, texts are numbered sequentially. For example, DK 80a3 refers to the third testimony about the eightieth ancient author in Diels-Kranz, namely Protagoras.

Specific texts in the works of Plato are cited using the conventional form of reference known as Stephanus numbers. They standardize references to Plato’s works regardless of translation or edition and often appear in the margins of both Greek and English editions of Plato. Stephanus is the Latinized name of Henri Estienne (1528–98), the editor of a three-volume 1578 edition of the complete works of Plato. Each page of this edition is split into two columns, with the Greek text on the right and a Latin translation (by Jean de Serres) on the left. Between the two columns are the letters “a” to “e” dividing each column into five sections. A Stephanus number consists of the title of a work, a number corresponding to a page in the Stephanus edition, and a letter indicating a section of a column; for example, *Sophist* 247d. Translations in these notes come from *The Collected Dialogues*, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), unless otherwise indicated.

Specific texts in the works of Aristotle are cited using the conventional form of reference known as Bekker numbers. They standardize references to Aristotle's works regardless of translation or edition and often appear in the margins of both Greek and English editions of Aristotle. The numbers originated with the Prussian Academy of Sciences edition of the complete works of Aristotle. The editor of that edition was August Immanuel Bekker (1785–1871), from whom the reference system takes its name. A Bekker number consists of a numeral up to four digits corresponding to a page in the Bekker edition, a letter indicating column “a” or column “b” of the page, and then a line number. For example, the *Nicomachean Ethics* begins at 1094a1. Translations in these notes come from *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, volumes 1 and 2, edited by Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971, 1984), unless otherwise indicated.

References to the Bible are to the King James Version unless otherwise noted. Biblical texts are identified according to the name of the book, the chapter, and the verse; for example, Matthew 18:20. References to the works of William Shakespeare are abbreviated *OXS* and point to *The Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Works*, edited by John Jowett, William Montgomery, Gary Taylor, and Stanley Wells, second edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

STANDARD SOURCES FOR “NOTES TO THE TEXT”

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Robert Audi, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

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The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, eight volumes, edited by Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and The Free Press, 1972).

An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon: Founded upon the seventh edition of Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/>.

The Oxford Classical Dictionary, edited by Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth, third edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Oxford Reference Online, <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/GLOBAL.html>.

FRONT MATTER

i.14 ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή] For the activity of the reason is life (Greek). This is found in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Book XII, Chapter 7 (1072b27). The English is from Santayana's unpublished translation of *Metaphysics*, the holograph of which is located in The Houghton Library at Harvard University (MS Am 1946.2, folder 43 of 45).

INTRODUCTION

1.15–16 seventy Alexandrian sages,] According to legend seventy-two Jewish scholars were commissioned by Ptolemy II Philadelphus, the king of Egypt, to translate the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek for inclusion in his library. They were said to have worked for seventy-two days on the island of Pharos and to have separately produced seventy-two identical translations. The Greek text therefore was known as the Septuagint, which in turn became the Old Testament of the early Christians.

2.21 Aristotle] Greek philosopher (384–322 B.C.), born in the Ionian city of Stagira. He entered Plato's Academy in Athens around 367 B.C. and remained until Plato's death in 347 B.C. He then tutored Alexander the Great and founded the Lyceum in 335 B.C. He was a prolific lecturer and writer on art, logic, metaphysics, natural sciences, psychology, politics, and ethics. Aristotle argues, in Book 1, Chapter 7 of *The Nicomachean Ethics*, that happiness consists in performing one's proper activity excellently. The essential human activity is reasoning, hence human happiness is the excellent exercise of reason. Santayana's personal library included *The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, translated by J. E. C. Welldon (London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1892).

5.34–35 Don Quixote] Title character in the novel *Don Quixote de la Mancha* (1605) by the Spanish writer Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra (1547–1616). The novel is a satire on the exaggerated chivalry of the seventeenth century. Some critics have perceived the main character as an idealist who is continually mocked and defeated in a materialist world.

5.36 naturalists] Those who hold that everything in the world consists of natural entities (i.e., entities studied by the sciences) and that appropriate methods of justification and explanation should be modeled more or less on those of the sciences.

5.38 Bacon] Francis Bacon (1561–1626), English philosopher and statesman. Bacon is well known for promoting the inductive method and experimental

science, and his works include *Essays* (1597), *Novum Organum* (1620), and *New Atlantis* (1627). For Bacon, the value of science lay in its application and its potential for improving human life through mastery of nature.

6.2 positivists] Those who hold that knowledge derives from observation and is restricted to the observable physical world. As a philosophical position it was articulated by the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857). He was concerned mainly with scientific methodology and criticized metaphysical speculation as the product of unbridled imagination.

6.33 Fathers;] Religious leaders or teachers who have formulated the orthodox doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. Santayana’s mention of the Fathers of the Church in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (*IPR*, 70) places them in the fourth century A.D., indicating that he had in mind figures such as Ambrose (c. 340–97), Jerome (c. 347–420), and Augustine (354–430).

6.33 Plato,] Greek philosopher (c. 427–347 B.C.), born to a wealthy family in Athens. He was a follower of Socrates, and in 387 B.C. he founded the Academy in Athens, where Aristotle was to be his student. Plato wrote approximately twenty-four dialogues, which typically feature an inquirer and a respondent exploring a topic. Plato maintained that the observable world is made up of imperfect copies of unchanging ideal “Forms” that constitute true reality. His ethical doctrine advocated a life dedicated to study and contemplation of these Forms. Because the truth of the Forms was difficult (or impossible) to communicate, some commentators have thought that Plato resorted to myths in his dialogues to convey a sense of the truth. Santayana writes of the “disastrous consequences” of Plato’s parables or mythmaking in *Reason in Religion*, where he describes how Greek culture appropriated Hebrew metaphors and created “a chimerical metaphysics, containing much which, in reference to existing facts, is absurd” (*LR3*, 88–89). Santayana further remarks in *Reason in Art* that “[t]o give moral importance to myths, as Plato tended to do, is to take them far too seriously and to belittle what they stand for” (*LR4*, 175). Santayana’s personal library contained editions of Plato’s dialogues in German, English, and ancient Greek.

7.16 Pantheon] The temple in Rome honoring all the gods, first dedicated in 27 B.C. by Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa. The original building burned and was rebuilt during the emperor Hadrian’s reign (A.D. 117–38). Since A.D. 609 the Pantheon has been a Christian church dedicated to St. Mary of the Martyrs. The name comes from the Greek *pantheion* (πᾶνθεῖον), “temple of all gods.”

- 7.38 Elysian consolations;] Refers to Elysium or the Elysian Fields, an afterworld first described in Homer's *Odyssey*, 4.563–68 (translated by Richmond Lattimore [New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975], 79), as a paradise in which the inhabitants enjoyed a life of leisure similar to the gods. Originally, Elysium was reserved for the distinguished few, but later literature indicates that anyone who had lived a good life was admitted to Elysium. For a later description of Elysium see Virgil's *Aeneid*, 6.1000–1008 (translated by Robert Fitzgerald [New York: Vintage Books, 1984], 186).
- 8.29 Afrites] Evil spirits or monstrous beings in Arabian mythology. Of the five classes of jinn, or genies, they are the second most powerful. Also called “Afreet,” “Afrits” or “Efreet.”
- 8.34 mystic] One who holds that knowledge of the real world cannot be obtained by means of the senses or by conceptual thought. Such knowledge is obtained instead through direct communion with God or ultimate reality, often connected with ascetic or meditative practice. Typically, mystical experience leads to the conclusion that distinctions between oneself and reality, or subject and object, are erroneous.
- 9.12 Heraclitus,] Greek philosopher (c. 535–c. 475 B.C.), born to an aristocratic Ephesian family. He is known for the view that all is in flux, and permanence is an illusion; but the underlying *logos* (λόγος) or connected order of things abides in the ever-changing nature of reality. Plato famously reports that “Heraclitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same water twice” (*Cratylus* 402a). Only fragments of Heraclitus's actual writings survive, including this text: “On those stepping into rivers staying the same other and other waters flow” (DK 22B12). Santayana refers to this doctrine in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (IPR, 86).
- 9.17 Descartes] René Descartes (1596–1650), French philosopher, scientist, and mathematician; often cited as the originator of modern philosophy. He was born in a small town near Tours and educated at the Jesuit College at La Flèche in Anjou. Famous philosophical works include *Discourse on the Method* (1637), *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641), and *Principles of Philosophy* (1644). In his philosophical inquiries he sought an Archimedean point or solid ground of indubitable knowledge on which to base all scientific knowledge but that also allowed a place for the individual soul or mind. He claimed to find such a ground in the seemingly certain statement, “I am thinking, therefore I exist” [see note 129.5]. However, this foundation introduced a sharp divide between

the mind and the external world, and, furthermore, made certainty the standard of all knowledge about the world.

9.24–25 skepticism,] From the Greek verb *skeptomai* (σκέπτομαι), meaning “to look about, look carefully” or “to examine, consider, think carefully.” The English word denotes a critical attitude toward claims of knowledge. As a philosophical position, skepticism questions the possibility of knowing anything about the real nature of things. Descartes is responding to such skeptical doubts with his famous first instance of indubitable knowledge, “I am thinking, therefore I exist” [see note 9.17]. As was his habit, Santayana uses the British spelling. When Santayana had corrected the proof of *Reason in Common Sense* he wrote to his publisher, Charles Scribner’s Sons, regarding the British spellings: “I have restored the us in “honour” etc, partly because I prefer them and partly because, if this book appears also in England, the other spelling would shock people too much. They will receive shocks enough from the substance without adding others in the manner” (*LGS*, 1:271).

9.25 transcendentalism] In opposition to mysticism and skepticism, transcendentalism holds that reason is the only means to philosophical truth. This way to truth is corrupted by succumbing to external authority or tradition. The term is often applied specifically to a group of New England intellectuals including Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–82), Henry David Thoreau (1817–62), and Theodore Parker (1810–60). In its wider application, transcendentalism can include Romantics, German Idealists, Kantians, and Platonists.

10.9 Democritus] Greek philosopher (c. 460–c. 370 B.C.), born at Abdera in Thrace. Following fellow Greek philosopher Leucippus (fifth century B.C.), Democritus was a materialist who held that all existence is explicable in terms of collisions and conglomerations of atoms (from the Greek *atomos* [ἄτομος], meaning “uncut” or “unmown,” “indivisible”) moving in a void. Atoms are, in Democritus’s view, tiny indivisible and indestructible particles imperceptible to the senses. The mechanical motion of atoms, and not human perception, is true reality. Human knowledge results from contact with atoms; mind operates according to the same principles as other material existence. This philosopher is the inspiration for the character Democritus in Santayana’s *Dialogues in Limbo* (1925).

11.5 Socratic philosophy,] Socrates (469–399 B.C.) lived his entire life in Athens, Greece. He was a stonemason by trade and reputed to be a courageous soldier. Concerned primarily with moral questions and specifically the nature of the good, he famously maintained that the unexamined life is not worth living. His dedication to the examined life led him to question famous and powerful

Athenians about the virtues they lauded. This earned him the ire of many fellow citizens, who put him on trial and condemned him to death for impiety and corrupting the youth of the city. Socrates wrote no works himself, but Plato wrote many dialogues portraying Socrates engaged in conversation with fellow Athenians and visitors to the city. Plato's accounts are the chief source of Socrates' reputation, though it is often difficult to distinguish Platonic and Socratic strains of thought. Xenophon (c. 430–c. 350 B.C.), an Athenian soldier and writer, also left written accounts of Socrates [see note 12.9].

11.15 Athenian agora;] An open, central location in the city reserved for public functions. The agora was the heart of commerce, politics, and culture in ancient Greek cities. The central area of the agora could be a site for monuments and memorial statuary, while important civic buildings lined the sides. In Athens the council-house, magistrates' offices, law courts, archives, mint, and public dining-hall could be found at the agora, along with fountain houses and sanctuaries. The agora was regarded as sacred and could be subject to rules of purity.

11.28 Sophists,] From the Greek adjective *sophos* (σοφός), meaning “wise,” “learned,” or “expert,” the term came to denote traveling teachers, roughly contemporary to Socrates, who instructed young men in rhetoric, science, and morals. They took payment for their teaching, and some became quite popular and prospered. However, some Greeks considered sophists a threat to traditional morals and religion because of their naturalistic outlook. Though no single doctrine united the sophists, some became well-known for their particular views. Protagoras was famous for asserting that “Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are, that [or “how”] they are, and of things that are not, that [or “how”] they are not” (DK 80b1). Plato believed that public suspicion of sophists contributed to the condemnation of Socrates, hence Plato's attempt to distinguish Socrates from the sophists by, among other things, portraying Socrates as never taking payment for instruction.

11.31 Hellas] Referring originally to a region near Thermopylae and south of the Spercheios River, Hellas eventually applied to all of Greece. Greeks now refer to themselves as Hellenes (the official name of the present-day nation of Greece is the Hellenic Republic), but the origin of this broader application is unknown. In *The Iliad*, Homer makes the distinction between the majority of “Achaean” Greeks and the few “Hellene” Greeks, Achilles belonging to the latter group.

12.2 gods of Greece] The Olympian gods according to traditional Greek mythology include Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, Hades, Hestia (or Dionysus), Ares, Hermes, Apollo, Hephaestus, Athena, Aphrodite, and Artemis, although the Parthenon

frieze replaces Hades with Demeter. Zeus, as king of the gods and ruler of the heavens and earth, embodies the societal value of patriarchal authority. Hera is his sister and queen, and his brothers, Poseidon and Hades, rule the sea and underworld. The divine children were Ares, Hermes, Apollo, Hephaestus, Athena, Aphrodite, and Artemis. It was said that Zeus's sister Hestia, who was also an Olympian, resigned her place to Dionysus. Apollo, as the god of the sun and of music, can be seen as representing the ideal of order; conversely, Dionysus's role as the god of wine and drunkenness, as well as his ability to embody opposing qualities (e.g., human and beast, masculine and feminine), signifies the ideal of unrestrained decadence and disorder.

12.9 Socratic ethics] Socrates' philosophy is generally thought to be more faithfully portrayed in Plato's earlier works, in which Socrates engages fellow citizens in ethical debate. The exchanges typically begin with a search for the definition of an ethical concept such as courage, piety, or justice. Though satisfactory definitions are not established, some ethical principles appear to be consistently advocated by Socrates. For example, the unexamined life is not worth living; it is better to accept injustice to one's self than to commit acts of injustice; a genuine understanding of moral matters is the only good in and of itself; the virtuous aspects of all the various forms of knowledge cannot be separated from one another; death is not an evil; the truly good individual cannot be harmed; and the divine holds wisdom inaccessible to humans and is incapable of immoral action [see note 11.5].

12.12 owl of Minerva] Minerva, the Roman analogue of the Greek goddess Athena, was the goddess of wisdom and the owl was her symbol. Hegel uses the image in a famous passage from the preface to his 1821 work, *The Philosophy of Right*: "When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering" (from the author's preface to *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde [London: George Bell and Sons, 1896], xxx). Hegel's phrase has been interpreted as asserting that philosophy is incapable of making normative claims about the world but rather is able only to understand the world after events have occurred. Santayana's personal library included an 1821 German edition of Hegel's work.

12.12 Hegel] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), German philosopher, born in Stuttgart. He was educated at the University at Tübingen, where he met as students the philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling and the poet Friedrich Hölderlin. Hegel is widely known as an Absolute Idealist who

believed in the supremacy of reason. Hegel's philosophy maintains the priority of a collective human spirit against the modern assumption of the priority of the individual subject. For Hegel, the subject-matter of philosophy is the history of human experience, which is the history of human spirit coming to self-consciousness. This self-consciousness is achieved through the dialectical interaction of spirit and matter in history and results in the realization of universal rational order. The influence of Hegel's philosophy has been extensive and the range of interpretations various. His most famous works include *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), *The Science of Logic* (1812–16), and *The Philosophy of Right* (1821).

12.15–16 the love ... the poets;] In Book X of Plato's *Republic*, Socrates tells Glaucon that "we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men. For if you grant admission to the honeyed Muse in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best" (607a). Socrates advocates severely regulating poets in the ideal city, because poets are engaged in an imitative art, which puts their productions at a remove from true beauty and truth itself. Just as painters necessarily distort their subjects in representing them, for example, as two-dimensional; so poets produce misleading accounts of gods. This is seen in the epics and tragedies that assign base attributes to divine beings.

14.31–32 Heraclitus's ... immediate,] Heraclitus held that immediate experience is always experience of change, but there is a permanent *logos* or rational process underlying the ever-changing immediate. The doctrine of Heraclitus that Plato received was transmitted through Cratylus, who held a radical view that all is in flux and so knowledge is not possible. Plato took this view of the immediate and made it his realm of phenomena or world of appearance; knowledge was assured, however, through Plato's world of unchanging Forms [see notes 6.33 (Plato) and 9.12].

15.1 Parmenides] Greek philosopher of Elea (c. 515–480 B.C.), an Ionian colony in southern Italy, and founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy [see note 110.15–16]. Of his writings, 150 lines of a didactic poem remain. The poem has an allegorical introduction followed by two parts: the "Way of Truth" and the "Way of Seeming." Parmenides argues that what has being necessarily is. Being, according to Parmenides, is ungenerable, imperishable, and unchanging—it cannot not be. Plato attributes to Parmenides the doctrine that "all is one," though this phrase is not found in Parmenides' extant writings. However, the idea that all being is a unity seems consistent with the idea that being is

unchanging (G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957], 263–86).

15.7–8 Eleatic Absolute.] The unchanging reality or Being postulated by Parmenides [see note 15.1].

15.30–31 Aristotle ... efficient cause and formal essence;] In the *Physics*, Aristotle distinguishes four types of causes: the material cause is that out of which something is made; the efficient cause is that which initiates a process of change acting on the material cause; the formal cause is the essential plan guiding the enactment of the efficient cause; and the final cause is the purpose, end, or goal of something. Modern science is often characterized as rejecting final causes (or teleology) in favor of mechanistic accounts of phenomena.

18.28 Spinoza] Baruch (or Benedict) Spinoza (1632–77), Dutch philosopher, born and educated in the Spanish-Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam. He studied Descartes' philosophy with a German former Jesuit, Francis van den Enden, from 1652 to 1656, and in 1656 the Jewish community excommunicated him for his unorthodox views. He earned a living as a lens grinder and never left Holland despite being offered a professorship at the University of Heidelberg. He refused the position partly because he thought it a threat to his intellectual freedom and tranquility. Famous works include *Ethics*, the fullest statement of his views; *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*, and *Theological-Political Treatise*; all of which were published a few months after his death. Spinoza denied that God and Nature are distinct and maintained that there is only one substance. He claimed that God exists necessarily and everything follows necessarily from God's divine nature. Together with Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza was an important philosophical inspiration for Santayana. At the time of his graduation, Santayana published his essay "The Ethical Doctrine of Spinoza" in *The Harvard Monthly* (2 [June 1886]: 144–52). Later, he wrote an introduction to *Spinoza's Ethics and 'De intellectus emendatione'* (London: Dent, 1910, vii–xxii). Santayana characterized Spinoza as his "master and model" in understanding the naturalistic basis of morality (*PP*, 233–36). Santayana's personal library contained a collection of Spinoza's works entitled *Benedicti de Spinoza Opera Quotquot Reperta Sunt* (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1882–83).

CHAPTER I

24.13 Cronos] In Greek mythology, a Titan and the youngest son of Uranus (Heaven) and Gaia (Earth). At his mother's urging, Cronos (or Cronus) castrated his father and assumed his authority. With his sister Rhea he fathered the

Olympian Gods: Hestia, Demeter, Hera, Hades, Poseidon, and Zeus [see note 12.2]. Fearing destruction at the hands of one of his children, Cronos devoured all of them with the exception of Zeus, who was saved by Rhea. Gaia forced Cronos to vomit up his children, who eventually overthrew him. He also is associated with time, which in Greek is *chronos*, since it also destroys or “swallows” all that it brings into existence.

26.18 *point-d'appui*.] Literally meaning “point of support” (French). The phrase typically occurs in a military context and means “a point upon which troops are formed,” “base of operations,” or “rallying point.”

26.36 rationalists.] Those who privilege reason over other means of knowledge. Rationalism often entails a denial of the reality of sensation or experiential phenomena in favor of *a priori* knowledge or what can be known independently of experience. [See note 8.34 for the contrast with mysticism or mystics.]

27.24 Fichte.] Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), German philosopher and political thinker, born in Saxony and educated at Jena and Leipzig. His chief philosophical influence was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) [see note 53.13]. Fichte’s best-known work remains *Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy* (Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1794). His main philosophical concern was reconciling human freedom with natural necessity. He took the free human will to be primary and then sought to understand how human beings with free will could be part of the natural world of causally determined material objects. He was an influential figure for German idealism and romanticism [see note 114.35–36].

27.24 Schopenhauer.] Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), German philosopher, born in Danzig, studied medicine at the University of Göttingen and philosophy at the University of Berlin and the University of Jena, where he earned his doctorate in 1813. His main philosophical influence was German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) [see note 53.13]. The systematic statement of his philosophy and his most well-known work is *The World as Will and Representation* (1818) in which he claims that the fundamental reality is will, which he equates with Kant’s thing-in-itself. Furthermore, he maintains that the thing-in-itself is knowable through experience of one’s inner reality of willing. In his view, will extends beyond the individual to the inner nature of all things, and, in fact, all will is one. The quieting of the will is the human ideal and is achieved only rarely and by the saint, who recognizes the futility of struggle and rejects desire. This results in compassion for all beings and the insight that all things are one. Other important works include *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1813, 1847) and *Parerga und Paralipomena* (1851).

CHAPTER II

- 32.29 deeming nothing human alien to us;] This is an allusion to the play *Self-Tormentor* by Roman playwright Terence (Publius Terentius Afer, c. 190–c. 160 B.C.). In Act I, Scene I, the character Chremes says, “Homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto” (*Woman of Andros, Self-Tormentor, Eunuch*, translated by John Barsby [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001], 186). A common translation is “I am a human, so nothing human is alien to me.” Santayana made explicit reference to the Latin maxim in *The Genteel Tradition at Bay*, where he wrote, “[i]f the humanist could really live up to his ancient maxim, ... he would sink into moral anarchy and artistic impotence” (*GTB*, 7–8).
- 36.10 Laplace] Pierre Simon Laplace (1749–1827), French mathematician and astronomer, famous for his formulation of probability theory. His classic work on probability is *Analytic Theory of Probabilities* (1812). He maintained that the world is deterministic, but that our ignorance of causal relations requires us to express them as probabilities. He also worked with J. L. Lagrange to establish without a doubt Newton’s gravitational theory. The results were included in a famous five-volume work entitled *Celestial Mechanics* (1799–1825).
- 36.14 Lucretius] Titus Lucretius Carus (c. 99–c. 55 B.C.), Roman poet and follower of Epicurean philosophy. He is the author of the epic poem *De Rerum Natura* (*On the Nature of Things*), which is a rendering of Epicurean philosophy in hexameter verse. It attempts to show how even the most abstruse points of physics and philosophy contribute to tranquility and freedom from the fears of popular religion. Santayana’s reference is to Book IV, in which Lucretius discusses sensation and thought. Lucretius is one of the poets treated in Santayana’s *Three Philosophical Poets* (1922). Santayana’s personal library included a copy of *De Rerum Natura Libri Sex* (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1886).
- 36.35–36 “Now ... rich to die”;] From John Keats’s poem, “Ode to a Nightingale,” *Lamia, Isabella, The Eve of St. Agnes, and Other Poems* (London: Taylor and Hessey, 1820).
- 37.26 dithyrambic verse.] Verse that contains an element of unrestrained and intoxicated vehemence, originally associated with the choral worship of the Greek god of wine, Dionysus. The origins of the verse form and the meaning of the word have been debated since antiquity.
- 38.2 *Felix ... causas.*] From Virgil, *Georgics*, Book II, Line 490 (volume 1, edited by Richard F. Thomas [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], 65).

The line may be translated as “That man is blessed who has learned the causes of things” (*The Georgics of Virgil*, translated by David Ferry [New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005], 85).

CHAPTER III

43.9 Hume] David Hume (1711–76), Scottish philosopher and historian, born and educated in Edinburgh. Hume is regarded as one of the British Empiricists and claimed that philosophy could not go beyond experience to any ultimate origins. His most important works include *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40), *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748), *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751), *History of England* (1754–62), and *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1778). Hume is known for his claim that, despite the persistent human belief in necessary causal connections, neither sense nor reason can discover such a connection. Sense experience reveals only temporal or spatial contiguity. Reason offers no direct access to the truth of causal connection because there is no contradiction in imagining an observed correlation happening otherwise than it has so far been observed. The belief is explained as a habit conditioned by the experience of constant conjunction of things said to be causally related. Hume did not, however, reject inductive reasoning based on causal relations; rather he offered a new description of reason as a habit of mind. (See *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Sections IV and V.)

44.27–28 a “spiritual substance” or a “transcendental ego”] These are terms used to indicate an immaterial entity that remains constant and so provides a basis for the identity of the perceiving or thinking subject.

48.31–32 a heaven ... at Bethel,] This refers to passages in the book of Genesis: “And he dreamed, and behold a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven: and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it” (Genesis 28:12). “And he was afraid, and said, How dreadful is this place! this is none other but the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven. And Jacob rose up early in the morning, and took the stone that he had put for his pillows, and set it up for a pillar, and poured oil upon the top of it. And he called the name of that place Bethel: but the name of that city was called Luz at the first” (Genesis 28:17–19).

50.3–5MN *Mens naturaliter platonica.*] Latin, translated as “Mind is naturally platonic.”

50.17–19 If no site be ... enshrined in heaven;] The “Platonic City” refers to the ideal city imagined by Socrates in Plato’s *Republic*. In the *Republic* Socrates and

his companions are trying to determine the nature of justice. Though it is justice in the soul of the individual they want to discover, they decide to look for justice in the city, because the city is larger than the individual human being and they presume it will be easier to find on the larger scale (368e–369a). They proceed to construct an ideal city in words, but later his interlocutors demand how such a city could be realized, and Socrates defends the unrealizable ideal (471c–473c).

50.19–20 has not where to lay its head.] This refers to a passage in the biblical Book of Matthew: “And Jesus saith unto him, The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head” (Matthew 8:20).

50.24 this rationalistic or Platonic system] A system which regards ideas as more real than objects of sense.

CHAPTER IV

53.4 The English psychologists] John Locke (1623–1704), George Berkeley (1685–1753), David Hume (1711–76), David Hartley (1705–57), James Mill (1773–1836), and John Stuart Mill (1806–73). They advocated an empirical psychology, which maintained that knowledge was acquired through sensory experience. This was in contrast to innatist psychology, which held that ideas develop out of the mind or consciousness alone. Empiricism rejected as chimerical traditional metaphysical ideas, which were closely allied with innatist or rationalist philosophies.

53.12 Hobbes] Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), English philosopher, born to modest circumstances, studied at Oxford. He became a tutor to wealthy and powerful people. His proximity to political power and his intellectual gifts allowed him to produce philosophical works of great political insight, and he is acknowledged as the founder of modern political philosophy. His most widely known book is *Leviathan* (1651), which builds upon a materialistic account of human life to argue for the need for a ruler vested with absolute power. His materialism was thoroughgoing and maintained that the world consists exclusively of bodies. In *De Corpore* (1655), Hobbes defined “body” as “that, which having no dependence upon our thought, is coincident or coextended with some part of space” (*The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, volume I, edited by Sir William Molesworth [London: John Bohn, 1839], 102).

53.12 Locke] John Locke (1632–1704), English philosopher and physician, born in Somerset to a middle-class Puritan family, studied at Oxford. His important

works include *The Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1689) and the *Second Treatise of Government* (1689). Locke is regarded as one of the British Empiricists, since he rejected innate ideas as an explanation for knowledge. He instead regarded the mind as a *tabula rasa* (blank slate) at birth that acquires ideas through experience, specifically through sensation and subsequent reflection. The mind then combines, divides, generalizes, and abstracts these ideas to create new ideas. Locke accounts for physical objects, about which one has ideas, in terms of matter in motion and impacts among material bodies. But Locke characterized the fundamental substance of things as that “I know not what,” and he was unsure about what immaterial and material substances had in common that made both substances. Locke acknowledged a distinction between natural and revealed theology. He believed the existence of God could be demonstrated and that the existence of God was a condition for human existence.

53.13 Berkeley] George Berkeley (1685–1753), Anglo-Irish philosopher, bishop of the Anglican Church, graduated from Trinity College, Dublin, lived in Rhode Island from 1728 to 1732, became bishop of Cloyne, Ireland, in 1734. He wrote on the psychology of vision, mathematics, and medicine, as well as philosophy and theology. His important works include *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709), *Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710), and *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous* (1713). He advocated a metaphysical idealism that all existing entities are either perceiving spirits or perceived entities. This entails that ordinary objects exist if and only if they are perceived, a view summed up in the principle *esse est percipi* or “to be is to be perceived.” The mind of God is supposed to ensure the continued existence of material objects. In support of his position, Berkeley argued that physical objects are collections of sensible qualities, and these qualities cannot exist apart from a perceiving mind; hence physical objects cannot exist apart from a perceiving mind. Furthermore, Berkeley argued that it is impossible to conceive of an object existing apart from mind because to do so involved conceiving that object; hence no object can exist apart from mind.

53.13 Kant.] Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), German philosopher, born in Königsberg, East Prussia (today Kaliningrad, Russia), established the philosophical position known as critical idealism. His teachers were Pietists influenced by Leibniz and Christian Wolff, and Kant himself found inspiration in Rousseau and Newton. Except for a time when he worked as a tutor in the countryside, Kant spent his life as a student and a teacher in Königsberg. Kant maintained that all knowledge is conditioned by the structure of the mind, though he did not deny that there is a reality independent of this structure.

Knowledge of experienced objects or “phenomena” is contrasted with the independent reality of things-in-themselves or “noumena.” Our ability to perceive phenomena includes the necessary “pure forms of intuition,” space and time, which structure the representations delivered by the senses. Our ability to understand phenomena includes the necessary “pure concepts of the understanding” or “categories,” such as causality and substance. His major works include *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787), *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), and *Critique of Judgment* (1790).

53.31 “tendency to feign.”] This phrase occurs frequently in Santayana’s works (in the present work at pages 53, 58, and 108; *LR5*, 302; *COUS*, 85; and *SE*, 42, 216). It occurs several times in *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, including once where it is explicitly attributed, without citation, to David Hume (*SAF*, 300). It refers to the human tendency to disregard the irrational basis of reason and then construe reason as a fixed structure of concepts, which often led to skepticism when knowledge could not be established with certainty. The references to Hume suggest the affinity of what Santayana came to call “animal faith” with Hume’s notion of natural belief. Norman Kemp Smith, in his work *The Philosophy of David Hume* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), writes that natural belief is perhaps the “most characteristic” doctrine in Hume’s philosophy. Hume’s position is that while the senses provide no certain basis for beliefs in independent existences and causal connections, such beliefs are inescapable. If skepticism about such beliefs prevailed “all human life must perish.... All discourse, all action would immediately cease....” (David Hume, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding: A Critical Edition*, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], 119). Natural beliefs are an unjustified and unjustifiable precondition for action and all more specific beliefs. These beliefs rooted in action indicate something more fundamental than reason or sense perception.

54.10–13 In Hume ... the party was over.] Hume argued that reason is an unintelligible instinct and thereby acknowledged the conflict that Santayana is pointing out in the thinking of the English psychologists and Kant regarding human reason. Hume expresses this view in his famous dictum, “Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man” (*An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding: A Critical Edition*, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], 7). According to Hume, human beings are both reasonable and active. He writes, “It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biases to *draw* too much, so as to incapacitate them for

other occupations and entertainments” (*Enquiry*, 7). In Hume’s view, “a man of parts” (that is, one of high intellectual abilities, of cleverness, and of talents) prudently balances a life of reason and intelligence and a life of action and instinct. See E. C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume*, second edition [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001]), especially Part I, Chapters 6 and 7, for an account of the experience in which Hume’s views are grounded.

55.5 Parmenides and Heraclitus] [See notes 9.12 (Heraclitus) and 15.1 (Parmenides).]

56.11 the scholastics] The term typically refers to philosophers of the medieval period in the history of European philosophy. The period is recognized as beginning with Augustine of Hippo (354–430) and continuing until the time of René Descartes (1596–1650). Notable scholastics include Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius of Rome (480–524), Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), Peter Abelard (1079–1142), Peter Lombard (1100–1160), Thomas Aquinas (1224–74), Bonaventure (1221–74), Duns Scotus (1266–1308), and William of Ockham (1285–1349). Scholasticism grew out of the traditions of Plato, Aristotle, and Christian apologetics. Medieval philosophers were often concerned with making Christian theology a science, by which is meant a field of rational inquiry; and much work was done to apply Platonic and Aristotelian insights to theological problems. As a result, medieval philosophers made contributions in logic and the nature of scientific inquiry.

56.36–37 “the frequency of insignificant speech is one.”] The quotation is from Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan* (edited by Edwin M. Curley [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994], 7). In the chapter in which this line appears, Hobbes distinguishes the sense of an object and the object itself (that is, what they are independently of sense) and maintains that the sensible qualities of an object are the result of matter in motion making impressions on an observer’s sense organs. He contrasts his position with the traditional Aristotelian idea that an object has within itself the very quality (sound, color, etc.) sensed by an observer. Hobbes maintained that the Aristotelian view, as taught by “the Philosophy-schools, through all the Universities of Christendome,” resulted in insignificant speech.

57.15 “mathematical atheists”];] The phrase applies to those who believe that nature may be understood wholly by means of mathematical methods. T. H. Green uses it in his introduction to David Hume’s *A Treatise on Human Nature*, where he identifies “materialists and ‘mathematical Atheists’” as opponents of Berkeley (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1874, 140).

57.31–32 distinction between impressions and ideas,] David Hume makes the distinction in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, in which he claims “that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent” (edited by David F. Norton and Mary J. Norton [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], 9).

58.18–19 that French lady who asked if all children were not natural.] The Duchesse de Réville asks, “Est-ce que tous les enfants ne sont pas naturels?” in Act I, Scene VII, of *Le Monde où l’on s’ennuie*, an 1881 play by Édouard Pailleron (1834–99). An 1894 edition edited for school use in America deletes this line and others “which mar its fitness for class reading” (Boston: D. C. Heath), iv. The play was best known in English as *The Art of Being Bored* (New York: Samuel French, 1914).

58.22 “sitting down in a forlorn scepticism.”] The phrase is found in the Introduction of Berkeley’s *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*: “we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn skepticism” (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957, 5). It refers to the discouragement resulting from finding paradoxes and puzzles after inquiring into the nature of reason and knowledge. [See note 53.13 on Berkeley.]

58.27–28 “tendency to feign”] [See note 53.31.]

59.24 *arrière-pensée*.] A concealed thought or intention (French).

59.29–30 indispensable categories of his understanding] Kant’s categories are conceptual forms, pure concepts of understanding, or forms of judgment about appearances without reference to content. See “The Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding” in Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 204). [See note 53.13 on Kant.]

60.19 “categorical imperative”] In Kant’s moral philosophy, the categorical imperative is the fundamental rule of behavior governing rational agents; it declares what ought to be done from the perspective of pure reason, independent of individual motives or desires. The general formulation commands that one act only on the maxim that can at the same time be consistently willed to be a universal law (a maxim being a particular determination of the will). For example, if acting on the maxim “I will lie by promising to repay money that I desperately need but can never repay,” it cannot be willed to be a universal law without contradiction. The attempt would yield the universal law “Whenever one is in need, one may obtain what is needed by making a false

promise,” but if this were a universal law every promise would become suspect and the practice of making promises would become meaningless. Hence as a universal law it is contradictory and in violation of the categorical imperative. Of greater significance is that in choosing the categorical imperative as an essential law of reason, rational agents achieve moral freedom. The rational agent, in choosing the rational categorical imperative, gives the law to him or herself and thus achieves autonomy. To choose an irrational course is to destroy the capacity to choose and to surrender one’s freedom (the moral agent then falls into heteronomy). See Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788).

61.29–30 his sect and generation,] This may refer to the Protestant sect of Pietism founded by Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705) and furthered by August Hermann Francke (1663–1727). The movement rejected the rigid institutional orthodoxy of contemporary Protestantism and emphasized practices of piety and the authority of inner experience. Kant’s mother was an early adherent of the sect. (“Pietism,” *The Oxford Concise Dictionary of World Religions*, and “Pietism,” *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church in Oxford Reference Online* [accessed 8 April 2009]).

63.4–5 Ask what can be meant by “conditions of experience” and Kant’s bewildering puzzle solves itself at the word.] Kant held that the mind actively contributes to the experience of what is observed. This is in contrast to the positions of the Rationalists (such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz), who regarded the mind as passively containing fully formed innate ideas, and the Empiricists (such as Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume), who regarded the mind as a passive blank slate that received ideas from sense impression. The “conditions of experience,” then, are the formal structures of the mind that are devoid of content and that make experience possible in the presence of sensuous intuition. For example, space and time are held by Kant to be forms of sensibility that make experience of objects possible. Space and time are not directly perceived, but they are required for perception of objects. Hence, they are, according to Kant, conditions of experience contributed by the mind. See Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and especially the sections entitled “The Transcendental Aesthetic” and “The Analytic of Concepts.” [See notes 53.13 and 59.29–30.]

63.31–33 Synthesis is not a natural ... but constitutes it.] Kantian synthesis is the cognitive process whereby mental schema or concepts are applied to sensory content. This is the process by which the categories of mind structure sensuous

intuition and make experience and thought about the world actual. [See notes 53.13, 59.29–30, and 63.4–5.]

64.9–11 Saint Lawrence’s experience of being roasted ... his own stalwart Christianity.] Lawrence (d. 10 August 258) was responsible, under Pope Sixtus II, for maintaining the church’s possessions and providing support for the poor and sick. When the Roman Emperor Valerian outlawed Christianity, Sixtus was arrested and sentenced to death. According to legend, as Sixtus was led to his death Lawrence lamented not being martyred with his pope. Sixtus comforted him, saying he too would become a martyr in three days. In response, Lawrence gave the church’s possessions to the poor, but a Roman prefect learned of this and demanded that he turn over the church’s wealth to the empire. So Lawrence appeared before his persecutors with the sick and poor of Rome claiming that these were the church’s greatest treasures. As punishment for this insult, Lawrence allegedly was slowly roasted to death on a grid-iron. Some Roman senators were so moved by Lawrence’s piety they immediately converted to Christianity, hence the beginning of the conversion of the empire being credited to Lawrence (Alban Butler, *Butler’s Lives of the Saints*, volume III, edited by Herbert Thurston S.J. and Donald Attwater [New York: P. J. Kennedy and Sons, 1963], 297–98).

64.25 “subjective conditions”] Subjective conditions, for Kant, are those conditions provided by the mind that make experience and judgment possible. They are not subjective in the sense of varying from mind to mind, but rather in being distinct from objects. The subjective conditions of objective knowledge include the faculties of sensibility and understanding used in making empirical judgments. See Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). [See notes 53.13, 59.29–30, 63.4–5, and 63.31–33.]

65.3 thing-in-itself] Of key importance to Kant’s epistemology is the distinction between the ‘thing as it appears,’ or the phenomena, and the ‘thing in itself,’ or the noumena. See Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, particularly “The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements,” Division I, Book II, Chapter 3 (translated by Norman Kemp Smith [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965]). [See note 53.13.]

67.22 “mathematical atheists”] [See note 57.15.]

67.30 days of “Siris” and tar-water] After visiting America, Berkeley developed an interest in the medicinal benefits of drinking tar-water. He believed tar-water would cure most ailments, including asthma, small-pox, dysentery, and rheumatism. His work *Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-water and divers other subjects connected together and arising one from*

another (1744) is an attempt to establish the medicinal virtues of tar-water, provide scientific warrant for tar-water's efficacy, and lead the reader to contemplate God.

69.15–16 *esse est percipi*.] [See note 53.13 on Berkeley.]

69.18 Plato's *Theætetus*] In the *Theætetus*, a dialogue from the later period of Plato's literary activity, Socrates converses with the eponymous young mathematician about the nature of knowledge. They are seeking a definition that will account for knowledge being stable, infallible, and true of an existing object, and the result of first-hand experience. Three general suggestions are considered as a definition of knowledge: (1) sense-perception, (2) true belief, or (3) true belief plus an account. These are subjected to scrutiny and ultimately rejected with no final definition being formulated. Nevertheless, Socrates suggests the conversation has made possible further progress and has benefited Theætetus by showing him that he does not know what he thought he knew.

70.30 Peripatetic] Used to denote a follower or doctrine of Aristotle or Aristotelianism and more generally a scholastic philosopher or doctrine [see note 56.11]. The term derives from the Greek verb περιπατέω, meaning "to walk about." A popular explanation of the term claims that it was customary for Aristotle and his students to walk about while speaking, hence the name. Contrary to this view, some claim that the term is taken from the covered walking hall, called a περίπατος, that was part of the grounds at the Lyceum, the school founded by Aristotle in Athens.

71.33 Kant's antinomies,] Kant's antinomies are part of his rejection of Rationalism (exemplified in the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz). According to Kant, the antinomies show how one can prove contradictory claims using the basic premises of the Rationalists' position. This is due to the Rationalists' attempt to advance knowledge beyond the empirical realm, that is, beyond what can be tested experientially. The contradictory claims of Kant's antinomies include, first, the claims that the world has a spatio-temporal origin and that the world does not have such an origin; second, the claims that a substance is composed of elemental parts and that a substance is not composed of elemental parts; third, the claims that rational agents have freedom and that rational agents do not have freedom; and fourth, the claims that a necessary being exists and that a necessary being does not exist. See Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), Second Division: The Transcendental Dialectic; Book II of the Dialectic Procedure of Pure Reason; Chapter II, "The Antinomies of Pure Reason."

72.2 *Critique of Pure Reason.*] One of three critiques published by Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century. In *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), Kant investigates the nature and power of reason. In *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), he develops his notion of moral imperatives and human freedom. In *The Critique of Judgment* (1790), he examines the notions of the beautiful and the sublime.

CHAPTER V

73.18–19 the Elysian Fields and the Coast of Bohemia] Both are fictional places appearing famously in myth and literature. [For “Elysian Fields” see note 7.38.] Bohemia is a landlocked region of the Czech Republic bounded by Austria, Germany, Poland, and Moravia (another region of the Czech Republic), hence it has no coast. In Shakespeare’s *A Winter’s Tale*, Antigonus lands and leaves the baby princess on the coast of Bohemia. William Dean Howells alludes to the play with the title of his novel *The Coast of Bohemia* (1893), which is set in a New York art community (the title also plays on the word “bohemian,” used to refer to an artist who defies social conventions). In *Reason in Art* (LR4, 182), Santayana uses “Bohemia” as a generic name for a utopia.

74.23 El Dorado.] In Spanish, “The Golden Man.” According to tradition, a group of native Colombian inhabitants, the Chibcha, practiced a ritual in which they rolled a chieftain in gold. The story gave rise to the legend of a land of prosperity and gold. Starting with the conquistadors, many European explorers sought the land and its wealth, Sir Walter Raleigh’s 1595 journey being the most famous.

74.36 Magna Charta] The “Great Charter” is one of the most well-known documents in English history. Issued in 1215 by King John at Runnymede, the charter effectively limits the powers of the monarch. The charter is often considered a watershed moment in the history of government and an important step toward modern-day constitutional rule. Figuratively speaking, the term “Magna Charta” (or “Magna Carta”) can apply to any momentous or revolutionary idea.

75.12 Lalande,] Joseph Jérôme Lefrançais de Lalande (1732–1807), French astronomer and mathematician. In 1751 with Nicolas Louis de Lacaille he measured the distance to the moon, and two years later at the age of 21 he was unanimously elected to the French Academy of Sciences. He edited the 1799 and 1802 editions of the *Dictionary of Atheists* and advocated science instead of religion as a cure for moral problems.

76.38 *pari passu*,] Latin for “at an equal rate or pace.”

77.27 the “secondary qualities,”] Though originally formulated in Robert Boyle’s *The Origin of Forms and Qualities* (1666), the distinction between primary and secondary qualities was famously articulated in Book 2 of John Locke’s *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690). According to Locke, the primary qualities of an object are those properties that the object possesses independently of a perceiver. The secondary qualities of an object are powers of the object to produce certain sense impressions in a perceiver. These impressions are commonly taken as properties of the object, though properly speaking they have no genuine independent status. Instead, these impressions result from the interaction of the sensory capacity of the perceiver and the independent primary qualities of the object. Examples of secondary qualities include perceptions like color, taste, and smell.

83.12 like the series of suns imagined by Heraclitus,] [See note 9.12.] According to Aristotle, Heraclitus claims that “The sun is new everyday” (DK 22b6), believing that the sun is kindled anew each morning and then extinguished upon setting.

85.23–26 The divine mind ... ignorance.] In the appendix to part I of the *Ethics*, Spinoza writes of those who, seeking final causes, “take refuge in the will of God—in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance” (*The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, vol. II, translated by R. H. M. Elwes; George Bell and Sons, 1883), 78.

CHAPTER VI

92.4 Lucretius] [See note 36.14.]

92.4 Dante] Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), Italian poet, born in Florence. His most well-known work is the *Divine Comedy* (1321), which describes a spiritual journey through Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven. In addition to a vision of the afterlife, the poem presents social critique and moral education. Dante’s symbols and allusions came from contemporary political and social events as well as natural science, astronomy, history, and philosophy. Dante is one of the figures Santayana treats in his *Three Philosophical Poets*.

94.13 Æsop] Ancient Greek storyteller (early sixth century B.C.), likely born in Thrace and lived on Samos as a slave. He was later freed and became known for his tales, often of talking animals, that teach a moral lesson, such as “The Tortoise and the Hare” and “The Boy Who Cried Wolf.”

- 95.5–6 Unsure ... spirit not.] From “The Discontented Poet: a Masque” by Ralph Waldo Emerson (*College Poems and Translations*, edited by Harold Bloom and Paul Kane [New York: Library of America, 1994], 373). The line also appears in “The Poet” by Emerson (*Poems*, New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, 1904, 319).
- 96.11 If Rousseau ... writing those *Confessions*] Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), Swiss-born French philosopher, author, political theorist, and composer. He has been characterized as the father of French Romanticism, due to his sensitivity, individualism, and imagination, along with his glorification of emotions, closeness to nature, and rebellion against established social and political order. His political ideas influenced the leaders of the French Revolution of 1789. *The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (1782) is an autobiographical inquiry into the relation of the inner self and social identities and is concerned with the personal qualities of one’s own existence.
- 97.19 Stoics] Stoicism was a movement in ancient philosophy founded by Zeno of Citium (334–262 B.C.), who came to Athens in 313 B.C. The name of the movement comes from the Greek word *στοά*, a kind of colonnade or porch with a roof and a rear wall. Zeno was said to frequent the Stoa Poecile so much that his followers became known as Stoics. The movement is divided into three periods: Early, Middle, and Late or Roman Stoicism. Figures in Early Stoicism include Zeno, Cleanthes of Assos (331–232 B.C.), and Chrysippus of Soli (c. 280–c. 206 B.C.). Figures of Middle Stoicism include Panaetius of Rhodes (185–c. 110 B.C.) and Posidonius of Apamea (c. 135–c. 51 B.C.). Figures of Late Stoicism include Seneca (c. 4 B.C.–A.D. 65), Epictetus (c. A.D. 50–c. 138), and Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121–80). Stoics were monists whose theology reflected their physics: God is the power that forms all things and harmonizes the relationship of all creation. For Stoicism, there is no distinction between God and the universe.
- 97.23 the Hebrew prophets,] The Hebrew prophets include the major prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel) and the twelve minor prophets (Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi), all of whom have books which contain their own writings. The list may also include the “Former Prophets” whose stories (rather than their actual writings) are found in the books of Joshua, Judges, 1 and 2 Samuel, and 1 and 2 Kings. The prophets were responsible for communicating the will of God to the people of Israel, and in particular they warned of God’s wrath if the Israelites did not conform their conduct to God’s laws (James D. Newsome Jr., *The Hebrew Prophets* [Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1984], 11. Ronald

H. Isaacs, *Understanding the Hebrew Prophets* [Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, Inc., 2001], 2).

CHAPTER VII

99.20–22 the familiar maxim of Aristotle that the particular alone exists in nature and the general alone in the mind.] In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle rejects Plato’s theory of Forms understood as independently existing universals (see 990b1–992b18). Elsewhere Aristotle claims that the universal is established in the mind through sense experience of existing particulars (see *Posterior Analytics*, 100a15–100b3 and *On the Soul*, 429a18–28).

100.38–39 are all fused together in my practical regard and given one local habitation and one name.] From lines 12–17 of William Shakespeare’s *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, Act 5, Scene 1 (*Oxford Shakespeare*, 419):

The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven,
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.

101.27–29 the old principles of Aristotelian psychology, association by similarity and association by contiguity.] Typically, the attribution to Aristotle of laws of association is based on a text found in *On Memory and Recollection*. Aristotle explains that one thing may lead to recollection of another thing because the things are “similar, or opposite, or neighboring” (451b10–22).

105.14–17 Aristotle ... general concepts ... made ... the whole material universe gravitate around them ... science need no longer appeal.] This refers to Book XII (or Book Lambda) of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (especially Chapters 7 and 9), in which he discusses the non-sensible and eternal unmoved mover as the ultimate cause of all motion. The activity of the unmoved mover is thought, and its object is itself thinking: “Therefore it must be itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking” (1075b34).

105.32–35 association by contiguity. Hobbes and Locke made ... quite empirical, tentative, and problematical.] Hobbes and Locke are acknowledged to be the first English theorists to seriously take up associationist psychology. For Hobbes, the fundamental principle of the association of ideas is motion: “The

nature of sense consists in motion,” he writes in *Elements of Philosophy* (*The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, volume I, edited by Sir William Molesworth [London: John Bohn, 1839], 394). Relations among ideas are determined by sensations, and association of ideas depends on contiguity in space or time, cause and effect, and resemblance (see Chapter IV of *Human Nature*, in *English Works*, volume IV, 14–19). Locke gives an account that is original in its emphasis on the disadvantage of associationism for correct thinking. He distinguishes the natural connection of ideas with one another from the unnatural association through choice, inclination, custom, or education. See “Of the Association of Ideas” in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (edited by Peter H. Nidditch [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984], 394–401). (Martin Kallich, “The Association of Ideas and Critical Theory: Hobbes, Locke, and Addison,” *ELH: A Journal of English Literary History* [December, 1945]: 290–315.) [For Aristotle on laws of association see note 101.27–29.]

108.15–16 “tendencies to feign”] [See note 53.31.]

108.32 Xenophanes] or Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 570–c. 480 B.C.) Ionian poet, theologian, natural philosopher, believed to have lived a wandering life mostly in Sicily after Ionia was invaded by Persia in 545 B.C. He is known more as a critic than the originator of a doctrine, and is best known for his criticisms of immortality and the anthropomorphism of popular Greek religion. Reportedly he believed in a single, immutable god, which has led to a traditional assimilation of his teachings to those of the Eleatics such as Parmenides and Melisseum. [For “Eleatics,” see note 110.15–16.]

110.15–16 the Eleatics proved the impossibility ... of motion,] “Eleatics” typically refers to Parmenides [see note 15.1] and Zeno of Elea, a follower of Parmenides active in the early fifth century B.C. The term may also apply to Melissus of Samos, an admiral who defeated the Athenians in 441 B.C. and who took up and extended Parmenides’ ideas about reality. All Eleatics agreed that reality is changeless, and Zeno is known for his defense of this position by means of his four paradoxes of motion. The paradoxes, discussed in Aristotle’s Book VI, Chapter 9, of *Physics*, purport to prove the impossibility of motion. One of the paradoxes, known as the Racecourse, argues that it is impossible to move between any two points, *A* and *B*. To move from *A* to *B* would require first moving to the midpoint, *C*, between *A* and *B*. But moving to *C* would require first moving to the midpoint between *A* and *C*, and so on *ad infinitum*. The idea is that no matter how short the distance between two points there is always a midpoint that one must reach first, but since there are an infinite number of

midpoints between any two points, the task is impossible, thus making motion impossible.

110.16–18 Kant ... natural knowledge,] Kant held that experience was the result of categories of the mind organizing sensory content such that the objects of experience (or phenomena) are different from the actual things-in-themselves (or noumena). Hence, objects of experience for Kant are not reality; noumena are reality. [See note 53.13.]

CHAPTER VIII

113.21–23 Thus the substance of things hoped for becomes, even in philosophy, the evidence of things not seen.] This is an allusion to verses in the New Testament of the Bible: “Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. For by it the elders obtained a good report. Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear” (Hebrews 11:1–3).

114.35–36 what Fichte would call the Ego, the Non-Ego, and Life.] The three basic principles of Fichte’s philosophical system are, first, the idea that the basic existent is the self-affirming Ego; this self-affirming Ego is absolute, and infinite activity makes possible any act of the Ego. Second, the Ego posits a non-ego, thereby differentiating absolute ideal activity and its field of activity. Third, the absolute Ego posits a limited ego in contrast to a limited non-ego. These provide the subject matter for empirical knowledge (as opposed to the ideal activity of Ego). [See note 27.24.]

115.36–116.1 demonstrations of geometry ... recollections of prenatal wisdom.] In Plato’s *Meno*, Socrates engages Meno in a conversation about the definition of virtue in and of itself. Meno can talk about the various properties of virtue but is unable to give a general definition. This inability to define what one claims to know leads to a discussion about learning and how it is possible. For, if the knowledge one seeks is already known by the inquirer, then there is no need to pursue it. On the other hand, if the knowledge that one seeks is something that is wholly unknown and absent to the inquirer, then the inquirer has the impossible task of searching for something that if found would be unrecognizable. Socrates responds to the paradox by suggesting that the soul is immortal and prior to being born into a body an immortal soul has already beheld true knowledge. Hence, when humans acquire knowledge this is not learning but rather recollection or rediscovery of what is already known to the immortal

soul. To provide evidence for his hypothesis, Socrates questions an uneducated slave boy and draws out basic geometric truths that the boy never learned from anyone.

116.31–32 We may answer in the words of Saint Paul: because things seen are temporal and things not seen are eternal.] Paul (d. c. A.D. 67), theologian, apostle to the Gentiles. He was an active missionary and worked to give intellectual coherence to Christian ideas. The reference is to a text in Paul’s letter to the church at Corinth: “While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal” (2 Corinthians 4:18).

118.22 Pythagoreans and Eleatics] Pythagoras (c. 570–c. 495 B.C.) Greek pre-Socratic philosopher, emigrated from the island of Samos to southern Italy. He is known for the belief that the universe is ordered according to mathematical relations and that numbers have mystic power; his fundamental tenet was that all is number. He is credited with founding a religious order and was famous for promoting the doctrine of metempsychosis, which holds that after physical death the immortal soul is reborn in both humans and animals. Among his followers, rules were established for purifying the soul. [For “Eleatics,” see note 110.15–16.]

120.39 Euclid] Greek mathematician (c. 325–c. 250 B.C.). There is no reliable biographical information about him. His *Elements* in thirteen books established the study of geometry and became the standard textbook of elementary mathematics for over 2,000 years.

121.36 Iphigenia] The daughter of Clytemnestra and Agamemnon in Greek legend. When the Greek ships were delayed by contrary winds at Aulis en route to the Trojan War, the seer Calchas informed Agamemnon that Artemis demanded the sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia. Agamemnon reluctantly agreed and, despite Clytemnestra’s protestations, Iphigenia nobly consented to die for the glory of Greece. Another legend contends that Artemis saved her life by substituting a hind at the altar and then carried her off to the land of the Taurians to serve as her high priestess. Years later Iphigenia had the opportunity to save the life of her brother Orestes, with whom she escaped to Greece. Euripides recounts both legends in his plays *Iphigenia in Aulis* and *Iphigenia in Tauris*.

121.37–39 The emanation of all things ... the crucifixion of the Logos.] Santayana here adopts Neoplatonic terminology to illustrate the conflict between reason

and its practical application. The “One” refers to a notion in Plato taken up and elaborated by Plotinus (A.D. 205–70). Plato discusses the concept of the One explicitly in *Parmenides*. In Book VI of the *Republic* he discusses the Good as that which is beyond being while it is itself the source of being. This is taken by some interpreters to be identical to the One as the highest principle or cause. It is through emanation or a kind of overflow that the One is the source of all that has being. Intelligence is the first emanation; intelligence then leads to the realm of Soul; soul is then incarnated in matter. This could be construed as the crucifixion of Logos (reason) since matter for Plotinus can turn Soul away from Intelligence. See Plotinus’s *Enneads*; see also the New Testament and the book of John, Chapter 1, in which Christ is described as the Word (λόγος), who is ultimately crucified in Chapter 19.

123.16–18 those energies ... which, as Spinoza says, ... exceed the energies of man.] Spinoza maintained that human beings were wholly included in nature and not apart from or outside of it. Accordingly, the human mind is subject to natural causes. In *Ethics*, Part II, Proposition 48, Spinoza writes, “There is in no mind absolute or free will, but the mind is determined for willing this or that by a cause which is determined in its turn by another cause, and this one again by another, and so on to infinity” (translated by A. Boyle [London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1910], 74). Hence, the material universe always exceeds human powers. Indeed, Spinoza claims that the human mind does not possess an absolute faculty of willing and cannot determine its own actions; rather, the human mind is always determined by a cause.

CHAPTER IX

129.4 philosophers of the Cartesian school] Although the Cartesian school can be defined differently depending on the scholarly fields considered (physical sciences, epistemology, or metaphysics), it typically can be understood as coextensive with Rationalism, whose chief representatives are Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. A distinctive characteristic is a belief in the capacity of *a priori* reason to grasp truths about the universe.

129.4–5 the German transcendentalists] The German transcendentalists include Immanuel Kant and his followers. Relevant to the contrast that Santayana makes between Cartesians and German transcendentalists is Kant’s rejection of the notion of a single source of knowledge. Kant also rejected speculative metaphysics and a materialistic interpretation of life, both key doctrines in Cartesian thought that would lead to the metaphysical crisis to which Santayana refers.

129.5 *cogito ergo sum*] Latin for “I am thinking, therefore I exist.” Descartes first wrote the phrase in French, “je pense, donc je suis,” in Part IV of his 1637 work, *Discourse on the Method* (*Oeuvres de Descartes: Discours de la Méthode & Essais VI*, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery [Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982], 32; *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, volume I, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 127). It appeared in Latin, “*ego cogito, ergo sum*,” in Part I of Descartes’ 1644 work, *Principles of Philosophy* (*Oeuvres de Descartes: Principia Philosophiae VIII-1*, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery [Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982], 7; *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* volume I, 195).

129.11 *bête machine*.] French for “animal machine.” Descartes maintained that a machine made to look and act like a non-human animal would be indistinguishable from the animal, though this could not be the case with a machine made to look and act like a human being. The difference is that any non-human animal lacks a rational soul, and for explanatory purposes it can be regarded as machine. See Part V of Descartes’s 1637 work, *Discourse on the Method* (*Oeuvres de Descartes: Discours de la Méthode & Essais VI*, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery [Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982], 40–60; *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* volume I, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 131–41). See also *LR5*, 96, for a discussion of Descartes, animal bodies, and machines; and *RT*, 59, or *RB1*, 465, for critical comment on the notion.

131.21–23 We cannot, ... without meaning it.] This is an allusion to a verse in the New Testament of the Bible: “Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?” (Matthew 6:27).

132.3–4 “The die is cast,” said Cæsar,] Julius Caesar is said to have uttered these words as he crossed the Rubicon, comparing his action to a throw in a game of dice. The quotation is attributed to Caesar by Suetonius (*The Lives of the Twelve Caesars*, translated by Robert Graves [New York: Penguin Books, 1989], 28) and by Plutarch (*Plutarch’s Lives*, translated by John Dryden, edited by Arthur Hugh Clough [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1909], 291).

133.28–29 Only the free divine the laws, / The causeless only know the cause.] These lines are from an untitled 1893 poem by Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson that appears in *Poems* (Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson [London: Privately published, printed by Chiswick Press, 1896], 16). The lines are also quoted in a biography entitled *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson* (E. M. Forster [London: Edward

Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1973]). Dickinson (1862–1932) was a fellow of King’s College (1887–1932), a lecturer in political science, and an active advocate for peace. He authored several books on literature, politics, philosophy, Asian civilization, and ancient Greece, and was a friend and correspondent of Santayana. For further mentions of Dickinson, see *PP*, 438, and *Letters*.

135.32 Aristippus] A philosopher (c. 425–c. 360 B.C.) from Cyrene, a Greek colony in Africa; friend and follower of Socrates. Like Socrates, Aristippus’s philosophical concerns were mainly ethical. He is traditionally credited with founding the Cyrenaic school of philosophy, which held that the only knowable things are sense-impressions and the supreme good is sensory pleasure of the present moment. This resulted in a hedonistic philosophy that emphasized the rational control of pleasure.

140.12–15 To confuse means with ends ... that portentous commotion.] See Spinoza, *Ethics*: “those who form injudicious opinions of things and are not wont to see things through their first causes ... do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, nor know they in what manner things are produced.... For those who do not know the real causes of things confuse everything” (translated by A. Boyle [London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1910], 5).

140.38–39 Like the prisoner of Chillon,] François de Bonnavard (1530–36), Swiss patriot and historian. He was imprisoned in the Chateau de Chillon for six years by Charles III, the Duke of Savoy, for opposing the Duke’s rule. Previously he had been imprisoned by Charles III from 1519 until 1521. Lord Byron’s “Prisoner of Chillon” fictionalizes Bonnavard’s story.

141.6–7 whose names ... parts of peace.] From the poem “Wordsworth’s Grave” by the English poet Sir John William Watson (1858–1935): “Nor peace that grows by Lethe, scentless flower, / There in white languors to decline and cease; / But peace whose names are also rapture, power, / Clear sight, and love: for these are parts of peace.” (*The Poems of William Watson*, second edition [New York and London: Macmillan and Co., 1893] 9.)

CHAPTER X

144.14 eudæmonism] Eudæmonism (or eudaimonism) was an ethical doctrine popular among ancient Greek thinkers. On this view, the aim of ethical activity is happiness or εὐδαιμονία, which also translates as “blessedness,” “prosperity,” “good fortune,” or “wealth.” It is achieved through virtuous activity, that

is, through excellence in characteristic human activities, among which reasoning is preeminent.

144.37–145.1 Thus when Petrarch says ... a horror to his soul.] The reference is to a line in Italian poet Francesco Petrarch's (1304–74) Sonnet 231 in *The Canzoniere or Rerum Vulgarium Fragmenta*: “mille piacer non vaglion un tormento” translated as “a thousand joys aren't worth a single sorrow” (translated by Mark Musa [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996], 330–31). The same line is cited by German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer [see note 27.24] in *The World as Will and Representation* (translated by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, volume III [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1883], 386). Santayana, until dissuaded by his director, had planned to write his dissertation on Schopenhauer “because [he] was the German author that I liked most and knew best” (*PP*, 389).

147.27–33 Shakespeare says, ... “A bliss in ... reason hated.”] From Shakespeare's Sonnet 129, “Th'expense of Spirit in a waste of shame” (*Oxford Shakespeare*, 795):

Th'expense of Spirit in a waste of shame
Is lust in action; and till action, lust
Is perjured, murd'rous, bloody, full of blame,
Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust,
Enjoyed no sooner but despisèd straight,
Past reason hunted, and no sooner had
Past reason hated as a swallowed bait,
On purpose laid to make the taker mad;
Mad in pursuit and in possession so,
Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme;
A bliss in proof and proved, a very woe;
Before, a joy proposed; behind, a dream.
All this the world well knows, yet none knows well
To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell.

150.4–5 as Sallust praises Cato by saying: *Esse quam videri bonus maluit*; he preferred worth to reputation.] Sallust or Gaius Sallustius Crispus of Amiternum (86–35 B.C.) Roman historian, senator, praetor, and governor in Africa. Misfortune forced him from public life, and he turned to historiography. His first work, *Bellum Catilinae* (*The Catiline War*), is the source of the present quotation. The Latin may be translated as “He preferred to be, rather than to seem, virtuous” (*Sallust*, translated by J. C. Rolfe [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965], 112–13). The text that Rolfe translates has the imperfect

malebat, whereas Santayana uses the perfect *maluit*, from *malo*, meaning “to prefer.” J. T. Ramsey in *Sallust's Bellum Catilinae* (Chico, CA: Scholar's Press, 1985) gives no indication that he himself or other translators of Sallust, namely Ernout and Kurfess, found *maluit* in the text. Cato or Marcus Porcius Cato (234–149 B.C.), Roman statesman, orator, and historian. He was known to be outspoken and unafraid of conflict. He set high standards for himself and demanded the same of others, and he made a point of sharing the hardships of soldiers under his command. He was the leading orator of his time, though only fragments of his speeches now survive.

150.29–32 Why should we be so easily awed by ... a Pindar or a Leonardo,] Pindar (c. 518–c. 438 B.C.), lyric poet, born to an aristocratic family, native of Cynoscephalae in Boeotia. He wrote hymns, paeans, dithyrambs, processional songs, maiden songs, dance songs, encomia, dirges, and victory songs. Only the last have survived. These were commissioned and written in honor of victorious athletes of the panhellenic athletic festivals. He was recognized as a great poet and his works were acknowledged as classics by Herodotus. Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) Italian painter, sculptor, architect, musician, engineer, and scientist, born near Vinci in Tuscany. In 1455 he moved to Florence and apprenticed as a painter. In Milan in 1483 he painted the famous *Madonna of the Rocks*. In 1495 he began his fresco of the *Last Supper* and finished it about three years later. He had returned to Florence by 1503, around the time the *Mona Lisa* is believed to have been finished. In 1513 he went to Rome, where he worked for the Vatican on various architectural and engineering projects as well as on several commissioned paintings.

150.33–35 Why should we smile at the inscription in Westminster Abbey which calls the inventor of the spinning-jenny one of the true benefactors of mankind?] James Hargreaves (1720?–88), English carpenter and weaver, born in Oswaldtwistle. Without formal education, he invented a hand-powered multiple spinning machine in 1764 that doubled production. The name “spinning jenny” is said variously to derive from the name of his daughter, the name of his wife, or the word “engine.” In 1768 a group of spinners broke into his house and destroyed his machines. According to Christine Reynolds, Assistant Keeper of the Muniments at the Westminster Abbey, Hargreaves is in fact not buried at Westminster Abbey and there is no memorial for him there (although there is buried at Westminster a former governor of Gibraltar who died in 1751 named Lieutenant-General William Hargrave, also known as “Hargreaves”) (Joe Whitlock Blundell, *Westminster Abbey: The Monuments* [London: John Murray Ltd., 1989], 125).

150.34 Westminster Abbey] This London church is one of England's most important Gothic structures. It was originally the abbey church for a Benedictine monastery until it was closed in 1539. Churches have existed on the site since the seventh century, when Aethelbert, King of Kent, built the first one. Coronations for nearly every king and queen since William I (William the Conqueror) have occurred at Westminster Abbey, and eighteen monarchs are buried there along with notable statesmen and distinguished subjects. The Poets' Corner holds the remains of great English writers, including Chaucer, Browning, and Tennyson.

150.39 Hamlet or Imogen] Hamlet, the protagonist of the eponymous tragedy by William Shakespeare, is a prince of Denmark plagued by self-doubt, which leaves him unable to avenge the death of his father. He suspects that his uncle Claudius, who assumes the throne and quickly marries Hamlet's widowed mother, is responsible for his father's death. Imogen is the central female character in Shakespeare's *Cymbeline*, in which her father Cymbeline attempts to marry her to her stepbrother, Cloten, only to discover that she has secretly married the low-born Posthumus. Her husband makes a wager that his wife could never be guilty of adultery but is tricked with false evidence into believing otherwise.

151.3 Utilitarians] Utilitarianism as an ethical doctrine began with the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and was championed in the succeeding generation by the English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–73). Utilitarianism holds, in Mill's formulation, that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure" (*Utilitarianism*, second edition, edited by George Sher [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2001], 7).

151.23 Christ did not suffer, like Prometheus,] According to Christian tradition, Jesus Christ assumed the sins of humanity during his crucifixion and accordingly suffered God's wrath. For those who believe in Christ's sacrifice, his subsequent resurrection promises eternal life after death, but in the meantime there is no guarantee of the alleviation of physical suffering for believers. A contrasting Greek myth tells of Prometheus, the son of the Titan Iapetus, who sought to alleviate the suffering of humans by bringing them fire, in defiance of the gods, who had reserved fire for themselves. Zeus, king of the gods, punished Prometheus by chaining him to the top of a mountain and dispatching an eagle to eat his liver. By night Prometheus's liver would grow back, and the eagle would return the next day to repeat the evisceration. Even after pro-

longed suffering, Prometheus refused to submit to Zeus and eventually was rescued by Hercules.

152.6 Philistia Felix.] The Latin may be translated as “Happy philistines” or “happy land of the philistines.” The term ‘philistine’ is generally used in the sense of uncultured or uneducated persons; yet in his essay “What is a Philistine?” Santayana writes: “it is, I should say, of the essence of the Philistine mind to have rigidity without substance, whether that substance be intellectual, sensual, or spiritual, rather than a simple lack of ‘culture’” (*The Harvard Monthly* 14 [May 1892]: 89–99).

CHAPTER XI

155.17 Plato’s Republic] [See note 50.17–19.]

158.5–6 A certain school of philosophy] The text here recalls Santayana’s criticisms of romanticism or romantic idealism in *Egotism in German Philosophy, Character and Opinion in the United States*, and elsewhere. In “The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy” Santayana explains that when transcendental method is taken as a system of the universe, the result is a romantic and egotistic philosophy (*WD*, 195). “To discredit the intellect, to throw off the incubus of an external reality or truth, was one of the boons which transcendentalism in its beginnings brought to the romantic soul” (*COUS*, 114). A result was Kant’s “radical subjectification of knowledge” (*EGP*, 34), which led to the egotism Santayana criticized in Fichte, Hegel, and Nietzsche. The connection to “a certain school of philosophy” mentioned here is seen in Santayana’s characterization of egotistic German philosophy as cherishing “the vital joy of transition; and usually the joy of this transition lies much more in shedding their present state than in attaining a better” (*EGP*, 17).

158.25–26 so soon is the dyer’s hand subdued to what it works in.] From line 7 of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 111, “O, for my sake do you with fortune chide” (*Oxford Shakespeare*, 792):

O, for my sake do you with fortune chide,
 The guilty goddess of my harmful deeds,
 That did not better for my life provide
 Than public means which public manners breeds.
 Thence comes it that my name receives a brand,
 And almost thence my nature is subdued
 To what it works in, like the dyer’s hand,
 Pity me then, and wish I were renewed,

Whilst like a willing patient I will drink
 Potions of eisel 'gainst my strong infection;
 No bitterness that I will bitter think,
 Nor double penance to correct correction.
 Pity me then, dear friend, and I assure ye
 Even that your pity is enough to cure me.

159.7 Darwin] Charles Robert Darwin (1809–82), English naturalist, born in Shrewsbury to a family of physicians. He studied medicine at Edinburgh, but grew to dislike it. He took up theology at Cambridge, but natural history remained his passion. After graduating from Cambridge he participated in a five-year voyage exploring southern South America. He is known for his theory of the evolution of species explained in his work *The Origin of Species* (1859). He argues that species evolve through natural selection of random variations. It does not assume progress through evolution or that one biological type is absolutely better than another.

159.38 *Descent of Man*,] From Chapter 3, “Moral Sense,” in Darwin’s *The Descent of Man*. Santayana refers to the first edition, published in 1871 by J. Murray in London. This same passage occurs in the second edition, published in 1874 by the same publisher, but in Chapter 4, which is entitled “Comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals—continued.”

CHAPTER XII

165.17–18 *de haut en bas*] French, literally, “from top to bottom.” Used to describe a manner that is supercilious or condescending; suggests treatment or regard for someone or something as from a lofty position, with an air of affected superiority.

169.3–6 The true philosopher ... will rather resemble a reed shaken by the wind.] This refers to a verse in the New Testament of the Bible: “And as they departed, Jesus began to say unto the multitudes concerning John, What went ye out into the wilderness to see? A reed shaken with the wind?” (Matthew 11:7).

169.26–27 the angels of Saint Thomas,] Thomas Aquinas (1224–74), Italian philosopher and theologian, born at Aquino in Roccasecca, Italy, to an aristocratic family. Over the objections of his family he joined the Dominican order. He studied in Naples, Paris, and Cologne, where he was a student of Albertus Magnus. In 1252 he returned to Paris, where he taught theology. Aquinas taught in both Paris and Italy until 6 December 1273, when he ended his scholarly work. He died in 1274 while en route to the Second Council of Lyons. He

attempted to synthesize Christian doctrine with Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy and became the most influential thinker of the medieval period. His important works include *On Being and Essence* and his masterwork, the *Summa Theologiae*. In this work Aquinas maintained that each individual angel belongs to its own unique species. This is because individuals that belong to a common species share a common form and are individuated by their matter. Angels, however, are not composed of form and matter; rather, they are immaterial beings, and the form of each is unique. According to Aquinas, “it is impossible for two angels to be of one species” (second revised edition, Ia, Q. 50, a. 4; translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province [London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1922], 3).

170.31 *Ab esse ad posse valet illatio.*] Latin: “The inference from actual result to its possibility is valid.”

Textual Commentary

TEXTUAL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR *THE WORKS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA*

THE WORKS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA AND EDITORIAL SCHOLARSHIP

The volumes of *The Works of George Santayana* are unmodernized, critical editions of George Santayana's writings. This scholarly edition is "unmodernized" because it retains original and idiosyncratic punctuation, spelling, capitalization, and word division in order to reflect the full intent of the author as well as the initial texture of the work; it is "critical" because it allows the exercise of editorial judgment in making corrections, changes, and choices among authoritative readings. The goal of the editors is to produce texts that accurately represent Santayana's final intentions regarding his works while recording all evidence on which editorial decisions have been based.

Except for the *Letters* and *Marginalia* volumes, *The Works of George Santayana* pertain typically to materials composed by Santayana that he intended for publication and dissemination in a printed form. For these writings there may exist a holograph manuscript, a typescript, printers' proofs, two or more editions, and multiple impressions of editions. In such cases the term "critical editing" indicates the task of comparing these various forms of the text in order to ascertain and perpetuate the author's settled intention regarding his work. In the absence of the holograph manuscript, this is normally the document which is closest to the author's hand, or so identified in Santayana's correspondence. Two independent sight or machine collations are performed against the copy-text for each successive form of the text produced by Santayana or published during his lifetime.

Editorial judgments are based on an assessment of all available evidence manifest in Santayana's works, letters, annotations, and other authorial material. The editors study this evidence to identify all of the forms of the text over which Santayana did (or may have) exercised authorial control. They then compare (or collate) all of these relevant forms of the text and account for any divergence, whether substantive or accidental, from the earliest surviving version of the text. When completed, this procedure enables scholars, using the information presented in the editorial apparatus, to recover readings of the documents used in preparing the text and to evaluate the editorial judgments made in establishing the critical text.

TEXTUAL THEORY

The central editorial decision for unmodernized, critical editions is the choice of copy-text, the document on which a critical text is based. The texts for *The Works of George Santayana* are constructed according to the theory of copy-text first formulated by Sir Walter Greg.¹ This theory continues to be a model for recent texts on scholarly editing.² Greg distinguishes between substantives (variants in the words themselves) and accidentals (variants in punctuation, spelling, capitalization, word division, paragraphing, and devices of emphasis). This is a pragmatic distinction used to account for the known behavior of authors and of intermediaries involved in publishing a work. In practice, authors tend to regard accidentals as less important than substantives. In proofreading, they concentrate on the fidelity of the words and more freely permit or overlook changes in formal matters made by typists, copy-editors, and compositors. Simply stated, Greg maintains the copy-text should be the most authoritative source of accidentals and, unless clear and certain evidence indicates otherwise, that source will be the document closest to the author's unmediated hand, i.e., the fair-copy manuscript, or, when a manuscript does not exist, the typed or printed document that is closest to it.

Santayana always produced a handwritten manuscript, usually after earlier drafts (pre-copy-text forms). The holograph manuscripts of some of his later writings were given to a typist³ and the typescript was corrected by Santayana. Because a typescript may contain errors in accidentals that Santayana over-

¹Sir Walter Greg, "The Rationale of Copy-Text," *Studies in Bibliography* 3 (1950–51): 19–36, reprinted in *The Collected Papers of Sir Walter W. Greg*, edited by J. C. Maxwell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 374–91. Guidelines for the application of this method were taken from Fredson Bowers, "Textual Criticism," in *The Aims and Methods of Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures*, edited by James Thorpe (New York: Modern Language Association of America, second edition, 1970), 29–54, and the *Statement of Editorial Principles and Procedures: A Working Manual for Editing Nineteenth-Century American Texts*, revised edition, prepared by the Center for Editions of American Authors (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1972). Two exceptional essays on the art of modern scholarly editing that have been very helpful to the editors of this critical edition are by G. Thomas Tanselle: "Greg's Theory of Copy-Text and the Editing of American Literature," *Studies in Bibliography* 28 (1975): 167–229, and "Some Principles for Editorial Apparatus," *Studies in Bibliography* 25 (1972): 41–88.

²See for example William Proctor Williams and Craig S. Abbott's *An Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studies*, fourth edition (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 2009).

³Evelyn Tindall, an Englishwoman employed at the British Legation to the Holy See in Rome, began typing Santayana's handwritten manuscripts late in 1933, beginning with his novel, *The Last Puritan* (1935), and made typescripts of all of Santayana's subsequent work through *Dominations and Powers* (1950).

looked, the fair-copy manuscript best represents Santayana's preferred use of accidentals, even when a corrected typescript is extant. Hence, in *The Works of George Santayana* the fair-copy manuscript, when extant, is the copy-text unless there is clear authorial evidence to indicate otherwise. When a manuscript is not extant, the surviving form closest to it is chosen as the copy-text. This may be the typescript, or, if Santayana is known to have read proof for the edition, the marked proof. Where none of the authorial or presswork stages have been located, the first printing of the first edition will stand as copy-text.

Critical editions are eclectic in that readings may be drawn from several different authorial sources or from corrections by the editors. The authority for accidentals is the copy-text; variants in the accidentals of subsequent presswork or later editions must be rejected, except on the rare occasion where (1) there is direct evidence of authorial revision, or (2) the variant corrects an obvious error (such as spelling or capitalization) the author would want corrected.⁴ However, the authority for substantive variants may shift to later impressions (printings) or editions known to be revised by Santayana. Such editions may contain the author's substantive corrections and additions, so that questionable readings of substantives may be decided in favor of the later editions rather than the copy-text. This practice is based on the existence of evidence of authorial revision in later editions or from evidence in the correspondence. But even when such evidence exists, some substantives may have been altered by other persons and overlooked by Santayana; these substantives—often the result of compositorial (typesetting) error and editorial styling—are not authoritative and the copy-text forms retain their authority.⁵ All editorial emendations to the copy-text are recorded (and the sources of emended readings identified) in the editorial apparatus located at the end of each volume.

GENEALOGY OF THE TEXT

Establishing critical texts thus requires the utmost scholarly rigor. The relative authority of each textual document and the relationships among these documents are determined by establishing a genealogy of each text. This process involves locating all relevant forms of the texts and collating them to prepare tables of variants that can be used to delineate the development of and the relationships among the texts.

⁴Such emendations should only correct unacceptable errors; consistent idiosyncrasies in Santayana's spelling and punctuation preferences represent an important aspect of his style, and will not be emended.

⁵G. Thomas Tanselle, "Textual Scholarship," *Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures*, edited by Joseph Gibaldi (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1981), 40.

All material bearing on the history of the text must be examined. This includes items related to the publication of the work (letters, publishers' files, printers' ledgers), outside sources quoted by Santayana in the text itself, and every text that has *prima facie* authority (pre-copy-text forms, fair-copy manuscripts, all impressions of all editions of the work prior to the death of the author).

One of the first tasks of the editors of the Santayana Edition, therefore, is to locate all extant materials which pertain to any of Santayana's published works. Santayana's papers are located in several repositories within the United States as well as other countries. Major repositories include: Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University; The Bodleian Library, Oxford University; Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts, Boston Public Library; Butler Library, Columbia University; The Library of Congress; William R. Perkins Library, Duke University; Lauinger Library, Georgetown University; The Houghton Library, Harvard University; Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Libraries; Rockefeller Archive Center; Morris Library, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale; Temple University Libraries; Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin; Alderman Library, University of Virginia at Charlottesville; and the University of Waterloo, Ontario.

In addition to the above, there are over one hundred institutions and several individuals who have papers, particularly correspondence, written by Santayana. Well over 3,000 letters are known to exist, housed in libraries and archives throughout the United States, Europe, and even Japan, and many are in the possession of family members such as Robert S. Sturgis, David Bidwell, and the Sastre family in Spain. Fortunately, the majority of the library of books and papers once in Santayana's personal possession, and full of his handwritten annotations, are concentrated in the known deposits at Columbia, Georgetown, Harvard, Texas, and Waterloo.

The major collections of Santayana's papers from which the Edition has drawn information specifically for publication of the critical edition of *The Life of Reason* are as follows:

- The Scribner Archives (Manuscripts Division, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Libraries) holds materials that include manufacturing records and correspondence with the publishing firm and editors.
- Special Collections, Temple University Libraries, holds the correspondence between Santayana and his British publisher, Constable and Co., Ltd. of London.

- Special Collections at the Lauinger Library of Georgetown University holds the original books which were used by Santayana in preparing the manuscript of *Little Essays Drawn from the Works of George Santayana*. Portions of all five books of *The Life of Reason* are included.
- The Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at The University of Texas at Austin is the repository for manuscript material relating to the one-volume *Life of Reason*.
- The Houghton Library of Harvard University has the manuscript of the first eight chapters of Book Five, *Reason in Science*.

The Santayana Edition has, over the last thirty years, acquired photocopies of all known Santayana material from the various repositories and individuals. Copies of primary and secondary source materials and dissertations are available in the office of the Edition for staff research and use by other scholars.

To determine the authority of all documents containing the text for previously published works of George Santayana, all true editions (distinct typesettings) are collected and collated, and their variants are recorded in a table of historical collations.⁶ Each variant is studied to determine whether it is an authorial revision or the result of other factors, such as house styling or type damage. If there is evidence that Santayana revised an edition, the editors must distinguish between his revisions and non-authorial impositions or errors, such as those introduced by copy-editors or compositors. As each printing or impression of a single edition also may have been revised by Santayana, the editors collect and collate the first and last impressions of each edition to locate possible authorial variants. When variants are found, the intermediate impressions (if any) are studied to determine when the variants were introduced and whether they are authorial. Eventually, all impressions are machine collated to insure that no other readings were altered and then restored within the interim impressions. Such variants would not surface in the initial collation of first and last impressions, but would nonetheless need to be recorded and evaluated.

The chronological order and relationship of editions and impressions (see genealogical stemma following page 268.) are determined by internal as well as external evidence. Printing records or publishers' statements in the printed volume may indicate separate impressions, and correspondence sometimes provides

⁶All editions of Santayana's works are listed in *George Santayana: A Bibliographical Checklist, 1880–1980*, edited by Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., and John Jones (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982). Corrections and annual updates of the checklist are in *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society*: <http://indiamond6.ulib.iupui.edu/Santayana/>..

clues to the existence of new printings of an edition. Lacking such external evidence, the editors may distinguish between otherwise apparently identical impressions by internal evidence, such as wear and deterioration of the plates. Variants between impressions may be discovered by extensive collation of copies of the edition collected from disparate regions in which the work was marketed.

When the genealogy of the text has been established and the relationships of all textual documents have been determined, the editors choose the document that will serve as copy-text. Greg's theory of copy-text, described above, is the basis for this choice. The text of the critical edition adheres to the copy-text accidentals except where there is compelling evidence to justify emendation. Substantives are emended when a corresponding reading in another version of the text reflects Santayana's clear intention or, in those instances where the copy-text is a published form (book or article), when the editors judge that in the process of printing and publishing the work an unauthorial alteration (for example, a misprint) occurred.

Textual information presented in four lists following the "Textual Commentary" constitutes the evidence for and record of editorial decisions upon which the text of the critical edition is based. The first three of these lists concern editorial decisions; the fourth is a historical record. The editorial appendix for this volume records editorial decisions in (1) the "Discussions of Adopted Readings," (2) the "List of Emendations," and (3) the "Report of Line-End Hyphenation." A fourth section, the "List of Variants," permits the reader to compare the critical text with all variant readings in every other possibly authoritative text. The editorial apparatus records all editorial decisions and provides a historical record of variant readings in all authoritative forms of the text. It enables the reader to reconstruct the copy-text and to evaluate judgments made by the editors in establishing the text of the critical edition. For a description of the editorial appendix, see pages 203–5.

PRODUCING THE CRITICAL EDITION

Transcribing, editing, and typesetting the copy-text(s) to reproduce a critical text as accurately as possible is the primary goal of the Santayana Edition. This reproduction of *The Works of George Santayana* is, therefore, done electronically and, beginning with Volume Seven, *The Life of Reason*, the books are produced with Adobe InDesign, a commercial electronic typesetting program. First the text is carefully transcribed (a literal transcription indicating internal variants is produced if the copy-text is the holograph manuscript or a typescript corrected by Santayana). As part of the initial transcription the editors identify the various text elements (chapter headings, subheadings, marginal notes, standard paragraphs, extracts, poetry lines, footnotes, and the like), each of which is rendered visually

distinctive with the help of InDesign, making systematic use of the program's template features. Each transcription then receives at least two independent sight collations against the copy-text to ensure its accuracy. Various software programs aid the editors in locating, counting, and compiling material needed in making editorial decisions. Functioning as a concordance, the lists produced can indicate Santayana's usage and spelling of problematic words and identify patterns of punctuation and spelling and all line-end hyphens in the copy-text.

In addition to the copy-text, the front matter, textual commentary, notes, apparatus, and index are compiled and organized using a variety of software programs. These files are converted to InDesign and the pages produced are proofed twice for accuracy and checked against the text as necessary. Use of the InDesign desktop publishing program enables the editors to send proofed pages to MIT Press for printing. Before the book is printed, the editors check the digital proofs. At this stage, alterations to the text can quickly be identified by focusing principally on a comparison of line and page breaks. Differences in lineation or pagination signal changes within the lines, which then are scrutinized carefully.

The desktop typesetting employed in *The Works of George Santayana* greatly facilitates the editing and publication processes because it maintains the accuracy of the textual record, keeping it free from the errors or alterations almost invariably arising from rekeying a document. In having direct control over the printing process, then, the editors also safeguard the integrity of the critical edition text.

DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEXT OF *REASON IN COMMON SENSE*

COMPOSITION HISTORY

Santayana's *Life of Reason* lays out a naturalistic philosophy that rejects dualism and reductionism and conceives a life of harmoniously conjoined impulse and ideal. Such a life, in his view, constitutes happiness. Santayana described the work as "a sort of retrospective politics" that estimates "events in reference to the moral ideal which they embodied or betrayed" and could be considered "a philosophy of history."⁷ In five books he traces the life of reason through phases of human experience—expressions and institutions of human culture—designated common sense, society, religion, art, and science.

The idea for such a work came to Santayana as a student in 1888 when he first read Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.⁸ Santayana thought that in Hegel's work

⁷ *Reason in Science* (LR5) (1906), 58.

⁸ "I liked Hegel's *Phaenomenologie*; it set me planning my *Life of Reason*..." *Persons and Places* (PP), 389.

“myth and sophistry there spoil a very fine subject.”⁹ He took up the subject himself in the 1890s as an instructor at Harvard, where he taught “Philosophy of History.” This course, he later wrote, “prepared the ground for my *Life of Reason*.”¹⁰ But at the time he developed the course he believed he lacked adequate knowledge of the Greeks, who he thought might provide an outstanding example of the Life of Reason.

Santayana amended his ignorance of Greek philosophy in 1896–97, when he took a leave of absence from Harvard and was admitted as an “advanced student” at Cambridge University’s King’s College. During this year he read Plato and Aristotle systematically under the direction of Dr. Henry Jackson at Trinity.¹¹ Of the experience he wrote, “by that study and change of scene my mind was greatly enriched; and the composition of *The Life of Reason* was the consequence.”¹² He also wrote to Guy Murchie on 17 July 1897 of his experience with his new Cambridge mentor:

My teacher has been Dr Henry Jackson of Trinity, a splendid old man, who knows the text of Plato better, perhaps, than he knows Plato’s mind, but who is a very inspiring and jolly guide to one’s own reading. I have heard him lecture twice a week, and he has been good enough to give me an hour besides to myself, and I have read with him several of the hardest and most crucial of the dialogues.¹³

Santayana’s thought process for his system of philosophy can also be seen in a marginal note he wrote in his copy of Thomas Hill Green’s book *Prolegomena of Ethics* in 1896.

Idea
of a little system of moral philosophy,
The Life of Reason.

Part I. The origin and nature of Reason or of the moral sense
II. The ideal object of Reason, or the highest good
III. The power of Reason, or the freedom of the will
IV. The rewards of Reason, or the sanctions of morals.
V. The emancipation of Reason, or immortality.

⁹ *Reason in Common Sense (LR1)*, 1922 preface, x.

¹⁰ *PP*, 393.

¹¹ *PP*, 432–39.

¹² “A General Confession” in *The Philosophy of George Santayana*, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publishing Co., 1940), 13.

¹³ *The Letters of George Santayana (LGS)* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000–2008), 1:185. The original is in the possession of Guy Murchie Jr.

Santayana mentioned the work by title—*The Life of Reason*—in a 1900 letter to William James,¹⁴ and by the late spring of 1904 he had completed the manuscript of *Reason in Common Sense*, the first free-standing portion of the larger work. On 25 May 1904 he wrote to his publisher, Charles Scribner's Sons, informing them that he was sending “a first installment of my *magnum opus*,” *The Life of Reason*, which, he wrote, “represents all I have to say of any consequence.... A system runs through them all, but there is no formal continuity; or only such as might well exist between three plays in a trilogy.”¹⁵ Scribner's (publisher of his first two titles) immediately accepted the proposal and offered to release the new series at intervals (as Santayana finished them) rather than waiting until all of the book-length installments were at press. Santayana concurred and continued to discuss the specifics of his multivolume work in a 19 June 1904 letter to Scribner's, revealing just how long it had taken him to finish and refine his system of philosophy:

As to publishing serially, that is of no consequence to me, and any arrangement you think best will suit me. Indeed, in one way, I find the suggestion very convenient, as the revision I am now at work on is taking longer than I expected—the book had grown up in seven years, so that it was full of repetitions and inconsistencies—and I need not send you all the MS at once. The next three books ... I will entrust to you before I go abroad.”¹⁶

These travel plans were no surprise to his publisher; in the 25 May letter Santayana had related that he planned to spend the next fifteen months on a sabbatical leave traveling in Europe and the Middle East. He sent Scribner's the manuscripts of Books II and III, and the first half of Book IV before sailing for Europe in July 1904, leaving instructions for the presswork to be forwarded through a London postal agent.¹⁷ The Scribner's galleys for *Reason in Common Sense* followed Santayana through Belgium and Germany to Paris, where he read and revised them in early September. His concern that the running headers should accurately reflect the chapter titles persuaded Scribner's to undertake the time-consuming process of sending Santayana page proofs as well. By October 1904 he had arrived at his sister's home in Avila, Spain, and he was quickly able to turn around page proofs for the first two titles in the series, *Reason in Common*

¹⁴ *LGS*, 1:212. George Santayana Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

¹⁵ *LGS*, 1:264–65. Author files, Scribner Archives, Manuscripts Division, Department of Rare Book and Special Collections, Princeton University.

¹⁶ *LGS*, 1:266–67. Scribner Archives, Princeton University.

¹⁷ Santayana's travels and his coinciding revision of the galleys and proofs for *Reason in Common Sense* is documented in *LGS*, 1:268 and 271–73 (Scribner Archive, Princeton University) and in *PP*, 451 and 455.

Sense and *Reason in Society*; both were published early in 1905. In spite of his further travels through Italy, Egypt, the Levant, and back through Europe, he maintained a fairly regular (if not ideal) revision schedule for the subsequent stages of work; on 11 October 1905 Santayana, writing once again from Avila, sent his publisher the manuscript of the last chapter of the fifth and final volume, *Reason in Science*. This volume appeared in early 1906, just a year after *Reason in Common Sense*. More than four decades later Santayana still found occasion to reflect on the timing of his sabbatical and its impact on his “magnum opus.”

The Life of Reason was then in the press. What a pity that I couldn't have rested and travelled before writing that book! It would have been richer in substance and purer in form. At least, I could rest now, and hope that the impurities would evaporate from my mind in the fresh air and light of history.¹⁸

Reviews of the work were mixed, but there was a not uncommon view, held even by those who disagreed with Santayana, that his *Life of Reason* was an important work. G. E. Moore criticized a lack of clarity while F. C. S. Schiller praised Santayana's literary style. In private correspondence, William James acknowledged the lasting value of Santayana's work, and in a published review John Dewey called *The Life of Reason* “the most adequate contribution America has yet made—always excepting Emerson—to moral philosophy.”¹⁹ In a letter to Scribner's in April (possibly 1906) Santayana acknowledged receipt of a letter from the publisher regarding reviews:

Some time ago I received your letter about the general success of “The Life of Reason” and it gave me great satisfaction.... It is naturally most gratifying to me that my long book should receive so much recognition and should have such a respectable company of buyers. I have not read many reviews, as I find little profit in doing so as a rule....²⁰

The publication and success of *The Life of Reason* reflected well on Santayana; clearly, he had proven his ability to produce work for an academic audience and in the process, to write a long treatise of a philosophical nature. As William Holzberger has observed, the achievement had an immediate and significant impact on both his academic career and his scholarly reputation:

But it was not until the publication of his early masterwork, *The Life of Reason*, ... that Santayana's reputation as a professional thinker of wide learning and penetrating insight was

¹⁸ *PP*, 451.

¹⁹ *Education Review* 34 (1907): 116–29.

²⁰ *LGS*, 1:339–40. Scribner Archives, Princeton University.

finally established. The publication of *The Life of Reason* made it impossible for President Eliot to continue to ignore Santayana's distinction and importance, and in 1907 he promoted him from assistant to full professor and doubled his salary to four thousand dollars per annum.²¹

The Life of Reason went on to become a basic text for American philosophical naturalists and was taught regularly to students at Columbia University. Two important philosophical naturalists who taught at Columbia, Frederick J. E. Woodbridge and Morris R. Cohen, both counted the reading of *The Life of Reason* as an important event in their lives.²² In later years, Santayana was not always pleased with the importance accorded this particular work. He wrote in a letter to Nancy Saunders Toy on 28 March 1941 that "what annoys me is that now people should still talk about the Life of Reason as if it represented my whole philosophy, or was the best part of it. That is because Dewey's disciples make it a subject in their courses, and [criticize] it for not raising or not solving the questions that they propose to their classes."²³

Santayana's annoyance with being wholly represented by *The Life of Reason* is not surprising given the different emphasis of his later work. Though he claimed in the preface to the 1922 printing of *The Life of Reason* that there had "been no change in [his] deliberate doctrine; only some changes of mental habit,"²⁴ the changes in habit included changes in expression and perspective. He found his earlier expressions "verbose and academic"²⁵ and thought *The Life of Reason* "hopelessly lost in the subjective."²⁶

Though Santayana was critical of *The Life of Reason* throughout his letters from late 1910 onward, his estimation of the work seemed to soften in the early 1950s when he undertook a revision of the work. With the help of his assistant Daniel Cory, Santayana abridged *The Life of Reason* to produce a one-volume edition. Upon rereading the original, Santayana still thought it wordy and superficial, but he wrote that he and Cory "found the text better than we expected: a

²¹ *LGS*, preface, 1:xiv.

²² "They [Scribner's] told him Woodbridge of Columbia called his book the 'most important work of its kind in America—more important than James's *Psychology*,' while others 'suspect it because it is literary as well as science.'" (John McCormick, *George Santayana: A Biography* [New York: Knopf, 1987], 185.)

²³ *LGS*, 7:27. George Santayana Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

²⁴ *Common Sense* (1922), v.

²⁵ *LGS*, 6:9. 25 January 1937 to Daniel Cory, George Santayana Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.

²⁶ *LGS*, 2:290. 9 October 1917 to Logan Pearsall Smith, Pearsall Smith Papers, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress.

little cocky and flighty, ... but easy to read for the most part, and clear.”²⁷ Both men also were “surprised to find ‘The Life of Reason’ so much like my latest views.”²⁸ But by this time the climate of academic philosophy had changed; although the single-volume edition was easily accessible to a new generation of lay readers, the five-volume original had clearly had the greater impact on twentieth-century philosophy.

PUBLICATION HISTORY

That *The Life of Reason* was conceived as a single work is evident in Santayana’s letters and autobiographical writings, and he made this point explicitly to his publisher in the 25 May 1904 letter that accompanied his manuscript of *Reason in Common Sense*. Although this first installment of his philosophical system would also contain an overarching introduction to the entire series, he envisioned separate books for each of the five subjects of his new work:

What I desire is chiefly this: that the five books be bound separately, making five small volumes, so that they may be easily held and carried about, and may also, at least eventually, be sold separately as well as in sets. The remaining parts are on Society, Religion, Art, and Science respectively, and might well be independent books.²⁹

Santayana also had a clear vision of page design and layout, requiring closely set type—“I hate a sprawling page.” But there was a deeper purpose to his design, for he wanted to accommodate the marginal call-outs or summaries that he found so important to any book-length presentation of his philosophical writings:

A compact page with a rather generous margin would be my ideal; and in this margin might be the running summary I have provided. This might be instead, if you thought it better, at the upper corner of each page, or in an indentation (as in the *Sense of Beauty*). But in whatever form it appears it is a very important feature, because it is meant not merely to help the eye and carry along the thought over the details, but often to be a commentary as well as a summary and throw a side light on the subject.³⁰

²⁷ *LGS*, 8:396. 23 November 1951 to John Hall Wheelock, Scribner Archives, Princeton University.

²⁸ *LGS*, 8:421. 23 February 1952 to John Hall Wheelock, Scribner Archives, Princeton University. Of the resulting abridgement John Herman Randall wrote: “The only worth-while change in this mutilating ‘revision’ is the provision of a 14-page index.” *The Journal of Philosophy* 51 (24 June 1954): 393.

²⁹ *LGS*, 1:264–65. Charles Scribner’s Sons, Scribner Archives, Princeton University.

³⁰ *LGS*, 1:265. Charles Scribner’s Sons, Scribner Archives, Princeton University.

He was also concerned with the series bindings, and wanted Scribner's to explore options that included paper covers in an effort "to have the book as cheap as possible so that students might buy it." Santayana was particularly concerned about the book spines, where there was little room for both the book title and the full volume title, which had become *The Life of Reason: or the Phases of Human Progress*. He sketched out a design of abbreviated titles for the spine binding in a 21 October 1904 letter to Scribner's, using *Reason in Common Sense* as the example.

His idea was to include the individual book numbers (as roman numerals) on the spine, but time was rapidly growing short for such negotiations. During September and early October Santayana had managed to successively correct galleys and page proofs as he moved about Europe, but this time-consuming process had already delayed the production schedule. He was still checking the running headers and wrangling with the Greek epigraph on the title page, and on 3 December 1904 (writing from Rome) he noted that the title page publisher's imprint date would have to be changed to 1905. The change in year of publication had already been decided by Scribner's, and Santayana was quick to assume responsibility in his 25 January 1905 letter: "I am rather sorry that the publication of the "Life of Reason" has been put off so long, although I quite understand that the trouble came from my being so far away." Santayana had also learned that the roman numeral designations for the individual titles would not be included on either the bindings or the title pages, but by this time he realized that the creative weave between the individual books would be clear enough without such enumerative designations:

As to the independent title of each volume, that is not of any consequence from my point of view. Apart from the common heading "The Life of Reason" which I understand you have retained, the volumes will be kept together well enough by their individual titles, which are obviously meant to go together—"Reason in Common Sense, [*sic*] "in Society" etc. Merely leaving out the number of the volume or of the book will make no difference in the continuity of the work, especially as in the three later books I am still able to put in a phrase or two pointing to the next one in order. This reference forward happens to exist already in the first two books. That each book may be read apart from the others, as you say, was part of my original plan and I am glad you are taking steps to bring this result about.³¹

Scribner's did include the individual book sequence numerals in the series listing that faced the title page, and settled on maroon boards that would carry

³¹ *LGS*, 1:293. Charles Scribner's Sons, Scribner Archives, Princeton University.

through all of the early printings of the five-book series. Initially, Santayana had been offered the option of bearing the cost of plates for a twenty percent royalty, or deferring to Scribner's for the cost of typesetting and receiving a ten percent royalty. Santayana had accepted the second option, and the setting plates remained in Scribner's possession throughout a decades-long sequence of reprintings.³² *Introduction and Reason in Common Sense* (*The Life of Reason*, Book One) was printed in an initial run of 1,000 (designated *A_A*) on 30 January and published by Charles Scribner's Sons on 11 February 1905.

EDITIONS AND IMPRESSIONS


A total of fourteen cumulative printings underlie the transmission of the text through the first edition of *Reason in Common Sense*, revealing three distinct states and a publishing history that is somewhat less complicated than it first appears. Beyond the initial print run of 1,000, the Scribner's history of re-impressions is as follows: November 1905 (250); June 1906 (500); June 1911 (260); April 1917 (250); June 1920 (260); December 1921 (265); October 1922 (1,200); May 1924 (505); May 1927 (505); March 1929 (510); November 1932 (510); February 1936 (1,010), and January 1948 (510). The October 1922 printing included additional front matter by Santayana (a new preface) and was marketed as the second edition (it was actually a re-issue of the first edition); this publishing strategy accounts for the large print run of 1,200 copies for 1922. It is likely that the unusually large print run for February 1936 (1,010 copies) anticipated increased sales as a result of Scribner's simultaneous publication of the fifteen-volume Triton edition of Santayana's complete works (Volume III of the Triton includes the true second edition of *Reason in Common Sense*). The manufacturing records indicate a total of 7,535 copies³³ were bound and sold from the first edition impressions before Scribner's declared *Reason in Common Sense* out of print on 21 January 1952—just nine months before Santayana died in Rome.

The first four Scribner's impressions (1905 [2], 1906, and 1911) constitute the first state of the text; no variants have been discovered within those inclusive printings. The first-state printings (as well as the print run totals described above) include the unbound Scribner's sheets sent to the London publishing house of Archibald Constable in February 1905 (250 copies), March 1906 (100), February 1910 (50) and April 1914 (25). This would prove to be the beginning of a long-

³² McCormick, 142; *LGS*, 1:266. 19 June 1904 to Charles Scribner's Sons, Scribner Archives, Princeton University. Scribner's royalty options are found in Scribner's to Santayana, New York, 17 June 1904 (Scribner Archives, Princeton University Libraries).

³³ The manufacturing records also indicate that 5,665 copies of *Reason in Common Sense* were supplied with dust wrappers.

Life of Reason, Book I: Introduction and Reason in Common Sense (1905)



standing arrangement between Scribner's and Constable for British publication of Santayana's work; his two previous books—*The Sense of Beauty* and *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*—had been published in Britain by smaller houses, and to this point Santayana was relatively unknown there beyond his circle of Oxford and Cambridge acquaintances, which included Lord Russell and his younger brother Bertrand, and others who would soon form the Bloomsbury Group of writers.³⁴

Constable had an unknown number of the Scribner's sheets bound with British title and copyright pages; the small numbers involved in these trans-Atlantic shipments (and ensuing British wartime austerity) may account for the fact that only copies bearing a 1905 title page date (designated A_B) have been located. The sole exception is Santayana's own copy, which was disassembled to create his *Little Essays* volume prior to 1920; this copy includes a 1914 imprint date on the Constable title page (designated A_B^{1914}). In any event, the so-called British or Constable edition is in reality a separate issue bound from sheets periodically shipped to London from the first four Scribner's first-edition print runs. Since the first British shipment left Scribner's on 25 March 1905, the American issue has priority of publication over the British issue. Although the Santayana Edition has not located any copies of the Constable issue bearing 1906 or 1910 imprint dates, the existence of the single 1914 copy suggests that a very small number of copies bound with intermediate title pages may yet exist.³⁵

The Scribner's re-impressions of 1917, 1920, and 1921 represent the second variant state of the first-edition text. The 1917 Scribner's (A_A^{1917}) is the fifth cumulative printing of the first edition, and the first to show any variation from the first impression. Santayana had prepared an errata sheet for all five books as early as November 1906, but Scribner's was not contemplating more impressions of the first book in the *Life of Reason* series anytime soon and Santayana decided to hold the list in case further examination of the existing impressions (*Reason in Common Sense* was now in its third printing) revealed further error.³⁶ Collation reveals no variants in the 1911 impression of *Reason in Common Sense*, but by 1917 Santayana had apparently decided to have his cumulative corrections made. Although he had indicated that his 1906 list was "unhappily a rather long one," that list presumably included all five books; neither his initial errata list nor any other has been located, and there is no direct evidence that Santayana introduced the second state variants found in the text or in the front and back matter. However, the

³⁴McCormick, 116–22, 178–80.

³⁵The Scribner's manufacturing records also indicate that "25 sets bound" were sent to Constable in November 1921; these appear to be copies of the American edition sent at discount for sale in Britain.

³⁶Santayana to Scribner's, 21 November 1906, Scribner Archives, Princeton University (*LGS*, 1:356).

eight variants (excluding differences in front or back matter) imposed on the April 1917 impression (five substantives and three accidentals) are all of the sort that an author would request; in fact, Santayana actually marked one of these points in his copy of the 1914 Constable issue.

The 1922 impression (A_A^{1922}), the eighth cumulative printing, was designated a “new edition” in both the front matter and in Scribner’s advertising. Although not a new typesetting (and therefore the third issue rather than a distinct edition), it did include a new “Preface to the Second Edition” by Santayana that, like the ever-present 1905 introduction, overviewed the entire five-book series even though it appeared only in the first book. In addition to those variants introduced in 1917, two new variants—one substantive and one accidental—distinguish the 1922 printing of *Reason in Common Sense* as a third state of the first edition. In all, the eighth through the fourteenth printings (1922–1948) contain the third-state form of the text. Scribner’s once again sent sheets to Constable—520 in unbound flats, sent sometime after 12 October 1922. The American re-issue—released 22 October 1922—again clearly has priority of publication over the British, making the new Constable “edition” the fourth and final issue of the first edition text (see the genealogical chart).

The critical popularity that Santayana achieved during the 1920s and 1930s led Scribner’s to launch the Triton edition of *The Works of George Santayana* in fifteen volumes between 1936 and 1940. There were originally to be 750 sets of this limited edition, although the final contract with Scribner’s simply states that there would be a maximum of 900 sets. The five books of *The Life of Reason* were reset in their entirety and published unabridged, but they were bound into Volumes III, IV, and V of the Triton format. The Triton edition of *Reason in Common Sense* (designated B_A) opens Volume III, and includes the cumulative second- and third-state variants of the first edition text. But Santayana’s embedded section summaries were removed from the margins of the text and laid out across the page as sub-headings, resulting in a few editorially imposed variants that, for the most part, involved occasional reparagraphing. Santayana allowed this major format change with mixed emotions, but he was almost certainly not involved in the resulting variants.³⁷

SUBSEQUENT AUTHORIAL INTENTIONS

Over the years Santayana worked on two projects involving *The Life of Reason* texts that remain outside of his original and abiding intention for the five-book series. Although they represent distinctly different works, the involvement of the

³⁷ Santayana to Daniel Cory, 25 November 1936, George Santayana Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (LGS, 5:405–6).

Life of Reason texts makes a brief discussion of these works relevant as background to the present edition of *Reason in Common Sense*.

Little Essays: Drawn From the Writings of George Santayana by Logan Pearsall Smith (1920; designated *LE*), was compiled, as noted on the title page, with Santayana's active collaboration. Smith, a wealthy expatriate American author and editor living in England, began to engage Santayana's active participation in the *Little Essays* project during the spring of 1917.³⁸ Santayana had no copies of his works to spare, so Smith made a preliminary pass at selection by cutting up copies of Santayana's first seven works (including all of the *Life of Reason* titles). Among those volumes sent on to Santayana in December of 1917 was a copy of the Constable 1914 *Reason in Common Sense* (Constable would be the primary publisher for *LE*, sending sheets on to Scribner's for the American issue). This only known copy of the 1914 Constable imprint (designated *GSC*), apparently already cut apart, was copiously marked and edited by Santayana as he worked to prepare short essay extracts (generally one or two pages) for the new project.

The contents of *Little Essays* were constructed from the full range of his writing, including *The Life of Reason* series, but also extending into the five other books he had published between 1896 and 1916.³⁹ As a consequence, Santayana concentrated on less than half of the pages in his mutilated copy of *Reason in Common Sense*, and even here he (or possibly Smith) marked out many passages from the pages he had extracted (designated *GSC_{LE}*). At some point Santayana set aside (but retained) the larger unused remainder of unextracted pages (designated *GSC_D*), but not before making a layer of revisions that extend rather uniformly across *all* of the pages of the unbound book.⁴⁰

Once again, both the Scribner's and Constable issues were published from a single typesetting, but here the intention represents a completely distinct work from the main line of descent for *Reason in Common Sense* (and indeed for all five of the *Life of Reason* titles). However, the holograph revisions that Santayana made across many pages of the *GSC* artifact (not just those extracted in *GSC_{LE}*) require careful study. For the most part, these revisions focus on the bridging and cutting strategy that Santayana brought to bear on the new intention realized in the *Little Essays* project. But a very few of these revisions clearly represent considered and

³⁸Santayana's letters to Smith concerning the *Little Essays* volume are in the Library of Congress; his letters to Constable are in the Temple University Library.

³⁹The *Little Essays* volume included essays bridged from passages in the following works: *The Sense of Beauty* (1896); *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900); *The Life of Reason* (1905–6); *Three Philosophical Poets* (1910); Santayana's introduction to Spinoza's *Ethics* and *De Intellectus Emendatione* (1910); *Winds of Doctrine* (1913); and *Egotism in German Philosophy* (1916).

⁴⁰These separated portions of the mutilated *GSC* are housed in the Lauinger Library at Georgetown University along with many other books from Santayana's library.

intentional improvements on the readings as they stand in the original form of *Reason in Common Sense*, and as such they merit consideration as potential sources of copy-text emendation.

In his final days, Santayana was asked to work on a single-volume condensation of *The Life of Reason* (designated *ALR*). John Hall Wheelock, his long-time editor at Scribner's, proposed the project during the summer of 1951, as stock of the multivolume set was dwindling. It isn't clear whether Wheelock was motivated by the rather expensive prospect of reprinting the entire series at a time when Santayana was less frequently assigned as required reading in American philosophy classes, or whether he felt that the single-volume format might enhance Santayana's still prominent regard in broader popular reading circles. But Santayana was willing to collaborate, so long as either Daniel Cory or Irwin Edman edited the work. In spite of his long-standing intention not to revise this major hallmark of his early career, the prospect of a single-volume abridgement prompted Santayana to note candidly the advantages in his 24 August 1951 response to Wheelock's proposal: "[I]f the task is committed to Cory or Edman it would be not only agreeable to me (because I feel a little ashamed of some characteristics of that book, which would be removed or at least acknowledged to exist) but revision would be also an advantage to the book itself, which needs much pruning."

Santayana knew that Professor Irwin Edman of Columbia would be the better editor; Scribner's had entrusted Santayana's work to him once before, and the result was the highly regarded anthology *The Philosophy of Santayana* (1936). The aging Santayana knew that Edman would be "the more zealous and reliable reviser," even if he might retain portions that Santayana would wish removed. In his response to Wheelock, he envisioned the detached but balanced approach that Edman would take:

He might make—by leaving out superfluities, repetitions, and blunders only (say 500 pages) while retaining all the pragmatisms, dogmatisms, and vulgarities that I should have expunged—make a better historical and biographical document of the condensed book, representing the tone and cockiness of the 1890's.... Edman in any case would be the man to complete the Selections, as you propose, which would be improved by representing the later-phase of my interests.⁴¹

But Daniel Cory was his loyal (if somewhat underachieving) devotee, and Santayana was well aware of the fact that he had entrusted Cory with his literary legacy:

⁴¹ *LGS*, 8:382–83. Scribner Archives, Princeton University.

As to the choice of surgeons, for cutting out the bad things, I should prefer Cory (if he could be brought to do the work seriously) and also because the royalties which you justly think of assigning to the reviser would then go to him by right of work done as well as for the somewhat insecure heritage of my royalties in general, which in the contrary case would have to go to the real collaborator.⁴²

Santayana hoped for the best—“Cory might wake up and do something brilliant!” In the end, Wheelock did engage Cory as editor and compiler. Fortunately, Santayana was able to begin the process of abridgement during the final year of his life. In the “Preface” to the resulting one-volume edition, Cory writes: “In my mind’s eye I can see that frail shell of a body, clad in an old brown dressing-gown, sitting in an armchair with a rug across his knees. In one hand a volume of the Triton edition of his Works (the print is larger in this de luxe edition), and in the other the magnifying glass to assist the sight of the one good eye.”⁴³

Manuscript material of the one-volume *Life of Reason* is archived at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, The University of Texas at Austin. A type-written note from Daniel Cory included with the material states: “there is a good deal from Vol. I here.” However, nothing is extant for *Reason in Common Sense* except the table of contents. The materials from the other books of this volume are marked by Cory’s hand, and type for the entire abridged volume was set directly from Cory’s markup of the first edition.⁴⁴ Santayana stated to Wheelock (23 February 1952) that he revised only the first four books and then stopped; he later repeated to Rosamond Little (28 February 1952 and 17 April 1952) and Richard Lyon (9 March 1952) that he did not intend to mark any further revisions.⁴⁵ Cory, however, contradicted this version in his preface, writing that Santayana “had pruned the five volumes carefully, and the faithful red crayon was in action until the last chapter of *Reason in Science*.”⁴⁶ Cory was likely trying to diminish his role in the revision of the text in order to make it more acceptable to Santayana’s readers, since Santayana had insisted on Cory receiving the primary credit for editing it, as well as the copyright.

⁴² *LGS*, 8:382–83. Scribner Archives, Princeton University.

⁴³ *The Life of Reason* (1954, v–vi).

⁴⁴ Cory states in his notes deposited with the materials at the Humanities Research Center that: “The method was to tear the covers off the early five-volume edition, correct the text, and then send the sheets on to Scribner’s.”

⁴⁵ See *LGS*, 8:421, Scribner Archives, Princeton University; *LGS*, 8:423 and *LGS*, 8:434, Sturgis Family Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University; and *LGS*, 8:425, George Santayana Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

⁴⁶ *The Life of Reason* (1954, vi).

The one-volume edition (*ALR*) contains ten chapters from *Reason in Common Sense*. It does not include Chapter IV, “On Some Critics of This Discovery,” Chapter IX, “How Thought is Practical,” nor the Introduction, “The Subject of This Work, Its Method and Antecedents.” None of the marginal notes are included in the abridged edition and none of Santayana’s footnotes from the original publication were retained. Published in 1953, after Santayana’s death, this work constitutes a very different work than the multivolume series published in 1905. The editors of the present edition have not considered any changes to the one-volume abridgement as relevant to the critical edition text of *The Life of Reason*. However, just as with the *Little Essays* volume, sight collations were performed, and the variants list which was compiled during that process is provided in a separate appendix (see pages 189–200).

HISTORICAL COLLATION

At least two independent sight collations were completed for all major forms (that is, all distinct typesettings) of the text.⁴⁷ One set of collations was performed by a team of readers including an associate editor and staff, and the second set by the textual editor and assistants reading both as a team and individually. The combination of team and individual sight collations provides a valuable safeguard against oversights possible in collations confined to a single method.

Sight collations for *Reason in Common Sense* included reading the standard for collation (first edition, first issue, Scribner’s 1905) against the second Scribner’s edition, included in Volume III of the Triton edition (1936). Santayana’s personal copy of the Constable 1914 was used for compiling *Little Essays Drawn from the Writings of George Santayana*. The portion of the book not used for *Little Essays* also contains corrections, marginalia, and markings by Santayana (*GSC_D*). All of this material was compared to the collation standard, and variants were noted. For both the *GSC_{LE}* and *GSC_D* parts of this text, a team collation was done using a photocopy of the work; then a single editor looked at the original at Georgetown University. The “Preface” which Santayana wrote for the Scribner’s printing of 1922 is included in the anthology of Santayana’s writings entitled *Philosophy of*

⁴⁷The term “sight collation” refers to the process of comparing two versions of a text “by eye”; that is, in collating (comparing) a handwritten version against a typewritten version, or comparing two different editions (necessarily involving two different settings of type). The task cannot be done on a collating machine. “Machine collations” can be done only between impressions (printings) of a given edition. Machine collations for the present critical edition were done on a Lindstrand Comparator. The various editorial terms used in this commentary, including edition, impression, printing, issue, state, etc., follow the definitions found in Fredson Bowers, *Principles of Bibliographical Description* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949): 379–426.

Santayana: Selections from the Works of George Santayana, compiled and edited by Irwin Edman and published by Scribner's in 1936. Again two independent team collations were done to check for any variation.

Machine collations included comparison of photocopies of the 1905 collation standard against the Constable 1905 and 1922 printings (printed pages provided to Constable by Scribner's), and against the following Scribner's impressions: 1917, 1920, 1922, 1927, and 1948. The combined record of the sight collations (the vertical progression of separate typesettings, or editions) and the machine collations (the horizontal record of the variant states within a single edition's re-impressions and issues) amounts to a total of 451 textual variants.⁴⁸ This total includes both portions of the dismantled *GSC* 1914 Constable copy (133 variants in *GSC_{LE}*, 7 in *GSC_D*) and *LE* (203 variants), which have a tangential but significant relationship to the text of *Reason in Common Sense*. An additional 211 variants resulted from the sight collations of the passages from *Reason in Common Sense* that were abridged into *ALR*.⁴⁹

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CRITICAL TEXT FOR *REASON IN COMMON SENSE*

CHOICE OF COPY-TEXT

The earliest surviving form of *Reason in Common Sense* is the first edition, first issue; neither holograph manuscript nor stages of presswork have been located

⁴⁸The following copies of the relevant forms of *Introduction and Reason in Common Sense* have been collated during the preparation of the critical text: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905 first edition, first impression (used as copy-text), from the library at Texas A&M University, College Station, TxCM (B945.S23.L7); Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1905, from the library at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TU (B945.S23.L7); Constable 1914 in special collections at the Lauinger Library of Georgetown University, Washington, DC, DGU-A; Scribner's 1917 from the Wheaton College Library, Wheaton, Illinois, IWW; Scribner's 1920 from the Dr. Lillian and Dr. Rebecca Chutick Law Library, Cardoza School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York City, NNYU; Scribner's 1920 *Little Essays Drawn from the Writings of George Santayana* from Auburn University Libraries, Auburn, Alabama, AAP (B945.S2.L8); Scribner's 1922 from the library at Texas A&M University, College Station, TxCM; Constable 1922 from Pacific University, Forest Grove, Oregon, OrFP; Scribner's 1927 from Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana, InRE; Scribner's 1936 Triton edition of *The Works of George Santayana* (volume III) from the library at Texas A&M University, College Station, TxCM; Scribner's 1922 *Philosophy of Santayana*, edited by Irwin Edman, from New College Library, Sarasota, Florida, FSsNC (B945.S21.E3); Scribner's 1948 from the James Prendergast Free Library, Jamestown, New York, NJam.

⁴⁹Scribner's 1954 one-volume edition of *The Life of Reason* from Roberts Memorial Library of Roberts Wesleyan College, North Chili, New York, NNcR.

for this first book in *The Life of Reason* series. It is the closest known form to Santayana's unmediated hand, and in spite of the long and varied life of this text, the 1905 Scribner's first impression also represents his settled intention for the work. Although Santayana began to have reservations about the text of *The Life of Reason* shortly after writing it, he did not feel compelled to extensively revise it merely for the sake of clarification. He first presented his reasoning in a 21 November 1906 letter to Scribner's:

I don't mean to make any changes in the text, except of clerical errors, on the principle of Musset "lorsqu'on change sans cesse au passé pourquoi rien changer"?⁵⁰ When I am converted I will make my recantation in a new book and not spoil the old one.⁵¹

Santayana also expressed his desire to not "make any great changes in the text" in his letter of 18 January 1910; but in a 16 March 1913 letter he asked about making substantial changes for a "second revised edition," as opposed to a "mere reprint with verbal emendations." Opportunities for such a revised edition would continue to be complicated by the somewhat independent sales records of the five-book series—the individual titles were generally reprinted in a cascading fashion determined by varying stock levels. This situation was further complicated by the fact that sales of the individual titles reflected varying degrees of popularity. Eight corrections entered the 1917 impression, setting the stage for potential revisions to come. Scribner's eventually suggested a new preface rather than wholesale revisions, and on 29 April 1922 Santayana responded positively to the idea:

I think that, apart from material difficulties, it will be better not to make any changes in the thought or spirit of the original, but (as you suggest) to write a "Preface to the Second Edition" in which I can indicate in what direction my mind has changed in these twenty years, and perhaps say something about the scope and intention of the book, as I originally conceived it.⁵²

This agreement allowed Scribner's the opportunity to market the 1922 reprinting as a "second edition" even though in reality it was simply a new issue of the first edition typesetting, introducing only two isolated points of variation into the text. Santayana's "Preface to the Second Edition" served as an alternative to significant

⁵⁰ Since we are constantly changing, why try to change what is past?

⁵¹ *LGS*, 1:356, Scribner Archives, Princeton University.

⁵² *LGS*, 3:73. Letter to Constable and Co., Ltd., Special Collections, Temple University Libraries.

revision; regarding the 1905 text, he observed “I was often betrayed into expressions which, if not taken dramatically, would contradict my naturalism” (page vii, lines 21–24). He went on to apologize for some of his phrasing in the 1905 text, citing a specific example from page 125 of *Reason in Common Sense*: “Nature is drawn like a sponge, heavy and dripping from the waters of sentience” (lines 23–24). Notwithstanding his extended critique of this particular passage on pages viii–x, he chose not to revise it in the 1922 so-called “second edition,” in any subsequent impressions, or in the true second edition of 1936. This passage even appears intact in the abridged 1953 edition (page 28, lines 14–15).

In the 1922 preface, Santayana also implied that there were many more passages he was ambivalent about: “Let a single instance suffice as a hint to the critic, and as an apology for all the equivocations of this kind of which I may have been guilty.”⁵³ Yet, he went on to note that although the text did not perfectly express his present feelings, he chose to revise it only in limited ways, even suggesting that his opinion could change again, such that he might prefer the original version later:

Some readers would perhaps prefer the original to my revised version, and if I lived another twenty years I might myself prefer it. The written letter, then, may as well stand; especially as nothing hinders me from setting forth my matured views in fresh works, leaving it for others to decide whether I have changed for the better. After all, there has been no change in my deliberate doctrine; only some changes of mental habit.⁵⁴

This observation characterizes Santayana’s attitude toward all of his major written texts, which he regarded as freestanding works distinct from his “deliberate doctrine” and merely expressing his “mental habits” at a particular point in time. This characteristic and consistent view toward his published works, reinforced by his specific statements about the *Life of Reason* series in his correspondence and in his 1922 preface, supports the collational evidence of relatively minor variation traced through the genealogy of the text. For these reasons, the first impression of the Scribner’s 1905 first edition (A_A) stands as copy-text for the present critical edition.

EMENDATION POLICY: DETERMINATIONS INVOLVING POST-COPY-TEXT READINGS

The copy-text (A_A) serves as the authority for the vast majority of words and punctuation contained within this opening book of the *Life of Reason* series. The

⁵³ *The Life of Reason* (1954, viii).

⁵⁴ *The Life of Reason* (1954, v).

later impressions ($A_A^{1905-1948}$), re-issues (A_B , A_A^{1922} , A_B^{1922}), and the second edition (B_A) of *Reason in Common Sense* have no independent authority, but represent potential sources of emendation by virtue of the two successive states of textual variation that these published forms contain. The author's holograph revisions across both halves of his disassembled 1914 Constable copy (GSC_{LE} and GSC_D) represent a subsequent and distinct authorial intention—the *Little Essays* project of 1920.

The editors take a conservative approach in editing the copy-text: a reading adopted from any source other than the copy-text is justified only by the certainty or great likelihood that it is a revision by Santayana. Obvious grammatical and spelling errors (those that fall outside of his known idiosyncratic preferences) and compositorial errors are also corrected by emendation. Santayana's occasional misquotations within the text are not corrected, however; to do so would risk obscuring some particular significance that these misquotations might have in the text (all quotations are correctly rendered in the present volume's "Notes to the Text"). The sigla used in the emendations list identify the source text of the emended reading; an emendation originating with the editors of the present edition is identified by the siglum *CE* (critical edition). All emendations in the copy-text, both in substantives and in accidentals, are recorded in the "List of Emendations" in the "Editorial Appendix."

Unlike Santayana's earlier works, *Reason in Common Sense* presents almost no evidence of house styling involving spelling. Scribner's now refrained from their earlier practice of imposing American spelling on Santayana's clear preference for British spelling (in earlier volumes copy editors and compositors had either styled or misread his 'is' holograph forms as 'iz' throughout). During his European travels, Santayana only found it necessary to restore a manageable number of 'our' spellings in the page proofs. Only one Anglicized spelling (152.22) is emended in the present critical edition—"idealization" had somehow gotten past Santayana's review of his marginal summary notes.

These marginal notes had also been reproduced as the table of contents of the 1905 first edition to form a synoptic preview of the contents for *Reason in Common Sense*. Santayana may not have seen or paid attention to the table of contents prior to publication, for a collation of the contents pages and the actual headings within the text revealed ten inconsistencies. One is substantive—an omission of Chapter XII's "Evolution" in the table of contents, probably caused by its obscure location in the margin of the text proper. Another seven involve punctuation, and two reflect spelling differences. All ten are included at the end of the present volume's "List of Variants." The one substantive omission is restored and described in the "Discussions of Adopted Readings"; the seven instances where Santayana's punctuation was corrupted in the table of contents

also have been emended to reflect Santayana's punctuation in the marginal notes as they appear within the text proper. The spelling inconsistencies both require an emendation to the marginal note in the text itself. Santayana's original synoptic table of contents is considered part of the copy-text and therefore all ten of these restorations appear in the "List of Emendations." In the quasi-facsimile of the table of contents, the original pagination reflecting the Scribner's 1905 text also has been replaced by the actual pagination of the present edition, and is noted with the CE sigla in the "List of Emendations."

A very few emendations are required for consistency in the presentation of the text, the type of change that an author would expect an editor to complete. Titles of written works have, therefore, been italicized by the editors of this edition. However, Santayana's inconsistency in capitalization of specific nouns is common throughout his work, and this requires a deeper exercise of critical judgment. For example, "Nature" meaning a universal existence is generally capitalized, while "nature" in a more abstract sense is generally not. The same is true of "Church," where Santayana capitalizes the noun most often in reference to the Catholic Church, but does not when he refers to church in more general terms. No attempt has been made to clarify Santayana's intent with capitalization, and no emendations are done for consistency.

In spite of its long textual history, the editors of the present edition have only made forty-eight emendations to the text. This reflects the care with which Santayana composed *Reason in Common Sense* and the relatively few corrections made in the 1917 and 1922 impressions. The 1917 impression (A_A^{1917}) introduces only eight variants from the 1905 first impression, of which six (at 30.7, 33.16, 62.25, 64.21, 100.16, and 103.32 in the critical text) represent obvious corrections. These presumably derive from the errata mentioned in Santayana's letters to Scribner's of 21 November 1906 and 22 June 1914 (the actual list—or lists—remain unlocated). One variant (152.3) involves a word substitution intended as a clarification of meaning. All seven of these corrections are emended into the copy-text and recorded in the present volume's "List of Emendations." The eighth variant (130.3) introduced a punctuation inconsistency that was corrected in A_A^{1922} . One final variant, a brief passage at 127.17–18, represents Santayana's only significant point of revision at any stage in the long history of *Reason in Common Sense*, and the A_A^{1922} is the actual source of emendation for the present edition.

Although Scribner's published the 1922 impression as a "second edition" and included a new preface written by Santayana, this third state of the text only introduced two new variants. The passage at 127.17–18, was revised by Santayana in GSC_{LE} before he made the final revision for A_A^{1922} . The second A_A^{1922} variant (130.3) settled the punctuation matter he (or his editors) had tried to correct

unsuccessfully in A_A^{1917} . Both of these variants are emended into the copy-text, and are recorded in the “List of Emendations.”

It remains to discuss the material from the two *GSC* fragments that emerged from Santayana’s work on the *Little Essays* project of 1920. *GSC* (Santayana’s disassembled copy of the A_B^{1914} Constable volume) contains marked-out passages throughout by Santayana and perhaps by Logan Pearsall Smith. Either Smith (or subsequently Santayana) divided the cut-up copy into pages for further abridgement into *Little Essays* (GSC_{LE}) and a larger stack of pages to be discarded outright from the project (GSC_D). But before the final separation of pages (or perhaps before the pages of *GSC* were separated), Santayana made holograph revisions across the entire disassembled book—even into those passages blocked out or subsequently blocked out—for exclusion from consideration for *Little Essays*. This holograph layer represents abridgements and word cuts for the purpose of creating an entirely different work—the merging of isolated passages from *Reason in Common Sense* and the other *Life of Reason* titles with passages from six other books. For this reason, none of Santayana’s work for the *LE* concept has authority in establishing the text of the present edition. However, all of Santayana’s holograph revisions and corrections found in GSC_{LE} and GSC_D , as well as all the variants within the passages carried over into *LE* itself, are recorded in the “List of Variants.” One necessary correction to punctuation only occurs in *Little Essays* itself (93.2). Since that work has no authority or even relevance to the text of *Reason in Common Sense*, the *CE* (critical edition) siglum is used to show the source of the reading.

The very conservative treatment of accidentals and substantives originating in *GSC* and *LE* itself differs from the emendation policy applied in previous philosophical volumes of *The Works of George Santayana* (Volume II, *The Sense of Beauty*, and Volume III, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*), in which authorial changes made for the purpose of compiling *Little Essays* were usually accepted for emendation if they represented Santayana’s more broadly defined “stylistic revisions either to clarify or refine his meaning” and were of a “general nature,” such that they pertained to both the source text and *Little Essays*.

However, there is evidence that Santayana viewed *The Life of Reason* as a whole to have a meaning distinct from that of its separate parts. In his 9 October 1917 letter to Logan Pearsall Smith regarding the compilation of *Little Essays*, Santayana wrote,

The only thing I should like to insist on is the omission here and there of arguments or opinions of which I no longer approve—and there is a whole family of them. I was hardly aware before how much my philosophy has changed since “The Life of Reason”. That book now seems to me hopelessly

lost in the subjective, not that the subjective is not worth expressing, but that it should never be confused with the natural or historical facts.⁵⁵

Santayana wanted the selections in *Little Essays* to express particular views that were congruent with his current thinking; therefore his discretionary revisions cannot be assumed to be of a general nature and to pertain to the source texts as well. The 1936 Triton edition includes mostly compositorial variants to accommodate the difference in format, such as the resetting of the embedded marginal summaries as section headers (without the original terminal punctuation marks) and the consequent insertion of arbitrary paragraph breaks at certain points where a marginal summary had appeared in the middle of a paragraph in the 1905 edition. Santayana did not care for the restyling, but his correspondence with Daniel Cory confirms that he accepted the inevitability of it.⁵⁶ These arrangements are not considered part of Santayana's intention for his text; therefore, his embedded summaries are retained and the Triton's imposed paragraph breaks are rejected. However, at three points (23.14, 73.6, and 144.21–22) the Triton corrects previously uncorrected typographical errors, and at two points (133.39 and 157.38) imposes the correct italic styling on a book title. All five of these variants are emended and recorded in the "List of Emendations."

In all, the variants discovered through the sight and machine collations have resulted in the adoption of forty-eight emendations to the copy-text. Of this total, twenty-one involve substantive readings and twenty-seven involve accidentals.

Finally, Santayana's editorial matter has also been carefully edited for the critical edition. As the title indicates Santayana's introduction to his "little system of moral philosophy" was only published in Book One, *Introduction and Reason in Common Sense*, even though it serves as an introduction to the five-book series. The present editors, therefore, include it only as part of Book One. James Gouinlock's historical introduction to the critical edition, followed by the original copy-text table of contents, concludes the roman numeral front matter page run; Santayana's introduction opens the arabic sequence of primary text as originally conceived for the series by the author.

⁵⁵ *LGS*, 2:290. Pearsall Smith Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

⁵⁶ 25 November 1936 to Daniel Cory: "My marginal headings are printed in large type across the page at the top of each paragraph. This suggests something which my writing is not. The paragraphs are only divisions in one discourse: they are not answers to stated questions or separate compositions. Probably this new arrangement will help the reader in that he will be satisfied to begin anywhere and read a paragraph: and that I believe is the way in which my style, if not my doctrines, may be best approached. But on the whole the change is a perversion, and marginal notes are an old device which has a special relish of its own." (*LGS*, 5:405–6. George Santayana Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.)

The preface, introduced in the 1922 issue, also addresses the nature of the entire *Life of Reason* series. There are no variants in the subsequent impressions of the first edition or the Triton (it was eliminated from the single-volume edition of 1953). The 1922 preface has a distinct purpose as Santayana's alternative to what would have amounted to a wholesale rewriting of all the books in the *Life of Reason* series, and it is included as an appendix in the critical edition of *Reason in Common Sense*. As Santayana did not include it in the 1922 re-issue of the other titles of the series, the preface will not appear in other titles of the critical edition.

Discussions of Adopted Readings

lvi.22 Evolution.] This marginal note was overlooked when the original table of contents was set by Scribner's, perhaps because it is the second of two notes found only two lines apart within the same paragraph of the main text. The table of contents is reproduced in this critical edition and the marginal note is included by emendation.

5.38 Bacon] Also at 9.12, 17.24, 18.7, 18.28, 33.5, 35.3, 39.2, 45.15, 49.7, 50.4, 64.13, 67.2, 86.10, 99.27, 104.15, 106.26, 114.28, 118.2, 119.32, 121.15, 132.1, 134.22, 136.23, 151.11, 153.28, 156.24, 157.4, 158.3, and 161.18. At these points the compositor for the Triton edition inserted paragraph breaks to accommodate the format change, in which the marginal notes appearing in *A*¹⁹²² (setting copy for the Triton edition) were typeset as section headings. In the critical edition, the copy-text presentation is retained.

61.33 *Critique*] Also at 62.6, 62.9MN, 62.17, 72.2FN, 96.11, 135.39FN, and 159.38FN. Santayana and his editors were inconsistent with their handling of titles of books. In the critical edition, the editors have emended book titles to italics.

69.23–30 If . . . thought.] In *Little Essays*, Santayana rewrote this passage to read as follows:

If a thing were never perceived, or inferred from perception, we should indeed never know that it existed; but after we become aware that we have perceived or inferred it, it may remain conducive to comprehension and practical competence to continue to regard it as existing independently of our perception; and our ability to make this supposition is registered in the difference between the two words *to be* and *to be perceived*—words which are by no means synonymous but designate two very different relations of things to thought.

The first two variants, at 69.25–26 (“but once perceived or inferred it may be more conducive”) and 69.26 (“to regard”), do not affect the meaning of the passage. The third variant, at 69.30 (“things in thought”), introduces a significant change in meaning, but the reading in *Little Essays* represents a completely different publishing intention; consequently, the *Little Essays* reading is not considered to be authoritative for the critical edition, and the copy-text reading is retained.

75.5–6 beginning; the] At this point, a semicolon or a period is called for, since the following clause does not explicate “beginning.” The editors have therefore accepted the Triton variant as a correction necessary to make sense of the text and have emended in a semicolon.

95.2 dies;] Because this sentence contains three consecutive independent clauses without conjunctions connecting them, they must be separated by semicolons to avoid reader confusion. At this point the comma found in the copy-text is emended to a semicolon.

129.17–18 matter determines the existence and distribution of mind, and mind determines the discovery and value of matter. To] This passage in the copy-text reads as follows:

If we must speak, therefore, of causal relations between mind and body, we should say that matter is the pervasive cause of mind’s distribution, and mind the pervasive cause of matter’s discovery and value.

In compiling *Little Essays*, Santayana slightly changed the word order but not the meaning:

If we must speak, therefore, of causal relations between mind and body, we should say that matter is the pervasive cause of the distribution of mind, and mind the pervasive cause of the discovery and value of matter.

Little Essays represented a radically different publishing intention, but his work with this passage is reflected at one point in his subsequent revisions of *Reason in Common Sense*. In the only significant revision he made for the 1922 printing, Santayana retained part of the *Little Essays* wording of this passage while changing the verb form. The 1922 reading represents Santayana’s final form of revision for the original full-volume concept, and is emended into the critical edition.

132.3 action. “The] Terminal punctuation is necessary here to separate the two complete sentences. A comma was typeset here in the first impression, and this was corrected to a colon in the 1917 and 1920 impressions; it was most likely among the errata mentioned by Santayana in his letter of 22 June 1914 to Scribner’s. It was changed to a period in the 1921 impression, probably also at Santayana’s direction.

133.22MN transcendental] Santayana occasionally continued his note text across more than one marginal note, even when these notes were separated by

many lines of content text. The completion point for this note (at 134.23MN) confirms that it is a continuation because it is not capitalized. The Scribner's compositor may have mistakenly inserted a period at this point because the continuation marginal note (221.22 in the copy-text) appears two pages after the first one (219.26 in the copy-text).

144.7 quality, are based] Santayana's revision for *Little Essays* ("is" was changed to "are") corrects a subject-verb agreement error (the subject of the clause is the plural "beliefs"). However, this emendation is made in the critical edition as a correction to the copy-text rather than on the authority of *GSC*_{LE}.

146.21–22 existence] In the first edition and all subsequent impressions based on it, the line-end hyphen is omitted (242.1 in the copy-text). This typesetting error is corrected by emendation in the critical edition.

154.3 deserve loyalty it] Among the variants initiated by Santayana in 1917 was the change here from "adhesion" to "loyalty." In compiling the excerpts for *Little Essays*, Santayana used "allegiance" instead. The critical edition emends in the 1917 variant.

List of Emendations

This list records all changes made in the copy-text by the present editors. Critical Edition readings are listed to the left of the lemma bracket; source(s) for the emended reading, followed by a semicolon, then the rejected copy-text reading and its symbol, as well as intermediate variant readings when they exist, are listed to the right of the bracket. See the “List of Variants” for all post-copy-text variants. For discussion of emendations marked with an asterisk (*), see the “Discussions of Adopted Readings,” pages 285–87. The tilde (~) stands for the word or words cited to the left of the lemma bracket and indicates that a punctuation mark is emended. The caret (^) indicates the absence of a punctuation mark. (See pages 207–9 for the “Editorial Sigla and Symbols.”)

liii.14 causes. Modern] *CE*; ~.~ A_A

liii.17 Pages 1–19] *CE*; Pages 1–32 A_A (similar pagination adjustments at liii.28, liv.2, liv.11, liv.21, liv.29, lv.7, lv.17, lv.25, lvi.2, lvi.10, lvi.18, lvi.29)

liii.24 interests,] *CE*; ~ ^ A_A

liii.26 gropings. Instinct] *CE*; ~.~ A_A

liv.17 *Critique*] *CE*; Critique A_A

liv.21 “fictions.”] B_A ; “~ ^” A_A

lv.3 body.] *CE*; ~ ^ A_A

lv.3 normal] *CE*; ~, A_A

*lvi.22 Evolution.—] B_A ; [*not present*] A_A

18.12–13 question, What] B_A ; ~ ^ ~ A_A

25.14 if experience] B_A ; ~ .~ A_A

32.7 evidence are external] $A_A^{1917-1948}$, A_B^{1922} , B_A ; evidence is external A_A

35.16 abhors] $A_A^{1917-1948}$, A_B^{1922} , B_A ; abhores A_A

50.3–5MN *Mens naturaliter platonica.*] *CE*; *Mens naturaliter platonica.* A_A

*61.33 *Critique*] *CE*; Critique A_A ; also at 62.6, 62.9MN, 62.17

64.25 contradiction] $A_A^{1917-1948}$, A_B^{1922} , B_A ; contradiction A_A

66.21 framed has empirical] $A_A^{1917-1948}$, A_B^{1922} , B_A ; framed his empirical A_A

69.18 *Theætetus*] *CE*; “Theætetus” A_A

*72.2FN *Critique of Pure Reason.*] *CE*; Critique of Pure Reason. A_A

*75.5–6 beginning; the] B_A ; \sim : $\sim A_A$

*95.2 dies;] *CE*; \sim , A_A

*96.11 *Confessions*] *CE*; Confessions A_A

102.16 mass in a] $A_A^{1917-1948}$, A_B^{1922} , B_A ; mass is a A_A

105.31–32 practice have thus] $A_A^{1917-1948}$, A_B^{1922} , B_A ; practice has thus A_A

*129.17–18 matter determines the existence and distribution of mind, and mind determines the discovery and value of matter. To] $A_A^{1922-1948}$, A_B^{1922} , B_A ; matter is the pervasive cause of mind’s distribution, and mind the pervasive cause of matter’s discovery and value. To A_A

*132.3 action. “The] $A_A^{1922-1948}$, A_B^{1922} , B_A ; \sim , “ $\sim A_A$; \sim : “ $\sim A_A^{1917-1920}$

*133.22MN transcendental] *CE*; \sim . A_A

*135.39FN *Memorabilia*,] B_A ; Memorabilia, A_A

*144.7 quality, are based] *CE*; quality, is based A_A

*146.21–22 existence] B_A ; exist $_{\wedge}$ / ence A_A

152.22MN idealisations.] *CE*; idealizations. A_A

*154.3 deserve loyalty it] $A_A^{1917-1948}$, A_B^{1922} , B_A ; deserve adhesion it A_A

*159.38FN **Descent of Man*,] B_A ; *Descent of Man, A_A

Report of Line-End Hyphenation

I. COPY-TEXT LIST

The following are the editorially established forms of possible compounds which were hyphenated at the ends of lines in the copy-text.

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------------|
| liii.14 restatement | 38.23 unequivocal |
| lv.21 reactions | 43.39 everlasting |
| lv.34 Preformations | 44.9 newcomer |
| 3.17 however | 45.14 something |
| 3.31 well-nigh | 46.28 something |
| 5.33 One-half | 48.20 supersensible |
| 6.25 something | 48.23 something |
| 8.4 supernatural | 49.33 sometimes |
| 14.19 afterward | 49.38 however |
| 24.16 retrospectively | 54.3–4 Self-knowledge |
| 24.23 afterimage | 58.21 backgammon |
| 24.25 presupposing | 60.27MN reconstruction |
| 27.5 afterimages | 60.34 anything |
| 29.8 springflood | 62.4 understanding |
| 31.24–25 however | 62.27 unknowability |
| 32.25MN uncontrolled | 63.21 landscape |
| 32.30 self-knowledge | 63.35 non-natural |
| 35.5 thereby | 64.29 therefore |
| 37.16 landscape | 67.31 understand |

- 75.12 metaphysics
77.27 Meantime
79.33 understand
81.35 however
82.27 to-morrow
82.38 whenever
83.19 subtend
85.6MN background
85.11 cannot
85.19 background
87.3 counterparts
88.20 therefore
88.39 all-seeing
92.6 widespread
93.21 metaphysical
96.2 re-enact
96.5 sometimes
96.32 friendship
101.2 however
104.34 without
105.37 something
107.5 however
115.37 long-consolidated
116.18–19 metaphysical
117.9 disproof
118.37 supernatural
123.11 unreality
128.10 something
128.23 however
128.26 interlarding
132.6–7 well-formed
132.15 without
135.33 anything
136.1 non-natural
137.27 without
141.18 heart-searching
153.16–17 whatever
155.14 co-operation
161.8–9 supernatural
163.6 reappear
164.38MN dethrone
165.33 ostrich-like
167.5–6 elsewhere
169.4 winepress
169.5 baytree
172.16 readaptation
173.2 transformations
174.14 therefore
174.27 uninspiring

II. CRITICAL EDITION LIST

In quotations from the present critical edition, no line-end hyphens are to be retained except the following:

- 3.28–29 co-/ordinate
- 54.3–4 Self-/knowledge
- 54.35–36 common-/sense
- 58.6–7 five-and-/twenty
- 62.19–20 store-/house
- 62.26–27 things-in-/themselves
- 64.17–18 self-/existent
- 81.29–30 self-/contradictory
- 83.6–7 vantage-/ground
- 88.26–27 all-/seeing
- 114.25–26 absent-/minded
- 132.6–7 well-/formed
- 161.8–9 super-/natural
- 163.24–25 to-/morrow

List of Variants

This list is a historical record of the variants in the authorized forms of *Introduction and Reason in Common Sense* and in the pages from this text used as part of the *Little Essays* project. Copy-text readings are listed to the left of the lemma bracket; variant readings are listed to the right. The tilde (~) stands for the words to the left of the lemma bracket and the caret (^) stands for the absence of a punctuation mark. (See pages 207–9 for the “Editorial Sigla and Symbols.”)

[List of volumes page] Each volume 12mo. \$1.25 net (Postage extra.)] [not present]
 A_A^{1920}, A_B

[not present]] SECOND EDITION / WITH A NEW PREFACE $A_A^{1922-1948}$

[Title page] NEW YORK / CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS / 1905] NEW YORK / CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS / 1917 A_A^{1917} ; NEW YORK / CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS / 1920 A_A^{1920} ; NEW YORK / CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS / 1922 A_A^{1922} ; NEW YORK / CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS / 1927 A_A^{1927} ; NEW YORK / CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS / 1948 A_A^{1948} ; LONDON / ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO. Ltd., / 1905 A_B ; CONSTABLE & COMPANY LTD. / LONDON • BOMBAY • SYDNEY A_B^{1922}

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v [not present]] [Preface to the Second Edition] $A_A^{1922-1948}, A_B^{1922}, B_A$

[The “Preface to the Second Edition” precedes the “Contents” page in $A_A^{1922-1948}$ and A_B^{1922} ; it follows the “Contents” page in B_A .]

liii.4 [¶] Progress is] [no new ¶] ~ B_A

liii.13 thus complete[broken comma] yet] thus complete, yet B_A

liii.14 re- / statement] restatement B_A

liii.17 Pages 1–32] [not present] B_A

liii.18 ——] [not present] B_A

liii.22 [¶] Existence] [no new ¶] ~ B_A

liii.23 static, impotent[broken comma] indifferent.] static, impotent, indifferent. B_A

liii.24 interests which] interests, which B_A

liii.27 Pages 35–47] [not present] B_A

liii.30 [¶] Dreams] [no new ¶] ~ B_A

liv.2 Pages 48–63] [not present] B_A

liv.5 [¶] Nature] [no new ¶] ~ B_A

liv.11 Pages 64–83] [not present] B_A

liv.14 [¶] Psychology] [no new ¶] ~ B_A

liv.21 “fictions”] “fictions.” B_A

liv.21 Pages 84–117] [not present] B_A

liv.24 [¶] Man’s] [no new ¶] ~ B_A

liv.29 Pages 118–136] [not present] B_A

liv.32 [¶] Another] [no new ¶] ~ B_A

lv.7 Pages 137–160] [not present] B_A

lv.10 [¶] So-called] [no new ¶] ~ B_A

lv.17 Pages 161–183] [not present] B_A

lv.20 [¶] Moral] [no new ¶] ~ B_A

- lv.21 re- / actions.-] reactions.- B_A
- lv.25 Pages 184–204] [*not present*] B_A
- lv.28 [¶] Functional] [*no new ¶*] ~ B_A
- lv.34 Pre- / formations] Preformations B_A
- lvi.2 Pages 205–235] [*not present*] B_A
- lvi.5 [¶] Honesty] [*no new ¶*] ~ B_A
- lvi.10 Pages 236–255] [*not present*] B_A
- lvi.13 [¶] The ultimate] [*no new ¶*] ~ B_A
- lvi.18 Pages 256–268] [*not present*] B_A
- lvi.21 [¶] Respectable] [*no new ¶*] ~ B_A
- lvi.22 opinion.-Pantheism.] opinion.-Evolution.-Pantheism. B_A
- lvi.27 variation. Spirit] variation.-Spirit B_A
- lvi.29 Pages 269–291] [*not present*] B_A
- 1.6–10MN Progress ... creates.] PROGRESS ... CREATES B_A
- 1.19 VOL. I.-1 [*signature in bottom margin*] [*not present*] B_A
- 2.20–21MN Life of Reason] LIFE OF REASON B_A
- 3.17 how- / ever] however B_A
- 3.31 well- / nigh] well-nigh B_A
- 4.8 another greater sorrow,] another great sorrow, B_A
- 5.6 anyone] any one B_A
- 5.33 [*no new ¶*] A great] [¶] ~ LE
- 5.33 One- / half] One-half B_A
- 5.38 [*no new ¶*] Bacon] [¶] ~ B_A
- 6.15 of what they] of how much they GSC_{LE}, LE
- 6.22 Life of Reason] life of reason LE

- 6.25 some- / thing] something B_A
- 7.11 Patristic] patristic LE
- 7.19–20 imposed, it ... which the pursuit] imposed, and the pursuit GSC_{LE}, LE
- 7.21 hopeless. Nature] hopeless, nature GSC_{LE}, LE
- 7.21 novel appendages, nor] novel expression, nor GSC_{LE}, LE
- 7.25 Patristic] patristic LE
- 7.27 minimised] minimized LE
- 8.4 super- / natural] supernatural B_A
- 9.12 [no new ¶] Heraclitus,] [¶] ~, B_A
- 10.20 our ideals; yet] our demands; yet LE
- 10.25 organisation] organization LE
- 10.38 itself.] itself. But it does not ask to be worshipped. GSC_{LE}
- 11.2 Democritus' physics] Democritus's physics B_A
- 11.3 VOL. I.–2 [signature in bottom margin]] [not present] B_A
- 11.24–25 anyone] any one B_A
- 14.19 after- / ward] afterward B_A
- 17.24 [no new ¶] Nor does] [¶] ~ B_A
- 17.26 [no new ¶] It was] [¶] ~ LE
- 17.33 common-sense] common sense B_A
- 17.38 theorising] theorizing LE
- 18.7–8 [no new ¶] It seldom] [¶] ~ GSC_{LE}, LE, B_A
- 18.8–9 all good and] all good, and LE
- 18.9 of its attainment; they] of attaining it; they GSC_{LE}, LE
- 18.12–13 question What] question, What, GSC_{LE}, LE, B_A
- 18.23 the basis] The basis GSC_{LE}, LE

- 18.28 [*no new ¶*] Spinoza] [¶] ~ B_A
- 19.12 [*no new ¶*] There is] [¶] ~ GSC_{LE}, LE
- 24.16 retro- / spectively] retrospectively B_A
- 24.23 after- / image] after-image B_A
- 24.25 pre- / supposing] presupposing B_A
- 25.14 if .experience] if \wedge experience B_A
- 26.7 organised,] organized, LE
- 26.9 rendering that body's] rendering the body's GSC_{LE}, LE
- 26.9–10 sensations harmonious] sensations in that body harmonious GSC_{LE}, LE
- 26.11–15 depend. It ... labour. Reason] depend. Reason GSC_{LE}, LE
- 26.18 *point-d'appui.*] *point d'appui.* LE
- 26.27 beginning we] beginning in the autobiography of mind we GSC_{LE} ;
beginning in the autobiography of mind, we LE
- 26.29–27.7 in flux. Pure ... immediate is not God] in flux. It is not God $GSC_{LE},$
 LE
- 27.5 after- / images] after-images B_A
- 27.8 all things] all our ideas of things GSC_{LE}, LE
- 27.13–16 languors. [¶] The seed-bed ... perturbed immediate itself that finds or]
languors. The perturbed immediate finds or GSC_{LE}, LE
- 27.18 the flux] the material flux GSC_{LE}, LE
- 27.22 [¶] Life] [*no new ¶*] ~ GSC_{LE}, LE
- 28.15 Life of Reason,] life of reason, LE
- 28.19 recognise] recognize LE
- 28.24 unrest.] unrest. Impulses to appropriate and to reject first teach us the
points of the compass, and space itself, like charity, begins at home. $GSC_{LE},$
 LE
- 29.1 The same primacy] The primacy GSC_{LE}, LE

- 29.8 spring- / flood] spring-flood *LE*, *B_A*
- 29.10 gayety,] gaiety, *LE*
- 29.18 reorganised] reorganized *LE*
- 29.26 around it,] round it, *GSC_{LE}*, *LE*
- 29.29 Life of Reason] life of reason *LE*
- 30.2 recognised] recognized *LE*
- 31.4 [¶] Consciousness] [*no new ¶*] CONSCIOUSNESS *B_A*
- 31.24–25 how- / ever] however *B_A*
- 32.7 evidence is external] evidence are external *A_A^{1917–1948}*, *A_B¹⁹²²*, *B_A*
- 32.11 VOL. I.–4 [*signature in bottom margin*]] [*not present*] *B_A*
- 32.12 is in fact no] is no *GSC_{LE}*, *LE*
- 32.13 ulterior practical function] ulterior function *GSC_{LE}*, *LE*
- 32.14 its conditions] its external conditions *GSC_{LE}*, *LE*
- 32.19 while knowledge and] while science and *LE*
- 32.25MN un- / controlled] UNCONTROLLED *B_A*
- 32.25 recognise] recognize *LE*
- 32.28 realising] realizing *LE*
- 32.30 self- / knowledge] self-knowledge *B_A*
- 32.36 breast; he] ~: ~ *LE*
- 33.5 [*no new ¶*] The predetermined] [¶] ~ *B_A*
- 34.1 cure. Madness, in like manner, if] cure. [¶] The path of reason is only one of innumerable courses open to existence, but it is the only one that human discourse is competent to trace. Madness, if *GSC_{LE}*, *LE*
- 34.2 not strong enough] not deep enough *LE*
- 34.3 it too may] it may *GSC_{LE}*, *LE*

- 34.6 exorcising] exorcizing *LE*
- 34.19 stand-point] standpoint *LE*
- 34.22 recognise] recognize *LE*
- 34.24–25 Life of Reason] life of reason *GSC_{LE}, LE*
- 34.38 [*no new ¶*] The] [¶] The *LE*
- 35.3 [*no new ¶*] But to] [¶] ~ *B_A*
- 35.4 affectation:] ~; *B_A*
- 35.4–11 affectation: it ... prevent. A] affectation. A *GSC_{LE}, LE*
- 35.5 there- / by] thereby *B_A*
- 35.16 abhors] abhors *A_A^{1917–1948}, A_B¹⁹²², LE, B_A*
- 36.3–4 if we could only weigh] if only we could weigh *B_A*
- 36.21 [*no new ¶*] systematic living] [¶] Systematic living *GSC_{LE}, LE*
- 36.37–37.2 humanity. [¶] The step by which pleasure and pain are attached to ideas, so as to be predictable and to become factors in action, is therefore by no means irrevocable. It is a step, however, in the direction of reason; and though reason's path is only] humanity. [¶] The path of reason is only *GSC_{LE}, LE*
- 37.3 existence, it] existence, but it *GSC_{LE}, LE*
- 37.3–4 that we are tracing here; the only one, obviously, which human] that human *GSC_{LE}, LE*
- 37.16 land- / scape] landscape *B_A*
- 37.18–19 absence, the change in the animal's feeling is not merely in the quantity of pure pleasure; a] absence, a *GSC_{LE}, LE*
- 38.2 [*no new ¶*] *Felix qui*] [¶] ~ *GSC_{LE}, LE*
- 38.3 needs and] needs, and *GSC_{LE}, LE*
- 38.4 civilisation] civilization *LE*
- 38.4 Life of Reason] life of reason *GSC_{LE}, LE*

38.6 of things, so] $\sim \wedge \sim GSC_{LE}, LE$

38.8–10 another. In proportion as such understanding advances each moment of experience becomes consequential and prophetic of the rest. The] another. The GSC_{LE}, LE

38.10 and its spasms] and the spasms GSC_{LE}, LE

38.12–13 altogether, because] $\sim \wedge \sim GSC_{LE}$

38.23 un- / equivocal] unequivocal B_A

39.2–3 [no new ¶] When consciousness] [¶] $\sim B_A$

42.9 VOL. I.–5 [signature in bottom margin]] [not present] B_A

43.39 ever- / lasting] everlasting B_A

44.9 new- / comer] newcomer B_A

45.14 some- / thing] something B_A

45.15 [no new ¶] A sensation] [¶] $\sim B_A$

46.28 some- / thing] something B_A

48.20 super- / sensible] supersensible B_A

48.22 Knowledge] But knowledge LE

48.23 some- / thing] something LE, B_A

49.7 [no new ¶] We may] [¶] $\sim B_A$

49.8–9 is after all no] is no GSC_{LE}, LE

49.12–26 spirit. To ... reach. Consciousness] spirit. But knowledge is not eating, and we cannot expect to devour and possess *what we mean*. Knowledge is recognition of something absent; it is a salutation, not an embrace. Consciousness GSC_{LE}, LE

49.33 some- / times] sometimes B_A

49.38 how- / ever] however B_A

49.27–50.30 of it. ... illumine. What] of it, and we cannot cease to think and still continue to know. What GSC_{LE}, LE

- 50.4–5 [*no new ¶*] In vain,] [¶] ~, B_A
- 50.31 You will not] You would not GSC_{LE} , LE
- 50.31–32 to make no inferences from your] to see no meaning in your GSC_{LE} ,
 LE
- 51.14–15 VOL. I.–6 [*signature in bottom margin*]] [not present] B_A
- 53.4 [¶] The English] [*no new ¶*] ~ B_A
- 53.4–6 of substance, and whose traces we have in general followed in the above
account, did] of substance, did GSC_{LE} ; of substance did LE
- 53.19 uncriticised,] uncriticized, LE
- 53.23–54.6 function. [¶] So ... elaboration. It] function. It GSC_{LE} , LE
- 54.3–4 Self- / knowledge] Self-knowledge B_A
- 54.16–19 the world; ... sort. Since] the world. Since GSC_{LE} , LE
- 54.35–36 common-sense] common sense B_A
- 58.10 though] through B_A
- 58.21 back- / gammon] backgammon B_A
- 59.5 [¶] Kant, like Berkeley, had] [¶] Kant had GSC_{LE} , LE
- 59.6 common-sense.] common sense. B_A
- 59.33 the real world?] the human world? GSC_{LE} , LE
- 60.27MN re- / construction] RECONSTRUCTION B_A
- 60.34 any- / thing] anything B_A
- 61.3–4 VOL. I.–7 [*signature in bottom margin*]] [not present] B_A
- 61.8 someone] some one B_A
- 61.26 feelings, is] ~ ^ ~ B_A
- 62.4 under- / standing] understanding B_A
- 62.27 un- / knowability] unknowability B_A

- 63.21 land- / scape] landscape B_A
- 63.35 non- / natural] non-natural B_A
- 64.13–14 [*no new ¶*] In our] [*¶*] ~ B_A
- 64.25 controdiction] contradiction $A_A^{1917-1948}, A_B^{1922}, B_A$
- 64.29 there- / fore] therefore B_A
- 64.34 common-sense] common sense B_A
- 66.21 framed his empirical] framed has empirical $A_A^{1917-1948}, A_B^{1922}, B_A$
- 67.2 [*no new ¶*] They might,] [*¶*] ~, B_A
- 67.31 under- / stand] understand B_A
- 69.17 through perception alone] through attention alone GSC_{LE}
- 69.18 “Theætetus”] *Theætetus* LE
- 69.25–26 but once perceived or inferred it may be more conducive] but after we become aware that we have perceived or inferred it, it may remain conducive GSC_{LE}, LE
- 69.26 to regard] to continue to regard GSC_{LE}, LE
- 69.30 things in thought] things to thought GSC_{LE}, LE
- 69.31–32 and a withdrawal] with a withdrawal LE
- 70.4–5 VOL. I.–8 [*signature in bottom margin*] [*not present*] B_A
- 73.4 [*new ¶*] When the] [*no new ¶*] ~ B_A
- 73.23 common-sense,] common sense, B_A
- 75.5–6 a beginning; the] a beginning; the B_A
- 75.12 meta- / physics] metaphysics B_A
- 75.13 [*no new ¶*] whoever it was, who searched] [*¶*] Whoever it was, that searched $GSC_{LE}; [¶]$ Whoever it was that searched LE
- 75.23–28 abstract. Truth ... lay. The] abstract. The GSC_{LE}, LE
- 76.1 of ideation by] of poetry by GSC_{LE}, LE

- 76.2 dramatisations] dramatizations *LE*
- 77.19 Nature is drawn] The idea of Nature is drawn *GSC_D*
- 77.27 Mean- / time] Meantime *B_A*
- 79.33 under- / stand] understand *B_A*
- 79.34–35 VOL. I.–9 [*signature in bottom margin*]] [*not present*] *B_A*
- 80.9 Intelligence is] And intelligence loves to perceive; water is not more grateful to a parched throat than a principle of comprehension to a confused understanding. Intelligence is *GSC_{LE}, LE*
- 81.6–8 mental, but in their original quality altogether disparate: the world of spiritual forces and that of sensuous appearance.] mental, were in their original quality spiritual forces and sensuous appearance altogether disparate. *GSC_D*
- 81.11–12 sensation. They come] sensation. Spirits come *GSC_D*
- 81.35 how- / ever] however *B_A*
- 82.27 to- / morrow] tomorrow *B_A*
- 82.38 when- / ever] whenever *B_A*
- 83.19 sub- / tend] subtend *B_A*
- 85.3 [*new ¶*] When] [*no new ¶*] ~ *B_A*
- 85.6MN back- / ground] BACKGROUND *B_A*
- 85.11 can- / not] cannot *B_A*
- 85.19 back- / ground] background *B_A*
- 86.10 [*no new ¶*] The suggestions] [¶] ~ *B_A*
- 86.14MN criticised:] CRITICISED \wedge *B_A*
- 86.22MN analogy] ANALOGY *B_A*
- 86.23MN bodies,] BODIES \wedge *B_A*
- 87.3 counter- / parts] counterparts *B_A*
- 87.4MN and] AND *B_A*

88.20 there- / fore] therefore B_A

88.39 all- / seeing] all-seeing B_A

90.9–10 VOL. I.–10 [*signature in bottom margin*] [*not present*] B_A

92.6 wide- / spread] widespread B_A

92.14 [*no new ¶*] There is] [¶] ~ LE

92.14 one case in] one case, however, in GSC_{LE}, LE

92.18 each, as he runs,] ~ \wedge ~ \wedge LE

92.19 feels himself; but] feels himself in imitating them; but GSC_{LE}, LE

92.20–21 recognised] recognized LE

92.27 concurrently] ~, LE

93.21 meta- / physical] metaphysical B_A

93.38 This miracle] The miracle GSC_{LE}, LE

93.38 insight, as] insight \wedge into another mind, as GSC_{LE}, LE

93.39–94.8 only so far as does the analogy between the object and the instrument of perception. The gift of intuition fails in proportion as the observer's bodily habit differs from the habit and body observed. Misunderstanding begins with constitutional divergence and deteriorates rapidly into false imputations and absurd myths. The limits of mutual understanding coincide with the limits of similar structure and common occupation, so that the distortion of insight begins very near home. It] only to the limits of similar structure and common occupation, so that the distortion of insight begins very near home. It begins with constitutional divergence and deteriorates rapidly into false imputations and absurd myths. It GSC_{LE}, LE

94.11 idealisation,] idealization, LE

94.19–29 formulas. Hence ... life. [¶] Language] formulas. [¶] Language GSC_{LE}, LE

94.36–38 suggestive power; the feeling they once expressed can no longer be restored by their repetition. Even] suggestive power. Even GSC_{LE}, LE

- 94.38–39 inspired verse, which boasts not without a relative justification to be immortal, becomes] inspired verse becomes GSC_{LE} , LE
- 95.2 dies,] ~; LE
- 95.5–6 Unsure the ebb and flood of thought, / The moon comes back, the spirit not.] *Unsure the ebb and flood of thought, / The moon comes back, the spirit not.* B_A
- 95.29 characterises] characterizes LE
- 96.1 dreamful,] ~; LE
- 96.2 re- / enact] re-enact LE , B_A
- 96.5 some- / times] sometimes B_A
- 96.13 friend, like Hume,] ~ \wedge ~ \wedge LE
- 96.20 irrelevant] irrelevant B_A
- 96.29 sympathised] sympathized LE
- 96.32 friend- / ship] friendship B_A
- 97.1 thoughts] ~, LE
- 97.5–6 independent of incidental consciousness. It] independent of the play of mind. It GSC_{LE} , LE
- 97.7 action and] action, and LE
- 97.7–8 action, of course,] ~ \wedge ~ \wedge LE
- 99.19–20 VOL. I.–11 [*signature in bottom margin*] [*not present*] B_A
- 99.27 [*no new ¶*] To discover] [¶] ~ B_A
- 101.2 how- / ever] however B_A
- 102.16 mass is a] mass in a $A_A^{1917-1948}$, GSC_D , A_B^{1922} , B_A
- 104.15–16 [*no new ¶*] But physiologically] [¶] ~ B_A
- 104.34 with- / out] without B_A
- 105.27–28 this dualism remained] this double allegiance remained GSC_{LE} , LE
- 105.31–32 practice has thus] practice have thus $A_A^{1917-1948}$, A_B^{1922} , B_A

- 105.37 some- / thing] something B_A
- 106.26 [*no new ¶*] In empirical] [*¶*] $\sim B_A$
- 107.5 how- / ever] however B_A
- 107.7–8 understanding.* The] $\sim.^1 \sim B_A$
- 107.16 is indeed not] is not GSC_{LE}
- 107.21 his body takes] his instinct takes GSC_{LE}
- 107.22–33 not intellectual ... Reason has] not intellectual. Yet reason has GSC_{LE}
- 107.34 *This distinction,] $^1 \sim, B_A$
- 108.34 VOL. I.–12 [*signature in bottom margin*] [*not present*] B_A
- 110.1 facts.* Nor] $\sim.^1 \sim B_A$
- 110.7 Language, then, with] Language, with GSC_{LE}, LE
- 110.7 imbedded] embedded GSC_{LE}, LE
- 110.8 terms formed by] terms fixed by GSC_{LE}, LE
- 110.8 successive perceptions, as] successive appearances, as GSC_{LE}, LE
- 110.9–10 superposing perceptions that] superposing appearances that GSC_{LE}, LE
- 110.15 *i.e.*,] *i.e.*, B_A
- 110.16–17 the unreal character] the imaginary character GSC_{LE}, LE
- 110.27 have seen,] have said, LE
- 110.29 *This natural] $^1 \sim B_A$
- 111.2 sensations,] appearances, GSC_{LE}, LE
- 111.2–3 is a homogeneous revival in] is recognized by a fusion in GSC_{LE}, LE
- 111.3 sensations] appearances GSC_{LE}, LE
- 111.7 common-sense] common sense B_A
- 111.21 principle.*] $\sim.^1 GSC_{LE}; \sim.^1 B_A$

- 111.22 *For the] [*not present*] GSC_{LE} ; $^1 \sim B_A$
- 114.28 [*no new ¶*] Present] [¶] $\sim B_A$
- 115.37 long- / consolidated] long-consolidated B_A
- 116.18–19 meta- / physical] metaphysical B_A
- 116.21 someone,] some one, LE, B_A
- 116.32–34 may add, remembering our analysis of the objects inhabiting the mind, that] may add that GSC_{LE}, LE
- 116.38 recognisable] recognizable LE
- 117.4 them real, namely] them existent, namely GSC_{LE}, LE
- 117.7 a datum of] a dogma of GSC_{LE}, LE
- 117.9 dis- / proof] disproof B_A
- 117.26 by external experience cannot] by existence cannot GSC_{LE}, LE
- 117.35 idealisation.] idealization. LE
- 118.2 [*no new ¶*] Aversion] [¶] $\sim B_A$
- 118.30–31 VOL. I.–13 [*signature in bottom margin*]] [*not present*] B_A
- 118.37 super- / natural] supernatural B_A
- 119.32 [*no new ¶*] But if] [¶] $\sim B_A$
- 120.10 to-morrow] tomorrow B_A
- 121.15 [*no new ¶*] In revenge] [¶] \sim
- 121.19MN importance,] IMPORTANCE $\wedge B_A$
- 122.3 recognises] recognizes LE
- 122.26–27 be deduced as] be deducted as LE
- 122.28 [¶] Such a] [*no new ¶*] $\sim LE$
- 122.31–36 mind. The ... inference. If the] mind. If the GSC_{LE} ; mind. [¶] If the
 LE

- 123.3–7 error. Now ... zeal, here] error. Zeal, here GSC_{LE}, LE
- 123.11 un- / reality] unreality B_A
- 125.3–4 natural or more congruous with all the analogies of experience than] natural than GSC_{LE}, LE
- 125.9–15 reproduction. This ... [¶] To separate] reproduction. To separate GSC_{LE}, LE
- 125.16 is consequently a] is a GSC_{LE}, LE
- 125.22–23 the body's entelechy, a] the entelechy of the body, a GSC_{LE}, LE
- 125.28 connection] connexion LE
- 125.29 connection] connexion LE
- 125.30 denaturalised] denaturalized LE
- 126.5 recognised] recognized LE
- 126.13–14 The soul is the voice of the body's interests; in watching them a] The mind gives voice to the impulses of the body; at their behest a GSC_{LE}, LE
- 126.30 connection] connexion LE
- 126.31 connection.] connexion. LE
- 126.37–127.16 thunder. A ... solve. Whether] thunder. [¶] Whether GSC_{LE}, LE
- 127.6 deduced] deducted B_A
- 127.16–17 consciousness, for instance, accompanies] consciousness accompanies GSC_{LE}, LE
- 127.37 VOL. I.–14 [*signature in bottom margin*] [*not present*] B_A
- 127.38 reorganisation] reorganization LE
- 128.9–18 verification. The ... observation. To add] verification. On the other hand, to add GSC_{LE}, LE
- 128.10 some- / thing] something B_A
- 128.19 is then seen to be an] is an GSC_{LE}, LE
- 128.22 organisation] organization LE

- 128.23 how- / ever,] however, B_A
- 128.26 inter- / larding] interlarding B_A
- 128.30–129.4 ghost. These ...event. [¶] If philosophers] ghost. If philosophers
 GSC_{LE}, LE
- 129.8 expected this collapse] expected the collapse GSC_{LE}, LE
- 129.11 *bête-machine.*] *bête machine.* LE
- 129.17–18 matter is the pervasive cause of mind's distribution, and mind the
pervasive cause of matter's discovery and value. To] matter is the pervasive
cause of the distribution of mind, and mind the pervasive cause of the discovery
and value of matter. To GSC_{LE}, LE ; matter determines the existence and
distribution of mind, and mind determines the discovery and value of matter.
To $A_A^{1922-1948}, A_B^{1922}, B_A$
- 129.21 undertaking] under-taking LE
- 132.1 [*no new* ¶] If this] [¶] ~ B_A
- 132.3 action, "The] ~: " ~ A_A^{1917}, A_A^{1920} ; ~. " ~ $A_A^{1922-1948}, B_A$
- 132.6–7 well- / formed] well-formed B_A
- 132.15 with- / out] without B_A
- 133.20 [*no new* ¶] Since the] [¶] ~ LE
- 133.20–21 thought, and potential in relation to immediate experience, it] thought,
it GSC_{LE}, LE
- 133.23–24 the foot-lights, while surely regarded by the play as a whole, cannot]
the foot-lights, cannot GSC_{LE} ; the foot-lights cannot LE
- 133.25 in its mechanism or] in the play or GSC_{LE}, LE
- 133.28–29 Only the free divine the laws, / The causeless only know the cause.]
Only the free divine the laws, / The causeless only know the cause. B_A
- 133.30–31 free will evidently] free can evidently LE
- 134.1–2 exists. Another experience, differently logical, might be equally real.
Consciousness] exists. Consciousness GSC_{LE}, LE

134.2–4 itself dynamic, for it has no body, no idiosyncrasy or particular locus, to be the point of origin for definite relationships. It] itself dynamic. It GSC_{LE} , LE

134.22 [no new ¶] These preferences] [¶] ~ B_A

135.11 Metaphysicians] metaphysicians LE

135.23–24 character.* [¶] That] ~.¹ [¶] ~ B_A

135.32 *Aristippus] ¹~ B_A

135.32 any- / thing] anything B_A

135.39 Memorabilia,] *Memorabilia*, B_A

136.1 non- / natural] non-natural B_A

136.11 excellence. Its utility lies] excellence. The utility of pain lies GSC_{LE} , LE

136.23–24 [no new ¶] If we] [¶] ~ GSC_{LE} , B_A

137.3 VOL. I.–15 [signature in bottom margin]] [not present] B_A

137.27 with- / out] without B_A

138.34 mechanical] mechanical B_A

139.13 [no new ¶] When we] [¶] ~ GSC_{LE} , LE

140.17–18 offuscation] effuscation LE

140.27 farther] further LE

141.6–7 whose names are also rapture, power, Clear sight, and love; for these are parts of peace.] *whose names are also rapture, power, Clear sight, and love; for these are parts of peace.* B_A

141.18 heart- / searching] heart-searching B_A

143.4 [new ¶] To put] [no new ¶] ~ B_A

143.18–23 obliterated. And ... a mind] obliterated. A mind GSC_{LE} , LE

143.28 representative will,] representative morality, GSC_{LE} , LE

144.3–6 value. A ... all beliefs] value. All beliefs GSC_{LE}

- 144.3–37 value. A ... when Petrarch] value. When Petrarch LE
- 144.7 quality, is based] quality, are based GSC_{LE}, LE
- 144.8 of value is] of estimation is GSC_{LE}, LE
- 144.12 [no new ¶] A rejection] [¶] ~ GSC_{LE}, LE
- 144.30–37 possible. [¶] The ... when Petrarch] possible. When Petrarch GSC_{LE}
- 146.21 VOL. I.–16 [signature in bottom margin]] [not present] B_A
- 146.21–22 exist / ence] existence B_A
- 147.19–20 reflection. The situation,] ~. [¶] ~, GSC_D
- 147.29–33 A ... hated.] A ... *hated*. B_A
- 149.10 humanised only by] humanised by GSC_D
- 150.11 [no new ¶] Sea-sickness] [¶] ~ LE
- 150.12–13 is finally forgotten or] is dead or GSC_{LE}, LE
- 150.16 absurdity is not] absurdity was not GSC_{LE}, LE
- 150.33–39 comparison? Why ... Imogen. There] comparison? There GSC_{LE}, LE
- 151.2–4 world. [¶] The same aesthetic bias appears in the moral sphere. Utilitarians have] world. [¶] Utilitarians have GSC_{LE}, LE
- 151.11 [no new ¶] But if] [¶] ~ B_A
- 151.30 recognised] recognized LE
- 152.22MN idealizations.] IDEALISATIONS $\wedge B_A$
- 152.26–27 conclusions. Experience, by its passive weight] conclusions. Experience \wedge by its dead weight GSC_{LE}, LE
- 152.27 sorrow,] ~ $\wedge GSC_{LE}, LE$
- 152.28–29 a present ideal will avail to move the will and, if realised, to justify it.] a living ideal will avail to attract the will and, if realized, to satisfy it. GSC_{LE}, LE
- 152.33 [¶] Thus it appears] [¶] It appears GSC_{LE}, LE

152.36–37 fact. Things are esteemed as they weigh in representation. A] fact. A
GSC_{LE}, LE

153.1–7 great. The ... enshrined. Fortunate] great. Fortunate *GSC_{LE}, LE*

153.9–10 ignorance. This imputed and posthumous fortune is the only happiness
 they have. The] ignorance. The *GSC_{LE}, LE*

153.14–15 [*no new ¶*] Yet this] [¶] ~ *GSC_{LE}*

153.16–17 what- / ever] whatever *LE, B_A*

153.19 value] values *LE*

153.20–21 In the latter case] In this case *GSC_{LE}, LE*

153.27 realisation] realization *LE*

153.28 [*no new ¶*] To convince] [¶] ~ *B_A*

153.31 possible. As in the case of fame, we must] possible. We must *GSC_{LE}, LE*

153.33–35 can prompt: we must make our ideal harmonise with all experience
 rather than with a part only. The] can prompt. The *GSC_{LE}, LE*

153.37–154.1 correction. A rational will is not a will that has reason for its basis
 or that possesses any other proof that its realisation would be possible or good
 than the oracle which a living will inspires and pronounces. The] correction.
 The *GSC_{LE}, LE*

154.2 realisation] realization *LE*

154.3 deserve adhesion it] deserve loyalty it *A_A^{1917–1948}, A_B¹⁹²², B_A*; deserve
 allegiance it *LE*

154.3–4 only to be adequate as an ideal, that is, to] only to *GSC_{LE}, LE*

155.4 [¶] Reason's] [*no new ¶*] ~ *B_A*

155.14 co- / operation] co-operation *B_A*

156.9–10 VOL. I.–17 [*signature in bottom margin*]] [*not present*] *B_A*

156.24 [*no new ¶*] The old] [¶] ~ *B_A*

157.4 [*no new ¶*] Each original] [¶] ~ *B_A*

- 158.3 *no new* ¶] One new] [¶] ~ B_A
- 159.2 civilisation.] civilization. *LE*
- 159.21 hunger.™*] ~.™¹ B_A
- 159.38 *Descent of Man,] ¹*Descent of Man*, B_A
- 161.8–9 super- / natural] supernatural B_A
- 161.18 [*no new* ¶] The conflict] [¶] ~ B_A
- 163.4 [¶] A conception] [*no new* ¶] ~ B_A
- 163.6 re- / appear] reappear B_A
- 163.31MN opinion.] OPINION_Λ / EVOLUTION B_A
- 164.3MN Evolution.] [*not present*] B_A
- 164.38MN de- / throne] dethrone B_A
- 165.33 ostrich- / like] ostrich-like B_A
- 165.33 VOL. I.–18 [*signature in bottom margin*] [*not present*] B_A
- 166.36 images,] ~_Λ B_A
- 167.1–2 or of conceiving] or conceiving B_A
- 167.3–4 or in another] or another B_A
- 167.5–6 else- / where] elsewhere B_A
- 169.4 wine- / press] wine-press B_A
- 169.5 bay- / tree] bay-tree B_A
- 169.24–25 expressing the entelechy of his own nature] expressing his nature
GSC_D
- 172.16 re- / adaptation] readaptation B_A
- 173.2 trans- / formations] transformations B_A
- 174.14 there- / fore] therefore B_A
- 174.27 un- / inspiring] uninspiring B_A

175.5 VOL. I.—19 [*signature in bottom margin*] [*not present*] *B_A*

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In the Scribner's 1905, first edition, first impression (copy-text for this critical edition), the "Table of Contents" is a paragraph per chapter which reprints Santayana's marginal notes. The following is a list of inconsistencies between this "Table of Contents" and the marginal notes within the text itself. The

“Table of Contents” reading is on the left, followed by the lemma; the marginal note reading is on the right.

liii.14 causes.–Modern] ~.Λ~

liii.24 interests which] ~,~

liii.26 gropings.–Instinct] ~.Λ~

liv.10 *Mens naturaliter platonica.*] *Mens naturaliter platonica.*

liv.21 fictions”] ~.”

lv.3 body] ~.

lv.3 normal,] ~Λ

lv.33 transcendental] ~.

lvi.9 idealisations] idealizations

lvi.22 [*not present*] Evolution.

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